The age of Aceh and the evolution of kingship 1599-1641 by Mitrasing, Ingrid Saroda
THE AGE OF ACEH
AND
THE EVOLUTION OF KINGSHIP
1599 - 1641
by
Ingrid Saroda Mitrasing
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover  page: Watermark of a  decree Sultan Iskandar Muda (Source: KITLV nr. 36D 650) 
 
 
 
 
THE AGE OF ACEH 
 
AND THE EVOLUTION OF KINGSHIP 
 
1599 – 1641 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proefschrift 
 
ter verkrijging van 
 
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden, 
 
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof.mr. P.F. van der Heijden, 
 
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties 
 
te verdedigen op dinsdag 22 maart 2011 
 
klokke 11.15 uur 
 
 
 
door 
 
 
 
Ingrid Saroda Mitrasing 
 
Geboren te Paramaribo 
 
in 1947 
Promotiecommissie  
Promotor:           Prof.dr. F.S. Gaastra 
Overige leden:    Prof.dr. J.L. Blussé van Oud Alblas  
                            Prof.dr. B. Arps 
                            Prof.dr. P.J.A.N. Rietbergen (Radboud Universiteit, Nijmegen)  
                            Dr. Th. Lindblad   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adjajéb! Sobeunhanalah! Leungo lon kisah aneu’radjah   
      
     Wonderful! Listen! I am going to tell about princes                                      (Hikayat Pocut Muhammad)                      
CONTENTS 
 
 
PREFACE                I 
 
INTRODUCTION               1 
 
Part One:   HISTORICITY AND MYTH 
 
CHAPTER I : The Geo-Historical Setting           13 
1.1.1 Malacca: marketplace and powerhouse          13 
1.1.2 Sumatra: a clouded history              16 
1.1.3 The Scenes of Aceh’s history           18 
1.1.4 Aceh: a good place in Sumatra           22 
1.1.5 A cosmopolitan society            26 
 
 
CHAPTER II : Representations of Kingship in Myth and Narrative        28 
1.2.1 The Texts              28 
1.2.2 The hikayat and the origin and meaning of kingship        30 
1.2.3 The chronicles and Acehnese ‘Thought’           34 
1.2.4 The obstacles to conceptualising kingship            41 
1.2.5 Influences on Acehnese ‘Thought’           43 
1.2.6 Succession              49 
1.2.7 The appointment of the Prince of Pahang as Sultan         51 
1.2.8 Significance of divine ordinance           56 
1.2.9 Metaphor symbols and ceremonies           58 
1.2.10 The council and the administration             63 
1.2.11 Conclusion              68 
 
 
Part Two :  A TASTE FOR SPICE  
 
CHAPTER  I: The Genesis of Aceh-European relations (1599-1607)       69 
2.1.1    Towards understanding international relations         69 
2.1.2 The first Dutch expedition to Aceh            71 
2.1.3 Negotiations between De Houtman and the sultan         75 
2.1.4 The sultan’s inclination to the English          76 
2.1.5 A turn of events: violence at the docks          78 
2.1.6 Relentless Dutch efforts for trade monopolies         83 
2.1.7 The dawn in Aceh-Dutch relations           86 
2.1.8 Acehnese envoys visit the United Republic          87 
2.1.9 The English obtain the Privilege in 1602              89 
2.1.10 The visit of the French in 1602           95 
2.1.11 Accord between Aceh and the VOC in 1607         97 
2.1.12 Conclusion            100 
 
 
CHAPTER II: Challenges and Choices: a Litmus Test        102 
2.2.1 Centralization of the trade           102 
 
 
2.2.2 Annulment of the Privilege of 1602 and the Accord of 1607      103 
2.2.3 An English Orangkaya: Thomas Best in Aceh        109 
2.2.4 Continuing English efforts for trading rights        113 
2.2.5 Humiliation and retaliation of the Dutch         115 
2.2.6 The nerve-system of the trade          118 
2.2.7 Conclusion             119 
 
                  
CHAPTER III: Triangular Affairs and Inter-European Competition      121 
2.3.1 English efforts for trade contracts          121 
2.3.2 The English in the lead of the pepper trade         122 
2.3.3 Coen’s ‘discourse’             128 
2.3.4 Cornelis Comans appointed special ambassador to the sultan of Aceh (1616-1619) 131 
2.3.5 The promise of a contract           133 
2.3.6 Threats against the Dutch           136 
2.3.7 A Dutch charm offensive           139 
2.3.8 Coman’s  plan to seize the trade of the west coast        139 
2.3.9 Bad performance of the Dutch merchants in Aceh        142 
2.3.10 Conclusion             144 
 
 
CHAPTER IV: An Ineffective Anglo-Dutch Alliance        146 
2.4.1 The Treaty of Defence           146 
2.4.2 The king and the beggars           148 
2.4.3 A botched strategy            150 
2.4.4 European retreat from Aceh and Iskander Muda’s retaliation      155 
2.4.5 Conclusion             160 
 
 
Part Three:  WAR AND SUBJUGATION 
 
CHAPTER I:   Prelude to the war expeditions         162 
3.1.1 Entangled interests: the real and the ideal                                         162 
3.1.2 Aceh’s Forces            164 
 
 
CHAPTER II: BELLIGERENCE BETWEEN ACEH AND JOHOR      169 
3.2.1 The early conflicts            169 
3.2.2 Aceh’s invasion of Johor in 1613          171 
3.2.3 The fate of Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah         173 
3.2.4 Raja Bongsu installed as vassal ruler of Johor        176 
3.2.5 Dutch-Johor relations           177 
3.2.6 Johor’s capitulation to Malacca in 1610                                                    179 
3.2.7 Aceh’s motif to invade Johor          182 
3.2.8 Portuguese reactions to the events          183 
3.2.9 The come-back of the Dutch in Johor         184 
3.2.10 A time of flux: fusion and fission          187 
3.2.11 Aceh’s revenge            190 
3.2.12 Conclusion             195 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III: EXPEDITIONS TO MALAY AND SUMATRAN  PORTS     197 
3.3.1 The castigation of Pahang in 1617 and 1618                   197 
3.3.2 The fate of a captured prince           199 
3.3.3 The ravage of Kedah in 1619          200 
3.3.4 The subjugation of Perak in 1620 and the threat to Patani        203 
3.3.5 The intimidation of Jambi                                  206 
3.3.6 Conclusion             208 
 
 
CHAPTER IV: THE ATTACKS ON MALACCA IN 1629 an in 1641      211 
3.4.1 The besieger besieged           211 
3.4.2 The momentum lost            213 
3.4.3 Incitements by the Dutch           217 
3.4.4 The end of an era and the end of a false start        219 
3.4.5     Dutch-Aceh negotiations for the siege of Malacca (1637-1640)       221 
3.4.6     The fall of Malacca            229 
3.4.7  Conclusion             229 
 
 
CHAPTER V: SUBJUGATION AND SLAVERY         232 
3.5.1 Introduction             232 
3.5.2    Demographic need for the invasions          232 
3.5.3    Dominant relations in Islam           234 
3.5.4    The institution of slavery in Aceh          238 
3.5.5    European perceptions of slavery in Aceh         240 
3.5.6 Treatment of royal captives and foreign orangkaya in Aceh                 243  
3.5.7 The plight of the European captives          246 
3.5.8 The human commodity           248 
3.5.9 The impact of subjugation and slavery on Acehnese Society      252 
3.5.10 Conclusion             256 
 
 
CONCLUSION              258 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY             268 
 
GLOSSARY              278 
 
SAMENVATTING             281 
 
RINGKASAN             285 
 
ANNEX                  
- Copy of a letter of the King of Acheen to the Queen of England 
- ‘Translaet’ of a letter of Paduqua Sri Sultan to Prince Maurice of Nassau  
- Original letter of Sultan Iskandar Thani to Prince Frederick Hendrik of Nassau 
- Successive Rulers of  Aceh  
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
                                                     PREFACE 
 
 
  
I shall tell about the kings of Aceh and the way they interacted with the outer world.  
By way of overture I like to start at the very beginning of my research enterprise.  
When I lived in Banda Aceh between 1988 and 1992,  I regularly visited the Documentation 
Centre where I met with three dignified elderly gentlemen, the ‘guardians’ of the Centre who 
still spoke ‘de moedertaal’ (mother tongue), as they laughingly referred to the Dutch 
language. They were particularly proud to talk to me about the epoch when four females in 
succession were on the throne. The period  lasted from 1641 until 1699 and was marked by 
peace and prosperity.  According to the norms in orthodox Islam, female rule is an aberration. 
I was eager to learn and understand why female rule came about and how it sustained for such 
an extended period. The gentlemen were sure that in the archives in the Netherlands, the 
extant documents of this period of the Sultanate were collecting dust and they suggested that I 
uncover them and write about this historical precedent. 
Some time later in one of Indonesia’s other cities of great historical significance, Palembang 
(the centre of the Buddhist Sriwijaya Empire), my husband laid hands on an exclusive book 
published for a special occasion, which describes prominent women in the course of 
Indonesia’s history. He presented this to me with the words ‘I hope this will inspire you to 
take up a study on the reign of the female sultans of  Aceh.’  
 
When we settled down to retire in our hometown of Leiden, I was ready to embark on a study 
of the rule of females in Aceh. To my delight I could join the TANAP project (Towards A 
New Age in Partnership), a Dutch-Asian-South African Mutual Heritage project, at the 
Leiden University, as an associate researcher. TANAP invited and facilitated researchers from 
countries in Asia and from South-Africa to study their own pre-independence history from the 
VOC archives. To pursue my objective I followed a course in palaeography which was 
organised at the National Archives in The Hague, indispensable for reading and 
understanding the old Dutch documents. I also followed a colloquium on the history of 
Southeast Asia and attended several guest lectures and seminars.  
When several months later our project leader broke the news to me that somebody else had  
already embarked on a study of  female rule in Aceh and would soon arrive from abroad to 
join the TANAP programme in Leiden, I was devastated. ‘Was I interested to examine the 
preceding period when Sultan Iskandar Muda ruled Aceh? His proposition was not at all 
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consoling.  I had to give up a subject I had long cherished. Very reluctantly I set out to make 
an inventory of the extant material of the preceding period and slowly a mental picture of this 
historically important era appeared. It marked the genesis of the East-West encounters and 
relations and it was of great significance in terms of the geo-politics of the Malacca Straits 
region and even beyond. With my background in international relations and development, this 
seemed to be more my subject. I accepted the new challenge and immersed myself in the 
study.  In 2004 I submitted a thesis on the trade relations between Aceh and the foreign 
traders. It was the precursor of this PhD dissertation. From there on I proceeded to study the 
evolution of kingship against the background of Aceh’s relations with the outside world 
during the same period and thus broadened the scope of my research. The sultans of Aceh 
played a dominant role in the political and economical development of the Malacca Straits 
region. Aceh became the most powerful state in this region and it was the nemesis of  
Portuguese  Malacca.  
 
The sovereign Sultanate Aceh Dar as-Salam (Aceh Darusalam) does no longer exist. From 
being an expanding power since it assumed the leadership role in fighting the Portuguese who 
conquered the famous Islamic emporium Malacca in 1511, up to the time when the Dutch -  
its old ally -  took Malacca from the Portuguese  in 1641, its political power gradually 
diminished.  It was invaded and occupied by the Dutch from 1873 to 1942 and  by the 
Japanese during the rest of the Second World War. We note a crumbling of empire, a 
redrawing of its domain, until its dissolution by way of  integration into the independent 
Republic of Indonesia in 1950. Civil unrest and rebellion were part of the political transition. 
In 1959 Aceh acquired the status of Special Territory (Daerah Istimewa) within the Unitary 
State of Indonesia, with autonomy in the fields of religion, education and cultural affairs.  
When I set foot in Aceh in 1988,  it had gone through several political transitions and social 
upheavals and there seemed no end to it. Secessionist wars were still fought against the 
central government in Jakarta.  In 2005 an accord was reached between the central 
government and the dissident groups. Aceh is now known as Nangeroë Aceh Darusalam and 
has more say in the exploitation of its natural resources. It is Indonesia’s largest provider of 
natural gas. Its natural resources have always been its greatest assets; pepper and gold, 
benzoin and silk brought it wealth and power in the period which marked its apogee, the 
period of this study.       
 
With the dissertation written, words of thanks are in place.  
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I feel  privileged that I was allowed by the coordinating staff of the TANAP project under the 
leadership of professor Leonard Blussé van Oud Alblas to participate in the PhD programme 
as an associate researcher. I wrote my thesis under his supervision.     
I proceeded to write this dissertation under the keen and sympathetic authority of professor 
Femme Gaastra.  
It is not amiss to name a few persons who encouraged me in my endeavours. Professor 
Barbara Watson-Andaya of the University of Hawaii lent me a listening ear and welcomed 
my idea of researching the evolution of kingship.  
Professor Teuku Iskandar, authority on the classical Malay works and a native of Aceh was 
always prepared to enlighten me on relevant issues. I grew up in Leiden during the fifties, 
when both he and my father, two eager young men from the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ studied at 
the university and our families became acquainted.  
The late professor A. Hasjmi, chairman of the committee of ulama and ex-governor of the 
province of Aceh, kindly provided me with copies of his writings on Sultan Iskandar Muda 
and on female authority in Aceh. 
Without the marvelous Marijke van Wissen of  IGEER my search and surge would have been 
less joyful.   
I thank Sri Margono, Muridan Widjojo, Chris Nierstrasz, Menghong Chen, Hsin Hui Chu, 
Alicia Schrikker, Harry Knipschild and Anjana Singh for sharing with me joy and distress.  
Janet van de Mark-Mc Kinzie, a native English speaker and teacher, read a chapter to screen 
my English and after taking out some ‘Americanisms’ merely gave my the green light to 
continue writing.   
I compliment Agus Suwignyo, a PhD candidate in the Encompass Programme at the Leiden 
University, for helping me with the translation of my summary in a finer Bahasa Indonesia 
than my own ability allowed me to do.   
I thank the staff of the Library of the Royal Institute of Linguistics (KITLV) in Leiden for 
giving me shelter all these years.  
The Reid Library of the University of Western Australia generously provided me with 
computer facilities during my stay in Perth from November 2004 to January 2005.    
My brother in law Onno Cosijn’s artistic hand helped to shape the front page of this 
dissertation.  
My mother, a qualified educator, always believed in my abilities and from childhood onwards 
encouraged me in all my endeavours. With her special talents for both the alpha and beta 
 III
 IV
disciplines she commanded an overseeing role during my years in high school. I am grateful  
that she may witness the result of this endeavour. 
I am much indebted to my late father, whose overwhelming academic and public merits 
remain a source of lasting inspiration to me.        
My husband Gustaaf stood by me during all these years. This dissertation could not have been 
written without his critical engagement and constant encouragement in every respect. His 
intellectual curiosity, practical mind and his indestructible positivism were indispensable in 
this enterprise. He and I could not have guessed that the famous forefather of his counterpart 
in Aceh, Raja Arifin Panglima Polem, would once be the subject of our many conversations: 
Sultan Iskandar Muda.  
The dissertation was in the making when the tsunami struck Aceh in 2004 with an 
unprecedented rage. Hundred thousands of lives were taken. A number of friends disappeared 
by the unleashed forces which also destroyed the written pages of Aceh’s history so jealously 
guarded by the three dignified gentlemen of the Documentation Centre.  
The past was often unfair to the people of Aceh. Yet life in Aceh goes on and the resilience of 
the people is once again demonstrated and makes me feel humble.  
 
I dedicate this book to the silenced witnesses of turmoil and devastation.  
             INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Theme  
I like to start this study by quoting Charles Dicken’s often quoted words: “It was the best of 
times, it was the worst of times.” This is how Aceh appears in the western historiography: an 
environment where harsh conditions were coupled with fabulous wealth at the court of the 
sultan.  
The mighty and sprawling Sultanate Aceh Dar as-Salam, located in the northern part of the 
island of Sumatra, conjures up awe, admiration and condemnation, chiefly through the pen of 
visitors, foreign company officials and historians. There is even an agreed stereotype for the 
ruler who came to dominate the first part of the seventeenth century, Sultan Iskandar Muda. 
According to this he was a callous warrior who expanded and populated his realm by 
conquests, a cruel tyrant and a potentate who monopolised the region’s trade.     
In this study I try to distance myself from the clutter of assumptions and opinions on Aceh 
and its rulers, which have somehow become facts. This entails an assessment of the dynamics 
of change at work. By trying to capture the dynamism of Aceh’s relations with the outside 
world,  I hope to arrive at a conclusion about Acehnese kingship and the role Aceh played in 
these relations in the period between 1599-1641.   
 
The most notable events of Aceh’s history occurred in one or other of the two spheres of 
actions: trade and war. The sultanate was essentially the product of trade and war.  
I have established two historical parameters within which this study is set: the arrival of the 
first European expedition under the Dutch in Aceh in 1599 and the take-over of Portuguese 
Malacca by the Dutch in 1641. Before 1599 the Portuguese were the only Europeans in the 
Straits. Aceh was the fiercest and strongest opponent of the Portuguese ‘infidels’. War against 
them was one of the consuming activities of the Acehnese rulers of the sixteenth century; they 
incessantly challenged the power of the Portuguese, officially assisted in the second half of 
the century by Ottoman Turkey which sent manpower, artillery and ships to help strike the 
Portuguese in Malacca. A substantial number of Muslim traders from Malacca sought refuge 
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under the umbrella of the Acehnese Sultan, relocating their trade networks which linked Aceh 
to the Red Sea Ports in the ports at the other side of the Straits of Malacca.  
These Muslim merchants contributed significantly to the economical and political rise of 
Aceh.  
The early Muslim visitors who came from the Middle East, Persia and India came solely for 
purposes of commerce and not to conquer, but the transmission of Islam was nonetheless a 
major feature of their presence in the area.  
The coming of the northern Europeans in 1599 was another defining moment in the region’s 
history. Much of what happened politically, economically and socially, owed this to their 
presence and unequivocal quest for trade contracts and monopolies.  
 
The primary foreign sources give us a sense of Aceh’s powerful position in the Straits region 
and its role in trade, conflicts, wars and peace. In these relations the role of the sultan was 
paramount. The dynamics and mechanisms of trade with the outside world in which the 
Acehnese sultans started to command a prominent role and the consequences of their contacts 
with the encroaching Europeans put a heavy stamp on the way they asserted authority. Their 
interactions with the northern Europeans, people from outside the traditional lines of 
communication and dependency, their differing and mutual interests, render the view which 
attributes a greater place to Hindu and Buddhist notions of kingship in Southeast Asia, in this 
case in Aceh, superfluous. In this view the mandala state theory is proposed to characterize 
kingship.1 Mandala is the Sanskrit word for circle: ‘A mandala – in whichever capacity, 
personal or communal – is a centring device. It lays out the order of one’s universe and the 
flow of energies relevant to one’s existence. It unifies disparate elements into a coherent 
complexity, organised around a central self or divinity.’2 The Portuguese conquest of Malacca 
in 1511 merely revolutionized the region’s history by setting in motion a chain of events 
impacting even beyond the Malay world. The occurring developments such as the rise of 
Aceh,  its concurrent political articulation and its aspirations, require from the historian to 
take a fresh look at Acehnese kingship, the way its rulers communicated with the past and the 
present. By exploring the interaction between the practical consequences of trade and 
                                                 
1 The historian O.W. Wolters used the term  mandala as a  model to describe patterns of  diffuse political power 
in early Southeast Asian history. His work is listed in the Bibliography.    
 
2 Rosita Delios “Mandala-building in International Relations as a Paradigm for Peace”.  Paper for the 16th 
conference of the International Peace Research Association.  (Brisbane: Bond University, 1996). 
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expansion and Acehnese perceptions and uses of the past,  I shall try to give a perspective of 
Acehnese kingship as it may have been.    
From the Acehnese annals such as the epics and chronicles, the representations of kingship 
which are furnished with myth and legend, are gleaned.    
 
During this period in Aceh’s history we see four rulers at work. These were Alau’d-din 
Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) who ruled from about 1589 to about 1604; his son Ali 
Ri’ayat Shah al Mughayat ruled from1604 to1607,  his grandson Sri Perkasa Paduka Shah 
Alam,  posthumously known as Iskandar Muda (the young Alexander) ruled from1607 until 
1636. As the longest sitting monarch his rule receives most attention in this study. He was 
succeeded by his son in law, a prince of Pahang, known as Iskandar Thani (‘Alexander the 
Second’) Alau’d-din Mughayat Shah who was on the throne from 1636 until 1641.  
Within this period Aceh experienced its political hey-day under the audacious Iskandar Muda. 
By intervening in the affairs of several Malay and Sumatran ports which he tried to bring 
under his control, he ultimately became the kingpin of the region’s trade. This period of 
wealth and power is usually perceived as Aceh’s ‘golden age’.  
When examining Aceh’s rise to prominence, it is not only important to look at  its material 
achievements, but to discern its ideals, and goals.  
The sultan was the central figure of the state, but despite the growth of royal pretensions, his 
claims did not always go unchallenged, which makes it necessary to identify the limitations of 
his power.  
 
From the expanding and contracting relations with outsiders during this roughly forty-year 
period, we obtain a picture of the complexity of the geo-political realities, the reasons of 
conflicts and motifs for war. It is important to find out if there was a connection with the 
situation of the sixteenth century. One of the features of Sultan Iskandar Muda’s rule was his 
relentless efforts to break Portuguese hegemony and to dispel them from Malacca and the 
whole Straits region. The epithet Dar as-Salam (‘abode of peace’), was above all a distinction 
between the rule and law of Islam versus that of the ‘infidel’ or ‘unbeliever’ in the Dar al-
Harb (‘abode of war’). The reality however was,  that Aceh was open to trade and alliances 
with traders and representatives of non-Islamic states who accepted the sultan’s sovereignty.   
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Justification of the study 
Aceh’s role as a key player in international trade and politics has so far inspired little 
scholarly interest, not in the least because of the variety of sources one has to make use of and 
particularly because of the lack of local sources which describe these relations. Aceh’s  
history must be pieced together from the records of foreign travellers and traders, from 
passing references in indigenous texts, both religious and secular, from panegyrics and works 
of fiction purporting to describe historical events.  
Notwithstanding the fact that much has been accomplished by researchers and prominent 
scholars who enlighten us on phenomena characteristic of the period they describe, other 
periods and fields have hardly been uncovered, charted and studied. The result is that we look 
at several lembar sejarah, pages of history.  
With this study I aim to fill a lacuna in understanding Aceh’s objectives, goals and ideals in 
its relations with the outside world, a world stretching beyond the traditionally perceived 
boundaries. Because the role of the sultan was paramount in these relations, it shows how 
kingship during this period of intense interactions evolved. At the same time the efforts of the 
northern European states and their representatives in shaping their own foreign relations with 
Aceh and other Asian polities are exposed and explored. It is too pretentious to draw a final 
conclusion on the implementation of their strategies, because Aceh was only one out of 
several polities with which they interacted.  
Trade was the central issue in the relations between Aceh and the northern Europeans. The 
European merchants were chiefly interested in pepper (piper nigrum), but silk, gold, benzoin, 
camphor and tin were also much appreciated. In this study I focus on the pepper trade because 
this was the most important source of income of Aceh and the most sought after product. 
The relations between Aceh and the northern Europeans were not limited to trade alone, geo-
political ambitions implied different ways of conducting these relations.  
The colliding and common interests of all the actors and their rivalry are explored as far as the 
sources permit, to gain a sense of the playing field and the power equilibrium.   
This study is definitely not about trade volumes or trade numbers. The task I have set myself 
is to confront such questions as: how were Aceh’s  relations conducted, on what lines? What 
were the motives or perhaps incentives for the sultans to grant special privileges, trade 
contracts and even jurisdiction to the northern European traders? What caused the conflicts 
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with the neighbouring ports and how were they solved? Was there a connection between 
European encroachment and the increased regional flux?  
 
 
 
 
Historiography and sources 
Three major studies emerged in the latter part of the twentieth century, which shed some light 
on the issues which are the concern of this study. These are the pioneering, mosaic-like work 
of  Denys Lombard, Le Sultanat d’Atjéh au temps d’Iskandar Muda 1607-1636 (1967) from 
which researchers on Aceh’s history have frequently drawn. Many issues are brought to light 
in this work, like Iskandar Muda’s war expeditions to several Malay and Sumatran ports. I 
miss a broader analysis of the regional developments and of Iskandar Muda’s motives for the 
war expeditions. 
Ito Takeshi has inimitably described Aceh’s internal structure in his extensive study The 
World of the Adat Aceh (1984). He prefers to use the indigenous sources and very 
apprehensively uses the foreign sources.   
Arun Das Gupta described in some detail Aceh’s trade in his study Aceh in Indonesian Trade 
and Politics 1600-1641 (1962), by also frequently drawing from then available documents of 
the VOC and the EIC.  
The historian and prolific author Anthony Reid has contributed inspiring and probing articles 
on different subjects of Aceh’s history of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, while a host 
of authors have written on a range of subjects. Their works are listed in the Bibliography.  
Several Acehnese historians have devoted their attention to this important era of their 
country’s history. From the pen of the historian and ulama A. Hasjmy appeared among others, 
a biography titled Iskandar Muda Meukuta Alam (1975). Rusdi Sufi has published Pahlawan 
Nasional Sultan Iskandar Muda describing the role of the ‘national hero’ Iskandar Muda 
(2003). Amirul Hadi published a major work titled Islam and State in Sumatra, a study of 
seventeenth century Aceh (2004).  
In the nineteenth century Dutch colonial interest inspired the writing of two major 
ethnological studies. The underlying goal was to deliver comprehensive knowledge to the 
colonial administration. C. Snouck Hurgronje wrote The Acehnese (1906), an extensive 
ethnographical study in two volumes of Acehnese society. J. Jacobs wrote Het Familie- en 
Kampongleven op Groot-Atjeh (1894). Both these works are of significant value for the 
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researcher of seventeenth century Aceh, because they provide hindsight information which is 
otherwise lacking. Different colonial scholars devoted their attention to important subjects.3 
  
Samuel Johnson may have remarked that ‘travellers are more defective than any other 
writers’4, it is a plain fact that we depend chiefly on their accounts concerning their 
experiences and their perceptions of the country and the local men and women with whom 
they interacted. They provide the bulk of the material on which a historical study can be 
based. The archives of the Dutch and English trade companies are the most important sources 
to embark on a study of the trade relations. In addition the  accounts of Dutchman Frederick 
de Houtman, the Englishman John Davis and the Frenchman Francois Martin of their visits to 
Aceh between 1599 and 1602 present the first impressions of the sultanate and of  the 
encounters  between Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al-Mukamil), his officials and 
the Europeans.5 The extensive account of the French admiral Augustin de Beaulieu provides 
valuable and detailed information on Aceh under the rule of Sultan Iskandar Muda and offers 
some hindsight information regarding the rule of his grandfather Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah.6      
Islamic scholars, (anonymous) text writers and court scribes - writing from different 
ideological angles - have contributed to the institution of kingship and its acceptation and to 
the historical experience of the Acehnese.   
The Taj as-Salatin (the Crown of  Kings), composed around 1603 by Bukhari al Johari, stands 
out as an important guide book for Islamic rulers. Notwithstanding the fact that it has no 
historical value, it certainly merits attention as one of the great classical Malay works written 
in Aceh.    
The Bustan as-Salatin (Garden of  Kings) which consists of 7 volumes, is composed by 
Sheikh Nuru’d-din al Raniri, the leading religious adviser of Sultan Iskandar Thani. Although 
Al Raniri came from Ranir in Gujerat, India, he acquainted himself with the existing Malay 
works before he began his task in Aceh. This highly significant work, describes ‘world 
                                                 
3 K. F. H. van Langen has written on the structures of the Acehnese state; P. J. Veth wrote on Aceh’s relations 
with the Netherlands. Both studies are listed in the Bibliography.  
 
4 Quoted by C. R. Boxer in:  Dutch merchants and mariners in Asia: 1602-1795, (London: Varium Reprints, 
1988), 11. 
 
5 There works are listed in the Bibliography.  
 
6 See : Denys Lombard (ed.), Mémoires d’un voyage au Indes Orientales 1619-1622; Augustin de Beaulieu un 
marchand normand a Sumatra. (Paris: Maison Neuve et Larose, 1996). 
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history’ and the history of Islamic kings. Volume II, book 13 describes the genealogy of the 
Acehnese rulers from the conception of the sultanate which is placed around 1500 AD.  
The Adat Aceh is a code of law compiled of royal edicts, harbour regulations and rules for 
conduct at religious festivals. It is written by a host of court-scribes who were ordered by 
Sultan Iskandar Muda in 1607 to make certified copies of his edicts; his successors added 
their own regulations.7 An explanation of the genealogy of the Adat Aceh is given by the 
Acehnese historian A. Hasjmy.8   
 
The hikayat is an epic story or a panegyric9 and as such not always reliable as a historical 
source. Contrary to what the title suggests, the Hikayat Aceh is a panegyric on the life of 
Sultan Iskandar Muda as a young man. The identity of its author is not known, but there is 
well founded speculation that the work is written by Sheikh Shamsu’d-din Pasai, the most 
influential religious scholar at the court of Sultan Iskandar Muda until 1629.10  
The epic stories the Hikayat Malèm Dagang and the Hikayat Pocut Muhamad which 
supposedly appeared at the end of the seventeenth century and beginning of the eighteenth 
century, carry special value for  acquiring insight in Acehnese kingship as it was brought to 
bear on society. The composers of these works are not named.  
Together these local sources provide for the representations of kingship which we cannot find 
elsewhere. 
                                                 
7 I base my examination on the edition by G.W.J. Drewes and  P. Voorhoeve,  Adat Atjèh  (‘s Gravenhage: 
Nijhoff, 1958). This is reproduced in facsimile from a manuscript in the India Office Library in London.   
 
 8A. Hasjmy,  Iskandar Muda Meukuta Alam , (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1975), 70:   
 ‘Sultan Alauddin Ali Mughaiyat Syah dicatat dalam sejarah sebagai Pembangun Kerajaan Aceh Darussalam, 
dan Sultan Alauddin Riayat syah II Abdul Qahhar Pembina Organisasi Kerajaan dengan menyusun undang-
undang dasar negara yang diberi nama Kanun Al Asyi, yang kemudian oleh Sultan Iskandar Muda, Kanun Al 
Asyi ini disempurnakannya. Dalam perjalanan sejarah kemudian, Kanun Al Asyi ini adakalanya disebut Adat 
Aceh dan juga seringkali disebut juga Adat Meukuta Alam  atau  Kanun Meukuta’.  
‘Sultan Alau’d-din Ali Mughayat Shah was the founder of the Sultanate, Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Syah II 
Abdul Qahar started to codify regulations which became known as the Kanun Al Asyi. Sultan Iskandar enhanced 
these regulations by adding several additions. It is known to us as the Adat Aceh, also the Adat Meukuta Alam or 
the Kanun Meukuta Alam.’ 
Meukuta Alam (Mahkota Alam) was the area north of the Aceh river, which gave its name to the first dynasty 
that ruled Greater Aceh. 
 
9 Shelly Errington defines hikayat as  ‘a written text to be recited in Court’.  Her study is based on the use of  
language; Wilkinson defines hikayat as a tale, a history, a narrative; in: O. W. Wolters, History, Culture and 
region  Southeast Asian Perspectives (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies , 1982),  110-11.   
 
10 Teuku Iskandar,  Hikayat Atjéh  (Leiden: Brill, 1958), 2 and 18.  In this dissertation I refer to the edition of 
Teuku Iskandar.  
L. Andaya names Shamsu’d-din Passai as the author of the Hikayat Aceh in: “Aceh’s contribution to standards of 
Malayness”,  Archipel  (Paris: CNRS, 2001 no. 61), 29-68.  
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The archives of the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) and of the (English) East 
India Company (EIC) provide most of the information on the historical events and the 
interactions between the merchants and functionaries and the local rulers and between Aceh 
and the ports in the neighbourhood. Both contain correspondence, (secret) instructions and 
treaties, while they also include scanty notes of travellers, narratives and accounts. Some of 
these sources have been published.11 
Portuguese published archival material serves to glean the relations between Aceh, Johor and 
Malacca, especially during the sixteenth century. Tome Pires’enlightening work Suma 
Oriental provides some very useful insight in the political developments in the Malacca 
Straits during the first years of Portuguese authority in Malacca. The author was an advisor of 
the governor of Malacca.     
Put together,  this eclectic collection written in Malay, Dutch, English, Portuguese and French 
provides very important, hence fragmented knowledge of the history of the Sultanate.  
 
 
          
 
Methodology and constraints    
By utilizing the primary sources, the foreign as well as the local ones as much as possible, and 
by also drawing from secondary material, I aim to write a history of Aceh of the period 1599 
until 1641. I must however stress here that the evidence used in historical discourse is 
intrinsically uncertain, because it is less susceptible to exact measurement and inference. The 
result is that our analyses of the historical, social and political realities is seldom watertight or 
conclusive and may give rise to contestable theories. Even if this research is chiefly based on 
primary sources, there are missing links. To make sense of dispersed, ambiguous and 
lacunose sources, one is not always successful and right.  
I shall look at the extent to which the Acehnese rulers communicated with the past in order to 
form or to inform their own contemporary concerns, which contributed in shaping their 
political ambitions and goals. To gain some fundamental insight in how kingship, its 
legitimacy and its anguish continued since the foundation of the sultanate, elements of the 
sultanate’s history such as myths, chronicles, epics, regulations and letters are examined and 
combined to create a coherent underpinning of the sultanate’s past and its development.  
                                                 
11 The relevant publications are included in the Bibliography.    
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Unfortunately no local sources survived which describe the historical encounters between 
East and West and the relations that ensued between the rulers and the northern Europeans. 
Much knowledge is therefore lost. Apparently the court of the sultan kept records of 
important events in the Balai Besar, (Public Hall), while the Balai Furdah kept a register of 
the harbour regulations. A razing fire which destroyed much of the palace buildings during  
the reign of the second female ruler (1675- 1678), has most probably caused this break in the 
record. Adding to this impediment in writing a history, is the fact that the extant local sources, 
such as the various hikayat are not wholly historically reliable while the guide book for kings 
known as the Taj as-Salatin and the code of law known as the Adat Aceh  promulgate rules on 
how society should be ruled but do not say how society strictly was.       
Central to using the material of the European companies are the relations between the  
merchants and the sultans and the impact of these relations on developments in Aceh and the 
Straits region. In these relations the common and colliding interests of all the actors involved 
in trade and politics come to the fore. The shaping of their own foreign relations with several 
Asian rulers can hopefully be drawn from this study. At the very start of their engagement in 
Asia, the European states relegated diplomacy to their merchants and admirals who acted as 
envoys of their sovereigns.  
In both Europe and in Asia social differentiation and the division of functions was a growing 
tendency during the seventeenth century. There rose greater need for coordinated institutions 
and the monarchs operated in this situation, filling these integrating positions. In turn it gave 
them ample opportunities to exercise more power.  
 
 It can certainly be confusing and in a way misleading to explain an Asian society by chiefly  
relying on European material which sketch the historical encounters and relations.  
Aceh’s history is not the overseas history of Holland, England, Portugal or France, but an 
authentic history shaped by circumstances and developments across the boundaries of 
European hegemony and interest. To base an opinion on the impressions of travellers who 
came from Europe is precarious because their writings are coloured by their cultural 
backgrounds and individual perceptions. 
The fundamental question which passes when looking at relations between states and nations,  
is why people from different parts of the world are willing to interact with each other? 
Bringing different expectations and experiences into their contacts may give rise to 
misunderstanding and disagreements between them; consequentially the tendency to assume 
that other people share or should share one’s own views and expectations, can lead to the 
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breakdown of the contacts, especially if a mutual or shared aim is lacking. Conflicts and wars 
can arise and may or may not be solved. Even if the parties usually respect the rules of law, 
the concept of law and order does not apply as much to them acting in the international arena, 
as to domestic relations, because there is usually less consensus among them than among 
individuals belonging to the same society about important values.12 The international arena in 
which states or their representatives interact, is not necessarily a place of peace; it is often the 
scene of conflicting interests and aggressive encounters. The contending actors often take 
arbitrary actions against each other.  
 
In this study Islam functions as a point of orientation to the extent to which it can encompass 
both the relevant questions and the evidence available. Although Islamization was a long, 
complex process and Islam and Muslim identity were not fixed or stable categories13, there 
are at least several solid reasons to look at Islam as a point of orientation: firstly because the 
Acehnese genealogies refer to the Muslim kings since the foundation of the sultanate around 
1500;  their courts were visited by many Islamic scholars who set up centres for learning. An 
Islamic court with Islamic judges presided over religious cases. There was an upsurge of 
Islamic literature written in Aceh during the period described here, of which the sultans were 
the patrons. The sultan led the Friday prayer in the main mosque. 
Another indicator of Islam’s importance is that pilgrims bound for Mecca and Medina 
gathered in the port of Aceh to wait for the favourable winds which enabled them to continue 
their voyage while they gained extra knowledge on Islam. Aceh became known as the 
serambi Mekah, the verandah of Mecca. 
I declare however, that it is not my aim or intention to examine Islamic governance, because I 
am not trained to do so.  
 
In  the chapters where I examine the trade relations and interactions between the rulers and 
the representatives of Dutch authority, I have taken the liberty to extensively quote Dutch 
                                                 
12 Steve Chan,  International Relations in Perspective: The Pursuit of Security, Welfare, and Justice (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers,1984), 308, 309.   
I have to clarify here that the term consensus can  probably be seen only in societies with democratic systems.    
 
13 Although not a scholar in the real sense of the word, V. S. Naipaul examined how Islam is practiced among 
converted peoples in Asia: ‘the overthrow of the old religions – religions linked to the earth and animals and the 
deities of a particular place or tribe – by the revealed religions is one of the haunting themes of history. Even 
when they are texts, as with the ancient Roman-Christian world, the changeover is hard to follow.’ In: Beyond 
Belief  (London: Abacus, 1999), 71.   
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texts,  because one cannot convey in translations the true meaning of what was said, meant or 
written.    
By examining the corpus of material, a picture of the sultanate emerged. I have extracted from 
this corpus the material which presents the most telling and relevant information of the East-
West encounters, of the conduct of the relations established between the rulers and the 
foreigners as well as the relations of the rulers with the neighbouring port states. 
I fully agree with the late Dutch historian M. A. P. Meilink Roelofsz who did not  believe in a 
theoretical model but in an idea,  put it in her own words ‘in the flexibility of an idea, of all 
things transitoriness of history.’14  
I have based my examination chiefly on the available primary sources to arrive at an 
autonomous conclusion. The study of primary sources enables us to some extent to form our 
own opinion of the past by not only accumulating facts, but also attempting to determine their 
true meaning.  
I believe that one should not rely too much on secondary sources which are already permeated 
by the opinions of others and are two or more removes from the sources themselves. It is a 
truism that ‘the oftener a theory or assumption passes from researcher to researcher or from 
pen to pen, the less accurate or even less trustworthy it becomes.’ Sometimes insignificant 
details are magnified with the result that fundamental considerations are easily forgotten. It is 
true that I also benefited from past scholarship and research for which I am grateful. That I 
disagree at times on interpretation and perception, does not diminish my admiration for all the 
work of my predecessors. They opened the window on Aceh’s history.   
 
The study is divided over three parts.  
Part One ‘Historicity and Myth’ includes a chapter on Aceh’s historical setting while the 
second chapter is concerned with the representation of kingship in the indigenous sources. I 
try to shed light on the way kingship was conceived by looking at mythology and ‘thought’. 
Part Two is about  the East-West interactions, especially the trade relations and the forming of 
alliances. 
Part Three focuses on armed conflicts and wars, their causes and solutions.  
The influx in Aceh of war captives from mostly Malay (Muslim) ports is examined and 
discussed in relation to their position in the new environment.  
                                                 
 
14 in: Leonard Blussé, Frans-Paul van der Putten, Hans Vogel, (eds.), Pilgrims to the Past, (Leiden: CNWS 
publications, 1996), 30. 
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The saying ‘Some books are written to answer questions, others are written to question 
answers already given’ does not pertain to the task I’ve taken on. In this study I try to 
encompass both questions and answers. Yet inconclusive evidence and even imperfect 
theories are part of writing history.  
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PART ONE 
 
 
HISTORICITY AND MYTH 
Part One 
 
 
 
                                                          CHAPTER  I 
                       
                                 
         THE GEO-HISTORICAL SETTING 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 1. 1     Malacca: marketplace and powerhouse 
The Malacca Straits was for centuries the gateway on which the Asian trade from India to 
China was linked. Along with trade, religions and various cultural elements travelled to the 
ports of Asia. Conveniently located, the port of Malacca was the great rendezvous for traders 
and shipping in Southeast Asia; Tomé Pires, an assistant of Alfonso d’Albuquerque, the 
conqueror of Malacca, saw the  bustling port as a big fair where all sorts of goods were traded 
by many different nations. He said that the scale of the trade was of such magnitude that there 
were four shahbandar in charge of its handling, assisted by lesser functionaries.1 Gujerati and 
Bengali traders from the Indian sub-continent bartered various kinds of Indian textiles and 
goods which Muslim traders from the Middle East had brought to their ports, for spices, gold, 
tin, benzoin, porcelain and other piece goods. 
Malacca was founded by a Buddhist (Sailendra) prince by the name of Paramesvara who had 
come from the great city of Palembang in southern Sumatra, which was the centre of the 
Buddhist Empire of Srivijaya and had married a Majapahit princess from the island of Java. 
He arrived in the unassuming village of Malacca at the end of the fourteenth century, 
embraced Islam when he was already of old age and took the name of Megat Iskandar Shah. 
After his death in 1424 he was succeeded by one of his sons who was named Raja Ibrahim, 
but who immediately adopted the title of Sri Paramesvara Deva Shah. According to D.G.E. 
Hall, an authority on Southeast Asia this indicated a reaction against the new faith.2 
                                                 
 
1 Armando Cortesao (ed.), Tomé Pires, Suma Oriental, ( London: Hakluyt Society, 1944). 
 
2  D.G.E. Hall,  A History of South-East Asia , (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 4th edition, 1981),  226. 
It is my view that both names Raja Ibrahim and Sri Parameswara Shah combine Hindu/Buddhist and Islamic 
titles. Hall asserts that Malacca became the commercial successor of  Srivijaya (225). 
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As a consequence thereof  this man was murdered during a rebellion of Tamil Muslims led by 
his elder brother who established himself as the new ruler, taking the name Muzaffar Shah. 
Islam then became the leading religion in Malacca. 
This was evidently later than in Samudra Pasai and Perlak, at that time two well-known ports 
on Sumatra’s east coast visited by Marco Polo and Ibn Batutta in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, who took note of the coming of Islam in these ports. 
Malacca’s connections with the north Javanese ports of Tuban and Gresik, from where rice 
and spices arrived, became a passageway for the spread of Islam on the island of Java; 
Javanese traders settled in Malacca where they formed an important constituency of the 
cosmopolitan society. 
 
For the Chinese Malacca was the key to the Indian Ocean where they brought porcelain and 
various piece goods which they bartered for pepper, spices and textiles, tin and gold. 
Chinese protection of Malacca when it shook off the yoke of Siam in the fifteenth century, 
contributed significantly to Malacca’s political and economical rise. In 1409 the visiting 
Chinese admiral Cheng Ho of the mighty imperial Chinese fleet declared the Sailendra Prince 
Paramesvara ‘king’ and presented him the insignias of sovereignty.3 From then on 
Parameswara sent tribute in the form of pepper to the Chinese emperor. 
A century later, when Malacca had become the powerful overlord of various territories on 
both sides of the Straits of Malacca, such as Pahang, Patani, Trengganu, Kedah, Perak, 
Kampar, Siak, Andragiri, Bengkalis, the islands of Bintang and Carimon, places rich in 
pepper, sulphur, silk, gold and. benzoin, it still paid tribute to a greater power; the ruling 
Sultan Mahmud told his Italian visitor Ludovico di Varthema in 1505, six years before the 
Portuguese conquered his city, that his overlord was ‘the king of Cini (China), who caused 
this place to be built about eighty years ago.’ This was grosso modo the geo-political 
condition in the Straits region when the Portuguese armada led by Alfonso d’Albuquerque 
conquered the famous port in 1511. 
Sultan Mahmud fled to the island of Bintang and later to Kampar on the east coast of 
Sumatra. His sons set up court in Johor, Perak and Pahang. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 John Winter Jones (tr.) The Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema of Bologna from 1502-1508  (The Argonaut 
Press: 1928).   
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Too far East is West (English saying). 
The maritime capabilities that brought the Portuguese around the Cape and into the East, 
ultimately made them the first Western imperial power there. 
The Papal resolution laid down in the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) confirmed Portuguese 
claims of this Eastern route to India, safeguarded their interests in Brazil, and ratified 
Colombus’ discoveries. The resolution was the outcome of a conflict between the two Iberian 
contenders of world discovery, that reached its breaking point after Bartolomeus Diaz 
accidentally discovered the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope in 1488. This discovery 
was crucial for opening up the sea lanes for global traffic and trade. 
The Portuguese achievement was taken onto a new level by Vasco da Gama who succeeded in 
what Cristobal Colon (Colombus) had failed to accomplish: reach the shores of India. He 
arrived in Calicut in 1498 and sought to break the trade monopolies in Asia of the Muslim 
traders of the Levant and Egypt and those of the merchants of Genoa and Venice. The Indian 
ocean steadily replaced the Red Sea in significance. 
Don Alfonso d’Albuquerque who is credited for Portuguese expansion in the East, succeeded 
in conquering Ormuz which gave access to the Persian Gulf; in 1510 he established Goa on 
the west coast of India as the capital of the Portuguese possessions, conquered Malacca in 
1511 and opened the trade with the Spice islands, China and Siam. The Portuguese occupied  
the main strategic points and became the masters of the Indian ocean. The monopoly of the 
spice trade and the huge revenues were the great attractions for establishing Portuguese 
settlements. Hall contends that by cutting off the shipping line between Cambay in north-west 
India, the important rendez-vous for Muslim traders from Egypt, Arabia and the Persian Gulf 
and Malacca, the Portuguese hoped to take over the Muslim trade. 4 
They introduced the cartaz system to establish full monopoly over all trade that passed 
through their ‘sphere of interest,’ obliging foreign vessels to obtain a written permit (cartaz);    
they put a sharp curb on the operations of the Muslim traders and that of their trading partners 
in the East and attacked and destroyed Muslim vessels en route in the Straits. 
Muslim merchants in Malacca felt forced to move their businesses over to other ports in the 
region; many crossed the Straits to the ports of Pedir, Samudra Pasai and Bandar Aceh where 
they based their trade with the rest of the archipelago and the Muslim ports of the Red Sea. 
Hall asserts that the Portuguese considered it an obligation to Pope Alexander VI to conquer 
Malacca, which was a main diffusion centre of Islam in the Malay Peninsula and the 
                                                 
 
4 A history of Southeast Asia,  229.    
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Indonesian archipelago.5 Scholars disagree on Malacca’s great contribution as an important 
diffusion centre of Islam to the Indonesian archipelago and credit Christianity with the rise of 
Islam in the region. The Malaysian historian Syed Muhammad Naguib Al-Atas argues that the 
‘magnification’ by Dutch scholar Bertram Schrieke of the role of Christianity in bringing 
about the rise of Islam in the archipelago, relegates Malacca’s importance as the centre from 
where Islamic propaganda and missionary activity radiated to the extremities of the 
Archipelago to the background.6 The evidence is that  before the Portuguese made their 
entrance,  Malacca traded with the north Javanese ports of Tuban and Gresik and one may 
assume that from there Islam spread to the rest of the island. Islam on the island of Sumatra 
arrived even earlier. Marco Polo and Ibn Batutta recorded the gradual process of Islamization 
in the ports of Perlak and Pasai when they arrived there in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. 
 
 
 
 
1. 1. 2    Sumatra: a clouded history 
Ancient Sumatra is known in the Ramayana epic as Svarnadvipa (island of gold), while it was 
also the scene of the great Buddhist empire of Sriviyaja, with its centre in the vicinity of  the 
city of Palembang in the south of the island.   
The huge island is blessed with an abundant nature: mountains, forests, rivers, swamps, and 
the rich surrounding waters. The Barisan mountain divides the island over the whole length in 
two parts.  
Marco Polo and his brother were the first Europeans who made landfall in 1293 at Perlak 
(‘Ferlec’) a port lying on the north east coast, where they arrived on their way back to Europe 
from the court of Kublai Khan in China. The visit of the Polo brothers merely coincided with 
the gradual Islamization of the Sumatran east coast. Marco credits the arrival of Saracen 
                                                 
  
5 ibid, 264 ‘Moreover, since Malacca under a Muslim ruler was the chief diffusion-centre of Islam in Indonesia, 
by capturing  it they would be carrying out the obligation laid on the Portuguese by the bull of Alexander VI. 
Thus the conquest of Malacca in 1511 was one of the most important features of  an over-all strategic plan, and 
not an act of revenge for the treachery of the sultan in his dealings with Diogo Lopez de Sequiera when he 
attempted to establish a factory there in 1509.’   
 
6 Syed Muhammad Naguib Al-Atas, Raniri and the Wujudiyya of 17th century Aceh, (MBRAS, monograph III, 
1966),  3.   
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merchants with the fact that the inhabitants of Perlak, who used to be idolaters, were 
introduced to Islam and he observes at the same time that the people of the surrounding 
mountains were living like beasts, ate human flesh and worshipped many different things. 
From Perlak the Polos moved to the bustling neighbouring port Samudra Pasai, where they 
spent five months, waiting for the favourable winds to set sail. Unlike Perlak, Samudra Pasai 
was not yet converted to Islam. The inhabitants were savages and idolaters, whose ruler was 
wealthy and powerful and professed allegiance to the Great Khan of China. 7 
Barely fifty years afterwards in 1345, Ibn Battuta ‘the traveller of Islam’ visited Samudra 
Pasai. He paints a different picture of the prevailing conditions, telling us that he was met at 
his arrival by several Islamic officials from the Court of the sultan and the kadi, the Islamic 
upper judge, who informed him that the sultan professed the Shafi’i form of Islam. This ruler 
loved to surround himself with theologians, followed the Islamic injunction to establish the 
Friday prayer, and walked barefoot to the mosque to pray. He mobilized his people for his 
expeditions against the ‘unbelievers’ in the neighbouring Batak territories on whom he 
declared a jihad.8 These people paid him the poll-tax to be relieved from the expeditions 
against them. Islam had become the leading faith in Pasai at that time. In the town of 
Lhokseumaweh in the province of Aceh (the location of Pasai), archaeologists unearthed a 
tombstone dating back to the year 1380 which belongs to a female Islamic ruler known as Nur 
Ilah .9 It is hardly disputable that Islam had firmly established itself in the north eastern ports 
of Sumatra when the Portuguese conquered Malacca. 
Was Sumatra the site of the legendary Ophir - as some sources speculate -, fabulously rich in 
gold, to where king Solomon sent his ships?10 The Portuguese were not only interested in the 
Spice islands, but they were also eager to find the island of gold.11 John Davis, pilot of the 
first Dutch and English fleets visiting Aceh in 1599 and 1602 respectively, mentions the 
existence of plenty gold and copper mines in Sumatra. It is tantalizing to imagine this when 
                                                 
7 Ronald Latham (tr.), The Travels of Marco Polo (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1958),  224-228. 
8 H.A.R. Gibb (tr.), Ibn Battuta,  Travels in Asia and Africa 1325-1354 (London: Routledge and Sons, 1929), 
273-276.  
 
9 Ibrahim Alfian (ed.), Wanita Utama Nusantara Dalam Lintasan Sejarah, (Jakarta, 1994), 3,4 .Here is 
mentioned that the scripture on the tombstone is transliterated by W.F. Stutterheim and published in the Acta 
Orientalia, vol. XVI (Leiden, 1936). 
 
10 William Foster (ed.), The voyages of SirJames Lancaster Kt to the East Indies, (London: Hakluyt Society, 
1940),  259.       
 
11 Jorge Manuel dos Santos Alves “Samatra” in:  A.H. de Oliveira Marques,  Historia Dos Portugueses No 
Extremo Oriente, 2 vols. Tomo II De Macao á Periferia, Seculos XVI-XVII, (Fundacao Oriente, 2000), 93- 94. 
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one travels today around the Ophir mountain in West Sumatra, the location of several gold 
mines. 
 
 
 
 
1. 1. 3   The scenes of Aceh’s history  
According to the Bustan as-Salatin, Part II, book 13, by Nuru’d-din al Raniri, the Sultanate 
Aceh Dar al-Salam), occupying the northern tip of Sumatra, was founded around 1500 when 
Alau’d-din Mughayat Shah of the Mahkota Alam region north of the Aceh river, subjugated 
the Dar al-Kamal region south of the Aceh river. In 1520 he annexed the port of  Daya on 
Sumatra’s west coast, the port of Pedir (Pidië) on the east coast in 1522 and liberated Samudra 
Pasai in 1524 from the Portuguese who had built a fort there. 
The vernacular on the east coast was Malay, but in Aceh the local language was Acehnese; 
Malay gradually acquired importance in Aceh as the lingua franca of commerce, literature  
and religion. 
When the Portuguese captured Malacca, Aceh came out strongly to defend the Islamic trade 
and Sumatra’s territorial integrity. It is warranted to look at the lucid and unconcealed account 
of the Florentine merchant Giovanni Da Empoli, who took part in the 1509 reconnaissance 
expedition to the Straits of Alfonso d’Albuquerque, for it provides an intimate look at the 
Portuguese operations and at Da Empoli’s own involvement in these and may explain Aceh’s 
response and articulation to Portuguese intrusions in the Straits region. 12 
After setting out from the Bay of Bengal, the mighty Portuguese fleet captured seven large 
ships owned by Muslim merchants from the great port of Cambay in western India, which 
were on their way to Malacca, and seized their rich and abundant cargo. In the vicinity of the 
port of Pedir on Sumatra’s east coast the Portuguese seized another ship owned by Turkish 
merchants. 
Da Empoli went on an inspection trip of  Pedir to find out what commodities were available, 
and to see which nations traded there. The ruler received him cordially, but strongly 
demanded the returning of the booty from the Turkish vessel, declaring that his port was a 
free port since long visited by traders from all nations and that he did not tolerate that ships 
                                                 
 
12 I have drawn from Antony Reid (ed.), Witnesses to Sumatra A Traveller’s Anthology,  (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 11-16. This is abstracted from A. Bausani (tr.), Lettera di Giovanni da Empoli  (Rome: 
Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1970), 124-129.      
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coming to his port were harassed. The Portuguese did not return the booty. Instead they 
furtively sailed away to the neighbouring port of (Samudra) Pasai, where Da Empoli went to 
see the sultan, to whom he announced that they had come to make pacts and peace, even 
though the king of Pedir had given them two bahar of gold to make war on his behalf. Pasai 
was at that time one of the most important suppliers of pepper and also provided raw silk to 
Cambay. 
The Portuguese unscrupulously set out to conquer the region’s trade, conducting their political 
and economical objectives along military lines. From Zainu’l-Abidin, the ruler of Pasai, they 
wrested a concession of an annual tribute of pepper for the Lusitanian (Portuguese) crown and 
for the governor of Malacca. In 1519, after Zainu’l-Abidin’s death they got permission from 
his successor to construct a wooden fort in Pasai where Giovanni Da Empoli was appointed 
the first factor with the task to take care of the trade lines Malacca-Pasai-China.13 For a time 
Malacca’s prominent position as trade emporium in the Southeast Asian region remained 
unimpaired, but Portuguese hegemony on the Asian seas and over the trade was immediately 
challenged by the upcoming power of Aceh. Their intrusion in the region and its trade, the 
concomitant seizure of Muslim ships and cargoes and their ability to manipulate local rulers, 
was anxiously followed by Aceh. The Acehnese historian Amirul Hadi asserts ‘Based as it 
was on religious intolerance and on trade monopolies, they (the Portuguese) threatened nearly 
all other inhabitants and visitors in the region’.14 
The Portuguese regarded the petty rulers in their new neighbourhood merely as chiefs of 
pirate states, but Tomé Pires in his descriptions of Aceh, called the Acehnese ruler, Alau’d-
din Mughayat Shah, a homem cavaleiro, a gentlemen, a man of authority.15 They gradually 
came to realize that their survival and their profits depended to a great extent on the good will 
of the neighbouring ports and began to change their conduct of the relations with these ports, 
basing their strategy on the developments in the region especially with an eye on the shifting 
coalitions and economic ties.16 They became regular visitors of the Sumatran ports. 
                                                 
 
13 Dos Santos Alves, “ Samatra”  in: de Oliveira Marques , (ed.), Historia Dos Portugueses, 90-91. 
 
14 Amirul Hadi,  Aceh and the Portuguese: A study of the struggle of Islam in Southeast Asia, 1500- 1579 
(Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies Mc Gill University, 1992), 51. 
 
15 Armando Cortesao: Tomé Pires, Suma Oriental, vol. I, 138. 
 
16 Manuel Lobato, “Malaca”  in : de Oliveira Marques (ed.), Historia dos Portugueses, 41.   
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Aceh’s Alau’d-din Mughayat Shah, alarmed by Portuguese incursions in Sumatra, and the 
ambivalence of the port rulers, annexed Pedir around 1522 and Samudra Pasai around 1524, 
whose rulers fled and sought refuge in Malacca.17 Aceh  took on he role of leader of the 
Muslim opposition against the Portuguese ‘infidel’. 
 
The third ruler of Aceh, Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (al- Kahar), a son of the founder of 
Aceh,  Alau’d-din  Mughayat Shah, considerably expanded Aceh’s borders. Ruling roughly 
from 1537 to 1571, Al-Kahar (the conqueror) subdued the ports of Barus, Tiku and Priaman 
on the west coast of Sumatra and Deli and Aru on the east coast, establishing Aceh as a 
political and economical force of the first rank. Johor, the assumed successor state of the 
sultanate of Malacca, claimed overlord-ship of the Malay ports on Sumatra’s east coast and 
saw Aceh’s rise as a threat to its own supremacy. 
Sultan Al-Kahar vehemently battled the Portuguese in the Straits and besieged Malacca 
several times, but his vigorous efforts were ineffective to dispel them from there. 
He sent his envoy Husein Efendi on an official mission to the Ottoman Emperor Suleyman to 
propose a Pacta Islamica against the Christian invaders. Effendi’s arrival in Turkey coincided 
with Suleyman’s death and the enthronement of Selim II, who welcomed the opportunity of 
having a committed ally against expanding Christendom in the Indian Ocean region.18 
An armada of 17 warships and 2 escorts led by commander Kurtoglu Hizir Reis reached 
Malacca in 1567,19 but the Portuguese led by Matias d’Albuquerque gained victory over the 
combined large Muslim fleet and confiscated much of its artillery. 
If  the material assistance from the Ottoman emperor enabled Al-Kahar to continue his naval 
actions against the Portuguese, the moral value of the support of the emperor, who was at the 
same time the assumed caliph of the Islamic community, gave impetus to Aceh’s leadership  
of the fragmented regional Islamic opposition against the ‘infidels’ in Malacca.  
                                                 
17 ibid., 26.  
In the historiography it is frequently mentioned that the sultan of Aceh called himself the sultan of Sumatra. This 
should be understood as Samudra (Sumatra) Pasai. Although Aceh under Iskandar Muda  subjugated and 
controlled a considerable part of the island, it did not control the southern part which now constitute the 
provinces of South Sumatra and the province of Lampung. 
 
18 Selim II declared that he would fight on Aceh’s side the enemies of Islam in the East who attacked Muslim 
countries. The official reply dated 20 September 1567 is discussed by Ismail Hakki Goksoy in “Ottoman-Aceh 
relations according to the Turkish Sources”, a paper presented at the First International Conference of Aceh and 
Indian Ocean Studies in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, held from 24-27 February 2007.   
 
19 Muhamad Hasan Basry and  Ibrahim Alfian (eds), Perang kolonial Belanda di Aceh, (Banda Aceh: 
Documentation and Information Centre, 1990), 54.  
The Turks assisted in establishing a military academy which was named  Askari Baitul Muqaddas where the 
female admiral Keumalahayati  was trained.  
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First the Portuguese regarded Aceh’s actions against their ships in the Straits as razzias, but 
they became aware that the help of the Ottoman caliph gave these actions the intensity and 
sincerity of a jihad.20 Amirul Hadi asserts ‘Based on the idea that Islam was strongly 
institutionalised in society, it is safe to suggest that Islam was a strong symbol stimulating 
resistance against the Portuguese and, later, the Dutch.’21 
When the Acehnese choose to put up an appearance, they inflicted serious losses on their 
declared enemy, but they were not successful to dispel the Portuguese from Malacca. The 
Portuguese tenaciously held on to Malacca sometimes aided by several Malay ports. 
In 1536 the Portuguese forced neighbouring Johor to make peace. Hall asserts ‘For a time 
Perak, Johor and Pahang were content to remain on friendly terms with the Portuguese’.22 
When the armada of Aceh was on its way to attack Malacca in 1547, the combined fleet of 
Johor, Pahang and Perak arrived to lend support to Malacca, but the Portuguese had beaten off 
the Acehnese. Aceh retaliated by burning down a number of villages upon the Johor river.23 
In 1565 Aceh constructed a fort at Perak, which is situated at the entrance of the Malacca 
Straits, to guard the trade of the merchants from the Malabar coast of India. Johor perceived 
Aceh’s infiltration in Perak as an aggressive deed against the Malay world. Despite the fact 
that Malacca was inherently Johor’s archenemy, Johor regarded Aceh’s rise as a threat to its 
own ascendancy. Johor for long controlled the Straits and its shipping. The incessant  
hostilities between the sultanates marked the regional politics of the sixteenth century.24 
                                                 
 
20  Dos Santos Alves,“Samatra” in: de Oliveira Marques (ed.),  Historia dos Portugueses, 97.  
Islamic theorists generally have difficulties in accepting the term jihad if it is coined as a military action, 
requiring among other things a description of the funding of the operation. In the view of Aceh the Portuguese 
were the enemies of Islam who had to be dispelled from Islamic territory. Mobilization against the ‘infidels’ was 
a religious command.  
I may refer to Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991)  in which the author  traces the development of Islamic political language from its beginnings to this 
age.  Review: ‘Lewis places words of politics, past and present in a historical context and argues that wars, 
conquests and revolutions augment some terms and devalue others, which means that no term has meaning 
above the historical context’. 
According to the Islamist P. S. van Koningsveld, in Islam as in other religions, there is the notion that war (Holy 
War or jihad) is mandatory under special circumstances.  Not only a defensive war but also as a means to 
expansion.  De Islam, (Utrecht: Uitgeverij De Ploeg, 1981),125-6.    
 
21 Aceh and the Portuguese, 111.    
 
22 A history of Southeast Asia, 367. 
 
23  idem.  
 
24 Lobato “ Malacca” in: de Oliveira Marques  (ed.),  Historia dos Portuguese no Extremo Orientes, 34    
The Portuguese regarded the ‘imperialistic conflicts’ between Johor and Aceh as based on political and 
economical rivalry. They saw Johor as the protector of the Malay dominions and Aceh as a centralizing power.  
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There were however brief intervals of peace between the two antagonists in which they 
cooperated against the Portuguese.25 
e 
 were 
                                                
In 1593 Portuguese merchants from Malacca made overtures to the incumbent Sultan Alau’d-
din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil), soliciting the opening of trade relations with Aceh. It 
resulted in  establishing trade and diplomatic relations between Malacca and Aceh.26 
Enthused by Sultan Alau’d-din’s receptiveness, a Portuguese delegation from Goa came to 
request a site for the construction of a fort on one of the islands within Aceh’s domain, but th
sultan responded that they first deliver him Johor. It illustrates that Aceh and Johor
irreconcilable and that they both sought the help of the Portuguese ‘infidel’ and invader to 
attack each other. 
 
 
 
 
1. 1. 4    Aceh: a good place in Sumatra 
It is perhaps from the Indians that Aceh got its name. Overwhelmed by the beautiful coastline 
shaded by abundant coconut palms and the distant green mountains, the early Indian visitors 
called out ‘achai’ which means good, fine. 27 
 
‘The name is properly Aceh. The Portuguese turned it into Achem, and the English 
call it Achin, The Dutch Atchijn.‘ Colonel Yule suggests that we got our form of the 
word from the Arabs, who have Achin. It is so written in the Ain Akbari and in the 
geographical tables of Sadik Isfahani’. (anonymous English traveller). 
 
While it is beyond the scope of this study to focus on theories that explain the arrival of 
Indians centuries earlier and the transmission of Indian culture to the ports of Southeast Asia, 
I like to dwell for a moment at the proposition of L. F. Brakel, a Dutch sociologist, who 
typifies Aceh of the seventeenth century as a case sui generis in the Indies, because it was 
much influenced by Indian ideas.28 A serious oversight is that the ‘Indies’ was not a culturally 
 
25 A history of South-East Asia, 368. 
 
26 Dos Santos Alves, “ Samatra”  in: de Oliveira Marques (ed.), Historia dos Portugueses no Extremo 
Oriente,104.   
 
27 For more on the toponyms I refer to Denys Lombard,  Le Sultanat d’ Atjéh au temps d’Iskandar Muda 1606-
1636 ,  9-11. 
 
28 L. F. Brakel, “State and Statecraft in 17th century Aceh”  in: Reid and Castles (eds.), Pre-colonial State 
Systems in Southeast Asia, (JMBRAS, monograph no. 6, 1975), 56-66. 
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nor politically homogeneous mass, but constituted a range of polities and entities with 
different cultural and political traditions; even stone-age areas persisted and atavistic beliefs 
juxtaposed alongside Islam; while some of these converted to Islam at an earlier stage than the 
rest, the shadows of a Hindu or Buddhist past were nowhere completely erased. Islam in Aceh 
certainly wielded more influence after the Portuguese conquest of Malacca in 1511. 
Tasawuf  (Sufism) the mystical path of Islam which spread from Persia, was predominant in 
Malacca and Sumatra.29 Hamza Fansuri, who originated from the port of Barus on Sumatra’s 
west coast became one of the leading Sufi scholars in Aceh during the latter part of the 
sixteenth century. He acquainted himself with various Islamic doctrines during his time spent 
in Arabia. Through poetry Sufi mystics were able to summarize and share their mystical 
experience. Hamza Fansuri used the Malay form of sha’ ir to write and recite his religious 
ideas.30  His student and follower Shamsu’d-din Pasai became the leader of the mystic 
Wugudiya (also spelled Wujudiya) movement in Aceh. The term derives from the Arabic 
wahdat-al wugud (‘absolute unity of being’). The focus of Wugudiya teaching was on the 
nature of the  relationship between Creator and man, denying the duality between them. 
Shamsu’d-din Pasai was the most influential religious scholar, functioning for over thirty 
years as the ‘Sheikh al-Islam’at the courts of Alau’d-din Riayat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil), 
his son Ali Ri’ayat Shah and his grandson Iskandar Muda . With the arrival from India of the 
more orthodox Sufi scholar Nuru’d-din al Raniri at the Court of Sultan Iskandar Thani in 
1637,  a new religious order replaced Wugudyah mysticism. Both Nuru’d-din al Raniri and 
Shamsu’d-din Pasai stood at different points of the evolution of Islam.31 The outlawing of 
Wugudiya mysticism and the persecution of mystics which started when Nuru’d-din al Raniri 
arrived in Aceh,  indicated the end of the heterodox tendency which had long prevailed. 
It was a turning point in the socio-religious climate, with significant political consequences as 
the sequel shows, for example, when after the death of Sultan Iskandar Thani in 1641,  a 
successor had to be appointed. This successor was his widow Taj al-Alam Safiatu’d-din Shah. 
 
Aceh was the location of several smaller units before its unification around 1500. 
                                                 
 
29 Van Koningsveld asserts that by embedding mysticism in Islam, traditional faith was furnished with an 
acceptable vestment.  De Islam, 113. 
 
30 J. Doorenbos,  De Geschriften van Hamzah Pansoeri, (Leiden: Batteljee & Terpstra), 1933. 
 
31 C. A .O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, “Nur Al-Din Al-Raniri als bestrijder der Wugudiya”  (BKI, 1948 (104), 2 and 
3), 342. 
 23
The sultanate’s favourable location with its seaboards stretching on the Straits of Malacca and 
the Indian ocean, was a quality from which merely everything else flew. Ships travelling to 
and from Asia made landfall in its ports. The incorporated flourishing ports of Pasai and Pedir 
were long visited by traders from as far as the Middle East and China who came to barter their 
goods for pepper, silk and gold. 
For the very first images of Aceh at the turn of the sixteenth into the seventeenth century we 
rely on the writings of the English navigator John Davis who visited Aceh twice,  in 1599 
with the Zeeland expedition from the United Republic and in 1602 with the English fleet 
under the command of James Lancaster, and the observations by Francois Martin of the 
French expedition which visited Aceh in 1602. 
From John Davis’ pen comes the following prosaic description: 
‘The Ile Sumatra is a pleasing and fertile soyle, abounding with many rare and excellent 
fruites; of graine they have only rice, which is their bread. They plowe the ground with Buffs 
(buffaloes), of which there are great plenty, but with small skill and lesse diligence. 
The rice groweth in all respects as our Barley. Of Pepper they have exceedingly plenty, 
Gardens of a mile square, it groweth like Hops from a planted Root, and windeth about a 
stake set by it until it grow to a great bushie Tree. The pepper hangeth in small clusters, three 
inches long, and an inch about, each cluster having fortie pepper Cornes, it yeeldeth increase 
equall with Mustard Seed. They bee able to lade twentie ships yearliy; and more might, if the 
people were industrious and laboursome. The whole Countrey seemeth to be a garden of 
pleasure. The Ayre is temperate and wholesome, having everie morning a fruitfull dew, or 
small raine’. 
‘The citie of Achien if it may be so called, is very spacious, built in a Wood, so that wee could 
not see a house till we were upon it. Neither could wee goe into any place, but wee found 
houses, and great concourse of people: so that I thinke the Towne spreadeth over the whole 
land. Their houses are built eight foote or better from the ground upon posts of wood, with 
free passage under, the walls and covering of mats, the poorest and weakest thing in the 
World.  I saw three Market places, which are every day frequented as Faires with all kinds of 
marchandize to sell’.32 As a navigator Davis was apparently interested in the lay-out of the 
harbour which he describes as small, with a stone fort on one side: ‘before this fort is a very 
pleasant Road for ships, the wind still coming from the shore, a shippe may ride a mile off in 
                                                 
32 Albert Hastings Markham (ed.),  The Voyages and Works of John Davis the Navigator (London: Hakluyt 
Society, 1880), 142. 
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eighteene fathomes, close by in four and sixe fathomes.’ ‘Of Beasts, here are Elephants, 
Horses, Buffes, Oxen and Goates, with many wild Hogs.’ 
François Martin recorded that the local houses were built on poles because of frequent 
flooding and they were made from leaves and reed of the palm tree and very prone to fire.33 
The  sultan’s palace was situated half a mile out of the city upon the river and was similar in 
style to the traditional houses, only much bigger; one had to pass three guards with green 
spaces in between them before arriving at the audience hall. He mentions that there were no 
forts to protect the city. 
It is obvious that the visitors were much impressed by the display of wealth at the palace. For 
many of them it was their first visit to an Asian Court. The reception hall was covered with 
carpets and hangings of luxurious textiles with gold threads. Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah  
reclined on a raised platform, where he was attended by his eunuchs and women servants. 
Dancing girls performed their acts, while coq fights and elephant fights were much 
appreciated y the sultan. 
Evidently the sultan’s court was the centre of command, display and entertainment. 
Even the religious processions leaving for the Friday prayers to the mosque were 
manifestations of royal pomp and pageantry with horses covered with beaten gold and their 
bridles set with precious stones; the saddle of the royal elephant was of pure gold, likewise 
were the royal insignias such as the fan and the betel-box which were carried by a royal slave. 
Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah’s robes were astonishing luxurious, so much so that John 
Davis found it difficult to even describe them. The sultan carried the typical Acehnese dagger 
(rencong) on both his front and back side and Davis mentions that he was bedecked with 
precious jewels. These (ceremonial) daggers were usually made from silver, but the Acehnese 
rulers also highly favoured tin which came from Perak on the Malay peninsula. 
By profession the Acehnese were merchants, fishermen and craftsmen, which tells us that 
Aceh was not a typical agrarian society. Rice was not planted on a large scale, but mostly 
imported from India. Pepper was usually planted around  Pedir and in the territories on the 
west coast. 
François Martin relates how the people dressed. The common men only covered their private 
parts with a big belt, the orangkaya wore cloaks from cotton or silk and covered their heads 
                                                 
Also in W.S. Unger (ed.),  De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen naar Oost-Indië 1598-1604, (‘s Gravenhage: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1948), 53. 
 
33 Francois Martin,  Description du premier voyage facit aux Indes Orientales par les francois en l’an 1603, 
(Paris : Laurens Sonnius, 1604). Quoted in Anthony Reid (ed.), Witnesses to Sumatra, 55-63. 
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with a turban, their wives wore two pieces of cloth covering them from the breast to the waist 
and from the waist to the knees. The common women left the upper part naked, except for a 
scarf wound over one shoulder covering only part of the breast. The gentlemen distinguished 
themselves from those who did manual work by letting the nails of their thumbs and little 
finger grow. 
Justice was observed according to local custom and for minor crimes hands and sometimes 
also feet were cut off; murderers were punished to die in the same way or by being thrown to 
the elephants who would kick them to death or in some cases they would be thrown to a tiger. 
There was an Islamic court which Frederick de Houtman calls the ‘judges of the King’, who 
investigated him for several days under physical threat about his faith. 
John Davis observes that  ‘the State is governed by five principal men, with their inferior 
officers, his (the sultan’s) secretary and four called shahbandars, with these rest all 
authority.34 His women are his chiefest councillors. A woman is his admiral, for he will trust 
no men.’35 
 
 
 
 
1. 1. 5    A cosmopolitan society 
 ‘Of all which nations there bee some dwelling in Achen in the Ile of Sumatra, trading in 
marchandize, where I have met with Arabians and a nation called Rumos, who have traded 
many hundred years to Achen. These Rumos come from the Red Sea’.36 
Francois Martin recorded that traders from Negapatam, Bengal, Gujerat, Calicut, Cape 
Comorin, Ceylon, Siam and China were selling their wares in small stalls in the streets: fine 
cotton and silk from Gujerat, porcelain and other goods such as stones and drugs from China, 
spices from the Moluccan islands, etcetera. These traders were the only ones who bought and 
sold pepper. 
They usually stayed in Aceh for six months, usually bringing with them their wives and 
children; in some instances they bought a wife for the time they were in Aceh.37 
                                                 
34 When the French admiral Augustin de Beaulieu was in Aceh in 1621 there were also of four penghulu kawal 
who were the heads of the patrol. The function of penghulu Aceh is also mentioned by the English traders in 
Priaman in 1617. 
 
35 Mentioned by John Davis, The voyage and works, 141; 
De oudste reizen, 55-6. This female  admiral was named  Keumalahayati.  
 
36 People from the Byzantium/Roman empire; also included are the Turcs. 
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Muslim merchants from the Red Sea region, the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent 
were pivotal in the rise of Aceh and its trade during the sixteenth century and in transmitting 
Islamic ideas. Like Hinduism and Buddhism,  Islam originated from elsewhere and in the 
process Aceh became a society of converts. 
As one would expect the littoral consisted of layers of settlers. They came from as far as 
China, Pegu, India, Persia, the Red Sea area and Turkey, bringing with them their own beliefs 
and customs. They lived in racially segregated areas in the ports, while the inland territories 
were inhabited by the indigenous peoples who led a more or less autonomous existence. 
Francois Martin gives an account of the customs  practiced by what he calls the ‘gentiles’. 
They venerated animals of which they considered the cow and  the ox sacred and offered to 
idols,  refusing to eat or drink from cutlery that had been used by persons of other faiths. 
When a Hindu ( Brahmin) priest died,  his wife was burnt beside her husband on the pyre.38 
Although Martin was in Aceh simultaneously with John Davis and slightly later than captain 
Frederick de Houtman who also documented his experiences during his captivity in Aceh, we 
find no descriptions of this rather sinister custom in their accounts. From Martin’s description 
we  infer that not only Muslims, but Hindus too found their way from India to Aceh and that 
widow-burning had its adherents in the new environment. The conditions of life of the merely 
‘unregarded’ Hindu community are missing in the works of the Muslim scholars and 
chroniclers. The information of the racial and culturally plural society of that time is obtained 
wholly from the scanty notes made by observant foreigners like Martin and Davis. 
These writers were confronted by wholly new experiences as two different worlds met and 
came into intimate contact for the first time. There are no precedents and no records of the 
period, thus we follow the writers on their sojourn experiencing oddities, prejudices and 
emotions as probably no one before them did. 
 
37 Reid (ed.), Witnesses to Sumatra, 63. 
   
38 ibid , 62. 
 
 
 
 
                              
 
Nine-fold seal or Cap Sikureueng of Taj al-Alam Safiatu’d-din Shah who ruled from  
1641-1675. Clockwise from down under are the names of several of her predecessors 
 
 
    
 
                            
 
            Nine-fold seal or Cap Sikureueng of Sultan Muhammad Daud Shah (1879). 
            Clockwise from down under are the names of several of his predecessors 
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                                                              CHAPTER  II 
 
 
           REPRESENTATION OF KINGSHIP IN MYTH AND NARRATIVE 
 
 
 
 
1. 2. 1     The Texts 
‘The first thing God created was the pen, which tells us that it was created before the Tables 
of the Faith on which He has for all eternity written the fate of all human beings.’1 
 
Acehnese kingship was written - allegorically- on a palimpsest, with myth occupying one side 
and reality the other. Traditionally, myths and legends are strong elements of the Malay and 
Indonesian culture and they make much more understandable of the approach to religion. 
For the Acehnese mysticism was the undercurrent if not, the essence of their faith; several 
Western scholars, such as the ethnologist C. Snouck Hurgronje, who wrote his influential 
work The Acehnese, have often received this with mixed appreciation.  
To disregard the notion and the local acceptation of the mythical origin of kingship in a 
historical study, would make it difficult to understand Acehnese society and why it moved in 
certain directions. The kernel of Acehnese kingship was myth. Yet kingship was as much a 
contractually based institution in the sense that if the king did not rule justly, rebellion often 
ended his rule and assassination his life. These two strands of the origin of kingship in Aceh, 
the mythical and the contractual were rather incongruously combined.  
The sixteenth century provides many examples of cases in which the sultan’s rule was ended 
by rebellion and his life by assassination. The enumeration of successive sultans, their rivalry 
                                                 
1 Quoted . P. P. Roorda van Eijsinga: Bocharie al Djohari, De Kroon aller Koningen, (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 
1827). This is the Dutch translation of the Taj as-Salatin. This quote refers to the original text page 144.  
Roorda van Eijsinga, a colonial official, was the first to translate and introduce this work to the western public.   
The original manuscript composed by Buchari al Johari (about 1603) is in the possession of the British Library: 
registered as Or. Ms. 13295. 
 
According to Bernard Lewis the pen was a symbol of knowledge. In medieval Islam two often used 
classifications were ‘men of the pen’ (scribal and religious authorities) and ‘men of the sword’.  
The Political Language of Islam, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 141.        
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and their fall is described in the genealogy of the Acehnese rulers in the Bustan as-Salatin, by 
Nuru’d-din al Raniri, the religious scholar and prolific writer of treatises on Islam, who served 
at the court of Sultan Iskandar Thani and for several years also at the court of his successor, 
his widow Taj al-Alam Safiatu’d-din Shah.2 
Because the Islamic community is generally considered to constitute a single political 
community which is subordinate to Islamic Law, kingship is fundamentally a contractual 
obligation for the enforcement of the Law. The existence of a kind of moral covenant was 
evident on the day of the sultan’s installation, when the important men of the realm accepted 
his daulat or sovereignty.3  In the Adat Aceh which is perceived as a code of law of the 
sultanate, the procedures for the installation of the ruler are stipulated.4 
 
There are broadly two categories of texts written in the Malay language from which we are 
able to examine mythology and ‘thought’ or ideology in a broad sense and narrate a story of 
kingship; these are the hikayat (epic stories) and the chronicles. They function as the basis for 
a discussion of kingship as it was conceived and performed.  
Islamic scholars who were in most instances the writers and composers of the texts, were 
instrumental in disseminating the myths of kingship to a wider audience, a literate and also an 
aural one. Their seeming purpose was to defend the political system of the era, which was 
forced upon them by the prevailing circumstances and history. They evidently used 
meaningful juxtapositions to satisfy their audiences within a society that attached value to 
tradition and local belief systems and this  may reveal their anxieties with the institution of 
Islamic ruler-ship. 
                                                 
 
2 Teuku Iskandar (ed.), Bustanu’s-Salatin, Bab II, Fasal 13, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1966) 
 32-36. 
Iskandar utilized the copy which is in the possession of the Leiden University Library, codified as Cod. Or. 5443 
From now on I shall only refer to Teuku Iskandar’s edition. 
  
3 By formally accepting the daulat of a ruler, a contract or covenant was established. 
 See: A. H. Johns, “Political Authority in Islam”  in: Anthony Reid (ed.), The Making of an Islamic Political 
Discourse in Southeast Asia, (Monash papers on Southeast Asia – no. 27, 1993), 21. 
 
4 G.W.J. Drewes and Voorhoeve P. (eds.),  Adat Atjèh, reproduced in facsimile from a manuscript in the India 
Office Library, (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff,1958). 
The Leiden University Library possesses three copies : Cod. Or. 8213, 6501 and 7254. 
The editors have limited themselves to the parts 3 and 4 which are : (3) ‘The etiquette to be observed at the 
Court’ and (4) ‘Harbour regulations, duties and customs’. 
 Part I is a defective copy which concerns ‘Rules of government for Kings’. Part 2 concerns the Genealogy of the 
Acehnese Sultans which is included in the publication of a copy by T. J. Newbold in the Madras Journal of 
Literature and Science, Vol. III (Jan.-Apr. 1836) and Vol. IV (July-Oct. 1836).  
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The authority of the ruler and the obedience of the subject has been the cornerstone of Islamic 
politics, but Bernard Lewis, a historian of political Islam, asserts that ‘they are both neither 
absolute or unlimited, since they are subject to the law by which they are imposed and 
regulated.’ ‘The Muslim ruler may be and usually is an autocrat, but he is no despot. His 
office, and his tenure of that office, are established and regulated by the law, by which he is 
bound no less than is the humblest of his slaves. He may not change that law; in principle it is 
not even his function to interpret it.’5 We thus presume that the Islamic ruler is bound by the 
Law. Mythology on the other hand enshrines a king’s authority as almost sacrosanct. By 
juxtaposing Islam and mythology in this way, the Islamic scholars were performing a 
balancing act, which shows their occupational anxieties. 
It is far from my ability to employ a close-reading method of the narrative structures of the 
texts; my aim is to try to extract traditional expectation and perception of kingship, observe 
and analyse how it transformed towards the early modern age.  
 
 
 
 
1. 2. 2    The hikayat and the origin and meaning of kingship 
The hikayat can be regarded as a literary genre, used in the Malay world to write epics and 
legends.  As such it provides glimpses of the local belief system and myths of royal origin. 
The Dutch scholar G.W. J. Drewes asserts that the Acehnese hikayat is always composed in 
poetic form, contrary to the Malay hikayat which is a story in prose.6  As I set out in the 
Introduction, the Hikayat Aceh is essentially a prosaic story, a panegyric on the life of prince 
Darma Wangsa, also called Perkasa Alam and known to us as Iskandar Muda (the young 
Alexander), in which facts, myth and fiction are cleverly interwoven. The author of this 
panegyric, supposedly Sheikh Shamsu’d-din Pasai (‘al Samatrani’), the leading religious 
scholar at the courts of Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) and Mahkota 
Alam (Iskandar Muda), uses traditional mythology to expound the birth of the prince and also 
alludes to Iskandar D’zul-karnain (Alexander the Great) as the illustrious forebear of the 
Acehnese sultans. It looks as if he braided these stories from both the Hikayat Raja Raja 
Pasai which is the oldest Malay text describing royal genealogy and the culture of Samudra 
                                                 
5 The political language of Islam, 91. 
 
6 G.W.J. Drewes (ed.), Hikajat Potjut Muhamat (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 3. 
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Pasai, the first Islamic polity on the east coast of Sumatra, and the Hikayat Seri Rama which 
is based on Hindu mythology. To quote Teuku Iskandar, scholar of the classical Malay texts: 
‘It looks like the author derives from the story of Serie Rama the birth of Perkasa Alam 
(Iskandar Muda) from Maha Bisnu (lord Vishnu).’7  As such it may show a lasting appeal to 
old Hindu mythology at a time when Islam had established itself in Sumatra centuries earlier. 
The mystical path of Islam which was represented in northern Sumatra by the Sufi school of 
thought, smoothed the process of a gradual spread of the classical religious doctrine.8 
An avid reader discovers that the writer of the Hikyat Aceh presents the birth of Iskandar 
Muda as marking the unity of Aceh; the theme is central to the panegyric. He apparently used 
hidden passageways to bring the Mahkota Alam dynasty into the limelight after it was 
exhausted by rivalry and bloodshed.  In 1589 a member of the Daru’l-Kamal dynasty came on 
the throne. This ruler, Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil), was Iskandar Muda’s 
grandfather from mother’s side. Iskandar Muda’s father, Mansur Shah was apparently a 
member of the outlawed Mahkota Alam dynasty. 
According to the story, Mansur Shah received a dream in which the birth of his son was 
announced. He urinated from a fort into the river which fertilized the whole of Aceh.9           
The deep significance of the appealing metaphor lies in its unifying undertone. A unified state  
was indispensable at a time when the country was in peril and needed stability; rivalry for the 
throne in 1604 between the two sons of Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah had broken the cohesion of 
the polity, tainting its image. Assuming that this biographical work was composed after the 
birth of the prince, the consideration should be that the announcement (‘prophesy’) of his 
birth was purposefully brought in by the writer to sanctify his accession through usurpation, 
after he liquidated his uncle, the throne pretender. It is however not appropriate to suggest that 
the writer was in favour of the Mahkota Alam dynasty, for he had been the leading religious 
scholar at the court of Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah, a progeny of the Dar al-Kamal dynasty 
and the grandfather of the prince.      
The writer who was a witness of the struggle and rivalry between the two siblings, clearly 
ingrains in his audience the simple truth that Iskandar Muda was from both parental sides a 
prodigious child, in whom the two Acehnese dynasties came together. Thus Iskandar Muda’s 
birth came to symbolise the ultimate unification of the sultanate - of which the foundation was 
                                                 
7 Hikayat Atjéh, 46. 
 
8 On the subject  of mystical Islam in converted areas I refer to  P.S. van Koningsveld, De Islam (Utrecht: 
Uitgeverij De Ploeg, 1981), 111-14. 
 
9 Hikayat Atjéh, 56. 
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the unification of the two separate regions Mahkota Alam and Dar al-Kamal -, preserving the 
continuity of dynastic kingship. The book certainly has its merits as a unique document of 
royal myths entwined with true historical facts. 
Two well-known hikayat appeared during the latter part of the seventeenth and beginning of 
the eighteenth century, offering quite imaginative stories which allude to real historical 
occurrences and events. Even if I did not make a profound study of them, I was nonetheless 
able to extract the essence of these stories. The Hikayat Malèm Dagang is an epic, describing 
one of Sultan Iskandar Muda’s war expeditions to the Malay peninsula, most probably to 
Johor.10  Iskandar Muda’s expeditions to Johor are explored and analysed in Part Three. 
This epic’s striking feature is the heroism of the admiral of the sultan, named Malèm Dagang. 
The sultan on the other hand is depicted merely as a coward and weakling. One wonders why 
a story which runs so contrary to audience expectation of the ruler’s exclusive status, his 
bravery and authority, is used as the centre-piece in this hikayat. The writer, unnamed and 
unidentified, is a myth-buster who reveals his disdain for the sultan, safely writing long after 
the event which he claims to evoke, took place. I may safely conclude that this work was not 
written under royal patronage.                                                                                                 
Another epic of major significance is the Hikayat Pocut Muhamad which is probably 
composed by a religious scholar whose name is not recorded.11 The story describes the 
anarchical political situation prevailing in Aceh, a time when princes rivalled for rulership.12  
I clearly perceive of the writer’s great concern with dual government. Dual government was a 
political system practiced in several Malay polities.13 The principal figure in the story, Prince 
Muhamad abhors dual government which he believes is detrimental to the unity of the state 
and eventually jeopardizes its strength. In a dream God grants him a special place and 
success. He consults his brother whom he asks: 
                                                 
 
10 H. K. J.Cowan,  Hikajat Malèm Dagang: Atjehsch heldendicht, (KITLV, 1937). 
 
11 According to C. Snouck Hurgronje who includes an analysis of the narrative based on genre and structure, the 
writer was a man of religious  knowledge who resided in kampung Lam Rukam. ( The Acehnese, vol. II, 88-
100).     
 
12 I consulted the edition by G.W.J. Drewes,  Hikayat Potjut Muhamad.  
   
13 In the Hikayat Raja Raja Pasai there is talk of two ‘brother-kings’ in Samudra Pasai. A. H. Hill (ed.), Hikayat 
Raja Raja Pasai, (JMBRAS, vol. 33, 1960), 14. 
It is acknowledged that in several Malay kingdoms the system of dual government existed, like in Barus and 
Perak. I propose that  in Johor between 1579 and 1614  a similar system existed under Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat 
Shah and his brother Raja Seberang who was also known as Raja Ilir, the later Sultan Abdul Ma’ayat Shah. In 
Part Three chapter III I have explored and explained the political situation in Johor. 
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 “What do you think? What is your advice? I cannot bear the sight of two kings. That is what I 
cannot stand. The country goes to ruin and is thrown into disorder. We see that the royal 
compound has become a wood, and the Square a jungle. The main mosque is in complete 
disrepair and the country is doomed because of the two kings. People do not give notice of 
marriage and divorce anymore, because they see that there are two kings”.14 
“But people having the disposal of a ship all put out to sea; old and young, everyone is 
apprehensive. And for what reason? In Aceh pillage goes on unrestrained. Thieves are not 
kept in check, because there are two kings. When people see that disorder prevails, they say 
that Aceh is a most unholy country.”15 
It is tempting to see in this story the rivalry for the throne between the two sons of Sultan 
Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) which occurred around 1604. Augustin de 
Beaulieu, admiral of a French fleet that visited Aceh in 1621 gives some hindsight 
information about this sibling rivalry. His informants whom he calls living witnesses of that 
period, told him that Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah divided his state between his two sons: 
the kingdom of Pedir and the lands along the east coast went to the youngest son and the older 
one he declared king of Aceh and the lands on the west coast.16 These two princes rivalled for 
the throne, ending in rebellion and chaos. This is further explored in a following chapter. The 
composer of the Hikayat Pocut Muhamad  may have taken the rivalry of the two princes, 
which occurred almost a century earlier, as the argument to warn against dual government, 
preserving earlier memories and knowledge. The unity of the sultanate as imagined and 
‘prophesised’ in the Hikayat Aceh certainly had its resonance.  
Sultan Iskandar Muda, the heralded unifier of the Hikayat Aceh, started with a policy of  
centralization , drawing the trade of the ports on the west coast to the port city of Aceh 
(Bandar Aceh) which was also the seat of power and authority. It is debatable whether this 
was an effort to unify Aceh. I shall explore the trade relations in Part Two.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
14 Drewes, Hikayat Potjut Muhamad, 39- 41.  
   
15  idem. 
 
16  Melchisedech Thévenot (ed.), Mémoires du voyage aux Indes Orientales du General Beaulieu, dressés par 
luy-mesme in: Relations de divers voyages curieux (Paris : Cramoisy, 1666), vol 2, 114. 
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1. 2. 3     The chronicles and Acehnese ‘Thought’ 
The story of the development of Acehnese ‘thought’ as expressed in religion, philosophy, 
poetry and prose could only be written intelligibly if it was built on the foundation of dynastic 
history, which furnishes the indispensable chronological basis.  Following Nuru’d-din al 
Raniri’s Bustan as-Salatin (Bab II, fasal 13), which concerns Acehnese royal genealogy, this 
dynastic history starts around 1500 when Ali Mughayat Syah founded the Sultanate Aceh 
Darusalam (Dar as-Salam) by unifying the Dar al- Kamal and the Mahkota Alam regions, 
located south and north of the Aceh river. By adopting the epithet ‘Dar as-Salam’ (abode of 
peace), it is clear that Aceh distinguished itself from the  world of the ‘unbelievers’ in the 
‘Dar al-Harb, thus marking the borders. According to this eivision, territories which were no 
longer under Muslim rule became part of the House of War, and were subject to invasion and 
subjugation. 
Sheikh Nuru’d-din al Raniri, the composer of the Bustan as-Salatin evidently drew facts and 
ideas from the Hikayat Aceh of Sheikh Shamsu’d-din Pasai, the revered, influential Islamic 
scholar and mystic whose ideas and writings Nuru’d-din al Raniri - who is perceived as 
orthodox, - heavily criticised, advocating the burning of these writings and the execution of 
the Wugudyah mystics whom he called kafirs.17 Wugudyah mysticism was a local off-shoot 
of the Sufi school of thought which had found a fertile ground in northern Sumatra. 
In this work Nuru’d-din al Raniri employs contradictions probably to satisfy different 
audiences. Interpolating meaningful texts even though they seem in flagrant opposition with 
his orthodox inclination , illustrates his concern with both concrete and transgressive  
meanings. Apart from describing historical events and furnishing royal authority with myth 
and with religious authority, Nuru’d-din also extensively dwells on the construction of the 
splendid royal pleasure garden known as Taman Ghaira with its flowers, animals and water, 
fine buildings and other constructions. He introduced the Indian idea of a royal garden. He 
furthermore devotes exceptional attention to the funeral of Sultan Iskandar Thani in 1641, 
which was more than anything else a primeval affair in which animals with their legendary 
status were important participants. While it is inconceivable to see his hand in this 
manifestation of pre-islamic tradition, the attention given in his book to the funeral is quite 
significant and covers several pages. Was it perhaps his aim to distract the attention of a 
future literate audience from the anguish which gripped society when he advocated strict 
measures as a result of which people lost their freedom to follow their religious inclinations? 
                                                 
 
17 Bustanu’s Salatin , 8-9. 
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One is tempted to answer this question with a firm ‘yes’. He was very much a man of the pen; 
he knew the power of the written word.  
  
A work of a different order is the Taj as-Salatin (‘Crown of Kings’) which is supposed to 
have appeared in Aceh in 1603. Although it is a guide book for kings and government 
functionaries, it also directs its admonitions to the true followers of Islam. It admonishes the 
rulers and officials to rule and act justly. The enigmatic writer known by his pen-name 
Bukhari al Johari which may either mean the ‘mendicant’ from Johor or the ‘mendicant 
jeweler’(johari is the Arabic word for jeweller), who made the Taj or Crown, was a man of 
religion too, familiar with ancient Greek and other texts to which he refers. He uses Islamic 
allegory to highlight his origin or function. 
P.P. Roorda van Eijsinga, a Dutch colonial administrator who translated this work in Dutch 
includes a poem which starts as follows: ‘He who writes this text, should be dāl, ain, alif and 
ask the Lord for khāf, ba, wan, lam’.18  Roorda van Eijsinga omits a translation and 
explanation of this text, but even if a literal translation is produced, the meaning behind the 
words may elude the translator, still it is worth including for those who feel that they have the 
key to interpret it. One wonders why the writer of this generally perceived Furstenspiegel 
choose to remain anonymous when the sultan sanctioned its publication. Was he an original 
from Johor, Aceh’s Malay enemy? Interestingly the clue to the origins of the Taj is provided 
by Bukhari al Johari himself when he declares that it was conceived during the reign of the 
16th ruler of the Malay and the 10th of them who followed Islam, under whose rule the 
Hollanders first came to Johor. The first fleet from Holland under the command of admiral 
Van Heemskerk indeed arrived in Johor in 1603 when Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah was on 
Johor’s throne and his namesake Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Syah (Sayyid al Mukamil) was ruling 
Aceh under the latter’s patronage there existed a productive literary climate where prose an 
poetry were written. Bukhari al Johari explains that the Malay world devaluated and Malay 
literature degenerated when the Portuguese established themselves in Malacca in 1511. It is 
likely that he left Johor for Aceh where he could continue writing under the protective 
umbrella of the Acehnese sultan. At that time the Taj as-Salatin was not as influential in the 
Islamic ports as it supposedly became in later times, especially since it was written in Aceh 
which was at loggerheads with these ports.  
                                                 
 
18 P.P. Roorda van Eijsinga: Bochari van Djohor, De Kroon aller Koningen, (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1827), 1. 
This is a translation of the Taj as-Salatin by Buchari al Johari, composed around  1603  in Aceh. 
 35
Several scholars such as Richard Winstedt and Teuku Iskandar assume that it had been 
compiled from Persian works. The work is based on Islamic and moral precepts and refers to 
a book called ‘History of the Kings’ in which God blessed Alexander the Great with the 
highest human authority and magnanimity ‘because he spoke the truth, he was faithful and he 
shared his wealth’. The author’s fundamental concern was with these essential characteristics 
in a ruler. The Indonesian historian Taufik Abdullah establishes that one of the basic 
foundations of mystical Sufi teachings is cited in the first chapter of this work:‘Man arafa 
nafsahu arafa rubbahu’, ‘those who know themselves know their God’.19 This undoubtedly 
hints at a link with Persian Sufi works. 
The Taj as-Salatin consists of 24 chapters of which the last chapter concerns rules for ‘just 
and devout kings’. The value of this chapter is essentially its admonition to the rulers to be 
adil or righteous and to secure a state of well-being among their subjects. By using narrative 
as a tool and hagiographies as examples, it sets out to teach about just and unjust kings and 
God’s reward or punishment for them.20 
Islam requires from the ruler to respect and enforce religious law, to safeguard the worldly 
interests of the Islamic community, to defend or expand the frontiers, to wage war against 
unbelievers, to administer public property and the collection and expenditure of state 
revenues, to dispense justice and to maintain internal security and to build mosques. 
According to Taufik Abdullah the main concern of the Taj as-Salatin is to establish and 
secure an adil situation: ‘the pre-requisites of a ruler seem to have been designed to secure 
that the newly chosen ruler would prove himself to be an adil  king.’21 
Can we say with certainty that the system advocated by the Taj was wholly put into effect? 
We can glean to a limited degree from the notes of the foreigners in Aceh whether the sultan 
employed the adil principle.22 Yet, we should take into account that these notes are coloured 
by the foreigners’ own perceptions and background, making it difficult to grasp the actual 
conditions. 
                                                 
 
19 Taufik Abdullah, “The Formation of a Political Tradition in the Malay World”, in: A.Reid (ed.), The Making 
of an Islamic Political Discourse in Southeast Asia,(Clayton, Vic.: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash 
University, 1993), 35-58, 42. 
 
20 In his stimulating essayTaufik Abdullah claims that the adil  requirement remains the yardstick to evaluate 
the performance of the ruler,  but  that it can  never be used  to question the legitimacy of his daulat. 
 
21 ibid, 43. 
 
22 The subject of  Muslim authority is among others treated by  A.H. Johns in his article, “Political Authority in 
Islam” in: Reid (ed.), The Making of an Islamic Political Discours, 17-22. 
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 Hagiographies of prophets were sometimes included in the guide books as examples to the 
rulers. In Roorda van Eijsinga’s translation of the Taj as-Salatin a short hagiography of 
‘Omar’ (the caliph) is included.  According to this, Omar murdered his father because he did 
not believe in Mohamed, and  he had his son beaten to death, because he was immoral. 
The fact that Sultan Iskandar Muda had his son beaten to death around 1636 because he was 
immoral and committed adultery with the wife of a warrior23, may suggest that Iskandar 
Muda followed Omar’s good example. The question is whether the sultan liquidated this son 
because he acknowledged that the moral authority of the ruler (admonished by the Taj as-
Salatin) was extremely important in regard to the continuity of the state?  
He obviously feared that if this son would seize the throne, Aceh would crumble by internal 
strife 24. Its strong position in the region would diminish, giving its enemies an advantage in 
the power struggle. That was his chief concern. He needed a successor who did not incense 
Acehnese society by his amoral behaviour. Even in 1621 admiral Augustin de Beaulieu 
mentioned from talks he had with the sultan that the relationship between Iskandar Muda and 
his son suffered because this son was extremely cruel.  
The sultan had taken practical steps by nominating somebody else as his successor long 
before the execution date of his son. A captured prince of Pahang who was raised at the court, 
was appointed as his successor. The issue shall be treated further in this study. 
A. Hasjmy, historian and ulama includes a ‘hagiography’ of his own making in a work 
dedicated to female authority in Aceh 25, which tells us that Iskandar Muda fell sick after the 
execution of his son, and when his closest servants asked him if he felt any compunction for 
having put him to death he replied in Acehnese: ‘Mate aneuk na jirat, mate adat ho tamita’, 
meaning that when one’s child is dead, one can go to his grave, but when the law is dead, 
where can one go? 26  Hasjmy exults: ‘This is one example of Iskandar Muda’s righteousness 
(‘Suatu contoh dari keadilan Iskandar Muda’). Hasjmy’s intention seems to have been to 
present Iskandar Muda’s execution of his amoral son to avoid his accession of the throne, as a 
                                                 
23 Mentioned  by Augustin de Beaulieu. Lombard, Mémoires d’un voyage aux Indes Orientales 1619-1622,  
205. 
 
24 This seemed also the concern of the Dutch residents in Aceh. Daghregister 1637 (10-12 March), 86. 
 
25 A. Hasmy,  59 Tahun Aceh Merdeka di bawah Pemerintahan Ratu, (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1977), 45. 
Hasjmy disseminated royal myths to a  Acehnese audience struggling to come to terms with contemporary 
developments against the background of Aceh’s  historical importance as a fervent Islamic state.  
 
26 idem. Hasjmy quotes here  M. Zainuddin,  Singa Aceh, hlm. 181 (Medan: 1957) . 
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manifestation of adil. Perhaps in Hasjmy’s view Acehnese society - which had gone through 
difficult transitional stages - needed a positive impulse from exemplary deeds by the great 
men of bygone times.27 Thus contemporary scholars and writers such as Hasjmy and  
M. Zainuddin, as well as the writers of the court texts,  highlight the sultan’s exploits and the 
possible limits of his power, and use him to serve particular political purposes. 
In reality Iskandar Muda abused the rules of morality too and was ruthless if he did not get his 
way. We know of one case in particular reported by Dutch merchant Cornelis Comans who 
mentioned in a letter to Jan Pieterszoon Coen in Batavia in 1619, that one of the chiefs on 
Aceh’s west coast begged the help of the Dutch to oust the king of Aceh from there, in 
exchange for a pepper transaction. He and his family had fled from Aceh, because the king 
had set eyes on his wife and demanded her as a concubine. Iskandar Muda relentlessly 
pursued him, threatening to kill him.28   
Buchari al Johari, the composer of the Taj as-Salatin, declares ‘this book is composed from  
the precious words of many learned men from all over the world, whose names are well-
known.’29  By referring to the Greek political thinkers Aristotle, Hypocrates and Galenus, he 
informs us that he was familiar with many different ideas and concerned with diverse fields of 
life. However, to call the Taj therefore a book of ‘world thought’ would be a gross 
exaggeration, despite the fact that it adopted as paradigms several ideas of East and West. 
This is less strange than it seems to be, because Muslim philosophers in the Middle Ages 
endeavoured to reconcile the philosophic doctrines which they had inherited from ancient 
times with the religious teachings of Islam. They translated and adapted ancient Greek texts, 
notably the writings of Plato and Aristotle.30  
We don’t know with certainty what appealed to Buchari al Johari in Aristotle’s thinking to 
make it acceptable for an Islamic cadre. Was it in the teaching of the ethical and metaphysical 
that the Greek thinker’s ideas were inspiring to him? Developing on the basis of these 
underpinnings I must conclude that the Taj as -Salatin is not entirely original, yet it is a 
unique Malay document for Islamic ruler-ship. 
                                                 
27 Hasjmy also held the position of governor of the province of Aceh, known at that time as Daerah Istimewa 
Aceh  (the Special Territory of Aceh).  
 
28 The issue is addressed in Part Two of this study. 
 
29 De Kroon aller Koningen, 12. 
 
30 See the contributions in Joel L. Kraemer and Ilai Alon, (eds.), Religion and Government in the World of 
Islam, (Tel-Aviv, 1983); 
Also: Van Koningsveld,  De Islam, 34. 
Lewis, The political language of Islam,  26. 
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 Another work of significance is the Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals, appreciatively called 
the Sulalatu’l –Salatin, the genealogy of the Malaccan rulers, may have appeared around 1613  
in Aceh, after Sultan Iskandar Muda had sacked Johor and taken members of the royal family 
and a significant number of Johorese as his captives to Aceh. 31 The sultanate of Johor 
assumed the role of successor state of the sultanate of Malacca. The writing of this chronicle 
was commissioned by Raja Bongsu, younger brother of Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah of 
Johor, to Bendahara Tun Sri Lanang.32 It is based on an older one which preceded the arrival 
of the Portuguese in Malacca in 1511.  Apart from being a  royal genealogy it also describes 
Malaccan society and customs. There are clear similarities between the Sejarah Melayu and 
the oldest known Malay work which is the Hikayat Raja Raja Pasai, the chronicle of the 
kings of Pasai one of the very early Islamic kingdoms on the Malay speaking east coast of 
Sumatra, which became part of the Sultanate of Aceh around 1524. Before the Portuguese 
arrived  in Malacca, Sultan Mahmud Shah is said to have send his bendahara Tun 
Muhammad to Pasai to find answers for pressing religious issues.33 
Following the Hikayat Raja Raja Pasai, Iskandar Dzu’l-Karnain (Alexander the Great) was 
the mythical forebear of the Pasai kings. When Aceh annexed (Samudra) Pasai, it also 
inherently annexed its history; the Acehnese court-writers of the seventeenth century 
appreciatively utilized the myth of Iskandar Dzu’l-Karnain to suffuse the sultans with a 
numinous aura; the Hikayat Aceh, the Bustan as-Salatin and the Taj as-Salatin, all mention 
this myth of the royal ancestry. The influential religious scholar in Aceh, Sheikh Shamsu’d-
din originated from Pasai. He was instrumental in spreading the myth. For sage, sultan and 
commoner, myth seemed too irresistible to reject. 
 
Like the Acehnese works mentioned above, the Sejarah Melayu too aludes to Iskandar Dzu’l 
Karnain (Alexander the Great) as the illustrious forbear of the Malay kings:             
 “Ada pun nama kami dan bangsa kami bukannya daripada bangsa jin dan peri  Bahawa 
kami ini bangsa manusia asal kami daripada anak cucu Raja IskandarDzu’l-Karnain, nisab 
                                                 
 
31 The book itself gives the Hijrah year which is the year 1612 of  the Christian calendar as the year of its 
genesis. 
 
32 Tun Sri Lanang spoke to Sheikh Nuru’d-din al Raniri in Aceh (on Raniri’s first visit to Aceh) about the 
genesis of the Sejarah Melayu and declared that it was based on an older work which preceded the arrival of the 
Portuguese in Malacca in 1511. 
 
33 Hadi, Aceh and the Portuguese, 39. 
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kami daripada Raja Nushirwan adil Raja Masyrik dan Maghreb, dan pancar kami daripada 
raja Sulaiman Alahi ’s-Salam …….” 34 
(‘Our name and our origin do not come from jinn and are not made up of stories; we are the 
descendants of the grandson of Alexander the Great, the rightful king Nushirwan of the  East 
and the West and our very origin is from king Solomon.’)  
 
We thus identify Alexander the Great as the common mythical forebear of both the Acehnese 
and the Malay kings. Even if scholars put question marks at the correctness of the 
interpretation that Dzu’l-karnain who is cited in the Qur’an (verse 18:83), was the same as 
Alexander the Great, the outcome is irrelevant for our purpose. What is important is the fact 
that in the Malay world as well as in Aceh, Alexander the Great was revered as the herald of 
Islam and declared the forebear of the kings. The Ottoman rulers also alluded to Alexander 
the Great as the herald of Islam. Noteworthy is the fact that Aristotle to whom the writer of 
the Taj refers, was the teacher of Alexander the Great.35 
Although the Acehnese spoke their own language, Malay acquired the status of the language 
of literature, religion and trade. As I mentioned Sheikh Shamsu’d-din Pasai, the influential 
religious scholar and mystic who served for well over 30 years until 1629, the year of his 
death, originated from Pasai, the former Islamic sultanate where Malay was the vernacular. 
There can be little doubt that he was instrumental in propagating elements of the Malay 
culture. It is however clear that he did not invent the illustrious title Iskandar Muda (‘young 
Alexander’). It was a posthumous title for Sultan Perkasa Mahkota Alam made up by Sheikh 
Nuru’d-din al Raniri, appearing for the first time in the Bustan as-Salatin composed about a 
decade after the death in 1629 of Sheikh Shamsu’d-din Pasai. Nuru’d-din al Raniri’s patron 
and protagonist, the prince of Pahang who, as Iskandar Muda’s candidate for the throne, 
successively acquired the title Iskandar Thani (‘Iskandar the Second’). It is evident that 
Nuru’d-din continued with the Alexander myth of Acehnese kingship, introduced by his 
predecessor.        
 
                                                 
 
34 W.G. Shellabaer (ed.), Sejarah Melayu  (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967), 22. 
 
35 Anton-Hermann Chroust makes the interesting inference that the ‘Aristotelian conception of the polis was 
obscured by the Alexandrian ideal of the cosmopolis following the Macedonian’s world conquest.’ “Philosophies 
of the East” in: Review of Methaphysics, vol. XVIII, 3 (1965), 572-80. 
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A work of a different order is the Adat Aceh, a code of law, compiled by the copyists and 
scribes of the royal court, whose engagement was with statecraft rather than with ideology. 
They explicitly worked at the orders of the sultan.   
According to the Dutch scholar K.F.H. van Langen, the Adat Aceh was fashioned on the Adat 
Meukuta Alam (Mahkota Alam) which originates from the second half of the sixteenth 
century and should be credited to Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah ‘al Kahar’ (‘the conqueror’) 
who started to develop ideas on state structures. 36  Iskandar Muda initiated the parts 3 and 4 
which make up the edition of G.W.J. Drewes and P.Voorhoeve which we have at our 
disposal.37  Successive rulers, starting with the first female ruler Taju’l Alam Safiatu’d-din 
Syah (1641-1675) added their own ordinances. In relevant cases the stipulations and 
regulations shall be discussed in this study. 
Since most texts which I briefly discuss here, were composed during the seventeenth century, 
it means inter alia that they were written with the locale, a unique Asian Islamic milieu in 
mind and that myths of Acehnese kingship were transmitted by religious scholars cum court 
writers more than a century after the sultanate had come into existence. Because their basis is 
different, we are able to glean how kingship was acquired, proclaimed and conceived.  
 
 
 
 
1. 2. 4    The obstacles to conceptualising kingship 
In the older literature kingship in Southeast Asia is often discussed from the angle of Hindu 
and Buddhist concepts in which the parallelism between the macrocosm and the microcosm is 
central.38  Such an approach describes the links between these worldly men with the universe 
and explains the power of the king as resulting from the idea of concentric circles within 
                                                 
36 K.F.H. van Langen, De Inrichting van het Atjehsche Staatsbestuur onder het Sultanaat  (‘s-Gravenhage: 
Nijhoff, 1888). 
 
37 Adat Atjèh, 17. In  the year of his accession to the throne (1015 H.) which is 1607 of the Christian calendar, 
Sultan Iskandar Muda ordered Orang Kaya Seri Maharadja Lela, Penghulu Kerkun Radja Setia Muda, Kerkun 
Katibul-Muluk Seri Indera Sura and Kerkun Seri Indera Muda, officials of the Balai Besar, to make a certified 
copy (suruh tandakan surat seperti) of the tarakatas,  the royal edicts. 
 
38 R. Heine Geldren endeavoured to take the attention away from the long accepted one in which Hindu and 
Buddhist concepts were central. See: “Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia”, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University, paper no. 18, 1956). 
Several scholars after him also used a different line of thinking to describe political thought and kingship in 
Southeast Asia, to name a few: A.H. Johns, Peter Riddell, Mahmoud Ayoub. 
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which the interactions are predestined. But the idea that a Mandala, in this case a circle of 
kingdoms, contracted or expanded because of shifting allegiances, depending on a spiritually 
dominant centre, is flawed. Scholars were inclined to describe Southeast Asian history as a 
continuation of processes even after Islam entered the scene. By doing so, they did not give an 
adequate picture of the historical reality, because the contingencies were generally ignored 
and even obscured. Situations of the sixteenth and seventeenth century are not merely 
reflections of the past; the encroaching European world impacted on the developments and the 
allegiances. 
Let us for a brief moment dwell at the intellectual debate.  D.G. E. Hall, a leading Southeast 
Asian historian, criticizes the characterizations used by the French scholar G. Coedès :‘the 
decline of the Hindu Kingdoms’ and ‘the end of the Hindu kingdoms’ of the two subsequent 
periods up to 1511 which started Portuguese presence, saying ‘it betrays a failure to observe 
the real nature of the political and cultural developments of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, namely, the fact that leading peoples, not only of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, but in 
Indonesia also, were developing their own highly individual political systems and cultures.’39 
While these views intrinsically imply that Hindu notions were steadfastly outmoded, this does 
not mean that pre-Islamic notions totally collapsed in the face of the coming of Islam and pre-
modern civilization. As the Dutch scholar R.A. Kern observed, the arrival of Islam did not 
necessarily impact with force on the existing cultures. Islam in the Malay and Indonesian 
world was accommodative and able to absorb local customs. Kern established that traces of a 
pre-Islamic past can still be found in some of the rituals and customs of Islam, for example 
the word sembahyang, prayer or to pray, in fact refers to offering homage or sembah to 
Hyang, the primal ancestor of pagan times.40 
Indeed, it cannot be denied that several matters survived the peaceful infiltration of Islam in 
the Sumatran ports, alluding  to a remote past. The local intelligentsia adapted the new faith to 
their traditions in what can be regarded as a cross-insemination between local cultures and 
Islam. I may refer to  the use of the Sanskrit title ‘Raja’, which is an accepted title in the 
Islamised areas of the region. The letter R points to the word Rahmet (mercy); the letter A 
from its upright form, to the erecting of the Caliphate on earth by Allah, and his establishment 
                                                 
39  Hall,  A History of South-East Asia, xxii, xxiv. 
Hall refers to G. Coedès, Les États Hindouisés d’Indochine et d’Indonésie, (Paris: 1948, new and revised edition, 
1964).  
 
40 Quoted.  Farish A. Noor, “Rethinking the Islamization of the Malay World”, (Leiden: IIAS Newsletter,  27, 
March 2002) The writer refers to the ideas of R.A. Kern as published in: Gordon, Alijah (ed.), The Propagation 
of Islam in the Indonesian-Malay Archipelago, (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute 
(MSRI), 2001), 472. 
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of the Amir Allah (commands of Allah), through the agency of kings; the letter J to the word 
jemal (beauty).41 It is obviously reconciled with Muslim appreciation.   
A tradition which we may trace back to Hindu custom is that when the sultan died, the 
orangkaya shaved their hair as a sign of grief.42 Pre-Islamic and primeval elements were still 
part of the royal burial processions in which legendary animals took central stage. The Bustan 
describes in extenso the burial procession of Sultan Iskandar Thani, which may therefore be 
regarded as an important rite of passage for the sultans even if the main characteristic of the 
procession was pre-Islamic. It is quite remarkable that Nuru’d-din al Raniri enhances on 
Iskandar Thani’s visit to the grave of his father in Pahang ,where he held a khanduri (ritual 
meal or feast) to mark his father’s death, explaining that this was an ancient royal custom.43  
Nuru’d-din al Raniri who is considered the most orthodox of the religious scholars at the 
Acehnese Court, thus highlights Islam’s accommodation to local customs. It may give the 
impression that there was hardly any ‘tension’ between Islam and adat or local custom. 
If the foundation of the Islamic sultanate inculcates the formation of Acehnese kingship, is 
the corollary therefore that Acehnese kingship was an Islamic institution? Even if the answer 
to this question is ‘yes’, one is still faced with the dilemma of several of the court traditions 
which do often express the inescapable concomitant of human societies. The brisk 
developments for example in trade and diplomatic relations with the Europeans, also 
evidently impacted on how kingship was traditionally perceived. 
  
 
 
 
1. 2. 5     Influences on Acehnese ‘Thought’  
The successive Acehnese rulers were influenced by ideas on government and statecraft which 
spread to the littoral by way of the arrival of traders and religious men from diverse countries  
suh as Turkey, Arabia, Persia, India and China.44  It is a truism that trade and the transfer of 
religions and various ideas went hand in hand. 
                                                 
 
41 Adat Atjèh , 15. 
 
42 Dutch merchants mentioned  that the orangkaya  shaved their heads as a sign of grief.  
 Dagh-Register Anno 1637,  86, 87. 
 
43 Bustanu’s-Salatin, 58 : ‘Dan di-dirikan khanduri Paduka Marhum Yang Mahamulia itu saperti yang tersebut 
kemuliaan segala raja2 yang telah lalu itu pada masa dahulu kala wallahu a’lamu.’ 
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The acceptance of Islam evidently set in motion a new way of thinking about governance and 
the relations between ruler and ruled. Islam as a vehicle for statecraft also imbued the idea of 
concepts like ‘God’s deputy ’(khalifat Allah) and ‘God’s shadow on earth’(dzu’l Allah fi’l-
alam). Sultan Iskandar Thani made use of these sublime titles in his letters to the Dutch 
Governor-general Van Diemen and Prince Frederick Hendrik of Orange Nassau, which he 
wrote just after his installation in 1637.45  
It is instructive to note that khalif occurs in the Qur’an twice, once referring to Adam and 
once to David. After the death of prophet Muhammad the historic caliphate begins. Abu Bakr 
succeeded the prophet as the head of the Islamic community and was called Khalifatu Rasul 
Allah, deputy of the Prophet.46  Sultan Iskandar Thani thought himself the deputy of Allah 
and not the deputy of the Prophet. In their letters to their European counterparts, Iskandar 
Muda and Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) stressed their political authority by 
describing the lands under their power, rather than their religious authority.47  
Royal authority evidently attained a greater religious undertone with the arrival of  Sheikh 
Nuru’d-din al Raniri at the court of Sultan Iskandar Thani. 
     
The view among older scholars is that the Acehnese rulers borrowed ideas on statecraft and 
certain cultural elements from the Moghuls of India 48; it is warranted to look at several 
characteristics of both courts before we are able to corroborate this view. 
                                                                                                                                                        
44  A.W.’S. Sullivan (tr.): Snouck Hurgronje, The Acehnese,), 2 vols, ( Leyden: Brill, 1906), vol. II,. 278 
‘Those who sowed in the Far East the first seeds of Islam were no zealots prepared to sacrifice life and property 
for the holy cause, nor were they missionaries supported by funds raised in their native land. On the contrary 
these men came hither to seek their own worldly advantage, and the work of conversion was merely a secondary 
task. Later on too, when millions had in this way been  won over to Islam, it was the prospect of making money 
and naught else that attrackted hitherward so many teachers from India, Egypt, Mecca and Hadramaut.’  
 
45 A translaet (translation) of the letter to Van Diemen is registered in the National Archives as  VOC 1.04.02: 
11264.  Also published in Dagh-Register int Casteel Batavia anno 1640-1641, 6-9.   
The Library of the University of Leiden is in the possession of the original letter written in Arabic from Sultan 
Alau’d-din Mughayat Shah (Iskandar Thani) to Prince Frederik Hendrik of Orange written around 1637 ( Cod. 
Or 4818a- 1-3). This letter is included in the Annex.  
 
46 Lewis, The political language of Islam, 44- 45. 
47 See the Translaet of Iskandar Muda’s letter of 1610 to Prince Maurice:  NA: VOC 1.04.02: 11263.  The 
translation is also published in: J.E. Banck,  Atchin’s Verheffing en Val. 
Letter to King James I of England written in 1612 in: W.G. Shellabaer “Some Old Malay Manuscripts”  
(JSBRAS, 1898) 123-130. 
ibid., 17. Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah’s  letter to the governors of the west coast to announce the English 
arrival and interest to buy pepper in their ports. 
 
48 G. P. Rouffaer asserts that the Acehnese sultans styled their seals on those of the Moghuls. “De 
Hindostansche oorsprong van het Negenvoudig Sultans-Zegel van Atjeh” (BKI, vol. 3/4 part 59, 1906); 
Bertram Schrieke supports the view that the Acehnese sultans were much influenced by Moghul Court traditions: 
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Teuku Iskandar, who edited and discussed the Hikayat Aceh, the panegyric on the life of the 
young Iskandar Muda, is of the opinion that its author was influenced by the Akbarnama, a 
biography of  Emperor Akbar, who ruled northern India from 1555 to 1605, written by Abu’l-
Fazl, one of Akbar’s closest advisors.49  He sees similar trends in the lives of both men, in 
their interests and education and notes similar arrangements of the contents of the book. Yet, 
even if there are mirror images in their lives, and even if the Akbarnama functioned as a basis 
for the writing of the Hikayat Aceh, it is generally acknowledged in scholarly circles that 
Muslim text-writers and poets since the Middle Ages played prominent roles in describing 
history and the history of the rulers of their realm who frequently employed them for the task 
of polishing their image. This long established custom was copied simultaneously in different 
polities in the Islamic world.50  There can be little doubt that both the Moghul emperors and 
the Acehnese sultans were aware of this custom, simply because religious scholars at their 
courts were well travelled and visited the holy places of Islam. We should not leave out the 
possibility that certain ideas on government derived from the ancient Indian treatise 
Arthasastra written by Kautilya  especially for the Mauryan Empire, because this treatise 
influenced many thinkers and writers on statecraft and governance all over the world.51   
An attempt to establish the degree of Moghul influence on the rulers of Aceh needs a closer 
look at different aspects of Moghul court culture and compare these with the realities of Aceh. 
Taking expansion as one of the core elements of the Akbar era, it is indubitable that 
successive Acehnese rulers were aware of Akbar’s successes in this field. But the question is 
whether there was a connection between Akbar’s expansion and that of Sultan Alau’d-din 
Ri’ayat Shah (al Kahar) who was his contemporary and who is credited for Aceh’s territorial 
expansion, in other words can we establish that the Acehnese ruler (s) were inspired by and 
followed the example of the Moghuls?  In formulating an answer I advance the thesis that 
                                                                                                                                                        
Indonesian Sociological Studies, 2 vols. (Bandung/’sGravenhage, 1959, 1960). 
    
49 Hikayat Atjéh, 22. 
 
50 Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, 10: 
 ‘ In the days before the advent of the media, the poet had an important role in the field of propaganda and of 
what we nowadays call public relations, and poetry could often be an important weapon of political warfare. For 
the modern historian, it is often an invaluable source of information on the language of political discourse, and 
on the allusions to which the poet knew his listeners would respond. In addition to poetry, we have at our 
disposal a vast mass of literary and documentary evidence, the former including a wide range of historical and 
political writings, the latter reflecting many different aspects of both conduct of government and the waging of 
political warfare among Muslims from medieval to modern times.’ 
 
51 Narasingha P. Sil (ed.), Kautilya’s Arthasastra, a comparative study (London: Sangam Books Limited, 1985). 
D. G. E. Hall also briefly points to this ancient Indian treatise in connection to governance in Southeast Asia, but 
he does not pursue an analogy: A History of Southeast Asia,  250-1. 
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Aceh was a maritime power, the Moghul Empire was land based, something which already 
sets them apart. The sultanate Aceh Darusalam rose as a reaction to Portuguese incursions in 
the Straits region and their attack on Muslim trade and shipping. Historians perceive  of 
Emperor Akbar’s expansion as pure aggression with the intention to become the unrivalled 
ruler of India.52 
If court architecture can be regarded as a parameter to establish similarities in expression, it is 
evident that the architecture in Aceh was different from that of the Moghuls. Akbar was 
known for building huge forts, like the one in Agra and he established an elegant court-city in 
Fatehpur Sikri where today the sophisticated style of architecture is still preserved. The 
mausoleum which Emperor Shah Jehan built for his wife Mumtaz Mahal is an outstanding 
example of Moghul intricate architecture which was missing in Aceh. 
The foreigners in Aceh had an outspoken opinion of the architecture; although they spoke of a 
strong palace, they mention at the same time that it was built like the local houses which stood 
on poles and were covered with matting. 53 The forts were not imposing, and if we accept the 
description by John Davis who was in Aceh in 1599 and in 1602 as correct, in fact quite 
unremarkable ‘…. over which stood a stone fort, which was without covering, battlements, or 
flankers, low walled like a Pownd, a worse cannot bee conceived.’ Even the Hikayat Aceh 
points to the fact that the city needed no protection walls because its strength lay in its 
elephants. 54 
When the VOC fleet under admiral Verhoeven (Verhoeff) was anchored in Aceh in 1608, the 
disembarking made different observations. They spoke of a strong and beautiful castle with 
strong walls and fitted with palisades and metal pieces on all the sides to defend the fortress 
and the city. But it is doubtful that the castle to which they referred was styled on the 
exclusive Moghul architecture. 
Sultan Iskandar Thani took the construction of the beautiful royal garden with its flowers and 
fruit trees, known as the Taman Ghairah to hand, probably at the suggestion of his religious 
advisor Sheikh Nuru’d-din al-Raniri. A description is found in the Bustan as-Salatin.55 
                                                 
 
52 Percival Spear (ed.), The Oxford History of  India ( Delhi: Oxford University Press), Fourth Edition, 1958), 
341.    
 
53 The French merchant Francois Martin who visited Aceh in 1602  among other things gave a description of the 
lay-out of the city of Aceh. In: Reid, A., Witnesses to Sumatra, 55-63.  
 
54 Hikayat Atjéh, 165. 
 
55 Bustanu’s Salatin, 48- 49. 
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Originating from India the sheikh was familiar with the Moghul gardens and it looks like the 
Taman Ghairah was an adaptation of the Moghul gardens with its flowers such as the lotus 
and water lilly, its fruit trees and waterworks. Yet it is interesting to know that the Mauryan 
emperors of ancient India, Chandragupta and Asoka, constructed pleasure gardens full of 
flowers and fruit trees for the recreation of men and animals.56 I infer that both the Moghul 
pleasure gardens and the Taman Ghairah had their roots in the Mauryan gardens. 
I admit that this brief and limited comparison based on some basic aspects of the Moghul and 
Acehnese realities has its flaws. It implies however that a careful examination of the many 
dimensions of Moghul and Acehnese court traditions and politics is necessary to arrive at a 
compelling conclusion.  One should realize that Aceh was already an established and 
powerful sultanate when Emperor Akbar, one of the greatest Moghul rulers came to the 
throne. Although Akbar was brought up as a Sunni Muslim, his religious views changed 
gradually to the point that he adopted ideas which were spread by the different creeds in 
Indian society. During the latter half of his reign Muslims were even subjected to 
persecution.57 
Turkey deserves a more prominent place in ascribing influences on Aceh.58 The principal 
consideration is that the Ottoman emperor, who was the main supplier of Aceh’s artillery and 
cannons, technicians and artisans in the second half of the sixteenth century, was regarded the 
caliph of the Suni Islamic community; he was the example of power, piety and courage. The 
official contacts between Aceh and Turkey started in 1565, when Sultan Alau’d-din R’ayat 
Shah (al Kahar) sent an official delegation to the emperor with the request to form a military 
alliance against the Portuguese in Malacca. The Ottoman emperor even declared that he was 
the king of the West and that the king of Aceh was the king of the East.59  It is quite logical 
that ideas on statecraft also flowed from that same direction. 
We gather from the Bustan and from several of the royal letters that the Acehnese rulers used 
the Turkish title ‘sultan’60; the Moghul rulers were in favour of the title ‘shah’. Akbar was the 
                                                 
56 Looking at the construction of the Taman Ghairah  with inside its borders a mosque and pools , Anthony Reid 
is of the opinion that ‘it was not simply a garden for pleasure, but for that highest form of pleasure represented 
by the mystic communion with God’ (An Indonesian Frontier, 134). 
 
57 The Oxford History of India, 357-359. 
 
58 See for example: Anthony Reid , “Sixteenth century Turkish influence in western Indonesia” in: Journal of 
the Historical Society of the University of Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: 1969, vol. X), 411 onwards. 
 
59 Hikayat Atjéh, 18. 
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padshah. The private army of Iskandar Muda was trained like the Turkish janissaries.61  In 
Turkey they formed an elite army of celibates who lived according to strict rules. Whether 
this was the case in Aceh cannot be established. 
As distinct from G. P. Rouffaer who speaks of similarities between the Moghul and Acehnese 
seals 62, and H. Djajadininggrat who claims that Aceh copied the Moghul emperor’s seal 63, 
Anabel Teh-Gallop establishes, that the seal of Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al 
Mukamil), the grandfather of Sultan Iskandar Muda, resembles the Ottoman seals of the late 
16th century, ‘yet Ottoman influence cannot be discerned in all formal aspects of the seal. For 
example the continuous round border inscription is not typically Ottoman, as in most Ottoman 
seals with border inscriptions the inscription is usually contained within a number of distinct 
cartouches, sometimes separated by rosettes or elaborate plaited knots; nor is the hand directly 
comparable with that found on other Ottoman seals of the same period. This strongly suggests 
that the seal was made in Aceh, but within a climate of a considerable degree of acculturation, 
and leaves open the possibilities that the seal was either made by a Turkish craftsman, perhaps 
long resident in Aceh and adjusted to Acehnese norms, or by an Acehnese or other foreign 
craftsman with some knowledge of the iconographic vocabulary of Ottoman seals’.64  
It may have been the Acehnese ‘imperial ideal’ based on crushing Portuguese authority and 
hegemony and its resonance with the Ottoman Empire, that enhanced the sultan’s power 
towards the second half of the sixteenth century and well into the seventeenth century. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
60 A. H. Johns, an expert on Islam in Asia, explains that the word sultan according to the Qur’an means 
authority. With the Seljuks it became a regular sovereign title. While the title caliph connotes religious authority 
by a ‘valid’ line of succession, anyone who had sufficient charisma and was at the right place and time could 
become sultan. In:“Political Authority in Islam: Some Reflections Relevant to Indonesia” in:  Reid (ed.), The 
Making of an Islamic Political), 23. 
 
61 A. Reid,  An Indonesian Frontier Acehnese & Other Histories of Sumatra, 88. 
 
62 G. P. Rouffaer,  De Hindostansche oorsprong van het negenvoudig sultans-zegel van Atjeh, (’s-
Gravenhage:Smits, 1906). 
      
63 H. Djajadininggrat, “Critisch overzicht van de in Maleische Werken vervatte gegevens over de Geschiedenis 
van het Sultanaat Atjeh”,  BKI 65 (1911), 176. 
 
64 A. Teh-Gallop, “Ottoman influences in the seal of Sultan Alauddiin Riayat Syah of Aceh (1589-1604)”,  in: 
Indonesia and the Malay World, vol. 32, issue 93, July 2004, 176-190. 
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1. 2. 6     Succession    
The seeming absence in Aceh of a strict rule of primogeniture was one of the causes of 
dynastic disputes and rebellion, liquidation and usurpation, as the historical reality especially 
of the sixteenth century and the first part of the seventeenth century demonstrates. Neither the 
hand-book for kings, the annals or chronicles, nor the code of law, the Adat Aceh outline the 
rules for succession. Although the preferential claim of the eldest son to succeed his father on 
the throne was usually acknowledged,  his absolute right was not established. The sultan 
nominated his successor, sometimes overriding the claim of his eldest son. Most curiously, 
Ralph Croft, an assistant of the English General Thomas Best, who was in Aceh in 1613 
mentions the following: 
‘If the King have more sons than one, when he dies they are all put to death save the eldest, or 
conveyed furth of the kingdome into some other countree, because they shall not contend for 
the crowne after the Kinges death’. 65 Even if the story is twisted, it was the tendency to 
appoint sons as governors in far away territories; Alau’d’-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al 
Mukamil) appointed one of his sons son as his governor in Pedir, while the prince who he 
destined for the throne lived with him in the palace. After his abdication rivalry for the throne 
broke out between the two, which threw the country in turmoil. 
Alau’d-din Ri’yat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) was an usurper, most probably a former 
panglima and the primus inter pares of the Acehnese orangkaya. The sultan he served was 
murdered with or without his knowledge. After a rebellion of the orangkaya in 1589  in which 
the young crown-prince, Raja Buyong, also known as Raja Ashem, who was under his 
protection, was liquidated, Alau’d-din was installed on the throne which some sources say, he 
claimed in the name of his wife who was a relative of the murdered sultan.66 This is 
                                                 
 
65 W. Foster, The voyage of Thomas Best to the East Indies 1612-14,  ‘Journal of Ralph Croft’, 176. 
 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1934).  
Croft was no witness of an  accession,  he was there in 1613 and  the war for succession  had  raged in 1604 
when the two sons of Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) were contesting for the throne. One was the 
governor of Pedir while the other was destined by his father to succeed him. He ascended the throne in 1604 as 
Ali Ri’ayat Shah. 
The situation sketched  here, was not unique of Aceh; it apparently that this happened in many kingdoms in the 
Malay world and also in other parts of the world. 
 
66 R. Heine-Geldren establishes in his influential essay on kingship in Southeast Asia that in many Asian 
polities there have been attempts to prove legitimacy for the throne; ‘again and again usurpers have striven for a 
semblance of legitimacy by construing genealogies linking themselves to the dynasty they had overthrown or to 
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mentioned by John Davis who also learned from the locals that Alau’d-din was a former 
fisherman who ascended to the exalted function of advisor to the sultan. The same is 
mentioned by Francois Martin, who participated in the French expedition of 1602 to Aceh and 
the rumour persisted, for Augustin de Beaulieu who was in Aceh two decades later in 1621 
also mentions this. Eventually and inevitably the local people’s perception and gossip helped 
to shape the global view of Acehnese kingship. 
The Bustan as-Salatin  however calls Alau’d-din R’iayat Shah the son of Firman Shah of the 
Dar al-Kamal dynasty; evidently a prominent antecedent was a major criterion to accept a 
candidate for the throne when he was not the legitimate successor. One is prone to ask if the 
Bustan which is the work of a religious scholar, ascribes legitimate power bestowed by God, 
or did it sanction power by those who had the skill to seize it? The conditions prevailing at the 
time were important indicators of how to solve problems of succession. The situation was as 
follows: the murdered crown prince Buyong was the young son of the sultan of Johor and a 
daughter of the sultan of Aceh. It seems in my opinion most likely that the orangkaya rebelled 
against his accession, to save Aceh from the disgrace of becoming Johor’s vassal state and 
appointed Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah as sultan of Aceh. I thus assume that this coup d’état 
served a higher purpose, it was therefore legitimate and usurpation was accepted. 
Alau’d- in Ri’ayat Shah’s grandson Iskandar Muda also seized the throne in1607 from his 
maternal uncle who governed the port of Pedir; he was an usurper too. The young prince had 
proven his prowess in action against the invading Portuguese in 1606 and his determination 
impressed his uncle, the sitting sultan and the elites of the realm. His ambitious mother was 
the driving force behind his run for the throne and with the support of important courtiers 
whom she paid large sums of money, he was installed the same day the ruling sultan died. As  
What does Islam say of usurpation? According to Bernard Lewis there were different views 
on usurpation posed by various Islamic jurists of different sects, but ‘only one requirement 
survived the rest – that the ruler rules justly. The notion of usurper thus lost its meaning; but 
that of tyrant remained. In other words, when a ruler was challenged on religious grounds, the 
challenge was not based on the manner in which he had gained power, but on the manner in 
which he exercised it – not usurpation, but tyranny.’ Important aspects in exercising power 
were public acceptance, maintenance of Islamic ritual practices and moral principles. 67  
                                                                                                                                                        
a dynasty which at an earlier period had governed the country’. “Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast 
Asia”, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, paper no. 18, 1956). 
 
67 The Political Language of Islam, 103. 
This explanation echoes the admonition of the Taj as-Salatin  that a ruler should be adil. 
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As I earlier mentioned, the Taj as-Salatin  admonishes righteousness and it is noteworthy that 
the Arthasastra promulgates that moral perversity may also exclude a prince from succession, 
‘a wicked son, though an only one, should never ascend the throne’. It warns the rulers against 
the intrigues both of sons and wives, ‘for princes, like crabs, eat their own parents’.68  Princes 
in Aceh were educated and trained with great care; captured princes and the sons of vassals 
were also part of these training processes. The dalam or palace known at that time as the 
Daru’d-Dunya  (Dar al-Dunya) provided this royal education. We may infer that the activities 
of the princes were strictly controlled to ensure that they would not revolt against the sultan. 
According to the Bustan Sultan Ala’ud-din Ri’ayat Shah abdicated in 1604  in favour of his 
son the Sultan Muda ( crown prince), and died shortly afterwards. Abdication was not the 
usual way to end one’s reign as the conditions of the latter part of the sixteenth century show. 
Alau’d-dins two sons competed for the throne which coincided with the calamity of droughts 
and famine, resulting in the death of numerous  people. The Bustan does not refer to the 
rivalry for the throne, which is strange because Sheikh Nuru’d-din al Raniri must have known 
about the events. 
The crown prince came to the throne as Sultan Ali’Ri’ayat Shah and ruled from 1604-1607. 
When he died his nephew Iskandar Muda seized the throne with the help of influential 
courtiers. As the son of Raja Mansur Shah of the Mahkota Alam dynasty and the grandson of 
Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) of the Darul Kamal dynasty, he represented 
two royal dynasties. It is clear that the writer of the panegyric on Iskandar Muda, the Hikayat 
Aceh, made use of the alluring quality of myth to announce the birth of his protagonist, 
legitimising his usurpation of the throne and establishing him as the symbol of Acehnese 
unity. Following his grandfather and uncle, Iskandar Muda executed a number of orangkaya 
to avoid their rebellion. It implicitly shows the influential position of the orangkaya in matters 
of succession. 
 
 
 
 
1. 2. 7    The appointment of the Prince of Pahang as Sultan   
Iskandar Muda nominated his successor long before he passed away in 1636. The Bustan tells 
us that the sultan summoned Sheikh Shamsu’d-din Pasai and the Kadi Maliku’l-‘Adil to 
                                                 
 
68 R. P. Kangle (ed./ transl.), The Kautiliya  Arthasastra , 3 vols , Pt.i,  (Bombay, 1960), 17. 
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officially announce to them and the assembled courtiers that he had appointed Sultan Hussain, 
a captured prince from Pahang, who he had renamed Sultan Mughal, as his successor.69  This  
must have taken place before 1629, the year in which Sheikh Shamsu’d-din Pasai passed 
away. The appointment of this prince long before his own death in 1636, was not an 
impulsive act, but it had been carefully planned and it was a solid decision. Our source, 
admiral Augustin de Beaulieu , claims that Iskandar Muda had only one legitimate son, whose 
cruel disposition made him unfit to rule. 
The appointment of the prince of Pahang came after Iskandar Muda had invaded Pahang 
twice in succession, in 1617 and 1618 to crush Aceh’s enemy Johor’s control over Pahang 
where the orangkaya rebelled against their ruler who was inclined to Johor and where the 
Portuguese had tried to become influential. In Pahang, as well in Johor, the descendants of the 
expelled Sultan of Malacca were ruling. By appointing the Pahang prince as his successor, it 
looks as if Iskandar Muda wanted to legitimise his power over Pahang, dealing a blow to 
Johor’s ambitions to control its neighbouring (kin)-state.70 It was part of his geo-political 
strategy. This was later used by Nuru’d-din al Raniri to lift Pahang to an almost divine status, 
because it delivered Aceh a king.  
The appointment of the prince of Pahang came as a surprise to the assembled orangkaya, even 
though the candidate in question was married to Isakandar Muda’s eldest daughter. The 
perdana menteri  (first minister), straightforwardly asked the sultan why he wanted the prince 
of Pahang to succeed him. Alerted, Iskandar Muda said that if they (the assembly) had 
somebody else in mind they should make this immediately known.71  Dread of rebellion and 
conspiracy was a continuous anxiety for the sitting sultan, he was therefore obliged to listen to 
what his orangkaya had to say, whether he paid serious attention to their grievances or took 
their council or not. In this case it was merely an order to accept his decision. 
The prince of Pahang was appointed without known opposition. One wonders if the 
orangkaya were convinced that the choice was a good one, recognizing the political purport; 
Pahang was important as the opponent of Johor. Or were they too weak to oppose the strong 
                                                 
 
69 The ‘judge of the righteous king’. 
 
70 This is a subject of Part Three of this dissertation. 
 
71 Bustanu’s-Salatin, 13 : The perdana menteri  said: “Ya tuanku Shah Alam, barang ma’alum kira-nya bahawa 
ngadap nobat itu kapada suatu penjuru jua”. This can be paraphrased as: ‘ Our Lord, we are sure you will 
understand that we pledge our loyalty in one line’. This statement shows the assembled men’s confusion to 
accept a candidate who did not hail from the Acehnese royal line. 
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Iskandar Muda? The relationship between the ruler and the orangkaya was by tradition a 
difficult one; although the European merchants mention several cases of Iskandar Muda’s 
cruel treatment, humiliation and execution of orangkaya and the confiscation of their goods, 
they do not speak of an actual rebellion against him. Instead, from the documentation we draw 
that in matters of the trade, the orangkaya were influential and Iskandar Muda often listened 
to them. It seems that the orangkaya formed a pretty extensive group, ranging from a number 
of courtiers and other functionaries, governors who held sway over provinces, to a relatively 
large number of district chiefs and rich merchants. 
The installation of the Pahang prince as the ruler of Aceh in 1636 took place without the 
customary rebellion and bloodshed, despite the fact that the great men behind his 
appointment, Sultan Iskandar Muda himself and Sheikh Shamsu’d-din Pasai were already 
dead. It was unprecedented in the history of kingship in Aceh. 
The prince ruled as Sultan Iskandar Thani Alau’d-din Mughayat Shah for four and a half 
years until his sudden death in February 1641. The Bustan briefly mentions that he died of 
poisoning.72 It can only mean that the relation between Iskandar Thani and Acehnese society 
had suffered during the years of his reign. Because he left no heir to the throne, the principal 
men of the realm assembled together to appoint a new ruler. The orthodox clergy who had  
become increasingly influential at the Court of  Iskandar Thani, wanted a candidate of Arab 
stock which was against the wishes of the orangkaya who rivalled among themselves. 
Transition of kingship was again a matter of contest and bloodshed, causing the death of large 
numbers of people.73  The orangkaya settled their disputes and nominated Iskandar Thani’s 
widow Putri Sri Alam Permaisuri, who was the eldest daughter of Sultan Iskandar Muda, but 
they found strong opposition from the clergy who warned against female rule. In the end the 
permaisuri, the princess-consort was appointed. She ruled as Taju’l-Alam Safiatu’d-din Shah 
from 1641-1675. It was almost certain that she would leave no heir, for she was childless, and 
the prospects for marriage were tactically reduced by the now powerful orangkaya . They 
would  not allow her to marry a prince from Johor.74 Their coup d’état of 1589  in which 
crown prince Buyong was liquidated  to avoid his accession which would make Aceh a vassal 
state of Johor, is fresh on one’s mind. Johor remained Aceh’s worst indigenous enemy. The 
                                                 
72 ibid., 46. 
 
73 Nicolaus de Graaff  witnessed the events when he landed  in Aceh. He mentions  that the situation was 
unpredictable and that the Dutch merchants closed the factory for five days.  Reisen van Nicolaus de Graaff 
1639-1687 (Linschoten Vereeniging, 1930), 13- 14. 
 
74 D. F. A. Hervey (tr.), Francois Valentyn’s Account of Malacca  (JSBRAS, 1890, vol. XXI-XXII), 246.  
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Permaisuri’s succession would thus eventually be decided by these men, whose influence in 
society gained impetus. The existing view among scholars is, that the orangkaya deliberately 
put a female on the throne to assert their power over her. But it is indisputable that the 
introduction of Islamic orthodoxy in Acehnese society under Sultan Iskandar Thani put 
serious limitations on their religious and social freedoms and that of society in general. To 
break the power of the Islamic orthodoxy was an important requirement to gain back their 
former freedoms and bring social stability back in society. By appointing the daughter of 
Iskandar Muda as the ruler of Aceh, they implicitly spoke out in favour of the royal dynasty to 
continue. During her reign which lasted 34 years, no orangkaya seized the throne. 
 
The Bustan tells us that Iskandar Muda knew from the start, by looking at the pleasant 
features of the young Pahang prince, that he would make him his successor.75 His successor 
was revealed to him in a dream. 
Nuru’d-din al Raniri described Iskandar Muda’s conquest of  Pahang as divine intervention. 
This is a pastiche of the reality. He imbued his audience with the idea that the prince’s 
accession was divinely ordained, calling Iskandar Thani the descendant of sultans who 
implored the help of the Almighty. He was the most righteous! 
     Ia-lah perkasa terlalu berani, 
Turun-temurun nasab sultani, 
Ia-lah menyunjong inayat rahmani,  
Bergelar Sultan Iskandar Thani.76 
 
A text that seems to make such a strong case for Iskandar Thani’s succession would continue 
to have a positive function, for it made clear that Iskandar Thani was in every respect Iskandar 
Muda’s rightful heir and predestined to rule Aceh. Nuru’d-din al Raniri adorned his patron 
with a numinous aura and lifted Pahang to an illustrious place in the Malay world. The 
political conjecture is quite clear; in 1638, when Nurud’d-din al Rainiri began to compose the 
Bustan, Johor had tried to reassert its control over Pahang which was ‘at peace’ with Aceh in 
1637, after Iskandar Muda again invaded the port in 1635. Nuru’d-din made the story fit his 
ambitions for Aceh. The text extols and is narratively compelling. He wrote the eulogy of his 
                                                 
 
75 Islam favours a ruler with agreeable looks. 
 
76 Bustanu’s- Salatin , 44 ‘ He is the most courageous prince; a descendent from sultans; he is blessed by the 
Almighty; his title is Iskandar Thani (II). 
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protagonist with one clear objective: to mark Aceh as the best example of an Islamic polity 
and the new ruler as the most adil. This vigorous eulogy by the ‘Sheikh al-Islam’ seems to be 
justified by the facts as seen from his point of view. He calls Iskandar Thani maulana, the 
Indian term for ulama and even furnishes him with the title khalif.77 By alluding to the story 
of ‘prophet’ David, who chose among his children ‘prophet’ Solomon as his successor, he 
raised the prince to an exalted position.78  In orthodox Islam there is no separation between 
religious and political powers and the archetype of a ruler is the imam or caliph. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Nuru’d-din al Raniri was the more orthodox of the host of 
religious scholars at the Acehnese Court, advocating the eradication of Wugudyah mysticism, 
he recognized that allusion to myth was important and could be used as a powerful 
instrument. 
The preamble of the letter of Sultan Iskandar Thani to Dutch governor-general Van Diemen 
written around 1637 says: ‘I am the king of the entire world who is like a God over it’. 79  
If  this is indeed correctly translated by the Dutch clerks and if Nuru’d-din al Raniri stood 
behind the text, he is to blame that he had no qualms in reconciling the idea of the ruler as 
God. It is exactly the Wugudiyah philosophy he dismissed, which does not distinguish 
between creator and man. 
The guidance of his guardian who was a masterful man prone to exert his authority without 
much regard for other people’s views, steadfastly undermined the credibility of  Iskandar 
Thani. People lost their freedom to follow their religious inclinations and were confused. 80  
There was fierce opposition against Iskandar Thani’s introduction of religious orthodoxy and 
his rigid measures against the Wugudyah mystics. This may have cost him his life; there had 
                                                 
 
77 ibid, 45. 
 
78 ibid, 43 : ‘Shahdan maka ada-lah di-ilhamkan Allah ta’ala dalam hati Raja Iskandar Muda memileh Sultan 
Mughal akan ganti-nya itu saperti Nabiu’-lah Daud memileh dalam antara anaknya Nabiu’lah Sulaiman akan 
gantinya.’ 
 
79  NA VOC 1.04.02: 11264 : this is the translation. 
  
81 Snouck Hurgronje held the view that the Acehnese potentates were fully aware that ‘they should show all 
possible honour to the upholders of religion, to declare verbally that they set the highest value on their wisdom, 
and now and then,  merely as a matter of form, to grant them access to their councils.’ (The Acehnese, vol. 1, 7) 
 
The theme of narrow cooperation between sultan and uleema ( ulama)  is also discussed by Anthony Reid in 
“Kings, Kadis and Charisma” in: Reid, (ed.), The making of an Islamic Political Discourse in Southeast Asia’, 
(Monash Papers on Southeast Asia -  no. 27, (Clayton:  Monash University, 1993), 84-107. 
‘To ambitious kings, the new religion (Islam) offered the possibility of claiming a unique role as God’s 
representative on earth  in a newly-defined territorial unit. It was the strongest kings who saw advantages in 
allying with the uleema to undercut the legitimacy of rivals and powerful vassals.’ 
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been an attempt to poison him after he was only eight months on the throne.81  Nurud’din al 
Raniri does not enter into details of his patron’s sudden death and instead goes into lengths to 
describe his magnificent funeral ceremony as if to celebrate his brief rule.  
The observation or even logic that it was the strongest kings who saw advantages in allying 
with the ulama to undercut the legitimacy of rivals and powerful vassals halts. 82 It is usually 
presented as having been brought to a conclusion. In the case of Iskandar Thani, his 
unreserved dependency on his orthodox guardian Sheikh Nuru’d-din al Raniri, shows 
precisely the opposite. The persecution and execution of Wugudyah mystics and the burning 
of their books during his reign impacted profoundly on Acehnese society. Court actions 
against heterodoxy show a dramatic deviation from the line followed by Sultan Iskandar 
Muda and his predecessors. The picture one has of Iskandar Thani as a peace loving man with 
a mild character, is rather distorted. 
  
 
 
 
1. 2. 8    Significance of divine ordinance 
Even if the Islamic scholars imbued the idea of the state as a divine instrument established by 
God with the rulers as His chosen representatives, Acehnese reality shows that divine right 
was not the real essence of Acehnese kingship. Although Iskandar Thani took on the position 
of khalifat Allah (deputy of God), his rejection of Wugudyah mysticism and the persecution of 
the mystics undoubtedly led to his premature death by poisoning. 
In the last quarter of the sixteenth century Alau’d-din Perak, a captured prince from the Malay 
port of Perak was placed on Aceh’s throne. The Bustan calls him a pious, righteous king, 
strong in his belief of what was right or wrong, who called for the implementation of religious 
laws,  instructing the people to pray five times a day and installed the Friday prayer in the 
mosque. He ruled for eight years but he too was murdered. His virtuous example as written in 
the Bustan was clearly no guarantee against rebellion and liquidation. His grandson and 
successor, prince Buyong was liquidated in 1589 in what I see as a coup d état of the 
orangkaya.  
                                                 
 
81 Djajadininggrat,“Critisch overzicht”, 184. 
Bustanu’s  Salatin, 46. Here is mention of an attempt to poison him. 
 
82 For example Reid in: The making of an Islamic Political Discourse in Southeast Asia, 94. 
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 It is meaningful to dwell at the proposition made by L. F. Brakel about Aceh ‘being 
characterised by a strong Islamic element and perhaps equally strong ties with Moghul India.’ 
(see also page 21). ‘It is certainly far from incidental that the first Acehnese king under 
whom, as far as we know, heterodox mysticism flourished,  Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah, is 
referred to in the sources as Sayyid al-Mukammil (My Perfect Lord). In this way concepts of 
kingship which originated in Hindu religious theory could be integrated in a remarkably 
painless way to a Muslim context. Of course, this process was in no way exclusive to Aceh, 
similar accommodations and reinterpretations occurring wherever the local tradition of 
kingship was maintained in a Muslim environment. It may, however, facilitate our 
understanding of the role of the king of Aceh in relation to the ceremonies in which he 
participated and of the awe in which he was held by his subjects if continuity of older 
monarchical structures was assumed.’83 
Brakel’s proposition is certainly interesting, yet the argument marshalled in support of it is 
unconvincing. Islam and the Tasawwuf  (Sufi) ideas took hold in northern Sumatra before 
Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) came on the throne and mysticism was 
practiced before Sheikh Shamsu’d-din arrived in Aceh. A further remark is that the title 
Sayyid is usually conferred on the descendants of Prophet Mohamed; it means that any claim 
by a Sayyid to the throne is therefore justified. The reality was that Alau’d-din was an 
usurper, installed as sultan by the orangkaya. There are two versions of his background which 
I have earlier brought to the attention, the folk story is that he climbed from a modest 
fisherman to the position of principal courtier, the second is the version from the Bustan 
which says that he was a member of the Dar al-Kamal dynasty. It seems plausible that the title 
Sayyid was brought in by Sheikh Shamsu’d-din Pasai to give legitimisation to Alau’d-din’s 
usurpation of the throne. He canalised his idea of ordained kingship through what looks like a 
covered passageway. In his footstep Sheikh Nuru’d-din al Raniri awarded the posthumous 
titles Iskandar Muda and Iskandar Thani to the two important successors of Alau’d-din 
Ri’ayat Shah, alluding to the myth of Alexander the Great as the great forebear, at the same 
time underlining and glorifying their greatness and heroism.     
 
I demonstrated  that the claim to divinity did not go unchallenged and it made little difference 
to the secular sphere of the realm, even if  the orangkaya pledged allegiance to the sultan. The 
                                                 
83 L. F. Brakel, “State and Statecraft in 17th century Aceh” in: Reid and Castles (eds.), Pre-colonial State 
Systems in Southeast Asia, (JMBRAS, monograph no. 6, 1975), 56-66. 
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sultan’s authority and his survival depended much on his abilities to draw the loyalty of the 
orangkaya. 
The uniqueness of Acehnese royalty is also attuned to the need to refer to the great power of 
the Ottoman empire. As the Hikayat Aceh mentions, the Ottoman emperor declared that by 
divine decree there were two great kings who shared the world: the king of the West 
(Rum/Byzantium) and the king of Aceh in the East’, which referred to the two great kings of 
the past: Solomon and Alexander the Great.84  Whether this resonance with the Ottoman 
empire proved powerful enough to withstand the challenges of the time, is explored further in 
the following chapters. 
 
 
 
 
1. 2. 9   Metaphor symbols and ceremonies 
How sweet is mortal Sovranty’- think some: 
Others – ‘How blest the Paradise to come!’ 
Ah, take the Cash in hand and waive the Rest; 
Oh, the brave Music of a distant Drum! 85 
 
The big drum announced the day of  installation of the new sultan and as such its significance 
was well understood. 
Water became a meaningful metaphor in Acehnese kingship. ‘The king is like the source of a 
river. If the source is pure, the flow of the river will remain clean’.86 
In the Hikayat Aceh water plays an important role in representing Aceh’s unity and the Bustan 
mentions that Sultan Iskandar Muda received a dream in which a palace descended in a 
fountain of water from the mouth of an angel. The bridal couple (his eldest daughter and the 
Prince of Pahang) took a bath in this holy water. It was clear to the sultan that the couple was 
destined for marriage.87 
                                                 
 
84 Hikayat Atjéh, 67. 
 
85 (from: The Ruba’iyat of Omar Khayyam verse xii : translation by Edward Fitz Gerald). 
 
86 Taufik Abdullah in: Reid. (ed.), The Making of an Islamic Political Discourse in Southeast Asia,  44. 
 
87 Bustanu’s Salatin,  24. 
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Bathing was both a ritual purification act and a physical act to cleanse oneself. The sultans 
regularly went to their bathing place called Mata Ie ‘the eye of the water’ especially on 
important days of the Islamic calendar. The water which came from the mountains possessed 
healing properties and the foreigners in Aceh observed  that the people used to bath in the 
river for a speedy recovery of their amputations. 
 
Let us for a moment dwell at the ceremonial funeral of Sultan Iskandar Thani, which is taken 
by Saya Shiraishi as the subject of a study of metaphor in the Bustan as-Salatin.88 
By looking at the architecture of the gunongan, a stone hill in the royal garden, built as a 
place for the royal princesses to relax, Shiraishi proposes a remarkable thesis: ‘the pedestal on 
one side and a cemetery on the other, sovereignty as marriage ceremony and sovereignty as 
funeral ceremony are the two sides of a coin.’ 
Examining the magnificent funeral procession from its mythological underpinnings, Shiraishi 
prosaically concludes: ‘The funeral procession described in the Bustan is the allegory of 
kingship itself. Kingship is both wild and domesticated, and at the same time neither wild nor 
domesticated. Because kingship belongs to no category, it belongs to all categories 
simultaneously. It swims in the water, dwells in the forest, and flies in the air. It presides over 
extraordinary powers, wages war, and commands music. People enjoy and admire it from a 
respectful distance, fearful of approaching too close.’ 
In Iskandar Thani’s funeral procession, wild and domesticated animals took part such as large 
numbers of elephants, ridden by brave men and heroes who were dressed in hunting outfits, 
war horses, raksasa (giants) with bared teeth, a naga (half lion and half lizard, appearing 
often in Hindu mythology), buffaloes, tigers, singha (lion), deer, birds and various other 
animals. These were followed by silver platforms on which singers from Java, Pahang and 
Johor had taken their place; finally came the seven-tiered golden structure topped by the 
tombstone, guarded by maidens carrying the sultan’s regalia and the royal drinking water. 89 
Here we once again notice the importance of water. 
Noteworthy is Nuru’d-din al Raniri’s enumeration of the different groups from outside Aceh. 
                                                 
 
88 Saya  Shiraishi, “The Study of Bustanu’s-Salatin” (The Garden of the Kings), in: Audrey Kahin (ed.), 
Reading Southeast Asia  ( Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1990), 55-73. 
 
89 Bustanu’s Salatin, 61-69. 
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It is apparent that he wanted to bring to the attention that these foreign groups were the 
sultan’s subjects. It fitted in his marking of a Aceh as a large and important political and 
religious entity. 
 
The Adat Aceh includes an enumeration of the royal insignias, notably the (royal) sword 
(silah), the betel caddy (puan) and the betel-bag (bungkus-kain). These are followed by the 
three symbols of royal dignity, ‘tokens’(temanda or tanda) employed when the chiefs 
(hulubalangs) make obeisance to the sultan; these are the alif, the first letter of the Arabic 
alphabet and the symbol of the ‘caliphate on earth’, the ajam angon, a tame hen, and the 
bantal besar, a gold embroidered cushion. The payung or parasol also carried great meaning 
as an important symbol of royalty. Its main function is to give shade where the sun shines 
mercilessly, rather than  protecting against rain. Parasols could be seen displayed at the 
sultan’s side during public events when he received obeisance. The handles of these royal 
payung were of solid gold inlaid with precious stones. 
The metaphor of the ruler providing shade to protect his subjects from evil, was known in the 
Islamic communities where parasols were used in religious rites and ceremonies. In Aceh it 
was not only the prerogative of the sultan to display them, but commoners too used them at 
various occasions, in processions and as ornaments during marriage celebrations in which the 
bridal couple briefly assumed the position of royals.90  In the procession to his father’s grave, 
Sultan Iskandar Thani took with him hundreds of payung. 91 
The ceremony of paying obeisance to the sultan was practiced on the day called hari raja 
djungdjung duli, the principal day to pay homage to the sovereign, usually on the day of his 
installation. The simple raised platform of stones, situated outside the dalam (palace), where 
the sultan was seated to receive obeisance from the chiefs and the important men of his realm 
and from foreign envoys was known as the pra’na seumah (Ach.) the ‘high seat of 
sovereignty’.92 A bigger contrast with royal grandeur and the splendour inside the sultan’s  
court is hardly conceivable. If one looks for similarities with the customs at the court of the 
Moghuls, it is worthy to note that Emperor Akbar also reclined on a low platform made of 
bricks. 
 
                                                 
 
90 This was explained to me in Aceh in 1990 by A. Hasjmy, ulama and historian. 
 
91 Bustanu’s Salatin, 57. 
 
92 The Malay translation is peratna sembah. 
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The Adat Aceh does not speak of the crowning of a new ruler, but only of his installation. This 
seems in agreement with Islamic usage.93  However, the term crowning often appears in the 
literature, without the authors entering into details.94  Paradoxically the words for crown such 
as taj (Arabic) and mahkota (Malay) suggest the crown as the ultimate symbol of sovereignty. 
The royal headdress in Aceh was a turban, studded with jewels. 
The Adat Aceh provides insight in both ceremonial as well as practical aspects of statecraft as 
it was or should have been. Scholars call it the Constitution of the Sultanate, but while it 
certainly is a corpus juris, we search in vain for the rights of the common Acehnese folk. 
The regulations in the parts 3 and 4 are: 
1. sekalian madjlis radja: ‘ regulations concerning kings’ 
2. dan madjlis hulubalang: ‘regulations concerning government officials’ 
3. dan madjlis tabal pada hari memegang puasa: ‘regulations concerning the ceremonies 
during the days before the fasting month’ 
4. dan madjlis berangkat jang kedua hari raja: ‘regulations concerning the processions 
on the days of the two religious feasts’ 
5. dan madjlis djundjung duli: ‘regulations for the obeisance to the king’s sovereignty’ 
6. dan madjlis berangkat hari Djum‘at,  ‘regulations for the kings going to the mosque 
on Friday’ 
7. dan madjlis berangkat bulan Safar: ‘regulations for the procession on the final 
Wednesday of the month of Safar’ 
8. dan madjlis djaga-djaga, ‘regulations for the vigils (in the night of the kadar in the 
month of  Ramadan)’ 
9. dan madjlis Bandar Darussalam: ‘harbour regulations’ 
 
Drewes and Voorhoeve ascribe these regulations to Sultan Iskandar Muda. 
Ritual and ceremony were important means of communication between the sultan and his 
subjects. The mythical and divine power which covered him at his installation, was reinforced 
in the course of his reign by ceremonies and rituals. In times of danger these could serve the 
purpose of proclaiming his superior rights or debunking the pretensions of a rival.  
                                                 
 
93  Lewis, The political language of Islam, 22 ‘Muslim sovereigns were neither crowned nor enthroned, their 
installation was celebrated with certain ceremonies which could take days. Some of these ceremonies in time 
developed into complex and highly charged language, full of symbolism and often polemic.’ 
  
94 Anthony Reid uses the word crowning but omits to explain the ceremony. See his article “Royal Power in 
Aceh” in:  An Indonesian Frontier, (Leiden, KITLV Press, 2005), 107. 
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An example is when Iskandar Thani was informed in 1638 by Dutch envoys that his enemy 
Johor was ready to participate in the Dutch-Aceh coalition to attack Malacca, he demanded 
that Johor first accepted his daulat 95 before he could be seen in the company of his ‘blood 
enemy.’96 
The sultan and his advisors gave much thought in developing local procedures for the Islamic 
festivals; the Adat Aceh starts with a summary of the ceremonies on the days before the 
fasting month (madjlis tabal pada hari memegang puasa) (3). A large drum known as the 
Ibrahim Chailil is beaten to announce the most important day in the calendar of Islam. On this 
day the royal insignias are carried in procession ( to the mosque?). 
The drum was  probably the most important instrument, featuring prominently at the sultan’s 
installation. The Ibrahim Chailil was also the major drum of the nobat (nine drums) used at 
court ceremonies at the Malay courts. Whether the other drums of the nobat were used in 
Aceh is not ascertained. In contrast to Western sovereigns who were crowned, the Malay 
kings were ‘drummed-up’.97 
In describing the scene on the raja hadji, the most auspicious day of the Islamic calendar, the 
Adat Aceh compares the sultan to the famous conqueror Alexander the Great. The sultan rode 
on his elephant from the great mosque to his palace, accompanied by a large entourage as 
prescribed by the madjlis. ‘Then the king returns from the mosque to the palace; he is like 
Iskandar Dzu’l - Karnain setting out from Rum to conquer the world.’ 
Several ceremonies were held in connection with the Islamic calendar. The Adat Aceh 
contains a description of the religious days and the processions which left from the Daru’d-
dunya  to the great mosque, the music which was played, the number of animals in the 
procession and the royal regalia which were carried. The sultan led the religious processions 
and festivities and by doing so he fulfilled one of the main obligations of an Islamic ruler, that 
of leading the Friday-prayer. The sultan prayed in a secluded section in the presence of his 
closest religious advisor: in the case of Iskandar Muda this was Sheikh Shamsu’d-din Pasai; 
and in the case of his successor Iskandar Thani, this was Sheikh Nuru’d-din al Raniri. 
                                                 
 
95 For more on the subject of daulat  see: A. H. Johns  “ Political Authority in Islam” in:  Anthony Reid (ed.), 
The Making of an Islamic Political Discourse in Southeast Asia, 21. 
 
96 The subject  is treated in Part Three, Chapter V. 
 
97 ‘The genderang tebal was beaten; all the music struck up; the installation drum was fired; and the warriors 
and people did homage and obeisance crying out: ‘O, King, live for ever, thou Shadow of God upon Earth’. 
Ibrahim Chailil is translated as ‘Abraham the friend of God’  
 R. J. Wilkinson, “Some Malay Studies” ( JMBRAS, (vol. X, 1932), 82, 83. 
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 Sheikh Shamsu’d-din Pasai was Iskandar Muda’s most trusted advisor and faithful servant. 
His importance at Iskandar Muda’s Court and that of his grandfather Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah 
cannot be easily overstressed. Combining the parts of scholar, mystic, mentor, author, courtier 
and man of affairs he was the sultan’s ‘Jonathan’. John Davis probably refers to him when he 
reports: They have an Archbishop and Spirituall Dignities. Here is a prophet in Achien whom 
they greatly honour; they say that hee hath the spirit of Prophesie, as the Ancients have had. 
He is dignified from the rest in his Apparell, and greatly embraced of the King.’98 
 
 
 
 
1. 2. 10     The council and the administration 
Among the sultan’s practical duties were the collecting of taxes, the granting of trade 
contracts, the sending and receiving of envoys, the building of mosques, the governing of 
subjugated territories. This  evidently necessitated a corps of officials engaged in the 
execution of the tasks. 99 
The Taj as-Salatin admonishes the king to listen to the advice of his principal men. 
John Davis who informs us on Aceh under Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al-
Mukamil), says: ‘His State is governed by five principal men, with their inferiour officers, his 
Secretarie, and four called Sabandars, with these resteth all authoritie. The Kings will is their 
Law’.‘ His women are his chiefest Counsellers’.100  His admiral at that time was a woman 
named Keumalahayati who was in function when the first English fleet under the command of 
Lancaster visited Aceh in 1602. 
Aceh’s rise as the region’s most important emporium and powerful overlord, steadfastly  
needed more officials for functions in Aceh itself and its extended territory. 
The orangkaya were a privileged class, constituting rich merchants, nobles, chiefs and 
officials. They were better protected than the common men and women. In the historiography 
this is not always recognized. Because the Acehnese sultans are usually portrayed as absolute 
                                                 
98 The Voyages and Works of John Davis the Navigator, 151. 
 
99 For a closer look at governance and  Aceh’s institutions I refer to Ito Takeshi’s elaborate study The World of  
the Adat Aceh. 
 
100 The Voyages and Works of John Davis the Navigator, 150. 
 63
rulers and potentates, it is important to examine whether the administrative council had any 
authoritative power. 
From the primary European sources we draw that the European traders communicated and 
dealt with several of these functionaries such as the shahbandar, the penghulu kawal, the 
clerks of the Balai Besar, harbour officials, the laxamana and the panglima bandar. There is 
no evidence that the merchants interacted with the perdana menteri, the Acehnese equivalent 
of prime minister. He is not mentioned in their accounts of their negotiations. 
Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) delegated the trade negotiations to a 
shahbandar. Francois Martin observed in 1602 ‘the King has his Syabandar who is like the 
Constable who gives all the orders. He is very avaricious and no one can obtain anything from 
him without giving or promising him something.’101  In 1599 Cornelis de Houtman of the 
Zeeland expedition from the United Republic, negotiated the price of pepper with the 
shahbandar, while the sultan negotiated a strategic contract with De Houtman. Although he 
intervened in some instances, (see Part Two of this study), Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah 
generally left it to his shahbandars to deal with foreign traders.  
The English Admiral Lancaster appeared before the kadi, and a shahbandar in 1602 who 
made friendly interrogations and subsequently made their recommendations to the sultan. It 
cleared the way for his good reception by the sultan. 
Iskandar Muda was inclined to listen to the advice of his orangkaya when it came to licensing 
the northern Europeans to trade on the west coast. In his talks with the Dutch traders this was 
brought to light. Part Two explores the trade relations. 
 
In Adat Aceh the audiences for the orangkaya are stipulated; they were held on Saturday (hari 
sabtu). The orangkaya addressed the sultan with Tuanku (my Lord). The establishment of the 
Saturday audience is proof that the sultan was at least prepared to listen to the important men 
of his realm, whether he gave full consideration to their advice and qualms or not. 
The question now passes if the Acehnese rulers were bound by the cobweb of texts and 
regulations? The answer is that they were not at all limited by constitutional controls, and 
even if they infringed too palpably on religious laws there were hardly any checks on their 
sovereignty.102  Iskandar Muda  himself was in many instances the law-giver and one should 
bear in mind that the sultans either commissioned or patronized the writing of the extant texts. 
                                                 
 
101 Cited from A. Reid, Witnesses to Sumatra, 61. 
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Looking at the Hindu kingdoms of the Arthasastra,  it is apparent that kings could not 
infringe to palpably on religion without sanction, they could be sure to suffer opposition from 
the brahmanic (priestly) caste. Caste was absent in Aceh and the only real force threatening 
the sultan’s position were the secular orangkaya.103  Their rebellion was a dangerous threat to 
his security; in reality the only real check upon his arbitrary authority was his ever-present 
fear of rebellion and assassination. He took unceasing precautions against conspiracies. At 
one point during his reign Iskandar Muda established a scheme of guard of the palace in 
which the orangkaya had to patrol in shifts, unarmed, and were kept in check by his private 
army of bodyguards. He said to Augustin de Beaulieu in 1621 that they would otherwise plot 
against him during the night.104  
The almost customary regard Iskandar Muda showed the orangkaya by allowing them weekly 
audiences, was an effective method, resolved merely to announce his decision: the 
appointment of the prince of Pahang as his successor serves as an example of this.  
However, the sultans recognized that they had to accommodate to the wishes of the 
orangkaya for their own sake. In practice they depended to a certain extent on the advice of 
these men. In granting trade licenses and privileges to the European traders, Alau’d-din 
Ri’ayat Shah as well as his grandson Iskandar Muda were cautious not to go too much against 
the advice and wishes of the shahbandar and merchants. Iskandar Muda was advised by his 
                                                                                                                                                        
102 Bernard Lewis asserts “The effectiveness of religious law as a limitation on the power of the sovereign was 
flawed in two important respects. One was that the law itself gave the ruler extensive autocratic powers. The 
second was that while the law prescribed limitations both on the authority of the ruler and the duty of obedience 
of the subject,  it established no apparatus and laid down no procedures for enforcing these limitations, and no 
device for preventing or challenging a violation of the law by the ruler, other than force.  The political language 
of Islam, 113. What we know with regard to Aceh is that the Taj as Salatin  was an advice book for the Islamic  
rulers on how to act and rule virtuously. This means intrinsically that there was no apparatus and procedures  for 
enforcing  the law on the  ruler.        
 
103 A. Reid, ‘Trade and the problem of royal power in Aceh’ in Reid and Lance (eds.), Pre-colonial state-
systems in Southeast Asia  (JMBRAS, 1975). The author translated  from Augustin de Beaulieu who describes 
the orangkaya in the heydays of their wealth, a period decades before his own visit to Aceh: 
‘‘The Orangkaya’s lived extravagantly, and following the affections of their nature were addicted to novelties, 
insolent, and proud. The great wealth their predecessors had left them, in lands and houses in the city, as well as 
gold and silver, supported this life; no kings have oppressed them nor foreign nation plundered them. The town 
was six times as populous as it is at present, and so crowded that it was difficult to move in the streets. The 
wealth of the island being scattered in diverse hands, there was such a great number of merchants that there was 
no city in the Indies where trade so flourished. Moreover there was no Alfandegue (customs office), or other 
duties than that of the tjiap, so that the merchants could do their business in a fortnight….the orangkayas had 
beautiful, large, solid houses, with cannons at their doors, and a large number of slaves, both as guards and 
servants. They went out superbly dressed, with large retinues, respected by the people. Such great power very 
much diminished royal authority, and even safety, for the principal orangkayas had such authority, that when 
they tired of the domination of one king, they massacred him in order to install another. Thus a king was very 
lucky if he enjoyed his crown for two years. If he lasted longer it was with such exertion and such obligations 
towards several orangkayas, that nothing remained of his dignity except the title’. 
  
104 Lombard, Mémoires, 114. 
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important merchants to bring the pepper from the west coast to Aceh itself which drew 
revenues and opened financial opportunities not only for him, but for them too. In 1639 Sultan  
Iskandar Thani was rebuked by his governors on the west coast for granting the Dutch ship 
Grol exemption from paying tolls and dues; he was forced to come back on his promise to the 
Dutch to avoid their rebellion and ordered the merchants to pay the tolls in the respective 
ports of the west coast. 
The question whether the sultan and his council formed a legislative body, is one which can 
be answered as follows: the promulgated royal edicts (sarakata) were in fact orders referring 
to special cases; the sultan was the law-giver. I infer that established custom or adat was 
usually looked upon as inviolable, yet the sultan’s commands sometimes overruled these 
customs and became law. We gather from the Dutch captain Frederick de Houtman’s account 
of his ordeal as a hostage in Aceh from 1599 to 1601, that he appeared before a court of 
Islamic judges who threatened to execute him if he did not convert to Islam. Sultan Alau’d-
din Ri’ayat Shah ordered De Houtman’s capture and conversion, but also the dissolution of 
the case. 
The foreign sources speak of at least three courts of justice in the city of Aceh, a civil court, a 
religious court and one for the disputes concerning trade. Francois Martin says that justice 
was closely applied ‘according to their laws and customs.’ ‘There are some judges called 
poullo cauaillo (Penghulu kawal), who are the judges of the prisoners. They are concerned 
with justice and study all the arguments and complaints on both sides, the parties presenting 
their own cases themselves.’105 
 
 
 
 
1. 2. 11    Conclusion 
The pervasive presence of myth and legend, purposefully disseminated by religious scholars, 
shows that Acehnese kingship cannot be taken out of its local context. Herein lies its meaning, 
that Islam could maintain itself because of the transcending presence of the local cultural 
elements, whether in kingship or in ordinary life. The (in)fusion of Islam with indigenous 
patterns was not exceptional, and Islam in Aceh certainly borrowed a great deal from the 
                                                 
 
105 Quoted. Francois Martin, “Aceh in 1602”  in: Anthony Reid (ed.), Witnesses to Sumatra , 60. 
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locale. Those systems of Islam that were syncretised, were those more readily accepted by the 
people. 
The court texts give important information on Acehnese ‘thought’ in its dual dimension: 
morality and expediency in kingship and political life. They transmit certain concepts and 
morals. The Taj as-Salatin does not discuss completely utopian issues, despite the fact that its 
advice is rather pedantic. The principle that the king was or should be adil endowed with all 
virtues and should follow the advice of his councillors can be in a way misleading in 
establishing his actual inclination and power. 
The hikayat (epics) are often regarded by the common people as statements of absolute 
historical facts. These epics seem to be founded on imagination and vague traditions of the 
sultanate.  
The writers of the texts were faced with social and political changes on a large scale which is 
foregrounded in their texts.  Iskandar Muda is brought forward by Sheikh Shamsu’d-din Pasai 
as the symbol of Aceh’s unity; despite the fact that he was an usurper, he was the descendant 
of the two royal dynasties Dar al-Kamal and Mahkota Alam. 
Sheikh Nuru’d-din al Raniri, the orthodox scholar at Sultan Iskandar Thani’s court 
interpolated contradictions and juxtapositions in the Bustan as-Salatin, which betrays a 
heterodox treatment of his subject. 
Nuru’d-din al Raniri quite ambitiously brought Iskandar Thani forward as the sublime king 
and even as the heir to the throne of the Sultanate of Malacca because of his Pahang origin. In 
him the prototype of an Islamic ruler was made visible: ‘God’s representative on earth 
(khalifat Allah) and sultan. Iskandar Thani was his Leviathan. 
The kingship of these two sultans was ‘prophesised’ and they were heralded as men who 
would be of great significance for Aceh and Islam. 
The religious scholars and text-writers as well as the secular orangkaya were instrumental in 
the shaping of Acehnese kingship. 
Although primogeniture in succession was a tendency, the most able royal candidate was 
preferred to become sultan. This should lead to a wider acceptance of the transferral of power 
and more able rulers.     
 
The paying of obeisance by the orangkaya and subsequently their acceptance of the sultan’s 
daulat or sovereignty, demonstrates that the contractual element of kingship was a reality. 
Any limitations on a sultan’s authority took effect because he was afraid to lose his throne and 
his life. 
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The regulations which became part of the code of law the Adat Aceh, whatever their use and 
whether these were put together by lay men or clerics, are among the most rewarding proofs 
of Sultan Iskandar Muda’s methods and principles of government. Their subsequent 
incorporation into categories of law indicates an enhanced function of a record of royal 
pronouncements on the governance of the realm and even an understanding of them as a genre 
of legislation.  
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                                                             CHAPTER I 
 
 
THE GENESIS OF ACEH-EUROPEAN RELATIONS (1599-1607) 
 
 
‘Somewhere a strange and shrewed tomorrow goes to bed 
Planning a test for men from Europe; no one guesses  
Who will be most ashamed, who richer and who dead.’ (W. H. Auden) 
 
 
 
2. 1. 1  Towards understanding international relations 
The turn of the sixteenth into the seventeenth century brought Aceh in the limelight of 
European interest. Seafaring was an extremely important source of livelihood in countries 
with long seaboards, such as Portugal, Spain, England, the United Netherlands, France and 
Denmark. The Dutch, English and French in succession made their way to the bustling port-
city Bandar Aceh in search of pepper and subsequent trade contracts. There was a growing 
market for pepper in Europe and Aceh was a major supplier of the spice. Indians, Chinese, 
and Arabs bartered their goods, such as textiles, porcelain and spices from the Moluccan 
islands for pepper, silk, gold, tin and benjuin. 
Patani and Pahang situated on the east coast of the Malay peninsula and Jambi on Sumatra’s 
east coast were pepper stations in their own right, while the Sultanate Johor, which assumed 
the position of successor of the Sultanate of Malacca also provided pepper and other 
commodities but its trade was less significant than its strategic importance.          
The Asian littoral steadfastly became the terra cognita where the audacious European 
merchants pounced upon the local trade and boldly treated with the local rulers, who did not 
always submit without conditions to their wishes and demands, asking favours in return, thus 
cementing the foundation for an equal partnership.   
    
We owe it to the inquisitive and certainly also imaginative minds and the writing capabilities 
of men on board the first Dutch, English and French fleets that visited Aceh, such as John 
Davis, Frederick de Houtman, William Lancaster and Francois Martin, that an intimate - not a 
completely accurate - picture of Aceh, its ruler and its people at the start of their contacts with 
 69
the northern Europeans, develops. Their journals and narratives do also provide some 
hindsight notions of Aceh.  
Before I set out to explore the visits of these northern Europeans with their historical impact, 
it is certainly instructive to know why and how international relations develop.  
Foreign visits exudes prestige on a country and its government and says much of the 
country’s attributes, for example its political or strategic significance, its size and its 
commodities. This means that the visits are intentional. 
There is a positive correlation between the foreign visits and the growing importance of a 
state. Questions such as who are one’s friends and who are one’s enemies, who is weak and 
who is strong, represent the bread and  butter issues of international relations; they underlie 
the ‘images’ one has of these relations.  
Diplomacy and the accompanying avowal of friendship and the offering of assistance were 
advantageous as statements of the ruler’s prestige and a recognition of his political power. It 
was usually confirmed by gifts and effusive letters which stressed friendship, devotion and 
offerings of peace. A letter from Prince Maurice of Nassau to Sultan Alau’-din Ri’ayat Shah 
of 1600, gives some insight in the relationship. The prince ends his letter by saying ‘ I kiss the 
hands of your Majesty. Your servant: Maurice de Nassau’.1  The prince ‘dwarfed’ himself for 
the sake of gaining the sultan’s friendship, after the terrible events in 1599 which involved the 
Zeeland expedition under Cornelis de Houtman. It is a recognition of the Acehnese ruler’s 
sovereignty and Prince Maurice’s fervent wish to continue relations with this Asian ruler of 
standing.   
Diplomacy could be a means of recognizing, but also a means of devising boundaries between 
states. We need to realize however, that a state’s power attributes provide only the basis of its 
power, not power itself.  In order to influence others, capabilities must be exercised.2  
As I shall try to demonstrate that Aceh’s contacts with the outside world exemplified this train 
of thought. European presence and interest contributed significantly to further shaping Aceh’s 
position and policies and greatly affected the geopolitical plane and the terms of trade. The 
successive Acehnese rulers made the most of the new opportunities created by this new 
development and we glean how they confronted the concomitant developing issues. But it is 
too presumptuous to make any sweeping statement about their behaviour at that budding stage 
                                                 
1 The letter is published in: Unger (ed.), De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, 134-5;. 
J.E. Banck, Atchin’s verheffing en val, (Rotterdam, 1873). 
 
2 Steve Chan, International Relations in Perspective: The Pursuit of Security, Welfare and Justice (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1984), 42.  
According to Chan power is intrinsically a ‘relational’ concept.    
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of the relations. Surely there were certain trends in their behaviour and thinking and one may 
perhaps detect aspects of changes in norms, experienced as Aceh took part in trade and 
diplomacy within a wider world.   
 
 
 
 
2. 1. 2     The first Dutch expedition to Aceh  
‘Is this the way of the country?’ ‘Yes! It is the way of the king and of all kings before him’. 3 
 
When the Zeeland expedition which was fitted out by the company of Balthasar de 
Moucheron from the town of Veere 4 in the province of Zeeland, arrived in the Bay of Aceh 
on 15 June 1599, Aceh’s fame as a powerful state and chief trading centre in the Malacca 
Straits was known far beyond the Red Sea ports with which it traded. The world was no 
longer that of the mappamundi, maps produced in the Middle Ages and based on the 
Scriptures, often showing it as a flat disc. The voyage to Aceh took about three months; the 
fleet rounded the Cape of Good Hope and picked its way to the Indies, sailed along the west 
coast of Sumatra to the Maledives from where it continued its voyage to Aceh.  
The command of the fleet which consisted of the Leeuw (Lion) and Leeuwinne Lioness) and 
several pinnaces, was in the hands of Cornelis de Houtman. His younger brother Frederick 
was the captain of the Leeuwinne. 
Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al-Mukamil), was ten years on the throne and since 
1593 experimenting with trade with Portuguese Malacca, Aceh’s arch enemy since the 
Portuguese conquered Malacca in 1511. He set a historical precedent by allowing Malaccan 
merchants to reside in his port. There is no indication that the Dutch were aware of this fact. 
                                                 
 
3 “Itoe adda tjerre (‘cara’) negrij Sini?Ia, begitoe adda tjerre raija Sini, lage raija iang doeloeu adda poen 
begitoeu.”  Frederick de Houtman,  Spraeck ende woord-boeck in de Maleysche en Magaskarsche Talen met 
vele Arabische ende Turcse woorden (Amsterdam, 1603).   
Frederick was a prisoner in Aceh from 1598 –1601 where he made an effort to learn the Malay language. 
 
4 According to John Davis, the chief pilot of the fleet, they departed from Flushing (Vlissingen) on March 15: 
Unger, De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, 41. 
Frederick de Houtman mentions as date of departure 25 March 1598, in: Unger, 64. 
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The Zeeland expedition came to buy pepper in Aceh. The regional Dutch companies almost 
simultaneously sent their fleets to the archipelago where they hoped to procure pepper, cloves 
and nutmeg.    
Cornelis de Houtman was no stranger in the archipelago, in 1595 he took part in one of the 
first Dutch expeditions financed by the Compagnie van Verre in Amsterdam. He was 
supposedly the commander of this expedition, but J. K. J. de Jonge, editor of De Opkomst van 
het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost-Indië presents ‘new’ facts showing that Cornelis de 
Houtman was entered in the list of principal crew as a commies (customs officer).5  
The expedition turned out to be a complete fiasco; the loss of almost half of the crew was  a 
tragic testimony of Dutch explorations in the archipelago.  In spite of the vagueness 
concerning De Houtman’s role in the tribulations of the expedition, he was seen as a trouble 
shooter. There were brawls and violent confrontations with the local populations in Bantam 
on Java which accounts for a negative image of his personality.     
Notwithstanding the trepidations, De Houtman saw positive prospects for future trade in the 
archipelago, but the Amsterdam merchants were reluctant to appoint him on their next 
voyages. The Flemish merchant and ship owner De Moucheron who was looking for 
experienced sailors employed him and his younger brother Frederick for his expedition to the 
East Indies. 
 
The historiography speaks of a hostile reception of the Zeeland expedition in Aceh. This is a 
twist of the reality. John Davis, chief pilot of the expedition paints a totally different, even 
glossy picture of the crew’s reception at the sultan’s palace and Frederick de Houtman too 
draws a positive sketch of the expedition’s reception in Aceh.6  Frederick de Houtman’s 
narrative of the voyage is particularly important to obtain a intimate picture of the 
expedition’s fate.  Both men sketch the copious banquets to which they were invited, the 
splendid entertainment in their honour and the special presents Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat 
Shah presented his esteemed visitors. The sultan’s conversations with admiral Cornelis de 
                                                 
5 J.K.J. de Jonge, De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indië, 13 vols. (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1964), vol. II, 196.  
 
6 “Cort Verhael van‘tgene wedervaren is Frederick de Houtman tot Atchein” in: Unger  De oudste reizen van de 
Zeeuwen, 63-111.    
John Davis’ journal of the voyage is published in Unger, De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, 59-63, under the title 
“The voyage of captaine John Davis to the Easterne India, pilot in a Dutch ship, written by himselfe” ( taken 
from Purchas, His Pilgrims (London, 1625), reprinted by Hakluyt Society (London, 1880).     
Also published by Markham, The voyages and works of John Davis the Navigator, 129-156; 
I refer in this chapter to Unger’s publication. 
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Houtman and John Davis show his keen interest in the political affairs and state structures in 
Europe. John Davis was clearly overwhelmed by his avid interest in England and his 
undisguised adulation for Queen Elizabeth whose fleet had triumphed over the Spanish 
armada.7  
 
Vessels from Arabia and Pegu were anchored in the bay to load pepper, a sign of some lively 
trade. Significant is John Davis’ statement that four Portuguese ships arrived from Malacca 
under the command of Alfonso Vicente ‘to prevent our trade, as the sequel doth shew’.8   
One should realize that the sixteenth century was one of wars between Aceh and Malacca. 
‘The Portugals here have often times warres with the king of Achem, which standeth in the 
island of Sumatra; from whence commeth great store of pepper and other spices every yeere 
to Pegu and Mecca within the Red Sea and other places.’ 9 Their mutual belligerence 
unexpectedly came to a halt when in 1593 Portuguese merchants from Malacca braved what 
may seemed an unbridgeable distance between them and Aceh, to petition the sultan for trade 
with his country to which Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah consented.  Realpolitik won from 
belligerence, even if the Portuguese authority in Goa was apprehensive about this uncertain 
development. Malacca was dependent of trade. 
Why would Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah consent to such an experiment? He saw in the 
Portuguese rapprochement an opportunity to humiliate his enemy Johor with whom Aceh was 
at war. Johor even at times sided with Malacca against a rising Aceh.  
The trade and diplomatic relations between Malacca and Aceh brought an unprecedented  
stable political climate in the Straits.    
 
Frederick de Houtman gives us a sense of the Acehnese harbour procedures. Several officials 
arrived in a small canoe to make their investigations. One held out a red stick as a sign that he 
was the sultan’s messenger. They inquired about the reason for their visit and measured the 
length and width of the ships, took the number of crew and the number of ordnance.  
                                                 
 
 
8 De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, 47.  
With this in mind, I like to refer to Martine van Ittersum’s study Profit and Principle Hugo Grotius, Natural 
Rights Theories and the Rise of Dutch Power in the East Indies (1595-1615)  (Leiden: Brill, 2006) in which she 
advances the thesis that Hugo Grotius used the attestations of the Dutchmen, to serve his purpose, namely to 
explain the local hostilities against Dutch citizens and Dutch trade efforts as incitements by the envious 
Portuguese.  
 
9 William Foster (ed.), Early Travels to India, 1583-1591 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1940), 41. 
 73
Two officials remained on board as ostagiers (hostages),  at the same time the admiral 
delegated several men to the palace to be introduced to the sultan. They presented the sultan a 
bracelet of coral, a drinking glass and a looking glass and were treated to a banquet and 
entertainment.10 The delegates returned the next day escorted by a palace eunuch who carried 
the sultan’s golden chapp11  hanging from a golden chain on his neck, with the message of 
peace and welcome for the admiral , and the promise of plenty pepper.  John Davis asserts 
that it was the custom to take the chapp in the hand and listen to the sultan’s order.12 Admiral 
Cornelis de Houtman was summoned to be at the palace at midnight. Even if it was a 
discomforting thought to have to leave the ships at the odd time of midnight, the admiral did 
not hesitate to follow the order, taking with him his second in command while the shahbandar 
stayed on board as ostagier.  
The sultan sent two elephants to carry De Houtman to the palace.  He found himself in the 
company of the crown prince who was richly adorned with golden bracelets and precious 
jewels, and many nobles, all seated on elephants while court musicians played their 
instruments all the way to the palace. This respectful reception can only mean that the 
expedition was held in high esteem.  
De Houtman had been invited to the celebrations of the Islamic new year, to the occasion of 
which the sultan had invited several Asian and Middle-Eastern ambassadors. The guests were 
feasted on a lavish banquet of endless dishes served on golden plates, washed away with a 
distilled beverage called arak, made of rice or palm fruit, of which there was plenty.  
It was Acehnese court custom that foreigners were attired in the traditional outfit of white 
Indian linen before they were presented to the sultan. Sultan Alau’d-din presented De 
Houtman a ceremonial keris, a traditional weapon which carried special value when it was 
given by the sultan. John Davis mentions that it was strictly forbidden for the average person 
to carry a keris.‘ This Cryse is a kind of dagger…..it is death to weare this Cryse, but from the 
King’s gift: and having it, there is absolute freedome to take Victualls without money, and 
command the rest as slaves.13 It is likely that he exaggerated what he had been told.  
 
                                                 
 
10 Frederick de Houtman, De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, 69.  
 
11 The c(h)ap(p) or tsiap was the royal insignia which expressed permission. The Europeans often refer to this 
word to say that they received a license to trade or permission to land or to leave.    
 
12 John Davis, De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, 47. 
 
13 idem. 
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2. 1. 3     Negotiations between De Houtman and the Sultan 
De Houtman procured only 25 bahar of pepper. Sultan Alau’d-din was evidently more 
interested in the strategic advantages of the visit of the expedition than in the yet unimagined 
financial prospects of broader international trade.  He asked De Houtman to assist him with 
his ships for a war expedition to Johor for which he would pay him a shipload of pepper: “As 
touching your merchandize, it shall be thus: I have warres with the King of Ior (Johor), you 
shall serve me against him with your ships; your recompense shall be your lading of pepper; 
this was agreed”.14 The sultan evidently set the condition. He forbade the local merchants to 
sell their pepper to the Dutch, to force De Houtman’s assistance for the expedition to Johor.15  
Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah without hesitation drew his European visitors in the internecine 
conflicts with his Malay enemy. He wanted to avenge Johor’s attack on Acehnese territory 
and vessels, which was Johor’s revenge for the liquidation in 1589 of the Acehnese crown-
prince Raja Buyong, who happened to be a son of the Sultan of Johor. The murder of the 
prince staged Alau’d-din’s accession.  In Part three of this study I explore and discuss the 
Aceh-Johor conflicts.     
This request by an Islamic state to Europeans who are classified as ‘infidels’ to assist in  
attacking another Islamic state was without precedence. The momentous occasion presented 
itself. Johor on the other hand some times sided with the Portuguese ‘infidel’ against Aceh.  
 
After he consulted with his staff, De Houtman agreed to assist the sultan in the expedition to 
Johor 16. At that time the Dutch were obviously ignorant of Johor’s strategic and political 
stature in the Straits, a reality which the VOC shortly afterwards would recognize as a factor 
of major importance for its future operations and strategies; Johor’s key position in the affairs 
of the Straits made the Dutch perform their balancing footwork when dealing with the feuding 
rulers.17 
                                                 
 
14 ibid., 48. 
 
15According to Frederick de Houtman it was agreed that the expedition to Johor would take maximum three 
months. The sultan would provide rice, meat and wine. One person would remain in Aceh as ostagier.  
De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen,73.       
 
16 ibid, 72.  
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A contract was signed by both Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah  and Cornelis de Houtman, 
supposedly a novel experience for the Acehnese ruler.18 It was agreed that De Houtman 
would receive 1000 bahar of pepper before the expedition to Johor and another 1000 bahar of 
pepper after returning in Aceh. A salient facet is that the sultan pledged an oath with a 
commoner, by which they both declared that the agreement was made without fraud.19   
 
 
 
 
2. 1. 4   The Sultan’s inclination to the English 
Upon hearing that the chief pilot of the fleet was English, Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah 
immediately sent for him, anxious to meet the Englishman. English victory over the Spanish 
armada in 1588 had been an occasion of great joy for Aceh. A decade afterwards John Davis 
gloried over a flattering reception at the sultan’s palace.  
‘He enquired much of England, of the Queene, of her Basha’s, and how she could hold warres 
with so great a King as the Spaniards (for he thinketh that Europe is all Spanish)’.20   
Sultan Alau’d-din was remarkably well informed about the developments in Europe and he 
started to show a growing inclination towards the English. His admiration for England and the 
special attention he gave John Davis, annoyed Cornelis de Houtman, who could not restrain 
himself and threw some unpleasant remarks at the Englishmen serving on board his ships. He 
boldly requested from the sultan that the locals stopped calling him English, because he was 
from Flanders.21   
‘The twentieth, our Baase being with the King was exceeding well entertained, the King very 
importunate to know if he were English: Tell me truly (said the King), for I love souldiers; 
and I must further tell you, Alfonso (Vicente) hath been earnest with me to betray you, but it 
shall not be; for I am your friend: and therewith gave him a Purse of Gold. He giving thankes, 
                                                                                                                                                        
17 J. L. Blussé postulates that in the early modern period the Dutch had a reputation for performing a soft-handed 
approach in order to reach their objectives in Asia. “Amongst Feigned Friends and Declared Enemies” in: Solvi 
Sogner (ed.), Making Sense of Global History (Oslo: Universiteitsforlaget, 2002), 2.    
 
18 De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, 73. The contract probably got lost in the attack on the ships which took 
place soon afterwards. 
 
19 idem. 
 
20 ibid., 49.    
 
21 ibid, 48. Flanders was a province in the United Republic of the Netherlands.   
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answered that he was not of England but of Flanders,  and at the Kings service. I have heard 
of England, said the King, but not of Flanders: what land is that? He further inquired of their 
King, State, and Government; whereof our Baase made large report, refusing the Authoritie of 
a King, relating the government of Aristocratie. He further made sure to the King, to give 
commandment that his subjects should not call him English: for it was a bitterness unto him 
which the King granted.  Againe he required to know if there were no Englishmen in the ships 
he answered, there be some English in the ships, but they have been bred up in Flanders. I 
understand, said the King, that there be some that differ both in apparel, language, and 
fashion: what are those? He answered, English; of which my chiefe pilot is one. Well, said the 
King, I must see those men.’22 
‘The sixe and twentieth, our Baase came aboard with a boatload of pepper, reporting words 
above credit, how the King had used him, of his mightie fortune, and of the wonderfull trade 
that he had procured, with no small ‘Gaudeamus in superbia nostra’ (let us rejoice in our 
pride): he further said, that the king did often demand of him if he were not of England, which 
he did strongly denie, using some unfit speeches of our Nation. Further, said he, being aboard, 
I wish I had given a thousand pound that we had not English among us: thus we poor soules, 
were thrust into the Corner.’  
Cornelis de Houtman’s arrogance and his abhorrence of his English crew fuelled the uneasy 
relationship with John Davis. When he set foot in Aceh, Cornelis De Houtman was a self-
possessed ambitious man, who owed it to his qualities as a capable sailor that he was 
appointed commander of the Zeeland expedition. When the sultan declared that he had never 
heard of a country called Flanders,  De Houtman boasted that he came from a country with a 
government by Aristocracia.23  His reaction shows pride and prejudice. One clearly wonders 
what the Acehnese ruler thought of this outlandish system. Since autocratic rule was the form 
of government in Aceh, and in fact the only system known to the outer ends of the globe, it 
must have been difficult to envisage a government represented by a plurality of persons of 
more or less equal authority. Before he was installed as sultan, Alau’d-din was the pre-
eminent orangkaya at the court of the former sultan and the protector of the young crown-
prince whose liquidation opened his way to the throne. The Bustan as-Salatin calls him the 
son of Firman Shah, a prince of the Daru’l Kamal dynasty, one of the two dynasties before 
                                                 
22  ibid, 49.   
 
23  ibid, 48.   
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Aceh’s unification in 1500 .24 His enthronement brought a change in the dynastic line which 
had been dominated by the Mahkota Alam dynasty.  John Davis mentions that when he 
accessed the throne,  he eliminated thousands of fellow orangkaya to make sure that they 
would not rebel against him. By appointing new orangkaya, he hoped to drew their loyalty, a 
basic condition to keep the throne and rule the state. 25 According to local gossip Alau’d-din 
was a former fisherman who, because of his bravery, gained the former sultan’s favour and 
became his laxamana.26  
It is quite ironic that John Davis whom Alau’d-din showed so much honour calls him ‘a lustie 
man, exceedingly fat, who doth nothing all the day but eate and drinke, from morning to night 
there is no end of banquetting’. ‘Hee, his great men and women doe nothing but eate and 
drinke and talke of venerie. If the Poet’s Fables have any shew of truth, then undoubtedly this 
King is the great Bacchus. For he holdeth all the Ceremonies of Gluttonie.’ 27 Davis put to use 
his literary skill to pose an opinion, a notion of what he himself disapproved of, giving details 
of Alau’d-din’s life and doings when he was of old age. This ludicrous description has 
contributed to the lasting view one has of the character of Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah 
which transpires from the literature.    
 
 
 
 
2. 1. 5     A turn of events: violence at the docks  
The friendly atmosphere which marked the reception of the Zeeland expedition changed when 
contrary to what was agreed, the shahbandar raised the price of the pepper from 8 to 15 real a 
bahar. De Houtman was not amused by this deception and complained to the sultan, who 
stoically replied that he left the business of the trade to his shahbandar. 28 It signifies a 
                                                 
 
24 Bustanu’s Salatin, 34. 
 
25 Leonard Blussé identifies polities in Southeast Asia with unstable primus inter pares administrations. This 
intrinsically challenges the historical view that these polities were ruled by absolute monarchs.  
See: ‘Amongst Feigned Friends and Declared Enemies’ in Solvi Sogner (ed.), Making Sense of Global History, 
(Oslo: Universiteitsforlaget, 2002), 154-168    
 
26 De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, 54. 
 
27 ibid, 55.   
 
28 John Davis speaks of four shahbandar in Aceh, which shows the extent of the trade. (Unger, De oudste reizen, 
55)  The historiography gives evidence of four shahbandar in the port of Malacca at the time the Portuguese 
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delegation of tasks from which he detached himself, but it fundamentally shows his reluctance 
to make amendments in favour of the foreigners and against his own orangkaya. His 
detachment from the business contradicts the accepted view that he was the absolute ruler of 
the Acehnese realm. The orangkaya remained a powerful class and he had to consider their 
complaints, a pre-condition for a modus vivendi.  
 
The day before the expedition departed for Johor (in the course of September), when they 
were loading the ships with ordnance, the Dutch sensed that something was very wrong and 
immediately took measures. John Davis relates ‘We, mistrusting some treachery, filled our 
tops with stones, made fast our gratings and prepared our weapons, whereat our Baase (boss) 
was exceeding angry, commanding all to be dissolved, but we would not.’ 29 It illustrates 
above all that De Houtman did not anticipate a physical confrontation and believed in the 
good relationship with the Acehnese. His directors were resolute that the costly expedition 
would pass without the spilling of blood and without violating the rights of the local people. If 
he had any reason to suspect the locals, he should not allow them aboard armed with weapons 
and was permitted to castigate the violators 30. The corcun (secretary) and the chief  
shahbandar came on board with armed soldiers. They brought different kinds of meat and a 
large jar of arak with them of which John Davis claims that these were poisoned; after eating 
and drinking they were in a gay mood. 31   
The Acehnese attack on the ships was swift and brutal; Cornelis de Houtman and twenty eight  
of his men were murdered and in the ensuing battle many locals too lost their lives, like the 
shahbandar Abdalla,  a relative of the sultan. John Davis, who escaped the onslaught, with 
obvious satisfaction writes :  
‘In this great miserie, it was some pleasure to see how the base Indians did flye, how they 
were killed and how well they were drowned, the sea was covered with Indian heads, for they 
swamme away by hundreds.’32 Frederick de Houtman and another twenty two men were 
ashore and captured by the Acehnese.   
                                                                                                                                                        
arrived there. Malacca was a great trade emporium. The fact that four shabandar in Aceh were in charge of 
handling the trade, says something of Aceh’s importance as a trade centre.    
 
29 De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, 51. 
 
30 ibid, 30 onwards: ‘concept-Instruxtie ende memorie voor Cornelis de Houtman’ 
 
31 ibid, 50. 
 
32 ibid, 51. 
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The motif for the Acehnese attack at that most cheerful moment when they were celebrating 
the departure of the expedition to Johor is a haunting question. One should realize that the 
climate in Aceh was highly politicised at that time of European encroachment and interest. 
The port was alive with intrigue and conspiracy, where no one could trust anyone else. At the 
centre of power, like a spider in his web, was the sultan surrounded by a network of courtiers 
and intelligence which included Portuguese intelligence. There is little doubt that the 
Portuguese instigated the attack, threatened as they felt by Dutch intrusion into their preserve. 
They spread the rumour that the men from Holland were no more than pirates who had fought 
with the local people of Bantam. Noteworthy is the view of Manuel Lobato, a Portugues 
historian, that the Hollanders encountered problems on their first visits to Bantam and the 
Sunda islands because of Portuguese instigation; in Aceh they were attacked because of 
Portuguese diplomatic intervention, which marked the apogee in the relations between Aceh 
and the Estado da India.’33 The sultan earlier confided in Cornelis de Houtman that Alfonso 
Vicente vehemently warned against De Houtman, saying that his misconduct in Java was a 
forewarning of his bad intentions in Aceh. It seems that the pugnacious Vicente was 
deliberately manufacturing a casus belli. 34 
                                                 
 
33 Lobato, “Malaca” in: de Oliveira Marques (ed.), Historia dos Portugueses no Extremo Oriente, 55-56:  
 ‘Os Holandeses experimentaram grandes dificultades nos primeiros anos da sua frequencia da Insulinda. Em 
1595-1596 os irmaos Hourman tiveram serios problemas em Banten, parece que por instigacao dos portugueses 
de Malaca. En 1599 foram atacados em Sunda e no ano seguinte no Achem, aqui por instigacao da diplomacia 
portuguesa, facto que marca o apogeu do relacionamento entre Achem e o Estado da India.’  
Lobato’s conclusion is based on several sources which he names: Denys Lombard, Le Sultanat d’Atjeh, 23; C.R. 
Boxer & Frazao de Vasconcelos,  Andre Furtado de Mendonca 1558-1610, 124 ; Coutre, Andanzas, 161. 
  
34 Investigating the sources on Portuguese conspiracy in the East Indies used by Hugo Grotius in his De Jure 
Praedae, which are based on sworn statements of Dutch captains, merchants and mariners, Martine van Ittersum 
argues that Grotius interpreted these statements from a  perceived nefarious Portuguese conspiracy. ‘This 
reinterpretation of history was corroborated by the attestants’conversations with the Pangoran of Bantam and 
Sultan of Aceh, who were only too happy to play along. Malaccan envoys and Portuguese renegades were 
conveniently blamed for previous ‘misunderstandings’ between the new allies, such as the Acehnese attack on 
two Dutch merchantmen in September 1599.’ ( 56). 
‘In their eagerness to please their new allies and explain away previous ‘misunderstandings’, both rulers were 
happy to confirm the attesters’ worst suspicions about the Portuguese. The result was a radical reinterpretation of 
the early Dutch voyages to the East Indies, which Grotius accepted uncritically and incorporated into De Jure 
Praedae.’(82)  
What is sadly missing in section 2.3 of her book is the account of John Davis - not a Dutchman but an 
Englishman – who mentions that four Portuguese ships arrived from Malacca under the command of Alfonso 
Vicente ‘to prevent our trade, as the sequel doth shew’. Davis mentions too that the Portuguese were usually 
present when Cornelis de Houtman was with the sultan.   
It is legitimate to ask why the Acehnese would suddenly act with such vengeance against the Dutch when there 
seems no clear reason for this, especially not since De Houtman had agreed to assist in the attack on  Johor.  
If Alau’d-din was out to please his new allies (the Dutch), why would he hold Frederick de Houtman hostage 
when several Dutch fleets had arrived in his port asking for De Houtman’s release?  
Van Ittersum’s assertion that the attestants’ accounts (in the context of  the events in Aceh) backed up ‘the 
reinterpretation of history’, rests on very thin ice.       
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 There was evidently more at stake, Malacca engaged in friendly relations with its neighbour 
Johor, the head of the important Malay alliance and it was essential for continued Portuguese 
trade and shipping to have access to the Malay ports on either sides of the Straits. The 
Portuguese would not suffer the petty Dutch to come to Aceh’s help to defeat Johor. After 
decades of strategic operations and flirtations with local rulers, they could not stand by and 
see the Dutch ruin their existence, while Aceh was a slumbering tiger ready to prey on their 
trade and shipping, remaining their fiercest local opponent. It would threaten the power 
equilibrium which the Portuguese now cannily controlled,  if Aceh came out victorious from 
the confrontation with Johor.  
Cornelis de Houtman’s arrogance provokes the suggestion that the Acehnese attack on his 
ships was Aceh’s answer to his smugness, yet, from John Davis’ statement that De Houtman 
ordered his men to stop taking defensive actions and to refrain from aggression, one gathers  
another side of Cornelis de Houtman, one showing caution and restraint.   
The surviving crew escaped to sea with both ships, leaving behind two pinnaces and all the 
goods, pepper and cash. It was a great financial loss for the company and the young 
enterprising merchants who partook in the expedition.  
 
When the hostages were chained the Portuguese jubilantly cheered agorasta grand fiesta, 
calling it a day of celebration. Alfonso Vicente, whom Frederick de Houtman called ‘the 
traitor’, acted as spokesman for the sultan and demanded one of the ships in return for their 
freedom.  Frederick answered him that they did not have the power to decide because they 
were only the servants of the company, paid to do their work. 35 To negotiate the release of 
the hostages, the sultan sent one of them, Guyon le Fort, to the crew onboard the ships fro
which he did not return. The ships stayed for a time in the close vicinity of the port to try to 
free the hostages. They were attacked by Portuguese ships.
m 
                                                                                                                                                        
36   
The sultan seemed contrite, calling Frederick de Houtman more than once to the palace, 
telling him he had ordered the capture of the crew but not their killing, accusing the 
shahbandar of the killings.37 He was exceedingly apologetic for the death of so many 
Dutchmen but claimed that he had lost men too.  
       
35 De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen,78.   
 
36 John Davis mentions that in the confrontation with the Portuguese, the Dutch sunk one of their ships and ‘beat 
the rest, so they fledde’.  De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen,52.  
 
37 ibid., 81.    
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He reiterated this when they were at his bathing place in the company of Symon Nunes the 
Malaccan ambassador and a Catholic priest, who advised him to send the Dutch hostages to 
the mountains to prevent them to escape from Aceh.  Alau’d-din refused to follow the advice. 
We have to consider the fact that he had no experience in dealing with two mutually hostile 
European nations and not sure whom  to trust.  It shows the condition prevailing in the 
Acehnese realm at a precise moment.  
The horrendous event had damaged his standing, something he gradually came to realize. He 
derived more prestige by the visit of foreigners. Aceh was the first port in the Straits where  
northern Europeans called to trade. He demanded from Frederick De Houtman to stay calm 
(‘dat ik geen zwarichheyt stellen soude’) promising to restore his dignity, by giving him a 
prominent position and a wife.38   
Sultan Alau’d-din’s confession that he did not order the killings, puts the general assertion 
that he had absolute control of Aceh’s affairs in a different light. Although the capture of the 
Dutch crew was premeditated, the killings are an indication of activities undermining his 
authority.   
The captives were sent to a prison in Pedir. The change in their status came because Frederick 
de Houtman refused to convert to Islam, which the sultan demanded with the aim to use him 
as his spokesman when the Dutch eventually returned. De Houtman passionately defended his 
Belief in front of a court of Islamic judges and did not submit to their threats, not even when 
the executioners put a sword in his neck. He declared that it was to no avail to try to convert 
him, because he was a true Christian and could never become a Muslim. It took several 
agonizing days before the sultan ordered a stop to the threats.  It looks as if Alau’d-din had a 
passion for pleasure and a gift for compassion.  
In Pedir the prisoners laboured on the pinnace which had fallen in the hands of the Acehnese. 
They laboured under inhumane conditions, receiving for food a small portion of un-boiled 
rice twice a day, being chained when they were not labouring.  
 
The Portuguese were still treated by the sultan as friends, walking in and out of the palace. 
It is crucial for contemporary understanding of the political transformation taking place after 
almost a century of wars and hostilities between Aceh and Malacca to gain the deeper 
                                                                                                                                                        
Frederick de Houtman does not explain why he ordered the capture of the crew; on the other hand he mentions 
that the sultan had several of the murderers captured ‘for his own gains’, to extract money ‘300 pieces of eight in 
gold’, which was missing from the ransack of the Dutch ships.          
 
38 idem. 
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significance of Alau’d-din’s willingness to establish relations with Malacca in 1593. His 
positive demeanour to the overtures of the Malaccan merchants seems to have served one 
clear purpose, namely to celebrate his legitimacy and to underscore the regularity of his 
succession after the liquidation of the crown-prince whose father was the Sultan of Johor. The 
political conjecture is evident. By drawing Portuguese loyalty from Johor towards Aceh, the 
power scale which was not favourable for Aceh was in balance.   
The triangular affairs were shaped by geo-political ambitions.  Johor did escape the Acehnese 
attack in 1599; thanks to Portuguese interference the momentum was lost and De Houtman’s 
assistance for Aceh had become redundant. Malacca thus controlled the power equilibirum.  
In 1600 the Acehnese armada was on its way to Johor, when the news came that Dutch ships 
had arrived in the vicinity of Aceh. After only one day at sea the armada swiftly returned to 
fend off a possible Dutch attack. Frederick de Houtman had been enlisted in the war 
expedition to Johor. It is an ironical twist of history that Dutch interference twice saved Johor 
the humiliation of an Acehnese attack.  
 
 
 
 
2. 1. 6     Relentless Dutch efforts for trade monopolies          
The violence against the Zeeland expedition did not deter Dutch fleets from coming to Aceh. 
They were not refused to enter the port of Aceh. Various companies presented themselves at 
Sultan Alau’d-din’s court to ask for trade contracts and all requested the release of the 
hostages.  
When Pieter Both arrived with a large fleet owned by the Brabantsche Compagnie in the 
Malacca Straits, he immediately sent his second man, vice-admiral Paulus van Caerden, to 
Aceh in the course of November 1600 with a letter for the sultan from Prince Maurice of 
(Orange) Nassau, who was at that time ‘Stadhouder’ of the provinces Holland and Zeeland 
and three other provinces39. The prince asked for a contract to procure pepper and the release 
of the hostages. From the very start of the Asia expeditions, the prince was involved in the 
operations.40            
                                                 
39 The function of stadhouder can be equated with that of governor. Maurice also became stadthouder of Utrecht, 
Gelderland and Overijsel.  
 
40 His close involvement in the Zeeland expedition is evident from the ‘Artikelenbrief van Prins Maurits voor de 
Leeuw en de Leeuwin voor de reis naar Indië in: Unger,  De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, 24-30. 
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Van Caerden received a polite but otherwise cold reception. The letter from prince Maurice 
remained unopened,  because Alau’d-din was incensed that it had been written on pigskin.41 
Van Caerden, who perceived Portuguese incitement, set fire to one of their vessels and 
captured several of its crew. Aceh was again the stage for European animosity and rivalry. 
The Portuguese remained a nuisance to Alau’d-din in spite of his friendly demeanour towards 
them. Frederick de Houtman mentions that the Portuguese molested Arab ships in the 
harbour, after which the king took all their weapons and put guards around their houses.  
 
In spite of the fact that Van Caerden’s action was an insult to his sovereignty, Alau’d-din 
allowed him to trade, obviously pleased that northern Europeans again called at his port. Van 
Caerden was able to negotiate a very favourable contract for the procurement of pepper with 
the shahbandar.42  
The contract, written in Malay in Arabic characters was based on the following conditions for 
the Dutch: 
-exemption from the payment of tolls; 
-the right to be the first buyer; 
-exemption from payment in advance; 
-payment in gold for goods traded in Aceh; 
-a time limit of 3-4 months for the delivery and loading of the goods; 
-a set price of 7 tael per bahar of pepper. 
It was a trade contract par excellence.The company would be paid in gold for the goods they 
sold and it paid in silver tael for the goods they bought.  But there was a snag. Captain 
Vlamingh in charge of the official signing of the agreement discovered to his dismay that the 
agreed exemption to pay in advance for the ordered pepper, was not included and therefore  
refused to sign. The shahbandar infuriated by his rejection of the contract, tore up the 
document, telling Vlamingh to leave and come back another time. It was a heavy setback in 
the positive development of the trade relations. The Acehnese merchants obstructed every 
move of the Dutch, wary of their cunning ways and persistence to obtain the sole rights in the 
pepper trade. Van Caerden turned to the sultan, with the request to reinstate the earlier agreed 
                                                 
 
41 De Jonge (ed.), De Opkomst, vol. II, 231-32. 
It is well known that Muslims consider pigs impure (haraam).   
 
42 A translation of the contract is included  in: J. E. Heeres (ed.), Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando Indicum, 6 
vols., (Leiden: BKI, 1907), vol. I, (1596-1650), 19, 20. 
The contract is registered as  NA 1.04.01:  Archieven van de Compagnieen op Oost-Indië, 1594-1603, inv. no. 
171. 
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conditions, like the exemption to pay in advance, but Alau’d-din seemed careful not to go too 
much against his shahbandar and merchants, telling him that he delegated the business of the 
trade to his shahbandar. Yet he cunningly came with what looks like a Solomon’s ruling, 
ordering that a new contract be drawn. The price for the pepper was now 8 tael a bahar and a 
toll was levied for outgoing goods: 5 (tael?) to 100 (bahar?). The condition that the company 
would be paid in gold for goods they sold in Aceh, was erased. These were essential 
alterations. Hence the new contract still gave the Brabantsche Company the priority as first 
buyer, although it did not give it the right of sole buyer. With this contract in his pocket Van 
Caerden could still proudly show up before the company directors.       
Alau’d-din’s cautious interference, shows that he wanted to prevent a rebellion by the 
orangkaya at any cost. By tradition the relationship between the ruler and these men was one 
of mistrust and therefore fragile and combustible. We should realize that in Europe the 
relation between monarchs and their nobles at that time was not very different.  
When the news of the arrival of Dutch ships in the port reached the hostages in Pedir, they 
escaped from there confinement and sought refuge in Van Caerden’s ships, but he had to hand 
them over to the authorities.   
At his departure, Van Caerden, still resentful of the shahbandar’s deception and the fact that 
the  hostages were not allowed to leave, robbed several Muslim ships destined for Aceh of 
their goods, seized one ship and captured sixty men who he did not want to set free unless the 
sultan released the hostages, but in the end he left the ship and the captives behind.43  
Van Caerden’s actions were criticized at home, for it had brought Dutch relations with Aceh 
at jeopardy. Significant is the fact that compensation was paid for the loss of the goods 
through the services of Laurens Bicker one of Prince Maurice’s delegates to the sultan in 
1601.44 The settlement of the case which took a long time, shows that the Dutch, at least at 
the start of their operations in the Indies, relinquished to International Law.45  To obtain the 
                                                 
43 De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, 95-96. 
 
44 Mentioned in a footnote in W. Ph. Coolhaas, Generale Missiven van gouverneurs-generaal en raden aan 
Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, (’s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1960), vol. I, 54: footnote in the 
missive of Reynst, dated 26 October 1615).  
We are told  that a financial agreement was reached through Laurens Bicker in Amsterdam with Arab merchants, 
for the payment of compensation for their goods which Paulus van Caerden lightened  from their ships.  
On 16 November the Gentlemen XVII of the VOC deposited  ‘een halve ton’ (50.000 florins) in the bank.  
J.K.J. de Jonge mentions however that the Brabantsche Compagnie had to pay for this. It concerned a sum of  
50.000 real. De Opkomst, vol. II ,234.   
 
45 Van Ittersum asserts that Grotius developed his rights and contract theories for eminently practical purposes. 
‘De Jure Praedae was a brilliant vindication of the VOC’s privateering campaign in the East Indies, as 
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monopoly of the pepper trade was obviously the  decisive factor in settling the case with the 
sultan of Aceh, whose contacts with the Red Sea ports and India were most helpful in 
developing their trading networks.        
    
 
 
 
2. 1. 7     The dawn in Aceh-Dutch relations     
The arrival in Aceh on 23 August 1601 of Gerard le Roy and Laurens Bicker of the Zeeland 
company with the ships Zeeland and Lange Barke, brought the necessary repose in the 
anguished contacts. They functioned as delegates of Prince Maurice of Nassau, which started  
a new trend, that of diplomatic relations. Their visit marked a historical milestone in the 
contacts between Aceh and the United Republic of the Netherlands, giving impetus to a 
relationship based on friendship and alliance. Their voyage to Aceh took them through the 
Commoros islands where they made a stop at the island of Anchouan, whose king gave them 
a letter of recommendation for the sultan of Aceh with whom he engaged in trade. Whether 
this letter helped to reassure Alau’d-din of the good intentions of the Dutch, cannot be 
ascertained. When he complained to the delegates about the actions of Van Caerden against 
Muslim ships destined for Aceh, they said that their Prince was innocent of what had 
happened. Obviously convinced,  Sultan Alau’d-din read the letter of Prince Maurice and 
marked it with his cap as evidence thereof. The prince eagerly solicited his friendship, 
offering him assistance against the Portuguese whom he accused of incitement against 
Cornelis de Houtman and requested the release of the hostages.46  He sent the sultan some 
extraordinary gifts like gold plated weapons, mirrors and one thousand real. Frederick de 
Houtman and his mates were immediately released and returned home with Le Roy and 
Bicker.  
The new relationship allowed for establishing the Zeeland factory in 1601, probably the first 
Dutch factory in the region. Earlier Dutch merchants rented a house in Bantam from where 
                                                                                                                                                        
exemplified by Jacob van Heemskerk’s capture of a Portuguese merchantman in Singapore Straits in February 
1603 .’ ‘Grotius’ rights and contract theories largely served to justify the dispossession of the native’,(xxxviii).  
I should stress here that Van Caerden’s actions against the Portuguese in Aceh’s waters and his robbing of 
Muslim ships destined for Aceh took place before Hugo Grotius wrote De Jure Praedae in which he argues ‘that 
in the absence of an independent and effective judge, each private person resumed his sovereign powers and 
executed judgment in his own cause’, Profit and Principle, (Introduction, xxiii). It is a significant fact that the 
VOC paid compensation for the lifted goods. 
       
46 The letter dated 11 December 1600 is published in Banck, Atchin’s Verheffing en Val, 23. 
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they operated and stored goods. A second factory was opened shortly afterwards by the same 
Zeeland expedition in Patani, located on the east coast of the Malay peninsula.  
To oversee the trade two commissioners with their three assistants remained in Aceh. The 
sultan even offered them loans to facilitate the procurement of pepper during the harvest 
season. Of significance is the fact that he gave them a letter of recommendation for the king 
of Cambay, one of the foremost trading ports on the west coast of India, supplier of the bulk 
of textiles and several other goods to former Malay Malacca. It was an important Acehnese 
contribution to Dutch trade initiatives in Gujerat where the merchants went to make 
investigations.      
Even though the relations between Aceh and the Dutch were good, the procedures to procure 
pepper and also other goods in Aceh remained time-consuming and very costly. One of the 
reasons  was that the pepper had to be brought to the port of Aceh (Bandar Aceh) from Pedir. 
This hampered the departure of foreign ships who were dependent on the favourable winds. 
Several Dutch fleets therefore decided to set sail to the island of Ceylon, where they found an 
abundance of spices and other commodities, available against far lower prices and less time-
consuming procedures than in Aceh.  
        
 
     
 
2. 1. 8    Acehnese envoys visit the United Republic  
Encouraged by Prince Maurice’s wish for friendship and his pledge for assistance against the 
Portuguese, Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah sent several envoys with Le Roy and Bicker to 
the United Republic to be introduced to the States General and Prince Maurice. It was the first 
diplomatic mission of a Southeast Asian polity to Europe. Alau’d-din sent a signal to the 
Portuguese, that he established relations with an independent European state. The Portuguese 
had abused his kindness, vehemently meddling in Aceh’s affairs, embarrassing him in the 
eyes of the Dutch and the neighbouring rulers. He turned his back on the Portuguese when 
their warships started to cruise in Aceh’s waters, threatening its security. Malacca’s support 
for Johor which was out to re-establish control of the east Sumatran port of Aru, marked the 
end of the decade of calm and contacts between Aceh and Malacca.47  
                                                 
47 ‘After 1600, when Aceh and the Portuguese started to war, the relations  with the Dutch improved’. 
Femme Gaastra, De Geschiedenis van de VOC (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2002), 39.  
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The Acehnese delegation to the United Republic constituted an ambassador, an admiral and a 
cousin of the sultan, accompanied by their servants. In his letter to Prince Maurice dated 24 
August 1601 Alau’d-din enumerated the gifts he sent for the prince. These were ‘a small 
jewel and a ring with four big stones and some smaller stones, a dagger with a gold and 
copper sheath wrapped in a silver cloth, a golden cup and saucer and a gold-plated silver pot 
and two Malay speaking parrots with silver chains. He ordered that the gifts be divided over 
the two ships, probably with the idea that if only one ship made it to its destiny there would 
still be gifts for the prince.48  The home bound voyage turned out to be very fortunate for the 
expedition.  When the expedition arrived  before the island of Saint Helena in the South 
Atlantic where it waited the arrival of its sister ship the Zwarten Arent, the Portuguese carack 
San Jago which was on its way from Goa to Lisbon and richly laden with pepper and valuable 
goods  suddenly sailed by. A confrontation  between the rivals could not be avoided. In the 
battle  the Dutch were able to seize the carack, dropped off the crew on the island Juan 
Fernando de Noronha off the Brazilian coast and took their price to Zeeland.49 The sultan’s 
envoys were witnesses to the hostilities between the two European antagonists and they 
fortunately escaped humiliation by the Portuguese if the Portuguese had been victorious in the 
sea battle.             
 
The  envoys were treated with due respect and given a grand tour of the provinces where they 
visited important towns and met with local authorities; they were received by the States 
General and by Prince Maurice and had the opportunity to see ‘the government of 
aristocracia’ at work. J. E. Banck calls the relationship between Prince Maurice and the 
sultans of Aceh an inter pares relationship50 which is not accurate, because the prince was 
stadthouder of several provinces and not the sovereign ruler of the republic.  
No costs were spared to please them, banquets and exuberant entertainments were arranged in 
their honour. The States General invited European monarchs to send their representatives to 
meet the Acehnese visitors. It was a successful strategy to give publicity to their warm 
relations with an important Asian ruler and trading partner at a time when Spain was still a  
                                                 
 
48 A translation of the letter is in published in: De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, 136-37.   
 
49 De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, XLVII, XLVIII.  Here is mentioned ‘galeon’, while the Besluiten van de 
Raad der Admiraliteit in Zeeland speak of a ‘carack’ (144, 156, 157, 166). 
 
50 Atchin’s Verheffing en Val, 24. 
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menace in Europe. 51 The eldest of the envoys, Abdul Hamid, died three months after arrival 
and was buried in a church in the town of Middelburg in the province of Zeeland, in the 
presence of important dignitaries. The other envoys, Sri Muhammad and Mir Hassan, 
returned to Aceh in 1604 with the fleet of Admiral Steven Verhaegen. 
The peregrination of the Acehnese, which lasted about fifteen months was an expensive 
investment for their hosts, but with the eye on trade contracts no costs were spared. The 
expenses of the visit were divided between the different chambers. 52 
A solid foundation was laid for a strategic alliance against the Portuguese.  
In quick succession several Dutch fleets visited Aceh: a second fleet fitted out by De 
Moucheron arrived in August 1602 under command of Joris van Spilbergen who seized a 
Portuguese carack in front of Aceh in close cooperation with the English admiral William 
Lancaster. Another fleet under command of Sebald de Weert was fitted out by the United 
Zeeland Company in which De Moucheron participated .53 Admiral Van Heemskerk made 
port in Aceh with a fleet of 8 ships in 1602 from where he went to Johor.  
 
 
 
 
2. 1. 9     The English obtain the Privilege in 1602 
The English not only looked for spices, but for outlets for their wool and iron.  
In 1580 Francis Drake returned home from his voyage around the globe with spices from the 
Moluccan islands even before the Dutch set foot in the area. Already in 1592 an English fleet 
consisting of three tall ships was on a reconnaissance mission in the Straits of Malacca. One 
of the vice admirals was James Lancaster.54  J. S. Furnivall’s remark that the English 
followed the Dutch like ‘gadflies’ in the archipelago is therefore  arguable. 55   
                                                 
 
51 At that time Ambrosio de Spinola, a general in the Spanish army of Felipe III of Spain had demonstrated his      
military skill in the siege of Ostend in 1603.     
 
52 De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, XLIX. 
 
53 ibid., LII.  
 
54  ibid, 94. 
 
55 Quoted by Hall, A History of South-East Asia, fourth edition, 319.  
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The East India Company (EIC) was established on 31 December 1600 by royal charter and 
obtained a monopoly to trade in the region between the Cape of Good Hope and the Magellan 
Straits for a period of fifteen years.  
The first official fleet which consisted of the tall ships Dragon, Hector, Ascension and Susan 
left London for the East in February 1601. James Lancaster was in charge of the expedition, 
having as his chief navigator the indefatigable John Davis, the chief pilot of the ill-fated De 
Houtman expedition. The English indubitably profited from the firsthand knowledge of John 
Davis about the situation in Aceh and elsewhere. The Dutch accused him for spying for the 
Earl of Essex, which is not ill founded, because his journal of the De Houtman expedition is 
addressed to ‘the Right Honourable, mine exceeding good Lord and Master, Robert, Earl of 
Essex, etc.’ In the preamble he refers to the directions which the Earl gave him at his 
departure, ‘when it pleased you to imploy mee in this voyage for the discovering of these 
easterne parts of the world, to the service of her Majestie and the good of our countrey’. The 
competition between the Dutch and the English was a fact.             
It must have been an impressive sight to see the four tall ships accompanied by a supply ship 
sailing into the bay of Aceh in June 1602, confirming Sultan Alau’d-din’s image of the 
mighty England. Lancaster added great distinction to the visit by declaring to the palace 
messenger that he would personally deliver the letter from Queen Elizabeth to the king, since 
it was the established custom in Europe that an envoy delivered the letter from his sovereign 
in person. The court custom in Aceh was that the letter from a foreign sovereign was 
delivered to the sultan before the envoy presented himself at the palace.  
The letter of Amitie and League signed by Queen Elizabeth was one out of six copies all with 
a blank space in the middle in which the name of the local ruler at whose port he called 
needed to be filled in. In their letters to their counterparts in the East, Elizabeth I and later her 
successor James I proclaimed themselves queen and king of several European nations. In the 
preamble of the letter the queen introduces herself as ‘Elizabeth, by the grace of God, Queene 
of England, France and Ireland, Defendresse of the Christian Faithe and Religion……’ 
The show of sovereign power was not unusual in the contacts between sovereigns. The Asian 
monarchs equally associated power with territorial expansion and gloated about their victories 
in their letters to the European kings and princes.    
Lancaster also boasted of the help given by Elizabeth to Holland in its struggle against Spain. 
Sultan Alau’d-din curiously demanded to know what kind of relationship existed between the 
two countries. At that time his envoys were visiting the United Republic of the Netherlands. 
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Against this background it is interesting to know that two decades later in 1621 Sultan 
Iskandar Muda, equally intrigued by the power hierarchy in Europe enquired of the French 
admiral Augustin de Beaulieu whether the king of France was a subject of the king of 
England.  Beaulieu deftly responded that France had always been one of the greatest Christian 
kingdoms, and that it had only for a short period been subjected to Spanish authority. He 
elaborated on the legitimacy of the French monarchy saying that it had been in existence for 
1300 years and ruled successively by 64 kings. Iskandar Muda outwitted him and said that he 
had received several letters from the king of England in which he called himself ‘King of 
France’.56  
The expedition left England with the objective to procure pepper and to find outlets for 
English iron and wool. William Foster claims that they (the English) didn’t want to interfere 
with Spanish and Portuguese settlements.57  But there were collisions with the Portuguese all 
the same. Lancaster seized a Portuguese vessel in the Straits and took its cargo. In 1603 he 
and the Dutch admiral Joris van Spilbergen cooperated in attacking a Portuguese galleon.   
 
The sultan sent six elephants to carry the envoy of the much admired English queen to the 
palace. He sent Cornelis de Houtman in contrast only two elephants. The Queen’s letter was 
wrapped in a piece of silk and gold cloth, put under a canopy on the back of the largest 
elephant, a sign that the document was most significant. Lancaster followed on the second 
elephant. Musicians took part in the procession and played their trumpets, drums and wooden 
flutes, all the way to the palace. Passing three courts they arrived at the audience hall, which 
was attached to the sultan’s private apartments and decked out with beautiful carpets and 
draperies woven with golden threads. To enter the hall they had to take off  their ‘leg wear’ 
and were dressed in the traditional Acehnese outfit and headdress. They saluted the sultan in 
the manner of the country, raising their hands above their heads and bowing to the ground. It 
signified that they accepted the sultan’s daulat (sovereignty). Similar court rituals full of 
symbolism existed almost everywhere in Asia. 58 When Lancaster announced that he came in 
                                                 
 
56 Denys Lombard (ed.), Mémoires d’un voyage aux Indes Orientales 1619-1622, Augustin de Beaulieu  un 
marchand normand à Sumatra, (Paris: Ecole Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1996), 155,156.  
 
57 W. Foster, England’s quest of Eastern Trade, (London: Black), 1933), 127. 
 
58 Blussé describes the ‘strange practices’ in which the Europeans took part  when dealing with the local 
authorities, ‘most of which the vast majority of Europeans could never have been coerced to do; they were 
willing to “kowtow”, the Chinese and Japanese practice of sitting on their knees while bending their heads over 
and touching the ground, or to follow the Siamese Court’s practice of lying sideways and moving, crab like, 
across the floor. ’ In: “Feigned Friends and Declared Enemies”.  
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the name of the Queen of England and the purpose of his visit, the sultan kindly hushed him, 
telling him to sit down and take refreshments, ‘you are very welcome, and here you shall have 
whatsoever you will in any reasonable conditions demanded, for your princesse sake; for she 
is worthy of all kindness and franke conditions, being a princesse of great noblesse, for fame 
speaketh so much of her.59 Certainly the establishment of the English-Turkey Company, 
initiated in 1579 by William Harburn,  Elizabeth’s envoy, showed the English as reliable 
friends of the Muslims. Alau’d-din’s undisguised admiration for the valiant queen was 
unprecedented. A splendid reception was held in their honour with a gargantuan banquet 
consisting of numerous dishes served on plates of gold and tambaga, a kind of brass much 
appreciated by the Acehnese rulers. They were sitting cross-legged on the floor and enjoyed 
the entertainment performed by dancing girls. The sultan reclined on a raised platform and 
drank to the queen’s delegates. The gifts sultan Alau’d-din received from Queen Elizabeth 
were ‘a belt or girdle, a case of pistols, some plumes (fan) and an ewer of silver.’ He seemed 
most pleased with the plumes and immediately ordered one of his female servants to fan him.  
Among the assembled guests were the ambassadors of Siam, Pegu and Patani, who discussed 
the prospect of a military alliance against Malacca. It emerges that in 1602 the political 
configuration was changing; strategic issues against the Portuguese were high on the agenda 
in which Siam Pegu and Patani collaborated with Aceh. It is odd that the strategic discussion 
took place when the Portuguese were still present in Aceh. Lancaster was in the palace when a 
Portuguese ambassador from Goa proposed to Sultan Alau’d-din the construction of a fort at 
the entrance of the harbour, suggesting that the city needed defence works to protect it since 
its wooden buildings were prone to fire. Alau’d-din sneered back: ‘Hath your master a 
daughter to give unto my sonne, that he is so careful of the preservation of my countrey?’ 
When Lancaster complained to him that the presence of Portuguese spies at his court was 
discomforting for the English, he answered that the Portuguese were as much his enemies as 
he was theirs. He deferred a trip by Alfonso Vicente to Malacca, to enable Lancaster to pass 
through the Straits un-harassed by Portuguese ships. 60 In his letter to Queen Elizabeth Sultan 
                                                 
 
59 W. Foster (ed.), The voyages of Sir James Lancaster to Brazil and the Indies 1591-1603,  (London: Hakluyt 
Society, 1940) Second Series no. LXXXV, 92. 
 
60 It is evident that Alau’d-din did not consider trade relations with Malacca as the end of their enmity, but the 
relationship was reconciled to geo-political ambitions.  
According to Bernard Lewis there is an essential addition in the law books stipulating that the state of war 
between the Dar-al-Islam and the Dar-al-Harb could be interrupted, when expedient, by an armistice or truce of 
limited duration. ‘It could not be terminated by a peace, but only by a final victory. The Political Language of 
Islam, 73;  
Also: Van Koningsveld,  De Islam, 115-21. 
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Alau’d-din admitted that the Portuguese were his enemies ‘now and forever so we shall cause 
them to die in whatever place soever we meet them, a public death.’61    
Lancaster appeared frequently at the palace, but to his great disappointment the sultan was 
more interested in the political affairs of England, in the manners and customs of the people 
and in England’s military success against Spain than in trading. He did not for one moment 
touch upon the purpose of the expedition which was to obtain a contract to procure pepper.  
However much he esteemed Lancaster, strangely the latter was summoned to appear before 
the kadi, who is the chief Islamic judge whom Lancaster calls a very wise man and the 
shahbandar whom he calls a noble aristocrat of old lineage, to explain in detail the reasons 
for his visit ‘and many questions passed betwixt them.’ Again we note that Alau’d-din 
detached himself from the mundane procedures even if this concerned the revered English and 
left these to his courtiers.62 Lancaster impressed these prominent courtiers by brilliantly 
responding to their inquiries into Queen Elizabeth’s reasons to establish relations with Aceh 
and about his own demands. He painstakingly imbued them with the importance of wider 
international trade,  telling them that it brought prosperity and revenues to the countries 
involved and that kings acquired more strength and prestige if their subjects were wealthy 
because commerce generated wealth. 63 It was of course a counsel’s speech with an eye on a 
trade contract.     
Sultan Alau’d-din bestowed special honour on Lancaster by anointing him and calling him 
‘my son’, which made little impression on the single-minded ‘merchant’, whose prime 
interest was a solid trade contract.  
Led by his adoration for the queen whose fame had travelled to the East before John Davis 
first set foot in Aceh in 1599, the sultan granted Lancaster the ‘Privilege’, which gave the 
English the right to trade freely in Aceh and its dependencies, exempting them from paying 
customs dues and the freedom the bequeath their goods to whom they choose’. It gave them at 
the same time jurisdiction over their citizens on Aceh’s soil. This was unsurpassed and 
                                                                                                                                                        
     
61 ‘Letter of Sultan Alau’d-din to Queen Elizabeth of England written in the year 1011 H (1602), (JSBRAS, 
1898), 108-110. The original letter is missing. A copy is included in the Annex.   
Also in: Sir George Birdwood (ed.), The Register of Letters of the  Governour and Company of Merchants 
trading into the East Indies, 1600-1619.   
 
62 Anthony Reid speaks of an absolutist trend at the expense of the orangkaya in Aceh (and also in Bantam) 
under Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah. “Trade and Statepower in the 16th and 17th century Southeast Asia”( 
Bangkok: Seventh  IAHA Conference, 1977), 391 onwards. However, the negotiating procedures show his 
detachment in the business of trade. He was involved when serious arguments between the parties caused a 
deadlock.   
 
63 The voyages of Sir Lancaster, 96-98.  
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certainly raised doubts with the orangkaya, the Asian diplomats and the Dutch merchants in 
Aceh. ‘The king was ready to enter into peace and league with Her Majesty and for his part 
would hold it truly.’64 William Foster asserts  that Lancaster had hoped for the conclusion of a 
formal commercial treaty between the two nations, as a basis for further trade. ‘Such an 
arrangement, however, was not consistent with Oriental notions. No sovereign could bind his 
successor; and indeed any concession he himself might make was to be regarded as revocable 
at his pleasure. So Lancaster had to be content with a document in which the king authorized 
the English to trade freely with his people, without the payment of customs dues, and 
accorded them some minor concessions.’65  Foster’s comment that ‘such an arrangement was 
not consistent with Oriental notions’ suggests that everywhere in the East, the notions were 
similar. In the case of Aceh it is true that the history of succession has been a matter of 
bloodshed and usurpation, which does not guarantee a continuity of policies. It would be 
erroneous to expect from a successor to abide by a treaty made by his predecessor - who 
could be wicked or weak – that could ultimately threaten his sovereignty and put his country 
at risk. Looking at Europe of the seventeenth century we also see a tendency towards more 
power for national assemblies and parliaments, who increasingly questioned decisions and the 
king’s absolute authority. They expected that their opinions would be heard and that their 
traditional rights would be recognised. Royal authority in Aceh was supported by the 
orangkaya, but it was challenged on its absolutism or its weakness. 
Granting the English this great Privilege in fact demonstrates that the sultan did not behold 
the consequences of far reaching English privileges in his domain. The reality of the day was 
that the Portuguese were still a menace to the region’s integrity and the Islamic trade. Another 
European nation obtained the means to become one.    
 
Despite their privileges, the English were made to pay an excessive high rent for a dilapidated 
building, which badly needed repairs before it could be used as storage. Lancaster discovered 
too that he paid much more for a bahar of pepper than the Dutch earlier paid. John Davis told 
                                                 
 
64 F.C. Danvers and W. Foster (eds.), Letters Received Letters Received by its Servants in the East, 6 vols. 
(London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1896), vol. I, 1- 4:   
‘…..we, by the grace of God, great king of Dachem and Sumatra for us and our heirs and successors do promise 
by our princely word instead of an oath inviolably to maintain and preserve and will cause to be inviolably kept, 
preserved and maintained from time to time and at all times hereafter, and for the more ratification we command 
all our captains, judges, customers, governors and servants………that they be obeyed in all points accordingly as 
long as the Queen of England of her part shall duly keep and observe this league and holy peace expressed in this 
privilege…..’ 
   
65 The voyages of Sir Lancaster, xxvii.  
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him that they paid only 4 real the hundred (weight), in contrast to the 20 real he had to pay 
for the same quantity. The Zeeland expedition paid only 8 real for a bahar.  
The Acehnese merchants were evidently pursuing their own interests in spite of the special 
relationship with the English or perhaps because of it. It appeared to Lancaster that the 
Privilege had merely symbolic value and did not lead to a profitable trade. Seeing no 
prospects he decided to leave Aceh taking all merchants with him. Before his departure from 
Aceh Sultan Alau’d-din asked him if he could rent the pinnace for an expedition to Pedir, to 
castigate pirates who were molesting his subjects. He paid Lancaster ‘100 marks in gold for 
every person employed’. Lancaster offered him the assistance of 15 men. When one of them 
fell ill and could not serve, he returned 100 marks to the king who refused to accept it, saying 
that what he had given, he would not take again.  
He sent Queen Elizabeth several gifts, such as a ring set with rubies, two beautiful garments 
embroidered with gold, placed in a purple box of Chinese porcelain.  
His high esteem for the English is demonstrated by the remarkable farewell he took of 
Lancaster. 
‘The king said unto him: ‘Have you the Psalms of David extant among you? 
The general answered: Yea, and wee sing them daily. Then said the King: I and the rest of 
these nobles about me will sing a psalme to God for your prosperitie; and so they did, very 
solemnly. And after it was ended, the king said: I would heare you sing another psalme, 
although in your owne language. So, there being in the company some twelve of us, we sung  
another psalme’.66  
 
 
 
 
2. 1. 10   The visit of the French in 1602 
Sultan Alau’d-din could rightly pride himself on the number of fleets from Europe who called 
at his port seeking his favours. A small French fleet from St. Malo arrived on 24 July 1602,  
in the wake of the English who arrived a month earlier. One of the earliest French expeditions 
                                                 
 
66 The voyages of Sir James Lancaster, 112. 
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set out in 1529 from Dieppe to China ended in disaster after if made landfall in the west coast 
port of Tiku where the crew was killed by the local people. 67  
François Martin, head merchant of the 1602 expedition,  left a rather imaginative account of 
life in Aceh, but gives hardly any details of the procedures to procure pepper.68  
Sultan Alau’d-din spent three hours with the commander of the fleet Monsieur de la 
Bardelière who honoured him with fine crystal glassware and a silver cup and bowl. Again we 
observe that Alau’d-din  showed particular interest in the political affairs and local customs of 
a European state.  
‘The sultan gave him fifty crowns in small pieces which is the money of that land and had 
him sent back on an elephant, promising him free use of all commodities within his kingdom. 
From that day some of our sailors slept on land, finding for sale there poultry and arak which 
is their drink made from sugar cane, rice and coconut, distilled in earthenware stills. This 
drink is as strong as brandy….’69   
According to Martin the sultan promised him ‘free use’ of all his commodities (did he mean 
exemption of dues?). It is almost tantalizing to see in this gesture an arrangement with the 
orangkaya to make it look attractive to draw foreigners to trade in his port and once it came to 
an official contract, to disregard the promise. Or was it just an alluring light-heartedness 
which seemed part of Alau’d-din’s nature ?  
The expedition remained in Aceh until October where it traded without difficulties, before it 
set sail to the port of Tiku, - a trip which took fifteen days - where they were able to procure a 
shipload of pepper.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Ch. Schefer (ed.), Le Discours de la navigation de Jean et Raoul Parmentier de Dieppe (Paris : Ernest Leroux, 
1883).  
For more on this expedition see: Denys Lombard, Le sultanat d’Atjéh au temps d’Iskandar Muda, 1607-1636, 
(Paris : Ecole Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1967), 25. 
 
68 Francois Martin, Description du premier voyage facit aux Indes Orientales par les françois en l’an 1603 
(Paris: Laurens Sonnius, 1604).  
I have drawn from Reid (ed.), Witnesses to Sumatra A Traveller’s Anthology,  55 –63.    
Martin’s observations of Aceh’s social scene is a unique addition to the accounts of John Davis and Frederick de 
Houtman and James Lancaster. Reid mentions that some historians dismiss him as inaccurate because of his 
tendency ‘to run the specifics of Aceh with the generalities of ‘the Indies’ (55).       
 
69 A Reid.(ed.), Witnesses to Sumatra, 56.   
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2. 1. 11     Accord between Aceh and the VOC in 1607  
The Dutch United East India Company (VOC), into which the early companies merged, was 
founded in March 1602 under the Charter of the States General of the United Republic of the 
Netherlands. The formation out of former regional companies was with the objective to 
consolidate Dutch commercial interest in Asia. The board of directors resided in Amsterdam 
and consisted of seventeen members, who were known as the Heeren Zeventien (Gentlemen 
XVII), chosen from among the participating companies.  
The States General authorized the company to appoint governors, to make treaties with local 
rulers, dispatch military forces, build forts and wage wars, which gave it the character of a 
state in a state. The monopoly to trade was for twenty-one years.  
 
In 1605 an impressive VOC fleet consisting of eleven ships under the command of Cornelis 
Matelieff de Jonge was dispatched to the Malacca Straits on a dual purpose mission: to 
establish a rendez-vous for Dutch ships and to capture Malacca from the Portuguese. 
Matelieff discussed with the sultan of Johor, Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah, namesake of the 
Acehnese ruler a combined strike on Malacca and the construction of a fort on a strategic site 
in the Straits area. They concluded a treaty in June 1606 which gave the VOC the right to 
establish a rendez-vous, on the condition that Malacca would be captured from the hands of 
the Portuguese and given to Johor.70 Already in 1603 admiral Jacob van Heemskerk visited 
Johor and established friendly relations with the sultan and his brother Raja Bongsu after he 
intercepted a Portguguese galleon.   
Malacca was heavily injured by Matelieff, but not captured. The treaty became redundant and 
was replaced by a new one following September.  This stipulated that the VOC only received 
the right to maintain a factory in Johor.  It is needless to say that it was a great disappointment 
for the Dutch who frantically hoped to obtain  a foothold in the Straits to monitor Portuguese 
shipping. Yet, it was a major concession by the Johor ruler, because it would have amounted 
to a clear provocation of his Portuguese neighbours in Malacca.  
Matelieff’s vice admiral Olivier de Vivere went to Aceh to discuss with the new sultan Ali 
Ri’ayat (Mughayat) Shah the conditions for a Dutch rendez-vous. Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat 
Shah had abdicated in 1604  in favour of his son - the crown prince who rode in the 
procession with Cornelis de Houtman in 1599 - and died shortly afterwards. Rivalry for the 
throne between him and his brother, the governor of Pedir, marked his succession which was 
                                                 
70De Jonge,  De Opkomst, vol. III, 214 and  217. 
      
 97
tainted with bloodshed and came in the midst of a cataclysm resulting from prolonged drought 
and famine that took the lives of a huge number of Acehnese.  
De Vivere negotiated a very favourable ‘Accord’ for the VOC on 17 January 1607 with 
Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah. The treaty was based on a strategic partnership against the Iberians 
and gave the VOC the right to establish a rendez-vous and jurisdiction over its citizens on 
Aceh’s soil in return for military assistance. Of interest is article 7 which stipulates ‘Those 
who trespass against religious ethics fall under the penal code of their own government’. This 
is an example of limited jurisdiction and perhaps the earliest acquired Dutch jurisdiction 
outside the United Republic. 71  
Probing into the motives of Ali Ri’ayat Shah to grant the VOC these far reaching privileges in 
return for military assistance is important to obtain a picture of the conditions prevailing in 
Aceh. The critical situation  in Aceh was unprecedented; rebellion, droughts and famine had 
weakened Aceh’s strong position and the Portuguese could not be deterred without the help of 
a powerful ally. The Portuguese who set out from Goa in 1606 to attack Aceh, took advantage 
of the dire situation to castigate Aceh for closing friendships with the northern Europeans. 
They aborted their landing efforts to succour Malacca from the siege by Matelieff and were 
confronted by the Dutch fleet coming to Aceh’s help. In the ensuing battle the Portuguese 
were heavily injured and lost a large number of ships and men.         
The strategic alliance Ali Ri’ayat Shah closed with the Dutch cannot be regarded as a filial 
piety for a father who established friendship with the Prince of Nassau. Ali Ri’ayat Shah was 
compelled to follow his own way. As a prince he had witnessed Portuguese presence and their 
meddling in Aceh’s affairs. The military power the Dutch represented and their proven 
willingness to come to Aceh’s help was essential to withstand future perils. The important 
provision of the treaty concerned Dutch military assistance against the Iberians. As Article 10 
stipulates, the Dutch were committed to assist Aceh against the Portuguese and the Spaniards. 
Both parties were exempted from assisting in a war with other nations, except in 
circumstances when they were attacked. It was unlawful to make peace with the king of Spain 
(Iberians), without mutual consent. The treaty officially established an equal partnership 
relation based on the exchange of services. The character of the first contract with De 
Houtman was distinctly the same.    
                                                 
71 ibid., 223; 
   Also: Corpus Diplomaticum, vol. I., 48.  
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Forced by the unprecedented circumstances and a Portuguese assault in 1606 Ali Ri’ayat 
Shah consented to a Dutch rendez-vous in his domain and the subsequent establishment of a 
Dutch colony. For some insight into the Dutch political configuration, it is worthy to  note 
that the Accord was concluded in the name of the States General, the highest political body of 
the United Republic. Even though the Prince of Nassau was fundamentally involved in the 
contacts with the Asian rulers, he was no party in its passing; his name is not mentioned in the 
document.72  By sheer contrast, article 4 speaks of the need for other nations (including Dutch 
private traders) to be in the possession of  het bescheydt van onsen Koningh ‘the license of 
our king’.  Failure to produce this document would lead to repercussions, legal proceedings 
and ultimately war.73 
Apart from revealing Dutch ambivalence with their own type of government,  article 4 
underlines Dutch aim to monopolise the pepper trade. To oblige traders to carry a permit from 
their Prince, resounds the system maintained by the Portuguese, which required from ships 
passing through their ‘sphere of influence’ to be in the possession of a cartaz, a document of 
authorization. Taxes were levied for cargo on which the Portuguese claimed monopoly. The 
Dutch were unambiguously endeavouring to establish their own sphere of influence in the 
Straits. 
      
Shortly after the Accord was signed, Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah died. His short rule has hardly  
received attention from scholars. He is portrayed by William Marsden as follows:  
‘the new king, who took the name of Ali Maghayat Syah, proved himself, from indolence or 
want of capacity, unfit to reign. Neglecting affairs of state, always surrounded by women’. 
‘Those who put the crown on his head were not better requited, particularly the maharadja, or 
governor of the castle’. 74 Litera scripta manet ! This picture of the sultan as an indolent man 
is certainly at odds with the turbulence that preceded his installation and attendant horrors of 
bloodshed, drought and famine, which left him little room for a life of leisure and pleasure. 
                                                 
72 It was a well known fact that the Prince of (Orange)Nassau was often called upon to act as sovereign. 
 Sir John Chardin, Travels in Persia 1673-1677 (New York: Dover Publications, 1988), 79 ‘They are accustom’d 
throughout the East to the Yoke of one Man, whose Caprice is a sovereign Law, and who does and undoes as he 
himself pleases, without either reason or sense. The Hollanders, that they may not offend these manners, speak 
always of their country as of a monarchy after the way of other countries.’  
 
73 De Jonge,  De opkomst, vol. III, 223 :  
 ‘Sall ook Syne Majesteyt niet toelaten datter eenige Hollanders, Europische volckeren offte naekomelingen in 
eenige van zyne landen sullen mogen handelen offte sullen bescheydt van onsen Koningh moeten brengen ende 
hetzelve niet hebbende sullen als vyanden gehouden en vervolght worden’. 
 
74 W. Marsden, The History of Sumatra (London: Longman, 1811), 437 .  
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He had to cope with a Portuguese invasion in 1606.  The Bustan as-Salatin tells us only that 
his rule coincided with a climatic calamity which caused a devastating famine and the death 
of great numbers of people. The resident Dutch mention that the drought lasted for about three 
years.      
 
 
 
2. 1. 12     Conclusion 
The initiatives of the merchants from Malacca in 1593 to establish trade with Aceh was a case 
of realpolitik. The continuing wars with Aceh were detrimental to their trading business and 
existence. They preferred profitable trade above relentless, destructive wars.   
For Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah it was advantageous to draw Malacca’s loyalty away 
from Johor showing that he also understood realpolitik. The political climate in the Straits 
was stable during the period of trade relations with Malacca which lasted for almost a decade 
until about 1602. The arrival of the first Dutch expedition under Cornelis de Houtman shook 
the political balance; Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah immediately seized the opportunity to 
ask De Houtman’s assistance for an attack on Johor in return for a shipload of pepper. The 
Portuguese intervened to abort the war expedition to Johor.  
In 1602 the political configuration was in the process of transformation when Aceh discussed 
with Siam, Pegu and Patani the possibilities of a pact to overthrow the Portuguese authority in  
Malacca.  
 
Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah showed an inclination to detach himself as much as possible 
from the business of trade, leaving it to his shahbandar. It was a sure way to guarantee the 
loyalty of the orangkaya. The orangkaya put their heels down if the price and conditions went 
against their own and Aceh’s interest. Although the evidence is meagre, it supports an 
understanding of the power of the orangkaya as almost equivalent to that enjoyed by the ruler.    
The assistance of De Houtman in exchange for a shipload of pepper, shows the beginning of a 
system of equal partnerships.   
Alau’d-din’s decision to send a mission to the United Republic was a mature way to make 
public that he engaged in relations with an important and independent European state. It was 
the start of a strategic partnership with the Dutch and strengthened the new course he was 
setting out.   
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England’s victory over the Spanish armada was the overriding motif for Sultan Alau’d-din to 
grant the English the Privilege. The founding of the English-Turkey company in 1579 was a 
strategic step of the English to obtain a prominent place in the East India trade. The close ties 
between Aceh and Turkey since the second half of the sixteenth century certainly inspired 
Alau’d-din to cherish relations with the English.           
 
Sultan Ali Ri’ayat (Mughayat) Shah recognized that the imminent threat to Aceh’s 
sovereignty was not Johor but Malacca. He acknowledged the necessity of having a strong 
European ally to secure Aceh’s safety against the Portuguese who supported Johor in its bid 
over Aru and invaded his country in 1606.  A strategic alliance with the Dutch was therefore 
essential. The Accord of 1607 gave the Dutch the right to establish a rendez-vous within 
Aceh’s territory and limited jurisdiction over their citizens. The English Privilege of 1602 did 
not make Aceh and England strategic partners. The English and the Dutch both acquired 
jurisdiction within Aceh’s domain. Competition between them could lead to insurmountable 
problems for Aceh if they confronted each other in pursuing their ambitions.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The unveiling by his Royal Highness Prince Bernhard on October 24, 1978 of the marble 
plaque in memory of Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah’s ambassador Abdul Hamid, who died 
during his visit to the United Republic of the Netherlands in 1602 and was buried in the Oude 
Kerk in Middelburg.  
 
Part  Two 
 
CHAPTER  II 
                              
                                       
                               CHALLENGES AND CHOICES:  A LITMUS TEST   
 
‘The worms may master the tallest tree, and the Dutchman’s glass sees far and knows 
That seeming-great though our princes be, 
They are stately ships that some dinghy tows. ’ (translated  from  Malay by R. J.Wilkinson)   
 
 
 
2. 2. 1    Centralization of the trade 
When the grandson of Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Syah, known to us as Iskandar Muda was 
installed on the throne in 1607, he made centralization of the trade one of his priorities. It is 
safe to assert that the years of droughts leading to unprecedented famine, internal instability 
and a Portuguese invasion in 1606 gave impetus to this new strategy. The Portuguese 
vigorously tried to botch Aceh’s trade with the northern Europeans. When they failed in their 
efforts, they set out in 1606 to invade Aceh.  
Iskandar Muda’s enthronement was made possible by his proven dexterity to lead the troops 
against the invading Portuguese. When Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah suddenly died in 1607, the 
prince was installed as his successor, before his uncle, the governor of Pedir, arrived to claim 
the throne. He liquidated the throne pretender and with him a large number of orangkaya to 
prevent their rebellion. His grandfather and uncle also resorted to the same strategy.     
Raised at his grandfather’s court the prince was no stranger to politics and intrigues. He had 
witnessed the successive European expeditions arriving in Aceh , learned about their 
objectives and their vigorous efforts to obtain trade contracts and monopolies, which 
motivated him to start centralizing the trade. He devised ways to regulate the trade, ordering 
the officials of the Balai Besar, the Public Hall to make certified copies of his edicts.  
 
Before I set out to explore the relations between Iskandar Muda and the European merchants, 
and his relations with the ports within Aceh’s realm such as Tiku and Priaman, it is  relevant 
to know that in 1602 Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah sent his firman to the port of Tiku to 
announce that admiral Lancaster and captain Middleton of the first English expedition to 
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Aceh were under his protection and received his letter of authority to trade.1 Under Iskandar 
Muda the foreign merchants needed a license to trade in the ports, which had to be negotiated.  
Within the concept of a centre-periphery hierarchy, the centre usually has high ranks on 
various capability attributes especially economic and military capabilities. 2 Iskandar Muda  
was willing to use the attributes of power such as Aceh’s strong navy and land army to 
establish his control over the ports.  
 
 
 
 
2. 2. 2    Annulment of the Privilege of 1602 and the Accord of 1607     
In 1608, the Dutch and English returned to Aceh after years of absence. The destructive 
droughts and famine, the political instability and peril between 1603 and 1607 was the reason 
why they halted their visits to Aceh. Dutch merchants were still residing in the port, looking 
after their factory, but the English who came under Lancaster, packed and left in 1602 despite 
the fact that they were in the possession of the Privilege.        
With an audacious prince on the throne, who had shown prowess in withstanding a 
Portuguese invasion, the northern Europeans were eager to implement the Privilege of 1602 
and the Accord of 1607.  
In 1608  a Dutch fleet commanded by Pieter Willemszoon Verhoeven (Verhoeff) accidentally 
anchored in the Bay of Aceh. It was on a special mission to the Malacca Straits and forced by 
bad weather to shelter among the islets in the bay. This was no ordinary commercial fleet, but 
one with a military mission concerning the capture of Malacca.3 Verhoeven was instructed by 
the Board of Directors of the VOC, the Gentlemen XVII, to include the king of Aceh and the 
rulers of the neighbouring ports in any military strategy regarding the siege of Malacca. 
Verhoeven was chiefly directing his attention to Johor and in a hurry to discuss with its ruler, 
Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah, arrangements for the siege. At that time it was already clear 
                                                 
1 Published by Rev. W.G. Sheallabear, (JSBRAS, 1898), 113, 121-122.  
‘Generally a firman was a royal order or grant, usually given for special objects, as to a traveller to insure him  
protection and assistance’  Ira  M. Lapidus,  A History of Islamic Societies, 2nd ed. Cambride University Press, 
2002),  260-261. 
 
2 John Galtung has written on structures in relations between core and periphery states, between developed and 
developing nations and between East-West relations. The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective (New York: 
Free Press, 1980).        
 
3 De Jonge, De Opkomst, vol. III, 68:  ‘Secret Instruction’ for admiral Verhoef.  
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that Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah had to be encouraged to participate in the siege for he was not 
firm in his stance against his Portuguese neighbours. Another pressing point of discussion was 
the construction of a Dutch fort in the Straits. It was discussed and negotiated with the sultan 
by admiral Matelieff and led to the agreements of June and September 1606 between Johor 
and the VOC. 
Once in Aceh, Verhoeven decided to delegate the chief merchants Le Fieff, Hertsing and 
Segers to pay their respects to the new sultan and to ‘learn more about the situation in the 
Indies.’ They presented him with an exquisite piece of red cloth, several bundles of red coral 
and a few guns. The delegates were impressed by the display of wealth at the palace, the 
copious banquet served in their honour and the entertainment with cockfights and dances. 4 
The next morning Sultan Iskandar Muda sent for the admiral, but Verhoeven had secretly 
gone ashore on a brief inspection of the area and sent several captains to the palace. The just 
installed sultan was dressed to impress his prominent visitor, adorned with myriads of 
diamonds and various precious gems and surrounded by women bodyguards and eunuchs, 
some thirteen hundred armed soldiers and a large number of orangkaya. He was 
dumbfounded that his ‘confederate’ had not come to greet him.5  The captains told him that 
the admiral needed to remain on board to foil a Portuguese attack on their ships.  
Quite significant at this stage is Iskandar Muda’s use of the word ‘confederate’, for he denied 
the existence of the ‘Accord ’of 1607 which made Aceh and the Dutch official allies against 
the Iberians. The annulment was reported to Verhoeven by the resident merchant.6  
Was Iskandar Muda indeed unaware of the existence of a treaty, when he could have known 
what was discussed between Olivier de Vivere and his predecessor Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah, 
or was he starting on a new course in which there was no place for special privileges, such as 
the establishment of a rendez-vous and foreign limited jurisdiction in his domain?   
                                                 
 
4 M. E. van Opstall,  De reis van de vloot van Pieter Willemsz. Verhoeff naar Azië 1607-1612  (Den Haag: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1972). The journal of the visit to Aceh is included on pages 239-241. The author also points to 
a secret instruction: ‘The ‘Memory’ for Verhoeff is above suspicion, and speaks of trade and related matters, 
while the tone set in the  secret instruction is quite aggressive and shows how the VOC thinks of pursuing its 
objectives in Asia by destroying the Iberian’s fleets ( 20-21).           
 
5 ibid., 239.  
Before the first governor-general of the Indies took his function in 1610,  the admirals functioned as the highest 
Dutch officials. The first governor-general was Pieter Both  who served from 1610 to1614.  
 
6 NA VOC 1.04.02 : 1055 ‘Originele missieve Aelbrecht Willemsz. Aan Pieter Willemsz. Verhoeff’, (1608).  
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It is quite remarkable that,  at this crucial moment in the relationship, Verhoeven did not 
present himself at the palace to imbue the sultan with the importance of having a strategic 
partnership as laid down in the treaty, especially in view of his military mission tot the Straits.     
By denying or annulling the treaty it is not as if he did not perceive the importance of having 
northern Europeans residing in his port, for he granted permission for the stationing of two 
merchants to assist the resident merchant with the business. Aceh’s position as an important 
trade centre had weakened after the years of internal struggle and persistent droughts and the 
presence of foreign traders in the port was essential to re-strengthen this position.  
Unconcerned, as it seems, with the sudden void because of the annulment of the Accord of 
1607, Verhoeven proceeded to Johor to make arrangements with its ruler Sultan Alau’d-din 
Ri’ayat Shah for an attack on Malacca. He was informed of a pending armistice between 
Spain and the United Republic, but adamant to accomplish his mission to capture Malacca.  
 
Willem Janszoon and Arent Martenszoon arrived in Aceh from Bantam in 1609, close at the 
heels of Verhoeven, to discuss with Sultan Iskandar Muda the implementation of the Accord 
of 1607. 7 He  received them cordially, but he vehemently denied the existence of a treaty.8  
The delegates were astounded by his blunt denial which they considered a deception. Quite 
odd is the fact that at the same time, they handed him a letter from Prince Maurice of Nassau 
in which the prince informed the sultan of the pending armistice between the United Republic 
and Spain. An armistice with Spain is a demonstration of the fact that the Dutch did not abide 
by the stipulations regarding peace with the Iberians laid down by the Accord of 1607, the 
implementation of which the delegates came to request.  
One may surmise that the news of a pending armistice between the Dutch and Spain came as 
a bolt from the blue to Iskandar Muda. It made it more confusing since Verhoeven was on his 
way to attack the Portuguese in Malacca. He courteously replied to Prince Maurice that he 
understood his reasons for a truce with Spain, yet he stoutly declared that the Portuguese were 
the enemies of Islam and that he would continue with the task of his forefathers to pursue 
them in eternity, no matter what the prince decided. 9 I refer to the letter of his grandfather 
                                                 
 
7 VOC 1.04.02: 1055  ‘Memorie voor Willem Jansen gaende van Bantam nae Atchin ende Custe van 
Coromandel’.   
 
8 P.A. Leupe, “VOC relations with Aceh”  (Leiden: KITLV Neg. 219/IH164).  
 
9 Translaet van de brief van de Sultan van Atchin (1610) registered as  NA: VOC 1.04.02, 11243.  See Annex. 
 Published in Atchin’s Verheffing, 74-75. 
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Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah to Queen Elizabeth, in which he used words of similar 
purport.    
The implications of this combination of religious obligation and political control, which 
played such a major role in Iskandar Muda’s reign, shall be explored further in the following 
chapters.  
Can we regard Iskandar Muda’s denial of the treaty, as his response to Dutch deception, 
which is peace with Spain? The chronology of the talks shows that he was informed of the 
pending armistice after he denied the existence of a treaty between Aceh and the Dutch. 
 
Iskandar Muda had great doubts about granting the Dutch such far reaching privileges, 
provided by the treaty, like the establishing of a colony of Dutch families with limited 
jurisdiction. Aceh’s friendship with the Dutch and English had provoked a Portuguese 
invasion in 1606 and Aceh could become the scene of inter-European rivalry.   
The invalidation of the Accord made the constituent component of Dutch military assistance 
redundant. That was the consequence Iskandar Muda had to accept. Noteworthy is that along 
the lines of communication between the Dutch and his predecessors, the term ‘brothers’ was 
coined and it acquired a meaningful connotation in the ongoing relationship. It presented 
Iskandar Muda an opening out of the conundrum, hoping that a strategic partnership would 
sustain, even when the treaty was redundant. In their shaky relationship both he and the Dutch 
would call for assistance by steadfastly referring to their ‘brotherly’ bond.  
I earlier put in plain words why I think that the notion of the ‘inviolability’of agreements  
could hardly sustain. Dynastic squabbling, European encroachment and interest 
fundamentally created a politically susceptible milieu which did not allow for ‘eternal’ 
commitments and favours. Foreign jurisdiction within Aceh was detrimental to Aceh’s 
political integrity. A further consideration is that no ruler could downplay the important role 
of the orangkaya in Aceh’s development and trade, as much as he would like to deny their 
contribution. Their advice could not be totally ignored nor their interests put at risk, if he 
wanted to prevent their rebellion. Granting trade privileges and the concomitant freedoms to 
foreigners worked unfavourably for the Acehense orangkaya.  
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With the Accord expunged and the prospect of a rendez-vous in Aceh gone 10, the Dutch 
harassed the English Union in Aceh’s harbour, obviously resentful that the English were in 
the possession of the Privilege granted them by Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah in 1602. Their 
action was an offence to Aceh’s territorial integrity. It was a case of déja-vu of a situation in 
1600 when  Paulus van Caerden took revenge and robbed pepper and other goods for Aceh 
from  several Muslim ships. He too took arbitrary action in Aceh’s territorial waters. 
Despite the fact that Dutch aggression was an insult to Iskandar Muda, he did not resort to 
punitive measures, probably realizing that the Dutch represented a power factor which he 
could not deny. His own success as commander of his uncle’s troops in repelling the 
Portuguese in 1606 owed much to admiral Matelieff de Jonge’s thoroughness to confront the 
Portuguese fleet .  
 
Even with the Privilege of 1602  in his pocket, a disillusioned Lancaster left Aceh and bought 
pepper in the port of Tiku where the pepper was far cheaper than in Aceh itself. He traded 
there with the firman of Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah.  
The new, stringent regulations of Iskandar Muda made if difficult to procure pepper in Tiku 
and Priaman without a royal license. It was the very reason why the Union called at Aceh in 
1609 to request Iskandar Muda to observe the Privilege of 1602. To their utter dismay he 
turned down their request and no longer even allowed them to run an office in Tiku; the 
Privilege had ceased to exist.11  
Iskandar Muda realized that the northern Europeans were his  best paying clients, a concrete 
reason not to drive them away from Aceh; Bantam and Jamby were rival pepper ports and 
very attractive to them.         
Although rivalry with the Portuguese in Malacca was a major consideration for the Dutch to 
hold on to friendship with Malacca’s nemesis, the sultan of Aceh, the monopoly of the pepper 
trade was their principal aim. This is absolutely clear from the stipulations in the Accord of 
                                                 
10De Jonge is convinced that if the Accord of 1607 was observed, Aceh and not Batavia would have been the 
seat of Dutch authority in the East.  At the beginning of their explorations in the archipelago, the Dutch 
considered the Straits of Malacca of major importance to establish a rendez-vous for their shipping.  
De Opkomst, vol. III, 51-52. 
 
11 Letters received vol. I, 244 : 
‘It is true that the Union called at Achin in 1609 and was well received, despite the efforts of the Dutch to 
prevent her from trading there. The real cause, however, of the reopening of relations with Achin four years 
later, was the success of its monarch (grandson of the one with whom Lancaster had treated) in extending his 
power over Tiku and the neighbouring pepper ports, and his adoption of a policy of excluding foreigners from 
those places and forcing them to confine their trade to Achin itself.’  
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1607  in which they oblige traders to carry the written permit of  their ‘sovereign’, thus 
establishing their own sphere of influence.     
A compelling reason for the English to come back to Aceh was the development of their 
trading business in India, which meant that they were inclined to stay in the race for trade 
contracts.  Indian callycoe, a type of textile, was in strong demand in the Sumatran ports 
where it could be bartered for pepper and other commodities. Another important reason was 
the protracted presence of the Dutch in Aceh, which rendered their own presence there 
essential. If the ‘gadfly theory’ applies, it was evidently so in Sumatra where the English 
followed the Dutch.  
 
Competition between the Dutch and English was growing, in spite of the friendly relations 
during the first years in the archipelago. A letter from Samuel Bradshaw of 12 February 1612  
who visited Aceh, to the director of the EIC office in Bantam sheds light on the Dutch- 
English encounters and competition : 
‘Whereupon having kept the coast four days and sometime in danger it was resolved by the 
best experienced of our ship, to shape our course for Achen in hope to meet with some 
Guzerats with whom we might truck away our English commodities, and about 17th June we 
arrived there, and within 7 days had admittance to the King by means of our presents which 
we were enforced to bestow, the Hollanders seeking to debar our trade, but the more they 
sought the less they prevailed in what they sought, ‘by gifts they sought to prevent us, but by 
gifts we obtained.’ ‘Although my doings fall out therein a greater charge to the Company than 
I expect, yet I thought it not fit in a matter so important to be outborne for small presents; in 
sum they did us all (the) despite they could, their aspiring minds being to admit no traders in 
the Indies but themselves.’12 
‘Upon the 28th of June we went to the Court with our King’s letter and for a gift we carried 
one piece of ordnance, two barrels of powder, twelve fowling-pieces, ten swordblades and six 
fine baftas; these things were conveyed in great state, the letter on an elephant with three 
canopies over it and before us about half a score trumpeters.’13 
 
Both the English and the Dutch fervently tried to obtain trade contracts and sole rights by 
presenting valuable gifts to the sultan. Iskandar Muda gloried over their competition, because 
                                                 
12 ibid., 251 (letter dated 12 February 1612). 
 
13 Letters Received., vol. III,  225.  
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they were willing to lavish him with what he asked: money, artillery and all kinds of presents 
which he craved, like dogs and strange outfits, to obtain sole rights. These presents came on 
top of the official harbour dues and the fees, which they paid in accordance with the 
regulations for the port of Aceh.14  
The harbour regulations stipulate that the merchants first report at the Custom House to secure 
a stamped permit to stay in the port; they pay taxes according to their nationality, in Indian 
textiles. Minor dues are paid to all functionaries working in the harbour office and the 
workmen on board the vessels. The regulations laid the foundation for the emoluments of the 
harbour officials. In other ports similar systems seem to have existed.15  
 
 
 
 
2. 2. 3   An English Orangkaya: Thomas Best in Aceh    
General Thomas Best was appointed by the English East India Company to lead an expedition 
to the East in 1612 to find a market for iron and to persuade the sultan of Aceh to reinstate the 
Privilege of 1602. When he arrived in Aceh in 1613, Iskandar Muda had a tight grip on the 
trade of the west coast and he stood out as a the most powerful ruler in the Straits area, having 
subdued successively Deli and Aru, two ports on the Sumatran east which were under the 
influence of Aceh’s enemy Johor, around 1611 and 1612. His armada had just come back 
from a victorious expedition to Johor where it captured members of the royal family and 22 
Dutchmen who came to the sultan’s assistance against the invading Acehnese.16  
The account of the voyage mentions that upon  arrival of the fleet in the port, a palace eunuch 
came on board with the king’s chapp17 for landing and some victuals in return for the gifts of 
two muskets the general had sent to the king, ‘for the custome is at landinge to present the 
                                                 
14 G. W. J. Drewes and  P. Voorhoeve  (eds.),  Adat Atjèh, (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958). 
The Adat Atjèh lays down the enumeration of the gifts for the sultan (pp. 116-117). It also enlists the gifts for the  
harbour officials. Gifts for the lower officials are enumerated under the heading adat air- air,  referring to rose-
water or its equivalent in cash. 
When the sultan received a letter conveyed by a foreign envoy, he presented them with garments in return: 
Muslims were given imported vestments; Europeans and other non-Muslims were given Acehnese clothes and 
articles.        
 
15 The Undang Undang Melaka in which the trade in the port of pre-Portuguese Malacca was regulated, 
probably served as an example for Acheh’s trade regulations.      
 
16 The expeditions to Johor are closely examined in Part Three of the study. 
 
17 The chapp (cap) was the royal  permit. It was the seal of the sultan. W. Marsden describes the chapp as a flat 
silver box, 6 to 8  inches long holding the written permission of the king. See: A history of Sumatra, 127. 
 109
king with some small thinge and he requiteth it by several dishes of meate. 18 There is no 
mention of the measuring of the ships and the taking of numbers of crew and artillery, as was 
the case when the first fleets arrived during the reign of Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah. It 
may show a maturing way of dealing with the arriving northern Europeans.   
The account sketches the palace etiquette:       
 ‘This daie our kinges letter was sent for by the King of Achin, with an ellofant and a share 
(chair) of statt  (state) in the forme of a casle (howdah) upon his back. After wentt the general 
to the Courtt, where he presented the kinge with a rich present from our Kinge: and the King 
likewise give unto our General a vest, with mr. Moore and mr. Oliver. He entertained us with 
fightinge of ellofants, beffeloes, and great rames; and afterwards was provided a great 
banquett, with many dishes and great store of arack. The banquett was served in dishes of 
pure gold and silver. They brought in towe (two) chests of gould, which they do use to keep 
their beetle (bettle nut) of which they use to eatt of very much. Great curtesye by the King 
was offered, and that the country was att our command; but the Generall as yet nott altogether 
satisfied, for that he hopeth of furder commerce with the King, and at large to deliver his 
mynd unto him.’19 
Just like his grandfather in 1602, Iskandar Muda ceremoniously declared that his country was 
‘at their command’. The problem however was that such a declaration raised expectations, 
which were not usually met. When it came to issuing Thomas Best a license, Iskandar Muda 
prolonged the negotiations with the intention to draw extra gifts or money. He turned down 
Best’s request to trade duty free as was provided by the Privilege of 1602.  
Best had captured a Portuguese vessel from Malacca sailing to Aceh, which carried an envoy 
who came to solicit diplomatic relations with the sultan, the victorious conqueror of 
Malacca’s neighbour and ally Johor (1613). Iskandar Muda requested from Best to hand him 
over the envoy, the ship and the goods therein, which he eventually did with much 
apprehension. Iskandar Muda showed him his appreciation by bestowing on him the title of 
orangkaya puteh.20   
                                                 
 
18 William Foster  (ed.),  The voyage of Thomas Best to the East Indies 1612-14, (London: Hakluyt Society, 
1934), 158,159.  
        
19 ibid, 158. 
 
20 ibid, 160.  
The 12th of May we took a Portingal barque, not far from this road, wherein came an ambassador from Malacca, 
but at the earnest request of the King, our General released her, for which he did him much honour, and give him 
the title of Orankaya Pute, which is white or clear hearted lord.’  
 110
Much to Best’s chagrin, the handing over of  the Portuguese envoy and the barge did not 
result in the restoration of the Privilege, neither did Iskandar Muda quicken the procedures. 
Although Best was promised a license to trade in Priaman, it still took several months and a 
train of gifts, before the permit was finally issued and it was valid for a limited period of only 
three months, which left the merchants little time to procure the esteemed amounts. Sailing 
depended on the monsoon winds, and an early departure from the port of Priaman would 
render the trade unprofitable.  
The physical conditions of the sailing area on the west coast were known to be hazardous, 
while the climatic conditions proved detrimental to the health of the Europeans. 21 
Best had hoped to receive the royal firman  to trade in the west coast ports, which would be in 
compliance with the Privilege. The arduous negotiation procedures exasperated the general 
(his title according to the documents), who became very annoyed by Iskandar Muda’s 
insatiability. But it did not stop him from visiting the palace to engage with the sultan in 
conversations on a range of matters. He was a welcome guest at the palace. 
The Acehnese sultans had a keen interest in European affairs and both Alau’d-din  Ri’ayat 
Shah and Iskandar Muda loved the discourse. Thomas Best was also invited to the royal baths 
where he and the sultan spent several hours sitting in the refreshing water were they were 
served a full banquet which they washed away with lots of arak.   
Despite his closeness to Iskandar Muda, Best was unable to effect the release of several 
Gujerati merchants, who were friends of the English authorities in Surat. They were captured 
by the Acehnese for trading in the port of Perak, well-known for its tin. Aceh jealously 
controlled the trade of Perak. Even after he offered Iskandar Muda two of the best pieces of 
artillery from his ship the Dragon for their release, he refused to let them go. He had 
confiscated their junk, which was worth hundred thousand crowns, ‘and made all its people 
slaves.’ The longstanding good relations between Aceh and Gujerat did not stop Iskandar 
Muda to decree a ban on Gujerati shipping and trading in Aceh which indubitably affected the 
relationship with the Moghul emperor who assumed sovereignty over Gujerat. This stringent 
                                                                                                                                                        
 ‘And further to acknowledge his thankfulness to me, soulde me his bengiamin at myne pryce, his love and much 
esteeme of me; willinge me to aske and require whatsoever I woulde of him. I required only his letters of favoure 
unto Pryaman; which he promised’.        
 
21 ibid., 69: ‘Robert Portman dyed. This day I was under saile, but could not gett out. Here in this roade I stayed 
11 weeks, and bought 120 or 115 tonnes of pepper, and burried of our men 25, all which either dyed or 
contracted their deaths at Passaman and not at Teccoe. And certeynely had wee not attempted tradinge at 
Passaman, they had beene, either all or the greatest parte of them, now lyvinge. Therefore I doe wish all our 
nation never to attempt the sendinge of our men to passaman; for so contagious is there the ayre, and the water 
so evill, that ( it) is unpossible for a Christian to live’.   
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measure caused a shortage of much appreciated Gujerati textiles in Aceh. The English stepped 
into this void and established a lucrative business of various kinds of Indian textiles in Aceh.       
A very critical account of the procedures in Aceh is by Ralph Croft, an assistant of Thomas 
Best:   
‘When Best tried to free the Guserats, offering the King a faire peece of ordinance of the 
Dragon for the libertie of four of the chief of them, the King refused to do it under a great 
some of money. Whereupon our General took leave, haveinge found him always reedie to 
promisse much and in the end to performe little. But his bassenes has not onelie bene evident 
to his owne subjectes butt also unto us, nott performinge whatt formerlie he had promised 
unto our General. He diverse tymes shewed us his glorie, but never his loialltie nor fidellitie; 
and therefore we will leave him to that infidellitie he doth professe’22.  
‘Many nations have trad for this illand, more for the commodities yt affordes then the 
affabillitie of the people; for they are inhumayne and basse, and much unworthy to inhabite so 
sweet a countree.’23 This portrayal of Iskandar Muda by Europeans merchants, shows him as 
an untrustworthy,  resentful and impulsive man, unabashedly demanding.  
As a gift of friendship Iskandar Muda sent king James I an Acehnese dagger, a lance, several 
pieces of fine muslin and four camphor dishes.    
Thomas Best’s accomplishments in Aceh were moderate, but he boasted of his successes,  
proud to be called orangkaya puteh and honoured that he was assigned a personal assistant, 
one of the former envoys to Holland.  
He sold Iskandar Muda 168 bahar of iron at 5 tael per bahar and bought 23 bahar of benzoin 
for which he offered him 25 tael the bahar and reckoned that this was a very good deal, 
because the sultan first demanded 35 tael for a bahar. 24 He self-importantly mentions that he 
purchased the benzoin ‘at myne price’. The Board of Directors in London was not at all 
content with his opulent style and performance. Some members even accused him of 
squandering by pursuing his own gains and advancing his own business, calling it damaging 
for the company. For many years the Board dreaded to employ him on another assignment.25 
                                                 
 
22 The voyage, 174.  
 
23 ibid, 176.  
 
24  ibid., 53: ‘Quality of money and weightes at Achen’: ‘Yowe have a great weight called a bahar, which doth 
conteyne 385 ll. English. Yowe have also a small weight called cattee (Malay kati, varying from one to two 
pounds), which makes 2 ll. English. Yowe have gould, ther coyned, called masses.’ 
(John Davis noted in 1602  that sixteen of these made a gold tael, ‘an imaginary coin.’ 
 
25  ibid., ‘Court Minutes of 24 October 1615’  (vol. III, p. 523), 290: 
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2. 2. 4    Continuing English efforts for trading rights   
Captain William Keeling, who was since many years in the East and familiar with the area, 
set sail with the New Year’s Gift from Bantam to the port of Priaman where he arrived on 12 
March 1614, evidently ignoring Iskandar Muda’s rules to obtain a license in Aceh. He offered 
the governor of the port several yards of Indian calico (a type of textile) and some sword 
blades, which enabled him to procure pepper for which he paid in cash and confidently 
declared: ‘many occasions of presents to be given in this business wherein you must do as you 
see cause’. He was able to bring down the price of fifty dollars for a bahar to twenty-two and 
a half and categorically refused to pay the added exorbitant taxes. He bartered fifteen bars of 
iron for an extra bahar of pepper. Despite his negotiating skills, the local merchants cheated 
him with the weight: sometimes the bahar was 400  lb. and in other instances only 340  lb.26 
In evading the rules set by the Acehnese sultan, the Europeans were occasionally assisted by  
opportunists, who gained personally from the deals, or by the local merchants rebelling 
against the suffocating royal dictates.  In Priaman an annual supply of 2500 bahar of pepper 
which came from the mountainous hinterland, could be  easily obtained. During his fifty days’ 
stay on the west coast Keeling bought 1385 bahar of pepper, some gold and some benzoin. 
He said that the governor treated him very friendly, but the Acehnese penghulu was very 
hostile. This seems not at all strange, because he presented only the governor with valuable 
gifts. 
It became difficult and dangerous to sidestep Iskandar Muda’s decrees, most attempts to buy 
pepper without the mandatory royal chapp were fruitless, because of his threats to punish the 
local offenders.  He let it be known to the ports that he would kill everyone who evaded his 
decree by cutting open his stomach. His capacity to use force against the ports, steadfastly 
gained him almost full control over their trade.  
                                                                                                                                                        
  ‘At Achein he putt the Company to extraordinary expences by his greate guiftes (gifts) and pompe hee used in 
his carriage; wastinge a greate deale of tyme, without doinge anythinge for the Companies good [not] soe much 
as renewinge the ould capitulations; bought no commodities butt a parcel of very bad benjamyn for the 
Companies accompt, and very good for himselfe’.     
 
26 Letters Received, vol. I, 274 . 
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The foreign sources provide the orientation of the drama which developed in the relationship 
between Iskandar Muda and the ports and the cast of characters in this drama.         
The English tried to treat with him for the establishment of  a factory in Tiku and Priaman but 
he answered them that his subjects would be bereaved from business if he licensed them. The 
English writer’s account  presents a different picture of the relationship between Iskandar 
Muda and these people, one which was less considerate: ‘These subjects were ordered to send 
their principals once a year to Aceh to give a clarification of their doings,  if they be faulty it 
costs them their legs, arm or lives, the law being in the King’s breast; if no occasion can be 
found then by means of some concurrent it cost them their whole estates to continue in their 
place, as some of them reported, being forced to return home with never a penny in their 
purse.’27   
 
The relations between Iskandar Muda and the English started to break down.  Pieter Willemsz 
Floris and George Chauncy informed Th. Aldworthe at Surat on 16 November 1614 that the 
Osiander (one of the ships of Thomas Best), was on its way to Priaman ‘where the English 
were in great danger of the king of Aceh.’ The king was furious that they had established a 
factory in Priaman without his permission and sent several prahu and fusts to bring them from 
there to Aceh. The merchants hoped that the Osiander could prevent the Acehnese from doing 
that.28  
Another English attempt (1615) to buy pepper in the port of Tiku failed, because they did not 
turn up with the royal chapp. The officials in the port were evidently frightened to act against 
the sultan’s decree.  
The English insisted that the  Privilege of 1602 be honoured. The Hector went to Aceh to 
discuss the matter with the sultan whose resolution remained unaltered ‘but he was induced 
by means of presents, to allow the merchants to trade at the subordinate ports for limited 
periods’. In the words of John Sandcroft one of the merchants aboard the Hector ‘the king 
craved for presents and demanded without restraint whatever he liked: ‘a piece of ordnance, 
an anchor, a barrel of powder, several knives. He also eagerly desired a corselet and a helmet, 
of the kind the English noblemen were used to wearing, and he was desirous of the two dogs 
                                                 
 
27 ibid., vol. III,  226 : Letter from John Millward of 13 November 1615. 
 
28 ibid., vol. II, 165. 
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on board, an Iceland cur and a Shepherd’s cur. ‘These two, being given the king, was daily as 
he went abroad led after him with two sundry slaves’.29   
The merchants detested the local people saying that they were greedy and insatiable. Arthur 
Spaight wrote in very strong words to Nicholas Downton in Bantam: ‘with a beggarly kind of 
people nothing is to be done without presents’.30    
When Iskandar Muda sent his messenger to buy 30 swords from the English, for which he 
offered 30 mas for one piece, the merchant in charge did not allow him to take the swords 
until they were paid for and demanded his ring in deposit. Utterly offended by this insolence 
of the foreigner, Iskandar Muda cancelled the purchase. This episode demonstrates that hard 
bargaining was not the prerogative of the sultan and that he was not always victorious in 
dealing with the foreign merchants. Another confrontation between them occurred when 
Iskandar Muda offered 5 tael 31 for English iron. Merchant Oxwick demanded 8 tael for the 
lot. The sultan insisted on 5 tael, whereupon Oxwick brusquely responded ‘leave it’.  
According to Oxwick  the king angrily retorted that ‘Acheen is not beholden to us, but we to 
Acheene.’32 Iskandar Muda profoundly realized the importance of Aceh for the Europeans 
who yearned for trade contracts. But he also badly needed English iron to build his galleys for 
his planned attack on Malacca, eventually paying the price which the merchant demanded. 
Later he came even with Oxwick when the man impudently asked for a license to buy pepper 
‘as cheap as possible’ in Tiku and Priaman. Iskandar Muda snapped that he could buy pepper 
in the port of Aceh or go.  
 
 
 
 
2. 2. 5    Humiliation and retaliation of the Dutch 
Iskandar Muda was extremely confident that the European traders had no choice but to accept 
his rules. This self-fulfilling prophecy manifested itself in the deteriorating relations with 
                                                 
 
29 ibid., vol. III, 190.  
 
30 ibid., 103. 
 
31 A tael is an imaginary coin. John Davis mentions in 1600 that sixteen mas make a gold tael. The (golden)  mas 
is coined in Aceh.   
 
32 Letters Received , vol. III, 115. 
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them. His tightening grip on the ports of the west coast and his smugness obstructed a normal 
trade between the northern Europeans and these ports.  
The Dutch especially felt let down by his refusal to observe the Accord of 1607; many 
obstacles were thrown in their way when they tried to procure pepper in Aceh.   
Utterly challenged, the  authorities in Bantam resolved to stop their ships from going to Aceh, 
keeping them ‘on the coast’. The embargo caused the trade from the Moluccan islands which 
consisted of Chinese wares, cloves and nutmegs for the markets in Aceh, to come to a 
standstill. No boats came for almost two years from about 1612 to about 1614. 33  
The domineering Acehnese ruler suddenly faced the fact that a European power started to 
dictate the terms of the trade and evidently underestimated Dutch determination to ignore 
Aceh for such an extended period.  Angered by this obstruction, he threatened to harm the 
resident merchants. Several of them fled the country fearing for their lives. The anguish felt 
by merchant Willemssen that the sultan would take revenge by killing him and seize the 
company’s goods is a sign of  the total collapse of the relationship; he asked to be relieved 
from his duty in Aceh. The situation exacerbated when Acehnese vessels molested Dutch 
ships in the area and they fired at each other. It was a nadir in their relationship.34    
 
Jan Pieterszoon Coen, since 1614 director-general of the VOC business in Bantam, held the 
view that a complete break with Aceh was detrimental to the company’s trade of Moluccan 
spices and Chinese wares against textiles brought there by the Gujeratis, because the company 
did not trade directly in Surat. Despite his disdain for the Asian monarchs ‘who ruled their 
countries like tyrants according to the Indian aphorism the strongest is king’ 35, his common 
sense won over his resentment. Coen was infuriated that Iskandar Muda was holding 22 
Dutchmen hostage, captured by his armada in Johor in 1613 when they took up arms against 
the invading Acehnese in defence of the sultan of Johor.36 Although he regarded this as a 
humiliation of the company, he was adamant that to keep the friendship with Iskandar Muda 
                                                 
 
33 H.T. Colenbrander and W.P. Coolhaas (eds.) Coen’s Bescheiden Omtrent Zijn Bedrijf in Indie, 7 volumes in 8 
parts  (’s Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1919-1953), vol. I, 60-61.  
 
34 J. L. Blussé points to Holden Furber’s dictum ‘we should not represent that ‘partnership’ too romantically. 
Market traffic is based on mutual interest and competition, and occasionally that economic traffic was also 
compelled by the threat of violence.’ “Feigned Friends and Declared Enemies”, 3. 
 
35 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 215  ‘Dewyle alle dese Orientalische coningen seer tirranich sijn regeerende, ja, 
alsoo dat sy alle haren staet met enkel gewelt sijn houdende, gelijck het Indiaens spreeckwoort: de sterckste is 
conink.’       
 
36 The Acehnese invasion in Johor  shall be discussed in detail in part 3 of this study.  
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which  was necessary to continue the trade with Aceh.37  Dutch geo-political ambitions 
especially with an eye to oust the Portuguese from Malacca gained momentum and  played an 
important role in this.  
It immensely troubled Coen that the competitive English were licensed on the west coast 
where they did some brisk trade.  At his orders Hans de Haze went to Aceh in 1615 with the 
Rooden Leeuw met Pylen with merchandise amounting to the sum of  fl.80.891. De Haze was 
hard-pressed to bargain a trade contract for the west coast, by offering Iskandar Muda the 
assistance of several ships for his planned attack on Malacca.38 Coen perceived that the real 
cause of Iskandar Muda’s tyrannical behaviour was the company’s failure to assist him with 
ships to assault Malacca, for Iskandar Muda earlier complained that the governor-general did 
not live up to the ‘brothers in-arms’understanding. In this respect Coen also pointed to the 
merchants’ assistance for Johor against Aceh.39 The Treaty of September 1606 with Johor 
does not explicitly stipulate Dutch assistance against Aceh. The merchants evidently defended 
their business in Johor against the invading Acehnese.   
The mission of Hans de Haze to Aceh was doomed. Merchant Ryser who arrived in his 
company disembarked without waiting for the royal cap for landing and was severely 
punished for this trespass by being thrown three times to the elephants. He miraculously 
survived, but sustained broken limbs and bad bruises, and died when his ship made an 
unsuccessful attempt at landing in Bantam several months later. Ryser’s oversight was not 
merely an insult of the local custom as some authors mildly put it,  it was a violation of the 
law. One should realize that breaching the rules could impair a country’s integrity and 
ultimately the safety of its ruler and people. The protection of these values depended very 
much on inbuilt securities, such as the requirement of the royal cap when entering Aceh.  
Iskandar Muda sent a warning to visiting foreigners that they should respect his laws and that 
they could not perpetrate a blunder or a crime and get away with it. But to subject Ryser to 
such inhumane treatment, merely shows that the special relationship between Aceh and the 
Dutch was damaged beyond repair. De Haze discovered to his chagrin that the resident 
merchants had fled from Aceh, causing Iskandar Muda’s vexation that they had left without 
his permission. To make matters worse,  floods had completely destroyed the storage 
buildings and the goods had washed away. It was a financial loss for the company totalling 
                                                 
 
37 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 60.   
 
38 ibid.,vol. II, ‘Memorie voor Hans de Haze’, 53..  
 
39 ibid., vol. I, 130. 
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fl.6.337 which added to the total misery. When Iskandar Muda downright refused to give him 
a contract to trade on the west coast by excluding the English, a disheartened De Haze closed 
the factory in April 1616.40  It was too costly to run an non-productive factory.  
The officials in Bantam decided that military assistance for Iskandar Muda would only take 
effect if he licensed the company instead of the English to trade in Tiku and Priaman. An 
embittered Coen said that the king had abused their friendship by favouring the English and 
by his cruel punishment of merchant Ryser. Yet, despite his grievances against Iskandar 
Muda he still preferred a ‘dead friendship’ with him instead of violent  measures against him  
calling it an alarming trend that the local rulers were backing away from the company and  
became more demanding and obnoxious when the company followed their whims.41  
 
 
 
 
2. 2. 6    The nerve-system of the trade 
‘The king hath engrossed all the pepper into his hands, as the report goeth, and the Protector 
or Governor and the Sabendare (shahbandar) are his merchants.’42   
The reports of the European merchants lay bare the nerve-system of the trade as it pertained in 
Aceh and the ports on the west coast. Paying bribes – even after having received a license or a 
contract  to trade - was a main condition to purchase pepper. Prices were often set at will 
while the duties levied were usually higher than the actual pepper price.  
Iskandar Muda could be induced to alter his earlier decisions when he was given extra sums 
of money and valuable presents and the merchants -  although grudgingly - usually gave in to 
his demands in order to be licensed.  
 
The Regulations of the Port of Aceh  (Madjlis Bandar Darussalam) as described in the Adat 
Aceh were developed when Iskandar Muda ordered the officials of the Public Hall (Balai 
Besar) in the year 1015 H (1607), the year of his accession ‘to make a certified copy’ (suruh 
tandakan surat seperti )of his edicts (tarakata). These officials were Orangkaya Seri 
Maharadja Lela who was the Acehnese equivalent of a prime minster, Penghulu Kerkun 
                                                 
 
40 ibid., vol. VII, (pt. 1), 93.  
 
41 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. II, ‘Memorie voor Hans de Haze’, 53 . 
 
42 Letters Received, vol. III, 103.  
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Radja Setia Muda,  Kerkun Katibul Muluk Seri Indera Su(a)ra and Kerkun Seri Indera Muda, 
who were the official clerks.43 
The Madjlis reveals that much thought was given by the sultan and his council to the 
development of a system in which a network of high and low officials gained an income from 
the trade, setting the different dues and taxes and the sequence of the steps to be taken by 
foreign traders arriving in the port. Every service rendered had to paid in kind or cash. There 
was a clear distinction in the goods and dues which the different nationalities, Europeans, 
Indians and Arabs, were required to pay. One of the taxes was the adat kain (tax paid in 
textiles): ships from Gujerat paid 2 kayu (pieces) white ‘bafta Berotji’, those from 
Coromandel, the Maladives and Malabar paid 5 pieces of ‘batik mori’, 1600 stockfish and one 
jar of ‘rutu’ (fish-paste). In addition the traders paid the tax for the court which was called 
‘adat kain yang kedalam’ paid to the Panglima Bandar, the chief harbour officer, the 
Penghulu Kawal, (head of the garrison), and the Wakil Furdah, (harbour master). It concerned 
7 pieces of silk for ships coming from Gujerat.  
A manifold of dues was required from the foreign traders, from the payment for stamps (adat 
tjap), to paying free meals and sirih pinang (local tobacco) to the sultan’s men working 
aboard the incoming ships.    
Arriving Europeans were required to bring the sultan a roll of cloth (not specified) and a 
barrel of gunpowder. The sultan in return presented them with garments: Muslims received 
imported vestments, while Europeans and other non-Muslims were presented Acehnese dress 
and gifts.  
Leaving Aceh they paid the departure tax: lapik memohon berlajar ( permit for ‘sailing’).  
It should be borne in mind that the Madjlis does not explain how the situation was in reality; 
but how it ought to be. The sultan could exempt foreign merchants from paying the taxes.        
 
 
 
 
2. 2. 7    Conclusion 
Iskandar Muda’s rejection of the Privilege of 1602 and the Accord of 1607 underscores his 
line of thinking about a new economic order. Unlike his grandfather Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah, 
                                                 
 
43 Adat Atjèh, 17, 18.  
 119
 120
who detached himself from the trade negotiations, he was the central figure in these 
negotiations. Centralization of the trade became his fixation.  
He designed a system of regulations, which encouraged the development of relevant state 
institutions and laid down the emoluments of a range of functionaries. The regulations depict 
Aceh as a well-ordered society. However, the long-drawn negotiations, in fact the diverse 
obstacles thrown in the way of the European merchants, obscure this notion. Gift giving was 
the recourse for the European traders to obtain contracts. Iskandar Muda was willing to 
change his decisions, depending on the gifts the merchants bestowed on him. His displeasure 
with the insolence of the English merchants faded when they gave him the things he craved 
and licensed them to trade in Tiku for a period of two years.  
By showering him with expensive presents and artillery the European merchants in fact 
created a standard for his manipulation.  
 
From Iskandar Muda’s reply to Prince Maurice of Nassau in 1610 about the armistice 
between the United Republic and Spain, it is entirely clear that he saw it as his religious 
obligation to pursue the Portuguese in Malacca as long as he lived because they were the 
enemies of Islam. He honoured his forefathers and continued their struggle against the 
Portuguese.  
His rejection of the Accord of 1607 was not brought about by the Dutch-Spanish armistice of 
1609. He refused to give jurisdiction in his domain and trade privileges to the northern 
Europeans on the basis of treaties they either obtained or negotiated from his predecessors. 
The signing of an armistice with Spain on the other hand shows Dutch failure to abide by the 
stipulations regarding peace with the enemy as laid down in the  Accord of 1607.    
The VOC ‘s embargo on its shipping to Aceh demonstrates Dutch frustration with Iskandar 
Muda who totally disregarded their (his ally’s) economic interest. The embargo demonstrated 
to Iskandar Muda the growing significance of the VOC in the Asian trade, for he was bereft of 
essential goods which Dutch ships brought from the Moluccan islands and elsewhere to Aceh. 
Iskandar Muda’s grip on the trade of the west coast, antagonised the local chiefs and 
merchants and aggravated the intrinsically taut relations which existed between overlord and 
vassal.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
 
                       Bronze cannon gift from King James (Jacobus) in 1617 to Sultan Iskandar 
                       Muda (Museum Bronbeek, Arnhem) 
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               TRIANGULAR AFFAIRS AND INTER-EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
 
 
 
2. 3. 1      English efforts for trade contracts     
Iskandar Muda’s threats were effective to put a stop to the evasions of his decrees in the ports 
on the west coast. In 1615 William Keeling went to Aceh with a request from King James I to  
trade in Tiku and presented him some extraordinary gifts such as 10 mastiff dogs and 10 
bitches, and ‘a great gun wherein a man could sit upright’ which he earlier requested.  Keeling 
received a fine reception, which is remarkable in regard to the fact that the English had 
opened a factory in Priaman without Iskandar Muda’s authorization, whereupon he sent a 
fleet of small prahu to castigate Priaman for transgressing his rules. By recognizing Iskandar 
Muda as the central figure in the trade of the west coast and offering him extraordinary gifts, 
it looks like the English could do no wrong. He gave Keeling a contract for two years to trade 
in Tiku and sent his ‘Letter of Privilege’ to the authorities in the port, to announce that 
Keeling came to trade under his protection.1 He called Keeling orangkaya chuche atti (clear-
hearted); earlier he called Thomas Best orangkaya putih (white orangkaya), at the same time 
refusing Best a contract for an extended period to trade in Tiku. It is quite clear that he called 
these men orangkaya because of the great gifts and money they lavished on him.  
Quite revealing is Iskandar Muda’s reply to an earlier request by King James I for trade on the 
west coast, which Thomas Best took home in 1613.2    
                                                 
1 Letters Received, vol. IV, 373:  
-Letter to King James of  July 1616;   
-‘Privileges at Tiku’. This is a document Iskandar Muda sent to the authorities in Tiku to announce that he had 
granted William Keeling the right to trade under his protection under a tax of 7 per 100 for goods imported and 
exported.     
 
2 The letter is in the possession of the Bodleian Library (MS. Laud Or. B 1 R).  
The translation and the Malay text are published by W.G. Shellabear: ‘An account of the oldest Malay 
Manuscripts  now  extant’ (Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asian Society, vol. XXXI 1898), 121-130; 
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‘ ……..Now it is stated therein that the king requests that the English people may trade in 
Tiku and Priaman, and that they may settle there to trade, as in the time of His Highness the 
late Saidu ‘l-Mukammil (Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Syah al Mukamil). 
Now it is my decree that the English people cannot, as described trade in Tiku and Priaman, 
and that they may not settle there to trade,  for those countries are wild, and moreover are 
distant from us. If the people of Tiku and Priaman should molest them, we should certainly 
get an infamous report with King James. By the grace of the Lord of all universe, if the 
English people who are servants of the King desire to send their factors to trade, let them 
trade in Acheen: and if they desire to send their factors to trade, let them send them to 
Acheen, so that whoever shall molest them we may quickly make inquiry and punish with a 
just punishment, since they are the servants of the King who is in correspondence with us.’  
Iskandar Muda’s declaration shows that he had serious problems in controlling the ports, even 
after five years on the throne. To admit this weakness to foreign traders is proof  that he was 
still a novice in diplomacy.  
 
 
 
 
2. 3. 2   The English in the lead of the pepper trade   
By anxiously following each other in the archipelago, competition between the Dutch and the 
English grew to the extent that confrontations could not be avoided. To protect their interest 
in the Moluccan islands, the Dutch spread the rumour among the local populations that they 
would not see an English ship but for once in four years. Far from amused by Dutch insults 
and stern efforts for the sole trade,  John Jourdain, head of the East India Company business at 
Bantam, called the Dutch the company’s mortal rivals in the trade.3  Jourdain was  killed 
when the two rivals clashed near the port of Patani in the Malay peninsula in 1615. The rulers 
of the ports had to deal with two very ambitious European companies and it is not strange that 
occasionally they took advantage of their competition .  
                                                                                                                                                        
Interesting to note is that Iskandar Muda does not call King James his friend or ally, but  that he is ‘in 
correspondence with us’. His relation with Prince Maurice of Nassau was based on  ‘brotherly’ alliance.   
 
 
3 Letters Received, vol. II, 15. 
 122
Jan Pieterszoon Coen, director-general of the company’s business in Bantam, asked the Board 
of directors, the Gentlemen XVII  to find a solution for the problems with the English to 
prevent the situation in the East to get out of control.4   
It looks as if the annulment of the Privilege of 1602 and the Accord of 1607 by Iskandar 
Muda made the two rivals even more anxious and suspicious of each other, which took their 
rivalry to new levels. They lavished Iskandar Muda with artillery and gifts to either secure 
contracts or to obtain the monopoly over the pepper trade.5  Their competition to gain his 
favour turned their erstwhile chicanery into a real contest.  
Taking advantage of the furtive departure in 1615 from Aceh of the Dutch resident merchants 
and the subsequent closing of their factory in 1616, the English incited Iskandar Muda that 
they had left Aceh never to return with the result that they could occupy the vacant houses of 
the Dutch. 6 They were now formidable and cunning rivals of the Dutch and the sole 
European traders in Aceh and licensed to procure 1200 bahar of pepper in Tiku which they 
loaded in the Hector.  
The declining conditions for the VOC in Aceh worried Coen who was utterly dismayed by the 
deception of the English who occupied the company’s houses and surreptitiously filled the 
vacuum created by his merchants’ stealthy retreat from there. He claimed that the company 
owned it to its lack of common sense and its vague overall policy that led to an ineffective 
supervision of the business in Aceh, made worse by a shortage of cash, ships and yachts 
giving the English a big advantage.7  
 
It was not plain sailing on the west coast for the English, not even with the sultan’s contract in 
their pocket and the Letter of  Privilege he had sent with Keeling to the authorities in the 
ports. The local traders and functionaries deceived and obstructed them. When William 
Nichols, the resident merchant in Aceh told the sultan of the problems the merchants in Tiku 
experienced and of the swindle in the weight of the pepper, he responded that if he found the 
defaulters he would deal with them as he had dealt with the late panglima 8, explaining that he 
                                                 
 
4 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 130 : letter dated 15 October 1615.   
 
5 The Dutch do not explicitly mention what presents they offered the sultan.  
 
6 Letters Received, vol. IV, 165-166. 
 
7 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I., 205-206: letter  to the Gentlemen XVII dated 10 October 1616  
 
8 Letters Received, vol. VI, 204.  
 123
daily meted out punishments to his subjects in the city who were found to be immoral and 
acted against the law and that it did not surprise him at all that the people in Tiku were 
corrupt, ‘since they were far away from his justice.’ Again we note this extraordinary 
disclosure to outsiders of his difficulties in controlling the ports. It stands in stark contrast to 
the contract and Letter of Privilege he earlier granted William Keeling. 
The merchants had already given him a suit of red velvet, ‘Portugal fashion which he desired 
to have’, knives, cable and anchor, and several other things. In accordance with the custom 
regulations applying to all ships arriving in the port, they had paid the laxamana and harbour 
officials 112 tael for their services.9 
Iskandar Muda self-righteously declared that if they persisted to trade in Tiku and Priaman he 
would send three boats to bring all the pepper from there to Aceh. Because of his insistence  
that the merchants procure pepper in the port of Aceh, Nichols was sure that the obstructions 
in Tiku came from Iskandar Muda himself, confirmed by the arrival in Tiku of his principal 
officers who exchanged his oddments of textiles for pepper.10 Nichols daringly suggested to 
the merchants in Tiku to bribe the local authorities to draw them on their side for he knew that 
Iskandar Muda would bring all pepper from there to sell this to the French who had arrived 
with the Saint Michel in the port of Aceh.11   [… ‘he  having tasted the sweetness of profit by 
360 bahar lately sold to the Frenchmen, which men the king hath told me have promised him 
to bring him gold in payment for his pepper hereafter: this king not esteeming of (silver) reals 
although I have told him of their being current all the world over, besides so also that an 
English ship may bring reals and buy his commodities, as pepper or other…’] 12 
By haughtily announcing to the English that the French would pay him in gold for future 
pepper deliveries, Iskandar Muda stirred their competition. Noteworthy is that Aceh was an 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘The  manifold abuses offered them [the merchants in Tiku] by one Possegonge, late Pouleema of Tecoo and 
divers others which I had long before advice of from them, and having met here with the late Poleema, two 
months before this ship’s arrival, I acquainted the King of him, who caused his members forthwith to be cut 
off.…’   The ‘Poleema’ was the Acehnese orangkaya Panglima. The cruel punishment of his official in Tiku 
shows  that Iskandar Muda did not take lightly any disobedience against his rules.            
 
9 The merchants kept a list of the presents  and fees  given to all the functionaries and the taxes  they were 
obliged to pay. See: Letters Received, vol. III, 95-101.  
 
10 ibid., vol. VI, 70 ‘…proceeded out of secret command from the king to weary us thence. (which Deago affirms 
to have seen), whereby they also having been advised of the worth of pepper here, might rather have bribed and 
forborne some wrongs.’ 
   
11 The French were briefly in Aceh in 1617 after a long absence since 1602. The Dutch mention that they offered 
25 real for a bahar of pepper which Iskandar Muda refused to accept. The English eventually sold them their 
stock. 
  
12 Letters Received, vol. VI, 80. 
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exporter of gold which came from the Minangkabao highlands. Priaman was the port of the 
Minangkabao territory. It is quite evident that Iskandar Muda  punished corrupt local officials 
not because these men obstructed the English who traded under his protection, but because 
they evaded his decrees. Nichols mentions that the king had been ill for about ten months and 
was often distracted and behaved cruelly by putting people to death, ‘which he afterwards 
repented.’13  
He did not permit the Rose to moor in Tiku and Priaman to sell its cargo of salt and procure 
pepper unless he was given four pieces of artillery. The merchants were against  paying for 
the ‘privilege’ to trade, since Keeling’s contract had not expired. Iskandar Muda stoically 
declared that he had not licensed the English, but Captain William Keeling in person, because 
of the fine gifts he brought him. His cheekiness undermined his credibility and showed his 
gluttony. It was a betrayal of his promise to King James that the English could trade in Tiku 
for two years as corroborated in his letter of 1615.  
The obstructions and delays started to take their effects on the English, captain Diego insulted 
Iskandar Muda by recklessly saying to him in Malay, that if he would not be licensed to trade 
in Tiku, he would immediately leave with his ship from Aceh. He evidently overstepped the 
bounds of Iskandar Muda’s tolerance for he had him and the master of his ship thrown out of 
the palace.  
‘The King is almost a madman, wilful and wild; and Deago having spoken to him in 
abrupt manner in Malay at his first denial of giving liberty for landing the Rose’s salt, 
that if he would not grant he would be gone, the King caused him forthwith to be 
turned out of his further gates with the master, to no small disgrace; and never after 
would hear my motion in that behalf. Signor Deago having likewise in a drunken 
humour at my house and before my face told the Sabandar in Mallayes that if the 
Acheins would trade he was willing, if fight, he was ready; which I did presently 
reprehend him for in hope that it would have given the Sabandar satisfaction, but he 
glad of that occasion as being a merchant wont to gain much by Tecoo trade, whereas 
now frustrated by our trading there, told their king and many of his nobles of his 
words, which indeed the rather moved the King to displeasure towards him.’14  
This account fundamentally tells us that the shahbandar supported Iskandar Muda’s policy.  
One should understand that by canalising the trade from the west coast to the port of Aceh, he 
                                                 
 
13 ibid., 73. 
 
14 ibid., 69. 
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and many orangkaya profited. No wonder that when the Osiander arrived from Masulipatam 
with a variety of goods, the orangkaya spread the rumour that the goods would be transferred 
to the Rose and sold in Tiku. Their insinuation worked, Iskandar Muda immediately 
demanded from the English four pieces of ordnance to trade their salt in Tiku.   
A dejected Nichols wrote ‘ …..and wish myself, even with my soul, that I had never seen this 
place, being a King and people void of all honesty, having and craving.’15      
Nichols called a meeting of all captains and merchants to discuss Iskandar Muda’s conditions.   
“Council held ashore in Acheim (1 August 1617)’, ‘wherein each man is to write his 
particular opinion to the sequel, viz.’: 
‘Whereas this King doth absolutely deny his having granted general trade for two 
years unto the English at Tecoo, but in particular unto General Keeling’s fleet, saying 
that in regard of his large gifts by two ships and many others, such goods as he landed 
at Tecoo, let them trade and turn the penny during the said time’s expiration, but for 
any other shipping to trade or land goods upon pretence of being General Keeling’s he 
gave them but for such goods as were in his former two ships, nor will suffer any other 
English goods to be landed there during the two years unless he may have given him 
four pieces of ordnance; and that but for this only ship the Rose’s goods, wherein is 
nought but some salt with some 2000 rials of eight to be invested in cloth here for 
Tecoo, that will yield 50 per cent profit; etc….. 
Considering the premises that the King’s will is a law, and that it may be doubted, if 
the foresaid pieces be not given him, he will send such letters to Tecoo as the year’s 
trade to come at Tecoo granted general Keeling will be lost: whether most fit to give 
the King his foresaid demand or stand to hazard of the King’s displeasure.’ (James 
Fernandus) 
‘The opinion of me, Walter Bennett, is that in regard of the King’s rash answer, and 
likewise his ill usage, and in regard that he will not permit us to speak with him any 
more, I think it not fitting to let our demi-culverin go out of our ship; for in my simple 
opinion they will not stand in any stead, in regard the King is resolved that he will do 
nothing afore such time as another general or ambassador comes from England; other I 
cannot say.’  (Walter Bennet)   
‘My opinion is that in regard of the slender stock in the Rose and that it is resolved that 
the Unicorn now at Tecoo will be laden and departed thence, leaving the factory bare, 
                                                 
15 ibid., 80. 
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is not fit to give this King his unreasonable desire as four pieces of ordnance. But for 
two demi-culverin pieces (although as thrown away), better in my judgement to give 
for the continuance of the two year’s trade; whereby the King shall see we do not 
stand in opposition to his will but flexibly strain to pleasure him, as by his knowledge 
of the Rose’s slender lading of salt he cannot but consider hereafter, although now he 
may not please to consider it, but in his selfwill accounts to have what he list; which is 
once granted will be an ill precedent for further time.’ Wm. Nicholls.  
The considerations and arguments brought forward by the merchants, give us a sense of the 
reality and the merchants’ urgency to trade. They resolved to give the king some ‘fair gifts’ 
(two demi-culverin pieces?) with the result that the Rose was licensed to trade in Tiku.16   
The obstructions in Tiku did not end when they were licensed. The locals refused to buy the 
salt from the Rose, because the rumour spread that merchant Gillman relieved himself in the 
chamber-pot in the room where the salt was stored. 17 It looks like the people of Tiku made 
their own decisions. 
 
Whatever obstacles the English experienced in trading on the west coast, they were busily 
engaged in the textile trade from Surat and Cambay in the port of Aceh where candykens and 
blue baftas yielded good profits. Since he had banned the Gujerati traders from his port, 
Iskandar Muda bought much of his textiles from the English. As if eager to destabilize their 
trade, he bought candykens and different textiles from the French who had arrived from the 
Red Sea. It proves that he jealously guarded the trade in his realm by refusing other traders to 
become dominant. Nichols incited him against the French by telling him that they had lifted 
these textiles from eleven Muslim ships from Gujerat and Dabul. He retorted that every 
wrongdoer had to answer for his particular offences to God, and he was not responsible for 
what had happened.18 
 
 
                                                 
16 ibid., 29 onwards. 
 
17 ibid., 30:  Letter from Lewis Smyth of 25 November 1617 to George Ball at Bantam.  
‘The Polema hath bought all our salt at thirty measures the mace (mas), each measure being near half an English 
peck, each mace three shillings. All the country people refuse to buy it because Mr. Gillman lay in the chamber 
over it and used to do his needs in the chamber-pot and hired a Chynaman to carry it out every morning, which 
Chynaman reported to the country people that the English used to do their needs among salt. This is the country 
people’s report’.  
 
18 ibid., 70. 
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2. 3. 3    Coen’s ‘discourse’ 
Moeten patientie hebben, want daer niet en is, verliest de keyser zijn recht’ (We need  to be 
patient, because absence means loosing our rights)19 
 
Baffled by Iskandar Muda’s disregard for the VOC and his clear inclination to the English, 
Coen resolved that the company no longer be mistreated. He could not accept that the English 
obtained privileges from the king of Aceh for they did not lift a finger to fight the Portuguese.  
Another set back for the company was that Gujerati ships did no longer trade in Aceh, a 
condition which was detrimental to the barter trade of Moluccan spices for textiles from Surat.  
Coen called it great negligence that the business in Aceh had been abandoned and the English 
had become the sole traders.20  He ranted about the incapability of the resident merchants to 
judge the conditions in Aceh, where the English had picked up on the barter with textiles.   
Even though he frequently called the local rulers tyrants who ruled by violence,21 and fostered 
a grudge towards the ‘Atchynder’ ( a derogative the Dutch used specifically for Iskandar 
Muda), he was intent to end the existing impasse with him. As a strategic partner in the battle 
against the Portuguese, the king of Aceh - whoever was the incumbent ruler - remained 
exceedingly important. Coen therefore opted to follow a more pragmatic course.  
He sent the Enckhuysen in 1616 with plenty of goods and cash to Aceh, to request from 
Iskandar Muda a trade contract. The instructions for Everart Deyn and captain Dirck Allertsen 
are an expression of Coen’s anxieties about the unprecedented conditions in Aceh. He warns 
them to remain vigilant, expecting that the king might retaliate the fact that the resident 
merchants had left in 1615 without his cap which was considered an act of insurgency.22 The 
Ryser incident was fresh on Coen’s mind and another incident could mean a total break with 
the king. The ships should remain anchored until Acehnese ostagiers came on board, only 
then the delegates would go ashore, leaving the main crew behind. They needed  to explain to 
                                                 
 
19 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. VII, 396. 
 
20 ibid., vol. I : letter of 10 October 1616, 205-06:   
‘tIs voorwaer een groote onachtsaemheyt, dat desen handel nagelaten en de d’engelsen alleen vergunt zy’.    
 
21 ibid., 215 ‘Dewyle alle dese Orientalische coningen seer tirranich sijn regeerende, ja alsoo dat sy alle haren 
staet met enkel gewelt sijn houdende, gelijck het Indiaens spreeckwoort: de sterckste is conink.’  
 
22 ibid., ‘Instructie voor Everart Deyns aan boord van de Enckhuysen’, dated  4 Juni 1616, 122,123. 
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the king that Hans de Haze was forced to close the factory (in 1616) because of  his (the 
king’s) evident resentment towards the company, for it had not  made immediately available a 
fleet for an attack on Malacca. The main reason to close the factory was that the company 
suffered serious financial losses because of his refusal to license the merchants to trade in the 
ports on the west coast. They came to establish whether he was willing to continue the old 
friendship and to give them a license to trade in Tiku and Priaman and the ports within his 
jurisdiction where they wanted to buy the whole supply of pepper on offer. This was 
absolutely necessary to make trade profits, vital to run the company’s factories, to pay its 
servants and to maintain ships: ‘without these profits, this would be a difficult task for even 
the mightiest potentate in the world, whatever his financial situation.’      
Of special significance is the message to the king that in the previous year (1615 ) governor-
general Reynst sent a fleet to the Straits of Malacca, in response to his request for assistance 
and ‘thanks to God it humiliated the enemy’s fleet in the Straits. But it was also God’s will 
that the king’s armada had just returned to Aceh when the fleet arrived in the Straits.’ 23 The 
merchants needed to emphasise that it took some time before a fleet could be made available, 
because of the war waged in the Moluccan islands, which was caused by the deception of the 
English. The fleet urgently returned to the Moluccan islands to defend the company’s ‘labours 
and profit’ against the encroaching English. The governor-general was on his way to attack 
Malacca with the fleet of Verhaegen, but when he arrived in Bantam he was informed about 
the situation in the Moluccan islands and could not continue his trip to the Straits to destroy 
the Spanish fleet of Don Juan de Silva which was on its way from the Philippines, because the 
English prevented this wonderful opportunity.24   
Then came the syllogism: ‘It was unacceptable for the Dutch that the His Majesty allowed the 
English the sole trade, while he demanded Dutch assistance to attack the Portuguese, their 
common enemy. As long as he favoured the English above the Dutch,  he could no longer 
                                                 
23 The fleet of Verhaegen which came from the Moluccan islands attacked several Portuguese vessels and lifted 
their cargo and artillery. Verhaegen’s encounters with the Portuguese are explored in Part Three. 
 
24 idem :  
‘ Dat het zoo lange is eer derwaerts een vloote gesonden sy, ende de schepen soo haest wederom van Malacca 
sijn gekeert, is eensdeels oorsaecke den swaren oorloge, welck ons in de Moluccos wordt aengedaen, maer ten 
anderen voornamelijck d’ondercruypinge welck d’Engelsen aldaer sijn doende, ende ten waere door d’Engelsen 
genootsaeckt sijn geworden de schepen wederomme na de Moluccos te zenden opdat sy de vruchten van onse 
arbeyt niet en souden plucken, d’E. heer generael ware met alle voorneemste macht na Malacca gevaren, ende 
soude deselve aldaer een tijt lanck gehouden hebben; waere sulcx geschiet, de Spaense vloot van don Juan de 
Silva die naderhant tot Malakka arriveerde, soude mede geresconteert ende met de genade Gods oock wel 
geslagen hebben, soodat claerlijcken blijct d’Engelsen ons dit verhindert ende soo heerlijcken daet belet 
hebben.’ 
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count on Dutch assistance. To re-establish the strategic bond and be assured of assistance, he 
should order the loading of a shipload of pepper (against payment). This would be a 
demonstration of his good will towards the governor-general and the company.  
The English would make him all kinds of promises, paying only lip-service, for they had 
never risen against the common enemy and would not likely do so, because of their truce with 
the king of Spain.’25  The purport is clear. Coen deliberately played out Dutch assistance to 
imbue Iskandar Muda with the practical importance of licensing them instead of the English. 
To maintain a fleet in the Straits was a costly affair which had to be paid from the incomes of 
the trade. Coen’s ‘discourse’ illustrates his frustration with the situation in which the English 
acquired the upper hand in the trade of Aceh. Coen’s appeal for sole rights flows from the 
idea of an equal partnership between Aceh and the VOC which - in his view -  gave the Dutch 
the intrinsic right to trade contracts. D.G. E. Hall claims that the VOC conducted a 
concentrated national offensive against Portugal and Spain, and they bitterly resented the 
intrusion of the English into the spice trade, since the latter had lost much of their Elizabethan 
hatred of Spain and would gladly have made peace with the Portuguese on a basis of live and 
let live in the East.26  It is quite pathetic of Coen to accuse the English of ‘treason’, when the 
United Republic and Spain had signed an armistice in 1609. 
 
Although the facts, as they are presented above, are not in doubt, Coen deliberately blamed 
the English for undermining the Dutch everywhere, declaring that English interest in the 
archipelago had long been protected and represented by the Dutch.27  
He was deliberate to break the English efforts to trade in the archipelago, reasoning that the 
European market for spices was fairly limited and competition worked against a profitable 
trade. The allegation that the English were bystanders in the struggle against the Portuguese, 
                                                 
25 idem : 
‘Hierop dient U.I. ditto coninck van Atchin selffs in consideratie te geven, hoe ongerijmt het zy, dat syne 
Majesteyt d’Engelsen alleene den handel vergunt ende ons ten oorloge assystentie eyscht, ende oock selffs wel 
can begrypen wy geen assistentie connen doen, noch aldaer geen oorloge connen voeren, soolang hy d’Engelsen 
de negotie ende selve ons niet alleen verleent. Derhalven begeert sijn Majesteyt de vrientschap te continueren, 
begeert hy aldaar assystentie ende schepen, dat hem gelieve alsnu syne goede affectie te betoonen, ende sulcke 
ordre te geven, dat dit schip (mits betalende) met peper geladen worden, opdat zyne Majesteyts gunst by 
d’E.Heer Generael werde bespeurt. Belangende d’Engelsen, dat syne Majesteyt genouch sullen beloven, maer hy 
van hun niet te verwachten heeft, want noyt gehoort is, dat tegen onsen gemeenen vyant in dese quartieren iet 
notabels, ja, in  ‘tminste niet hebben gedaen, te meer wesende haer coninck met Spaenjen in vrede.’ 
 
26 A History of South-East Asia, 321. 
 
27 On Dutch-English rivalry in the East Indies the gadfly theory (proposed by J. S.Furnivall Netherlands India: a 
study of Plural Economy, 1939 , p. 26-27 and also suggested by B.H.M. Vlekke, Nusantara, 1945,  p. 111)  is 
about the English pursuing the Dutch wherever they go in the Indies. This is however contested by Hall, p. 309-
10) who mentions earlier voyages of the English to Ternate by Sir Francis Drake in 1580.     
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was not completely true. Even if they did not make it their objective to dislodge the 
Portuguese from Malacca, Thomas Best fought and damaged a Portuguese carrack close to 
India in 1612 and he handed over to Iskandar Muda a captured Malaccan vessel. Lancaster 
attacked Portuguese vessels in the Straits of Malacca in 1603  in cooperation with Dutch 
admiral Spilbergen. Keeling intercepted three Portuguese ships destined for the Manilla and 
Goa fleets in 1615 and lifted their cargoes. These actions inflicted serious damage on 
Portuguese shipping.   
 
 
 
 
2. 3. 4    Cornelis Comans appointed special ambassador to the Sultan of Aceh (1616-
1619) 
Utterly challenged by Iskandar Muda’s disregard for the company, Coen vowed to break with 
the trend ‘to meekly follow the Muslim princes who treat us as if we are their slaves, but they 
don’t understand that they need us as badly as we need them. God willing this situation shall 
change and we shall soon be in the position to determine the rules.’28  
The Dutch historian  M. A. P. Meilink Roelofsz asserts that Coen had been called ‘the most 
ideal servant’ of the VOC, and that he did not favour the use of force at all in 1614. After he 
became director-general of the company’s business, he adopted his masters’ standpoint in its 
entirety and implemented their policy in the future with the utmost consistency.29 There is 
however proof that the Gentlemen XVII also adopted several of Coen’s ideas.  
 
From the very start of their relations, Dutch military assistance for Aceh was closely linked to 
trade contracts and privileges. Now Coen made the profits from the pepper trade a conditio 
sine qua non to send a fleet in the Straits to battle the Portuguese.  
By following Cornelis Comans on his three missions to Aceh, we obtain an intimate picture of 
the deliberations and negotiations between the envoy-merchant and the sultan, for the trade 
monopoly on the west coast. Coen intentionally appointed Cornelis Comans as governor-
general Reael’s special ambassador to Iskandar Muda to give the mission more dignity and 
                                                 
 
28 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. II, 48.  
 
29 Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630,  208.  
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respectability. It was an important diplomatic move. His instruction of 10 October 1616 for 
Comans is the same as the instruction of 4 June 1616 for the crew and merchants of the 
Enckhuysen. Added is a protocol of ceremonial aspects, to give Coman’s visit that extra 
weight.30  Much thought was given to an impeccable conduct, for Coen had set his sights on 
far more ambitious goals than maintaining the profit margins of the company. His ‘discourse’ 
shows an absolute commitment to obtain the monopoly of the  pepper trade on Sumatra’s west 
coast, by ousting the English from there and to frustrate Portuguese efforts to trade in the area.  
Comans was appointed the commander of the entire fleet which cruised in the area to monitor 
the movements of the Portuguese. He would proceed with the Neptunus and the Valck to 
Aceh. The flag would fly from the tallest mast of the principal ship in which he as the 
commander sailed. He would present Iskandar Muda spices from the Moluccan islands and a 
piece of red cloth with a value which would not exceed 400 real.  This limit was set in case 
Iskandar Muda would refuse to license them.     
In the Adat Aceh we find an enumeration of the gifts foreigners were obliged to 
present the Sultan;  European and Christian ships calling at the port of Aceh were 
obliged to present the Sultan with a roll of textile and a barrel of gunpowder. The 
shahbandar would offer them meat, oil and rice if they took up their abode in their 
factories (“djikalau ia duduk di gedung”).’31 
 
It is obvious that Coen tried to counter Iskandar Muda’s imputations by creating answers. 
When he would lash out that no Dutch ships came to Aceh with merchandise (the embargo 
between 1612 to 1614), the answer was that the advance of the English in the Moluccan 
islands was the very reason for this; their former friends were causing the company greater 
worries than the Iberians. The merchants’ flight from Aceh was blamed on their bad 
inclinations and drinking habits. If  Iskandar Muda insisted on having a merchant stationed in 
Aceh, the answer was that the request would be conveyed to the governor-general with whom 
all decisions rested.  
Coen’s fervent plea for the trade on the west coast may sound melodramatic, but he had a 
valid cause especially in view of the military assistance Iskandar Muda expected from the 
company which had to be paid for.  
 
                                                 
30 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. II, 156-160.   
 
31 Adat Atjèh, 116-117. 
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How ironical was the arrival in Aceh of governor-general Reynst’s special ambassador;   
Iskandar Muda was ill and could not receive him.32 Yet, in spite of this unforeseen turn of 
event, Comans was received by the court officials with due respect.  He departed with two 
letters for the governor-general, one from the sultan and one from the laxamana, in which 
they both brought up the furtive departure of  the merchants in 1615 without the obligatory 
royal permission. It is a testimony of Iskandar Muda’s vexation that foreigners defied his 
rules. Royal regulations and etiquette carried important judicial weight. The fact however, that 
the merchants were able to depart without his cap  may show a gap in Aceh’s security web.  
Coman’s mission was not completely unaccomplished. When Iskandar Muda was informed of 
the ambassador’s arrival, he immediately ordered the English to vacate the Dutch houses they 
had occupied. It demonstrates  that he was eager to have Dutch merchants back in Aceh. In 
his letter to the governor-general, he declared that he would like to continue the friendship by 
‘offering his country for trade.’     
On his return to Bantam, Comans called at the port of Tiku, but he could not buy pepper 
without producing the royal cap. It confirmed his anxiety that Iskandar Muda had total control 
over the trade of the west coast. The king of Tiku33 however  assured him that when he was 
licensed he could count on an annual supply of 2000 bahar. The news already spread in the 
ports that the Dutch would be licensed after the contract with the English expired.  
Coen was cautiously optimistic that the delay was caused by the current contract of the 
English, which would shortly expire. The Neptunus destroyed a Portuguese galleon and hopes 
revived that Iskandar Muda would honour this proof of  being brothers in-arms. 
 
 
 
 
2. 3. 5     The promise of a contract  
Comans once again travelled to Aceh with the Arendt in June 1617 to push for a contract, 
carrying letters for the king and the laxamana in which they were promised ‘sonderlijcke  
vriendschap’  (exceptional friendship) and assistance in return for a two year’s contract which 
                                                 
  
23 William Nichols too mentions his long indisposition. In: Letters Received, vol.VI, 73.  
   
33 The VOC sources speak of both the king of Tiku and the governor of Tiku. It is instructive to know that the 
dependencies or t’aklukan were usually represented by an Acehnese panglima, acting as Iskandar Muda’s 
representative or governor.    
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would gave the Dutch exclusive rights for the trade in Tiku and Priaman .34 The laxamana 
presided over the court in the custom house (alfandique), where all the disputes among 
traders, locals and foreign, were heard.35   
Comans was under great pressure to draw a contract. A testimony of the new course followed 
by Coen is his bold instruction that in case the ‘Atchynder’ deceived him, he was to seize all 
Muslim ships and lift their cargoes of pepper. This should take immediate effect if Iskandar 
Muda delayed a decision.36  For shipments which fell under free trade he would pay the 
market price. It was a disguised declaration of war. An explicit declaration of war was the 
assistance for the king of Tiku, to help him oust the Acehnese from his territory.37 We may 
infer that the king of Tiku was a different person than the governor of Tiku who was Iskandar 
Muda’s representative. This means that the King of Tiku was still a man of authority even 
after Tiku was incorporated by Aceh in the sixteenth century.  Comans was ordered to trade 
on the west coast with or without Iskandar Muda’s permit. The consequence of such 
fissiparous actions, which was war with Aceh, seemed not to concern Coen any longer. His 
bold proposal to assist the king of Tiku against the ‘Atchynder’ in exchange for trade 
monopolies, shows that he wanted to obtain the trade of the west coast at any cost.       
 
Iskandar Muda made it clear to Comans that he could not refuse the English to trade on the 
west coast because they had given him 2000 tael. He stirred the competition between the 
rivalling Europeans who paid him extra money, artillery and precious gifts to win his favour 
and gloried over their rivalry. He understood that the basis for sound war finance was a 
prosperous economy; Aceh’s wars with the Portuguese and the successive expeditions to the 
Malay ports, devoured huge amounts of money even if he himself - according to De Beaulieu 
-  did not pay for the maintenance of his fleets which was left to the important orangkaya. The 
discussion of the war expeditions and war finance is in Part Three.    
Even if the VOC was short of money, Comans was authorized to spend 16.000 real on 
procuring pepper, which again shows the importance Coen attached to becoming the sole 
trader. A defiant Iskandar Muda accused Comans of trying to wrest a contract from him, and 
                                                 
 
34 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. II, 260 ‘Translaet van een missieve aan de Coninck van Atchijn’  
    ibid., 261 ‘Translaet van een missieve aan de Orangkaya Laxemana’. 
 
35 Augustin de Beaulieu quoted by Anthony Reid, Witnesses to Sumatra, 68. 
 
36 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. II, 262-63 : Instruction of 3 August 1617.  
      
37 ibid.,vol. II,  263.  
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warned him that he considered to extend the licence of the English, reiterating that they had 
given him 2000 tael. He also said that his orangkaya advised him against licensing foreigners 
on the west coast and to give his subjects in the ports the chance to earn a living from the 
trade. 38  It is evident that the Acehnese orangkaya advised against licensing foreigners in the 
ports on the west coast, because they profited from the incomes if the trade was drawn to the 
port of Aceh. They were responsible for the maintenance of the war ships.  
From the very start of the Aceh-European trade interactions, the orangkaya showed their 
discontent when the Europeans were given favourable conditions and contracts.  
After six weeks of uncertainty Comans was invited to a public audience in the palace, also 
present was the English commissioner. To his surprise the sultan announced that he decided to 
grant the Dutch a license to trade in the port of Tiku for a period of two years. He declared 
that he would take his share first, for he had already sent 6000 tael to Tiku. Comans asked 
him for a written promise, but he responded ‘don’t  reject my words, say to your general to 
immediately send two ships and I shall fill them with pepper. Half of my money is spent, if 
the other half was not invested, I would have licensed you immediately’.39 
The promise of a license did little to raise Comans’s spirit who left Aceh again without one 
peppercorn.  
It is very clear that Iskandar Muda wanted to continue the relations with the Dutch, having 
ordered the English to vacate their houses. He seemed eager to have Dutch merchants 
stationed in his city. But his unpredictability was a serious obstacle for the merchants to 
follow his whims and to follow their own devices; apparently Comans did not resort to apply 
the recommended sanctions. When he returned in Bantam without a license, Coen’s patience 
which had stretched to its limits, burst. He was ready to break Iskandar Muda’s grip over the 
west coast by helping the local chiefs to oust him from their territory.40 
On 14 February 1618 an indefatigable Comans went for a third time to Aceh with the Valck.  
Finally on 29 January 1619 he informed  Coen that he was licensed and that the English were 
ordered to leave Tiku. The year spent in Aceh was not completely unproductive, for it 
transpires from the records that several Dutch vessels procured pepper in the port of Aceh. 
There were however pitfalls on the road to buy pepper in the west coast ports. Comans was 
required to buy Iskandar Muda’s oddments of pepper before the license to procure 1000 
                                                 
 
38 ibid., vol. VII ( 2) , 396-400 : Letter of 28 January 1619.  
 
39 ibid., vol. I, 329. 
 
40 ibid., vol. II, 262-65 : Instruction of 3 August 1617.  
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bahar in Tiku was issued and grumblingly paid 8.000 real for the stuff. Two of Iskandar 
Muda’s junks had arrived in the ports loaded with textiles worth 6000 real raided by his 
armada in Kedah in 1619. The local merchants were forced to  accept these in return for their 
pepper. The ports were now saturated with textiles, making it impossible for Comans to barter 
his textiles for pepper and he was duly forced to pay in cash. On top of this the panglima (the 
governor) was ordered to reimburse him in textiles for the remaining 30 bahar of  pepper 
Iskandar Muda still owed him.  
 
 
 
 
2. 3. 6    Threats against the Dutch  
The mood in the ports was grim, the locals in Tiku were incensed by what they perceived as 
the arrogance of the Europeans and their cunning ways of obtaining pepper on their own 
terms. I mentioned earlier that the English resident merchant Nichols believed that the 
obstructions came from the king himself. This is apparent, for he sent his officers with his 
oddments to the ports to buy the available pepper.41  
A group of some 200 people threatened to make an assault on the lodge of the Dutch. The 
exact reason for this is not mentioned. It was only through some friendly Acehnese who came 
to the help of the Dutch merchants, that the situation calmed down. The problems were latent, 
and the hostilities erupted because the Dutch were reluctant to pay the duties of 20 real per 
bahar which exceeded the pepper price of 17-19 real a bahar. To these was added a tax on 
the price of all goods which were locally traded. This was 7 real for both import and export 
against 20 real per bahar, while the authorities demanded for every 100 bahar exported 50 
real for the panglima,  25 real for orangkaya Surij Raija and 10 real each for the clerks.  
In the port of Priaman a similar situation existed; the Acehnese authorities there could not be 
moved to lower the dues. Comans was exhausted from the prolonged dealings and called their 
demands excessive. Sensing his disgruntlement, Raja Lila, a local chief of the port of Priaman 
secretively approached him with his request for assistance to remove the Acehnese from his 
country, in exchange for the pepper trade. The raja had fled from Aceh because Iskandar 
Muda laid his eyes on his wife and demanded her as his concubine. He was a hunted man, 
                                                 
 
41 Letters Received, vol. IV, 165  John Millward in Tiku to general Keeling in Bantam of 10 September 1616  
mentions that the king’s officer  ‘Addick Raia’ buys all the pepper.  
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relentlessly pursued by the Acehnese. Suspicious of the locals who had proved unreliable and 
conniving, Comans was apprehensive to accept his proposal.  
The Dutch suffered constant abuses in Tiku. In one horrendous instance several locals who 
were taking their side were kicked to death by angry mobs of discontented people who feared 
that they would lose their livelihood to the privileged European traders. Merchant De Rassiere 
who was on his way to Aceh via Tiku accompanied by Acehnese ambassadors returning from 
a visit to the Pangoran of Bantam, was murdered in 1618 by local Achenese. Coen 
immediately demanded justice from Iskandar Muda. In the end the call for justice was 
honoured. Two innocent slaves were accused of the murder and condemned to death. The 
Dutch merchants intervened on their behalf and in the end  they were released.42      
One of the local traders,  Raja Muda, dodged Iskandar Muda’s decree and sold Comans a 
catty of camphor in exchange for certain goods he wanted from Jacatra. He owned large 
stores of pepper and promised Comans to sell these to him, but unconvinced as Comans was 
of his honesty, he instructed the resident merchant Casembroot in Aceh, to inform Iskandar 
Muda of Raja Muda’s evasion of his decree. Casembroot refrained from doing this. 
      
The rivalry between the English and the Dutch arrived at a serious level with clashes between 
them in Bantam and the Moluccan islands. Iskandar Muda ordered the English to leave the 
west coast when he licensed the Dutch, but they surreptitiously returned through the backdoor 
by means of gifts. They presented Iskandar Muda an exceptional piece of artillery from their 
ship the Dragon. In several Sumatran ports, including the ports of Aceh, Tiku and Priaman 
they purchased 7000 sacks of pepper. Despite having obtained a contract to trade on the west 
coast, the Dutch felt threatened by the presence of the English, who were able to prolong their 
trade in Tiku for another two months.43 The Dutch were convinced that the English were 
planning the establishment of a rendez-vous on the west coast, and intent to drive them away 
from there. They seized the Dragon while three other ships surrendered to them, and 
confiscated their cargoes of pepper and artillery. To understand their action against the 
English, it is important to know that since 1615 the Gentlemen XVII proclaimed the statute 
known as the ‘Principael Hoofdpoinct van onsen Handel’ (‘Core Principle of our Trade’). Its 
essence was the enforcement of Dutch monopoly by using force and weapons ‘if gentle 
warnings did not help to drive out the Chinese, Javanese, Indians and Malays and in particular 
                                                 
42 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 551-552. 
 
43 Some EIC sources speak of a prolongation of one year. 
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the English and French from the Moluccan islands, Banda and all other places where the VOC 
established factories or obtained contracts.’ It became the cornerstone of the company’s trade 
and an important pillar of its geo-political strategy. 44     
Mindful of the fact that their action against the English in the waters of Tiku was an offence 
of Aceh’s territorial integrity, Coen instructed Casembroot to apologize to the king by 
declaring that they defended the honour of their prince, ‘your Majesty’s friend’ against the 
arrogance and deception of the English.45 It was a calculated way of saying that there existed 
a special bond between the Dutch and Aceh. The unfortunate Casembroot needed to 
straighten out various difficulties to obtain the king’s trust. The following one concerned the 
furtive departure in 1615 of the merchants. He conveyed Coen’s apology to the king, saying 
that these merchants were renegades who had neglected the company’s business and were 
more interested in the ‘pot of Arac’. Was this merely a false accusation, a desperate effort to 
obtain a favourable position in the trade?  Given the fact that the merchant’s unauthorized 
departure was brought up again, demonstrates that Iskandar Muda did not take lightly that the 
local rules were evaded. Obviously the king had to be pacified.  
The anxiety of the Dutch was unprecedented, they were anxious that Iskandar Muda would 
retaliate their arbitrary action against the English in Tiku. Merchant Van der Meer reported on 
27 November 1619 that he wanted to sail to Aceh to load sulphur and pepper, but the crew 
refused to go there, fearing that the king would capture and ultimately murder them.46 It was 
another nadir in their relations with Aceh. Coen was utterly worried that if no ships were 
going to Aceh the company would suffer a backlog of at least one year and that the Danes 
who were newcomers in the area’s trade, would step in, taking advantage of the rift between 
the company and the king.  
The scramble for pepper which was led by the sultan, clearly possessed the characteristics of a 
theatre drama in which every party felt victimized by the others. Iskandar Muda would not 
forego his position as the principal trader; he did not give away his prerogative to be the first 
purchaser and subsequent supplier of the valuable spice.         
                                                 
 
44 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. IV : Resolution of the Gentlemen XVII, 332.   
 
45 Coen’s Bescheiden , vol. II, 627:  
‘‘Soo den coninck van Atchijn sich belcht dat sijn reede niet verschoont en hebben, excuseert de sake met aller 
beleeftheyt, ende vriendelijcke bede dat het ten besten gelieve te verstaen, alsoo wy nootelijcken gedrongen sijn 
geworden d’eere van onsen prince, syne Magisteyts vriendt, tegens d’insolente presumtie ende hovaerdye van 
d’Engelsen te mainteneren…’  
 
46 ibid., vol. VII, (pt. 1),  479. 
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2. 3. 7    A Dutch charm offensive 
The dire situation in Tiku required that the company radically changed its attitude for the sake 
of a profitable trade. Coen now instructed Comans and Casembroot to do everything to win 
the hearts of the officials and the men in the street and buy their favour by dispensing tokens 
of gratitude and friendship to purchase pepper against more favourable prices than the 
English.47 His anxiety to deal a blow to the trade efforts of the English did not stop. He sent 
the  Zeewolff  to Aceh with 24.000 real to buy all the pepper available before the English 
claimed it. In line with the company’s policy to frustrate the English and French efforts on the 
west coast and drive them from there, the merchants were instructed to bid at a higher price. 
In spite of their efforts to pacify the locals, these locals still obstructed the trade and their 
hostilities did not subside. The Acehnese regent of Tiku refused Comans permission to build a 
house there and out of sheer necessity he stayed in the house of the English merchants. The 
price for a bahar of pepper soared from 12 to 20 real and Iskandar Muda threatened to 
remove them from the west coast if they refused to pay the dues. Coen was distressed and 
wound up that his merchants were constantly mistreated and humiliated and almost 
sovereignly vowed to bring an end to it.   
 
  
 
 
2. 3. 8    Comans’ plan to seize the trade of the west coast  
‘ This year I spotted two comets in these quarters. Only the Almighty knows what it means.’ 
(Cornelis Comans, 1619)  
 
Comans’ knowledge of the area, of local politics and people, made him some kind of a 
regional expert. He was warned that within two to four months Iskandar Muda would claim 
all the available pepper on the west coast. Encouraged by Raja Lila’s appeal to assist him in 
ousting the Acehnese from Priaman in return for trade, he developed a plan of action to this 
                                                 
 
47  ibid., vol. II, 397.  
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objective. Raja Lila and Raja Setia Pahlawan boasted that they could bring around four to five 
thousand men, but Comans thought that even a quarter of the number would suffice to carry 
out the plan. The two rajas proposed to send their representatives to Jacatra where the 
company had moved its main office, to present their plan and explain its execution .  
The plan was to incorporate Tiku and Priaman and construct a fort on the west coast to 
monitor the movements of the Acehnese. This required a force of four to six hundred men to 
make a land expedition and 4 to 5 ships, ‘some large Javanese prahu and some smaller yachts 
to cruise close to the coast’. Comans calculated that an annual supply of 3 to 4 à 5000 bahar 
of pepper would be adequate to compensate for the high expenses of maintaining the fleet and 
emphasised that the added attraction in having a stronghold there was the real prospect of an 
annual supply of gold from Kota Tenga and the Gunung Bukit mountain, transported from 
there by Javanese, Gujeratis and Kelings.48    
Quite significant is the information that Iskandar Muda decreed that the people of Priaman 
plant banana trees to make sure his elephants would not starve when they arrived there. This 
royal decree brought great agitation among the people of  Priaman for they expected that 
something terrible would happen. It is apparent that Iskandar Muda knew of the conspiracy 
against him, for he immediately ordered the construction of a fort in Tiku to defend the place 
against external aggression. Against such a naval force, Aceh’s elephants alone could not 
successfully protect the beleaguered port.        
Although Iskandar Muda knew of the complot against his authority, he did not declare war on 
the Dutch, but he took preventative measures to deter all foreigners from the west coast and 
                                                 
 
48 ibid., vol. VII (pt.) 1, 396-400 :  Letter  of  28 January 1619  
‘Soo den Ed. Hr. genl. geraden vindt, alhier sal binnen 2,3 a 4 maenden veel peper naer Atchijn gevoert werden, 
soo van den coninck als andre, die gevoechel. souden cunnen waernemen ende voor onse schade aenslaen. Mijns 
oordeels, onder correctie souden dese plaetsen Tiku ende Priaman wel te incorporeeren sijn, soo men maer een 
tocht met 4 a 600 man te land mach doen ende om omsicht te maecken 4 a 5 schepen ende om ‘tselve te houden 
ende continueeren, soude men een fordt moeten maecken bestant tegen den Atchynder, ongetwijffelt souden 
toeval van die van ‘tlandt krijgen, principael van de Priamanders ende van Orangkaja Maharadja Lilla, die mij 
sulcx is aenpresenteerende ende quanttiteyt volck op syn handt heeft ende bestant om haer met sijn volck alleen 
te dwingen. Off men nu ‘tyser smeden sal, derwijle ’t heet is, ofte dat men haer onredelycheijt ende 
ongerechticheyt sullen verdragen ende toestaen, sullen U.E. ordre daervan verwachten. Soo hierin iets gedaen 
soude werden, soude noodich sijn eenighe groote Javaense prauwen om tot roijtuych te gebruijcken ende lichte 
schepen ende chaloupen om dicht aen wal te mogen setten. D’oncosten souden vooreerst groot loopen, 
daertegen soude men jaerlijcx, als de cust vrij haden , twelck genoch met een a 2 schaloupen gedaen can 
werden, van dese plaetsen trecken 3,4 a 5000 bhaer peper, die al met Guseratsche cleeden ende goede avance 
gehandelt souden werden, mitsgaders valt hier jaerlicx, soo in Cotatenga als andre plaetsen, goede pertije 
goudt, dat door de javanen van den Gounong Boukit, Guseratten ende Clingen vervoert wert, soodat, als den 
handel in treijn was, mijns oordeels rijckel. betaelen souden d óncosten, die men doen souden. 
D’onredelijckheijt van de Atchynders ende haer tollen sijn te groot ende onlijdelijcken, hierop sullen U.E. ordre 
verwachten.  
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increased his threats of the local populations who breached his decrees. There is no evidence 
however  that Comans’ plan was indeed implemented.  
A vengeful Comans developed a second plan to undermine Iskandar Muda, whose armada 
was on a war expedition to Kedah in 1619. The war expeditions are discussed  in Part Three.   
He proposed that ‘if the king is victorious in Kedah and decides to proceed to Malacca, we 
will combine our forces and invade the city together. After a successful invasion of  Malacca, 
we shall overpower the Acehnese armada and even if this is not a ‘holy’ act, the tyrannical 
and hostile attitude of the ‘Atchynder’ towards our country and our prince justifies this. It 
would mean a double success. Our friendship and alliance with the king of Johor may turn his 
wrath on us.’49  His remark that Dutch friendship with the king of Johor could have negative 
results is quite significant and shows another source of friction between them.   
Of relevance for the historical accuracy is Coman’s information that two Gujerati ships had 
arrived in the port of Aceh, for it indicates that Iskandar Muda’s ban on Gujerati shipping was 
no longer effective. More importantly, merchant Van der Broecke in Surat mentions in his 
letter of 10 May 1621  that the ‘prince’s ship’ had arrived from Aceh, bringing with it 300 
bales of pepper but little other commodities. According to W. Ph. Coolhaas it concerned the 
ship of prince Khurram, the later Moghul Emperor Shah Jehan.50 This is a first reference of 
Aceh-Moghul relations during the reign of the sultans of the seventeenth century. The same 
Van den Broecke mentions the arrival in Surat in the first half of 1628 of twelve elephants 
which the king of Aceh sent the Moghul king.51  
                                                 
 
49 idem.   
‘Soo den Coninck van Atchijn victorie in Queda becompt, daer syn vloot na doe is, souden wel cunnen gebeuren 
alsdan naer Malacca te trecken, want seer op deselve gestoort is, sulcx geschiedende, souden onder correctie 
twee vlieghen met eenen lap connen  geslaeghen werden, te weten onsen macht nevens de syne voegende (soo 
sulcx mocht geschieden) om voorsz. stadt te vermeesteren ende geincorporeert sijnde, ons alsdan Mrs. 
(‘masters’?) van de stadt ende syn vloot te maken, en is wel niet Godlyck, evenwel sijn cleynachtinge van onse 
prince ende natie als sijn tyranique ende leugenachtige handelinge, gelyck aen ons bethoont heeft, is sulcx wel 
meriterende, oock moeten ons voorsekert houden, soo verstaet, d’onse eenige alliantie met die van Jhoor syn 
hebbende, syn affectie te minder, syn wraeckgiericht te meerder t’onswaerts wesen sal….’  
 
50 ibid., vol.VII, (pt. 2), 697.    
 
51 ibid., 1302. 
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2. 3. 9    Bad performance of the Dutch merchants in Aceh 
It is quite surprising that Coen dismissed Comans, the governor-general’s special envoy to 
Aceh,  from the company’s service. The reason was that Comans refused to pay the price of 
24 to 25 real for a bahar of pepper which was demanded in Tiku, insisting on 20 to maximum 
22 real. Coen was enraged by this perceived blunder which was why the Zeewolff left Tiku 
with the slightest amount of pepper.  He considered this a serious neglect of the business since 
the company experienced an absolute low point on the west coast and the running contract 
was for only two years. Comans in his turn blamed the Achenese for making a fraudulent 
contract, but Coen alleged that this was due to his own obstinate behaviour.52 The controversy 
was fundamentally a clash of principles between the envoy-merchant, who time and again 
dealt with an unreliable king, deceiving officials and traders, and the VOC’s business director, 
(in 1619 appointed governor-general), whose main aim at that time was to thwart the English 
from the trade of the west coast and to that extent started a charm offensive to win the hearts 
of the people in Tiku. It is however true that Comans’ obstinacy  put the company at a very 
disadvantageous position, because the contract was for two years and the shortage of vessels 
delayed the purchase of pepper in time. Coen explicitly instructed both Comans and 
Casembroot to buy all pepper available at whatever price before the English could lay their 
hands on it. Merchant Casembroot did not follow the instruction to sell the expensive cargo of 
cloves on board the Vlissingen in Tiku to utilize the money to buy all the available pepper; 
instead part of the cargo went to the Coromandel coast.53 
 
If dealing with the local authorities and traders was a  frustrating and time-consuming affair, 
communications between the officials in Bantam and the merchants in the field did not 
deserve a beauty award. The merchants in Aceh complained about the failure to provide them 
with necessary cash, textiles and goods. Because of the embargo on Aceh from 1612 to 1614 
Willemssen did not have the opportunity to barter fresh merchandise for Gujerati textiles to 
                                                 
 
52  ibid., vol. I, 471. 
 
53 ibid., vol. II, 627. This transpires from Coen’s letter to Nicolaes Casembroot of  23 December 1619.  
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put to use in Ambon and the Moluccan islands.54  In 1615 Van Berchem asked for generous 
supplies of merchandise to ‘saturate’ the ports in the area and frustrate Portuguese trade 
efforts. The Portuguese were indeed barred from several ports, because of the promise the 
Dutch merchants made the local merchants in these ports to bring them a variety of goods. 
When the merchandise failed to arrive the locals ridiculed them.55  I should say here that 
Coen was well aware of the importance of textiles necessary to trade in the ports of 
Sumatra.56 Shortly after he was appointed director-general in Bantam in 1614, he took action
and sent Hans de Haze with De Rooden Leeuw met Pylen with plenty merchandise to Aceh.  
De Haze eventually closed the factory in 1616 because Iskandar Muda showed his displeas
with Dutch behaviour and was not at all interested in the renewed efforts to tra
s 
ure 
de.  
                                                
Confusion and collisions between the officials in Bantam and the merchants was detrimental 
to the business, different responsibilities and aspirations caused frictions. While Coen 
oversaw the business in its entirety and recognized relevant trajectories, the merchants were 
focussed on one division and entrusted with the modus operandi of the pepper purchase and 
of other commodities. Eventually their director’s single mindedness to obtain the monopoly 
over the pepper trade at any cost, perturbed the merchants who needed to adapt to the 
changing and sometimes unfathomable moods and strategies of their director. Coen did not 
hesitate to resort to questionable methods if this was for the sake of the company. He 
instructed Comans to accuse Hans De Haze of furtively taking the merchants with him, 
reassuring Iskandar Muda that the governor-general would be informed of this shameless 
action and would deal accordingly with De Haze.          
A fragment of an anonymous internal VOC letter, supposedly written by Coen is published by 
the English, which describes the poor performance of the merchants in Aceh.57   
 ‘Aceh is a place which cleaveth to the trade of the coast of Coromandell and more other 
western places, where there is sometimes great vent of cloth and other merchandises, and in 
between there is much goods to be had and other things needful for the aforesaid coasts.  
 
 
54  ibid., vol. I, 57.  
 
55  ibid., vol. I, 59. 
 
56 ibid., I, 485.  
 
57 Letters Received, vol. I, 77  (‘A fragment of a paper, translated from Dutch, anonymous and imperfect’ ) It is 
not established how this letter came into the possession of the English. Both companies had offices in Bantam 
and during the brief period of the Anglo-Dutch alliance from 1619 until about 1623, cooperation, but probably 
also intelligence was practiced between them.    
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They give good advance for there is brimstone, pepper, Bournesh camphor, pewter from 
Perak, gold for the coast of Coromandell and other wares all which, as I have afore said may 
be had for Gouseratish cloth with very good advance, and  the best advance is yet to be had in 
the cloth there. 
This factory of Atchin if it had been used and ruled as it should have been, it would have been 
one of the principallest factories in India for the Company, but there hath always been no 
regard taken of it and besides that it hath always been furnished with debauched persons 
which study more in the Arrack pot than to the company’s good service, and so that factory 
will come to nought before any diligent and experienced person be sent, which will seek the 
Company’s profit and not his own and which may be suffered to have a little in the going and 
coming ships. And also that it may be overseen by greater men of charge, and that it be so 
used that Factory may have his yearly cargoson belonging thereto of Cloths, otherwise all will 
come to nothing.’  
 
                                                
 
 
2. 3. 10    Conclusion   
The pepper trade was frenetically pursued by all parties. Pepper was in high demand in 
Europe. It became the most important source of income and an extraordinary stimulant for 
Aceh’s economic development.  
Policy-making power begins with the acquiring of revenue and Iskandar Muda understood 
that by centralizing the trade to the port of Aceh, he secured a steady income from revenues. 
He insisted on having European traders stationed in his port to boost his prestige and the 
trade. The Acehnese officials and orangkaya profited enormously from the centralization of 
the trade. The Adat Aceh stipulates the emoluments for the harbour functionaries.   
The Dutch and the English, in order to maximise benefits out of their trading activities, 
entered into a deliberate policy of ‘friendship’ with the sultan. By giving in to his demands 
and by showering him with gifts and artillery, they established a standard. Despite the fact 
that they called him untrustworthy and tyrannical, loathing the way he drew the highest 
benefits, they held on to trading with him, contributing to his increased control of the ports.  
The reason the English remained in Aceh was that they found a good market for their textile 
trade from India, their iron and cotton wool.  
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The objectives of the Dutch to keep a good relationship with Aceh was dual: economic and 
strategic. Their wish to remain in Aceh was grosso modo the pepper monopoly, but friendship 
with the sultan was essentially based on geo-political ambitions: the removal of the 
Portuguese from Malacca and consequentially the take-over of Malacca. They expected that 
their strategic alignment with Aceh would secure them contracts and trade monopolies. A 
contract became a condition sine qua non for their military assistance.  
The Dutch were undisguisedly bent on expelling the English from Priaman and Tiku for 
which they were willing to forfeit their reservations and resentment against Iskandar Muda. 
The English realized that they were up against a staunch Dutch move to monopolize the 
pepper trade. Iskandar Muda triumphed over their competition by drawing valuable artillery 
and presents in return for a license or a contract.  
 
In conducting their relations with Iskandar Muda,  the chief consideration of the Dutch was 
the dispersion of the Portuguese from the Straits region. The strategic partnership was absent 
in Aceh-English relations. English ambitions were not geared to capturing Malacca from the 
Portuguese. To put it differently, the English were neither allies nor rivals in the battle for 
Malacca. Consequentially the relationship between them and the sultan was less charged.  
Iskandar Muda paid with his oddments of textiles or in cash for the pepper he drew from the 
west coast ports, which demonstrates that he did not completely disregard the interests of the 
merchants at the periphery of his realm. The Acehnese orangkaya supported his centralizing 
policy from which they gained incomes and benefits. 
The strategic deals between Cornelis Comans and the King of Tiku show that Tiku was never 
absolutely incorporated into the Acehnese realm.                                                                
 
 
                                                      
 
 
 
Ancient fort (date not established) Indrapatra circa 20 km outside Banda Aceh (photo: own 
collection)  
 
 
 
 
 
Outer wall of the fort (photo: own collection)  
  Part Two 
                                                          CHAPTER  IV 
 
 
 
AN  INEFFECTIVE ANGLO-DUTCH  ALLIANCE 
 
 
2. 4. 1    The Treaty of Defence     
As incident upon incident between the Dutch and the English followed, the English company 
requested the Lord Treasurer Salisbury to take this up with the States General of the United 
Republic. D.G. E. Hall mentions that in 1611 the English ambassador in The Hague suggested 
that pressure should be brought to bear upon both companies by their respective governments 
to negotiate an agreement for joint trade.1   
In 1615 Jan Pieterszoon Coen, at that time director-general of the VOC trade business in 
Bantam, appealed for a solution to the combustible situation, crying foul that the English were 
deceiving the Dutch and humiliating their country and their prince.2  
The call for a settlement of the ‘undeclared war’ between the United Republic and the 
Kingdom of England, led in the end to the establishment of an Anglo-Dutch alliance signed in 
London in 1619. As a result the ’Treaty of Defence for the East Indies’ came into effect on 21 
April 1620; it was a major step to overcome the latent problems and hostilities between the 
two companies and not in the least to mutually oppose the local ‘potentates’.  
The resolutions gave both companies the right to buy half of the pepper available. Of the 
spice trade of the Moluccas, Amboina and the Bandas islands, the English would have a third 
of the share. Both companies kept their own factories and forts.3   
It is not, perhaps, surprising, that Coen had his qualms regarding these resolutions. The 
English from the start of their presence in the archipelago, refused to fight the Portuguese 
from the Spice Islands 4 and now they would share in the trade the Dutch had wrested from 
Spain and Portugal. 5 The inference I make is that  the Defence Treaty overruled the 
                                                 
1 A history of Southeast Asia, 322.  
 
2 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 130 : Letter to the Gentlemen XVII dateT  22 October 1615.    
 
3 ibid., vol. IV, 46- 47 : ‘Resoluties van den Raad van Defensie 21 April 1620-20 Janari 1623’  
 
4 Foster asserts that the English did not want to interfere with Spanish and Portuguese settlements. 
England’s quest for the eastern trade, 127.  
 
 146
‘Principael Hoofdpoinct’ of 1615, to which I referred earlier; to thwart the English, French 
and other traders from the places where the Dutch established factories and built forts, which 
Coen advocated, was the raison d’etre of the VOC which clearly transpires from this statute. 
Despite his serious doubts considering the provisions of the Defence Treaty, Coen went to 
celebrate the new alliance on board one of the English ships at Bantam. He commented that 
the English were overwhelmed with joy with such an advantageous treaty and welcomed the 
Dutch aboard with salute gun shots.6  To oversee the cooperation, the Council of Defence was 
installed, consisting of four members drawn from each company, having at its disposal a 
defence fleet composed of ten ships from each side. One of the English members in the 
Council had been the director of the English factory in Aceh. The Council held the view that 
Bantam and Aceh were of major importance for the trade and for the procurement of pepper.   
Combined actions were undertaken to inform the local ports of their established bond. The 
English Bull and the Dutch Hert took off together to the west coast to meet the English fleet 
and announce the good tidings of their alignment. Coen clung to the hope that the establishing 
of an Anglo-Dutch Defence alliance would safeguard their mutual interest and that it would 
damage the interests of  their enemies.7   
Concerning their interests in the Straits region, the Council set out a strategy for the 
procurement of pepper, by refraining from bidding against each other and for sharing equally 
in the profits. Coen warned his merchants not to abuse the English by bidding against them 
and to avoid the chances of being manipulated by the local rulers who had gained from their 
competition.8  
It is not difficult to imagine that Iskandar Muda was unreservedly disgruntled with the new 
alliance of old foes and in no mood to give in to their demands. He set the price for pepper on 
the west coast at 43 real a bahar, which was much higher than the price he set for the Muslim 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 According to A. Reid ‘Coen was appalled  to learn that a treaty had been signed in Europe in July 1619 
whereby the English and Dutch were to cooperate in the East, sharing equally the burden of military actions with 
each taking half  the  available pepper and the English one-third of Malukan spices. Since Dutch forces in 
Indonesian waters were predominant and Coen was determined to use them to maximum advantage,  the treaty 
failed to halt Dutch-English conflicts.’ Southeast Asia in the age of commerce 1450-1680  (New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1993), vol. II , 274. 
 
6 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 545.  
 
7 ibid., vol. II, 682-683.   
 
8 idem. ‘Den prijs van den peper  sal U.E aldaer tegen d’Engelsen niet opjaghen, maer eendrachtelijck coopen 
tot alsulcken prijs als met den anderen goetvinden sult, de peper daerna egalijck deylende volgens accoort door 
de heeren Mayores met d’Engelse Compagnie gemaeckt, mits goed regard nemende, dat u d’Englsen niet 
abuyseren.’ 
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traders which moved between 25 and 30 real. The merchants categorically refused to pay 
more than 40 real for a bahar. He defiantly declared that he preferred to send his stock of 
1500 bahar to the Red Sea in stead of selling it to them against a lower the price. The existing 
deadlock was unprecedented and caused Iskandar Muda more worries than he had foreseen. 
He took drastic measures to secure his interests in the ports on the west coast, promulgating a 
decree which banned the locals from trading with the foreigners, threatening ‘to cut them up’ 
if they evaded this. He sent a small fleet of prahu to the ports to make certain that they did not 
sell their supplies on board the European vessels and reserved 1500 bahar of pepper from 
there for which he paid with his oddments of textiles, setting a time limit for the supply 
between three and four months.  
The European merchants were constantly obstructed. In Priaman the Dutch procured only 400 
bahar since they lacked textiles to barter for pepper and because the locals were afraid to 
trade because of Iskandar Muda’s threats.  
 
 
 
 
2. 4. 2   The king and the beggars   
‘Kamu mau berkelahi ke Tiku?’ Do you want to fight in Tiku?   
 
Since the murder in Tiku in 1618 of merchant Rassiere, the contacts between the Dutch 
merchants and the locals had reached their lowest point, but the merchants stoically held on to 
their business there.  
Whatever were  the misgivings, Casembroot requested to see the king to discuss an extension 
of the contract for trade in Tiku, but Iskandar Muda was ill. He was successful in his second 
attempt and together with the English representative he went to the palace.9 
Iskandar Muda was confrontational and uncompromising. He showed unrestrained anger 
when Casembroot requested an extension of the contract even though the current one was still 
effective for another couple of months. He raised his voice at the assembled European 
merchants and remarked in Malay ‘that their shame was not like that of the prophet Mozes’. 
Casembroot anxiously tried to calm him down, saying that he did not come by himself, but 
                                                 
 
9 They apparently went together to show Iskandar Muda that they were committed to support each other in their 
bid for fair prices and contracts.   
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that he acted on the orders of his superiors. Iskandar Muda then yelled that he was as much a 
king as the king of Holland and the king of England. ‘Did they think that he did not possess 
enough gold and silver and depended on them?’ ‘Did he and his people had no right to trade 
in their own country?’ He challenged them by saying ‘if you want war, I am ready; if you 
come with 70 ships, I will bring 600 and I will assemble all the people from Aceh and bring 
them to the west coast to fight.’10  It was an implicit declaration of war and the merchants 
understood that the threat to come with 600 ships was not merely bluff, Iskandar Muda 
possessed one of the largest naval forces of Asia.11   
 
Iskandar Muda ordered all the available pepper from the west coast to Aceh which he offered 
the merchants for the price of 43 real a bahar. They refused to pay the high price, offering 32 
real instead. He unequivocally responded ‘if you don’t want to pay for it, then don’t buy it’.  
He said that he was building a ship to transport 1500 bahar of pepper to the port of Mocha in 
the Red Sea. 
J. Coetelij, a Dutch fiscal official who was visiting Aceh,  paints his version of the charged 
atmosphere during the meeting. The king used offensive rhetoric saying to Casembroot ‘Are 
you not ashamed of yourselves to come and beg at my door once again? Beggars go to 
different houses because they are ashamed to knock on the same door time and again.’12 
                                                 
  
10 VOC: 1.04.02: 1072/ 52  a 53;  
Coen’s  Bescheiden, vol. VII (pt.1), 614-17:  
‘Op den 26 ditto ben ick near den Coninck gegaen en de Engelsche waeren mede binnen, hebbe ick den Coninck 
voorgehouden volgens Ed. ordre den handel van Ticco ende Priaman, vraechde mij, off daer noch Hollanders 
waeren, zeyde jae, onsen tijt was noch omtrent 4 maenden, heeft ditto Coninck geantwoort, waeromme wij den 
handel altijt daer versochten, te meer wij daer noch waeren en onsen tijt noch niet uijt en was, vraechde mij, off 
ick myn niet schaemde dat te vragen, anttwoorde dat ick d’ordre van myn meesters, die mij, sulcx schrijvende, 
belasten, aen syne Magt. aendienen moste, dat ickt niet en dede uyt mijn selve, d’Engelsen versochten die tijt 
mede den handel van Ticco, heeft den Coninck haer en mij al op een wijse geantwoort, vraechde ons, ofte wy 
meenden, dat hij gout en silver courang hadden, dat hij alle de proffijt van ons hadde ende oock, ofte wij 
meenden, dat hij ende syn natie oock niet en mosten handelen in Ticco, om daer mede proffijten te genieten, 
heeft tot diversche maelen geseght, malou kamou tida sabaggij moses benjage ketico, seyde oock, dat niet en 
vraechden naer den Coninck van Engelant ende Hollant, waren sy Coninck, hij was oock een Coninck, heeft ten 
laesten geseght kamou mou backelij ketico wecht?, comt seijde hij, daer, ick sal alle mijn volck uijt Atchijn naer 
Ticco brengen, dat niet een persoon hier blijven sall, hebt ghylieden 70 schepen, ick sal der 600 doen maecken, 
oock seyde, ick ben geen mensch, soo ick alleen tegen U lieden al tsamen en wil vechten, met sulcke ende 
dierglycke redenen heeft ons gemoet op tversoecken van den handel in Ticco. Ick meene, dat den Coninck aen 
niemant den handel in Ticco noch Priaman aen ons niet meer sal  
vergunnen, vermits al over langhe genoch gesien hebbe, dat alle de peper aldaer soeckt hier te brengen ende 
alsoo selffs wil ten dierste vercoopen…’   
 
11 Aceh’s naval capacity is discussed in Part Three.  
 
12 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. VII, (pt.1), 610-11;  VOC: 1.04.02: 1072/50 a 51.   
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Aware of the fact that the pangoran of Bantam had burnt his pepper vines and that the 
Europeans were now chiefly depending on him, he self-importantly told them that a catty of 
pepper was worth a catty of silver.  
Based on the different reports he received, governor-general Carpentier (1623-1627) wrote in 
colourful words to the Gentlemen XVII that the lunatic king called the Dutch and the English 
the beggars of Europe, who were condemned to eat the pepper out of his hand at his price. 
Carpentier could not disguise his dislike of the ‘Atchynder’ who he considered worse than the 
sultan of Bantam, because of his decrees, his control of the trade and his vigorous attempts to 
subdue all the pepper ports of Sumatra. ‘Vanity and arrogance have driven this man to such 
lengths that his fall is near.’13   
Both Casembroot and Coetelij mention that the king was willing to give the VOC a two 
months permit to trade in Tiku, on the condition that the company bought his stock of pepper 
of 1500 bahar for the price of 13 tael per bahar ant that they assist him with two ships for an 
attack on Malacca. This was most probably the stock of pepper which he boasted to send to 
the Red Sea port of Mocha.  
 
 
 
 
2. 4. 3   A botched strategy  
Iskandar Muda set the price for pepper in Aceh at 48 real per bahar. A resolution taken by the 
Defence Council stipulated that the merchants were not allowed to pay more than 40 real per 
bahar pepper. The factories would have to be closed if the king persisted in keeping the price 
at an unreasonable level and the merchants would then  depart from Aceh.14   
                                                                                                                                                        
‘ .. schaemt ghij U niet sulcx wederom aen mij te versoecken, een bedelaer en sal niet altijt aen een huijs comen 
bedelen, maer sal aen diversche huijsen om schaemtshalven sijn toevlucht nemen ende niet, gelijck ghij doet, 
altyt tot myn huijs compt bedelen..’  
 
13 ibid., vol. I, 595:  
‘De bedelaers van Europa, soo noempt hij ons ende d’Engelsen, noch uyt sijne handt de peper sullen moeten 
comen eten dnde tot sulcken prijs als sijn lunatique hooft sal gelieven te eyschen; hij darff oock wel seggen, 
alwaer’t dat voor een catty peper een catty silver betaelden, niet te veel soude wesen, gemerckt Bantam, soo hij 
meent, sijne peper verbrandt heeft ende nu geen ander als bij hem alleen te becomen is. Glorieusheyt ende 
hoogmoet hebben desen man soo verre gebrocht ende betovert, dat, soo ‘t gemeene spreeckwoort ons niet en 
bedrieght, sijnen val seer nabij moet wesen. ’    
Dien coninck soud gaerne alle den peperhandel van Sumatra in sijn handt alleene hebben, om de peper na sijn 
appetijt te venten. Een graet erger dan de pangoran van Bantam heeft hy het over lange gemaect. Den 
Atchijnder mach wat wupsteerten, stoffen en blasen, te sijnder tijt moet hyder almede aen’.  
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The Council proposed a flexible approach as a last resort to the deadlock, with  the fervent 
hope  that it would work,  instructing the merchants to convince Iskandar Muda that they were 
serious to remain trading in Aceh by offering him 40 real per bahar for a maximum of 200 
bahar, as a gesture to meet him halfway and insist on a lower price for the rest, until their 
available cash was spent. Then the time had come to close the door behind them and leave 
Aceh. It was a strategy for a permanent retreat from Aceh.  
The strategy did not work, Iskandar Muda refused to lower the price. He was sure that he 
would get rid of his stock of pepper. As I mentioned earlier the Moghul Prince Khurram who 
visited Aceh in 1621, left with a shipload of pepper.  
 
In the midst of the gridlock between Iskandar Muda and the Anglo-Dutch alliance, a French 
fleet under the command of Admiral Augustin de Beaulieu arrived in January 1621 with two 
ships Montmorency and the  Ermitage.15 It came at a most unsuitable time for the alliance 
which feared that the French would accept Iskandar Muda’s price for the pepper.  
De  Beaulieu was clearly a novice to the local customs although he had been in the 
archipelago in 1617. He was immediately put off guard when the king’s messenger came with 
the royal cap demanding that he gave him the emerald ring which he wore. He  answered the 
messenger that he would personally bring the ring to the king the following day,  but he was 
ordered to give it immediately. It is evident that Iskandar Muda became more demanding, 
showing ill-behaviour towards a foreign visitor.   
A very gifted narrator De Beaulieu tells us of his first encounters with the English and Dutch 
captains who gave him an elaborate rundown of the ‘indignities and extortions’ to which the 
king and the orangkaya daily subjected them an they told him that Iskandar Muda demanded 
54 real for a bahar while they had offered him 40 real.16 It is utterly clear that the captains 
saw in De Beaulieu an interloper who might profit from the gridlock which existed between 
them and the king. The presence of the new arrivee unnerved the alliance, its solid stance 
                                                                                                                                                        
14  ibid., vol. IV, 46-47:  ‘Resolutiën van den Raad van Defensie’ ( 21 April 1620 – 20 January 1623),  24 June 
1621.  
 
15 The French fleet came into problems when it sailed on the west coast of Sumatra and  suffered from a lack of 
water. Many crew sere sick. The Dutch came to their assistance and transported some of them to Aceh where 
they went to look for their admiral. Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I., 608: Letter to the Gentlemen XVII dated  8 
January 1621.   
 
16 Lombard,  Mémoires, 105-106 :   
‘La journee se passa en plusieurs discours entre les capitaines anglais, hollandaise et moi; ceux-ci me contant 
une infinite de griefs qu’ils dissent recevoir journellement de ce roi, qui ne leur veut vendre le poivre a moins de 
54 reales le bahar; ils en avaient offert jusques a 40 reales, ce qui est encore tres cher.’ 
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seemed no longer effective and the hope of getting the king on his knees by dropping  his 
price, vanished with a third party around.  
They resorted to mean practices to hinder the French. De Beaulieu learned from Portuguese 
captives of a plot by the northerners to poison him. He turned ill after spending an evening in 
the house of an Englishman named Robert, where he was lavished with food and drink and 
only afterwards  realized that his hosts themselves had abstained. He became extremely weak 
from nausea which continued for several days and only recovered from the food poisoning by 
curing himself with an antidote he called ‘coco de Maledives’.17 It is obvious that  the alliance 
did not take lightly the trade ambitions of the French.     
To obtain an intimate and overall picture of the situation and conditions in Aceh at that 
moment when the interests of all parties involved in the pepper trade collided, we should pay 
attention to De Beaulieu’s account of his negotiations and conversations with Iskandar Muda. 
His talks with the northern Europeans certainly prepared him for the things to come.  
He arrived in Aceh unprepared for a visit to the Court of the sultan. His company ineptly 
supplied him with some insignificant and cheap gifts for a king. Not wanting to offend him, 
De Beaulieu gracefully offered  him a full set of cavalry weaponry, richly engraved and 
decorated. Yet to all intents and purposes it was also a practical decision to avoid the scorn of 
the northerners who were eager to ridicule him. He was embarrassed that his company had 
failed to provide him with a letter of recommendation for the king and hurriedly wrote a letter 
in the name of the king of France, which he sealed with the French national coat of arms, 
addressing it : ‘A notre très cher frère, le Roi d’Aceh’, having it translated into Portuguese by 
an interpreter.18      
His  first public meeting with Iskandar Muda turned out to be a test of wills.  
The king wanted to know how much he offered for a bahar of pepper, but De Beaulieu was 
very hesitant to mention his price. The king insisted that he made this known. Through an 
interpreter De Beaulieu offered 32 real for a bahar. The dumbfounded interpreter did not dare 
to  mention the price he offered. The assembled orangkaya sat rigid and straight faced, 
whereupon the interpreter, now almost panicking, directed his attention to Aliq Raja, the 
shahbandar, to whom he whispered the price. The shahbandar too was uneasy and avoided  
to repeat what the interpreter mentioned. 
                                                 
17 ibid., 106-107. 
 
18 ibid., 109.  
Portuguese was  the language of communication  in the contacts between the Acehnese authorities and the 
Europeans.  Prince Maurice wrote his letter to Sultan  Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah  in Spanish. 
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The scene is illustrative of the existing tense mood in Aceh, showing the anguish felt by 
everybody in the audience hall. The king started to tremble from impatience and demanded to 
know what De Beaulieu offered. Utterly offended by this low price, he pledged that whoever 
offered him less than 64 real (which equals two catty) per bahar, was not welcome to trade in 
his country.19 He scorned the Dutch and the English for offering him only 1.5 catty for a 
bahar.  De Beaulieu stood firm, declaring that he had less money to spend than the Dutch and 
English. The king said that he did not go to less than 48 real a bahar and ended the meeting. 
This was the maximum price the alliance had in mind.20 The sources give different prices 
which  Iskandar Muda set for a bahar of pepper. Apparently the price for pepper from the 
west coast was lower than the price they had to pay in the port of Aceh. Even though Iskandar 
Muda eagerly tried to get rid of the pepper from the west coast, he dragged the negotiations 
with De Beaulieu, who requested a contract to purchase pepper in Tiku. Even when he 
showed interest to buy other goods, the orangkaya of the alfandique told him haughtily that 
they were not interested in reals. One wonders if they were following orders from the palace 
or whether they acted independently. The trade had come to a complete standstill. If nothing 
else, Iskandar Muda was eager for some company and confided in his French guest that he 
despised the Dutch and English because of the shameless way in which they pursued trade 
contracts and monopolies; they made war with the sultan of Bantam, which was the reason 
that the latter cut down his pepper vines. He confided that he set the price for them at 64 real 
a bahar but that he was not at all interested in selling them his pepper. 21 In his letter to the 
Gentlemen XVII governor-general De Carpentier also mentions the exorbitant  price of 64 
real a bahar.22  De Beaulieu went seven times to the palace and every visit to the king 
required fresh gifts. Just like the English and the Dutch he was appalled by Iskandar Muda ‘s 
greediness and  that of the harbour officials, whom he called insatiable thieves.  
During the six months that he remained in Aceh, De Beaulieu discovered that Iskandar Muda 
was keen to know more about France, its relations with England and whether the king of 
France possessed a large army and artillery. Iskandar Muda said to him that if he had not 
fallen sick he would have gone on an expedition to besiege Malacca. He cunningly informed 
of  De Beaulieu if he would have been willing to accompany him on the expedition, to which 
                                                 
 
19 ibid., 141. A catty is 32 real; One and a half catty is 48 real. 
 
20  ibid., 142-143. 
 
21 Lombard,  Mémoires, 113. 
 
22 Generale Missiven, vol. I., 106. 
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the latter responded that he would be honoured to assist him.23  Obviously Iskandar Muda 
wanted to find out if he had found a new ally against the Portuguese since he could not rely 
on the Dutch. 
De Beaulieu also mentions that Iskandar Muda seriously feared  a rebellion of the orangkaya. 
One day when he visited the palace, several female guards were tortured. For three hours he 
heard their screams of agony. They either died from the tortures, or were thrown in the river 
after their bodies were viciously mutilated.  
The king explained that they had refused to tell him what had caused the noise of the previous 
night which had wakened him from his sleep and  was convinced that they were concealing a 
plot against him. After his initial shock De Beaulieu faintly responded that a country indeed 
needed justice.  As if encouraged by his words,  Iskandar Muda said that if he did not punish 
the offences of his people, his life would be in jeopardy. He called the orangkaya cruel, 
stressing that their immoral behaviour provoked the wrath of God. He was God’s instrument, 
who needed to apply justice over them. They had no reason to complain about him because he 
protected them against neighbouring kings and against foreigners, allowing them to follow 
their religious inclinations and he gave them the occasion to enrich themselves and live 
comfortable lives with their families and slaves.24   
This is the first overt reference in a foreign source to the anguished relationship between 
Iskandar Muda and the orangkaya. De Beaulieu describes a scheme of guard of the palace in 
which the orangkaya had to take turns in shifts and were closely watched on by Iskandar 
Muda’s private body-guards. The Dutch and English do not speak of a troubled relationship 
between Iskandar Muda and the  orangkaya, at times referring to his punishments of those 
orangkaya who evaded his decrees. They mention on the other hand that he tended to listen to 
their advice. Iskandar Muda certainly relied on Sheikh Shamsu’d-din Pasai in matters 
concerning Aceh’s internal and external affairs.    
It is instructive to make a leap to France, De Beaulieu’s homeland to try to put the political 
system  in Aceh in perspective. The foreign merchants’ perceptions were fundamentally based 
on their backgrounds. When De Beaulieu set out for the East, the Thirty Years War had just 
started. Cardinal Richelieu’s ‘Le Raison d’ Etat’ through which the French monarch gained 
                                                 
 
23 Lombard,  Mémoires, 113-14. 
 
24 idem.   
 Iskandar Muda was convinced that his own mother was behind the plot because she favoured a prince of Johor  
to succeed him on the throne. That same evening the prince was killed at the orders of the king, together with a 
prince of Bintang and one of Pahang. They were captured princes who stayed in the palace. 
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absolute power over any contesting power of the various classes in society, guided  the 
country during the war. The system of government which Richelieu advocated was hierarchic 
and abrasive. The kings Luis XIII and Luis XIV were focussed on destroying the powers of 
their nobility and the traditional privileges of the provinces in order to establish a centralized 
monarchy. While Richelieu developed his philosophy for the state, Sheikh Shamsu’d-din 
Pasai advised Iskandar Muda and his grandfather Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah not only on 
religious, but also on social and political issues, which concerned the Acehnese realm, and on 
Aceh’s relations with the outside world. Religious advisors in both states were influential at 
the courts.  
The extended  negotiations for a license may suggest that Iskandar Muda was not at all 
anxious to sell his pepper to the ‘interloper’. When De Beaulieu was unsuccessful to obtain a 
license to trade in Tiku, he set sail for  Kedah a well known pepper supplier on the west coast 
of the Malay peninsula. His efforts to purchase pepper there were not very successful, because 
the Acehnese armada had invaded Kedah in 1619 and cut down all the pepper vines with the 
result that there was hardly any pepper available. He returned to Aceh to once again push for 
a license to buy pepper in Tiku which he finally obtained. It was valid for a very limited 
period of 21 days. He bought 400 bahar of pepper for the price of 25 real a bahar which is far 
less than the price asked in the port of Aceh. It demonstrates that the trade in Tiku was not 
completely in the hands of the  king of Aceh. 
As a gesture of friendship, Iskandar Muda sent the king of France 8 bahar of pepper.  
 
 
 
 
2. 4. 4  European retreat from Aceh and Iskandar Muda’s retaliation   
The west coast enjoyed abundant harvests of pepper which were claimed by Iskandar Muda. 
There was plenty of pepper available in Aceh, more than the Dutch ship the Orangeboom 
could carry. The English Unity loaded 1200 bahar pepper for which the merchants paid with 
textiles which were still very much in demand. The Dutch suffered from a lack of textiles and 
procured only 694 bahar of pepper, which gave them the feeling of onlookers in the trade.25  
Quite curiously merchant Van der Broeck wrote from Surat that if the merchants of the 
Thoolen had been supplied with cash instead of textiles, they could have procured the finest 
                                                 
 
25 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 680.  
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quality of pepper in Aceh.26 These differing opinions do not give a realistic picture of the 
prevailing conditions in Aceh.  
Nicolaes Casembroot asked for plenty of textiles and some nice Dutch gifts to present to the 
authorities, because it was expected that within three months there would be an enormous 
surplus of pepper ‘which needs  a master’ (buyer). He said that within a few years there would 
be vast quantities of pepper available, when the plantations in Aceh itself would start to 
produce. Iskandar Muda gave permission for free trade because he could not get rid of the 
supplies. He asked Casembroot 2000 tael for one year’s trade in Tiku, but eventually went 
down to 1500 tael (which amounted to about 6000 real), confiding in Casembroot that he did 
no longer drew any tolls from the ports and that the people there did not want his textiles.27 
This dramatic revelation to a member of the Anglo-Dutch Defence alliance he so despised, 
illustrates his desperation with the existing situation. His authority over the ports rested 
merely on dictation and threats, but his threats did not always work, as the example of Tiku, 
where he could not get rid of his textiles, shows.  
Casembroot’s tireless efforts to convince the company authorities in Bantam to remain in 
Aceh, bore no fruit. From his letter to them transpires that he was still confused by the 
company’s changing policies and strategies.28    
 
The Gentlemen XVII were compelled to reorient their policy due to the war in Europe and not 
in the least because of the obstructions by the Portuguese, French, English and Danes who 
were strongly influencing the markets, the sale of pepper had almost come to a standstill. The  
profits for the VOC were negligible because of the high prices the merchants paid in Asia. 
The enormous surplus had to be sold with great loss.29 It was resolved that the factories in 
                                                 
 
26 ibid., vol. VII, (pt. 2), 1041: Letter of 8 December 1622. 
 
27 ibid., 932-934: Letter dated 15 February 1622.  
 
28 idem. 
 
29 ibid., vol. IV, 562: 
‘Staet te letten dat den peperhandel alrij verscheyde tegenspoet heeft, eerstelijck, dat alhier te lande soo veel 
peper nu niet en can vercocht werden, als wel te voren, soo ten regart van d’oorloge, als het belet door de 
Portugesen, Francen, Engelsen ende Deenen, die ons alomme in ’t belet sijn ende merckten alomme verderven. 
De tweede tegenspoet is, dat de peper in Indien soo dier ingecocht wordt, dat het onmogelijk is eenich profijt te 
cunnen doen ende daerover getracht moet werden de peper in den incoop te doen dalen tegens 1 1/5 a 2 realen 
van 8ten de Bantanse sack. De derde tegenspoet is in den handel der peper, dat de veelheyt die U.E. 
overgesonden hebt, mede causeert dat den peper met grote schade moet vercocht werden.’  
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Aceh and Patani should continue with a minimum of costs and were resolute that no violence 
would  be used against the local rulers, but to leave their ports in friendship.30   
In spite of the Europeans’ dislike of the ‘Moors’, they were mindful not to offend them. 
Without much restraint they invested capital and energy in their relationship with the local 
men and women power holders. However, Iskandar Muda, the man who put a heavy stamp on 
their trade, often upset and infuriated them. Focussed as they were on their own interests, they 
were unable to describe him in any other terms but as a tyrant. He became the bête noir 
among the local monarchs.    
    
A disheartened Casembroot closed the factory in Aceh in the course of 1622 and traded from 
his ship. The English left after first securing 1000 bahar of pepper. Iskandar Muda was 
clearly insulted by the official departure from Aceh of the merchants; it tainted his glory if 
there were no longer Europeans residing and trading in his port.  
He was provoked by the slightest mistakes of the Dutch, accusing them of shooting from their 
ships at one of his prahu in the Straits. He sent a warning to Casembroot, saying that if this 
was proven true, he would send his armada to Batavia to drive out (vernestelen  the Dutch 
from there.31 It was his first explicit threat to Dutch authority in the archipelago. He 
demanded a couple of horses which the VOC owned in Batavia, or to stay away from his 
domain. The relationship between them was in constant limbo, but evidently neither wanted 
to completely give up on the other.   
Both the English and the Dutch made the pepper port of  Jambi their focus, where for many 
years they ran a profitable business. The Portuguese too frequented Jambi, their trade made 
possible by the armistice of 1615 between Malacca and Johor. Apparently the Dutch felt that 
the king of Jambi was intent on peace with Malacca and more inclined to the Portuguese than 
to them and the English, which threatened their trade.32 The Portuguese set fire to one of their 
vessels in the Jambi river, trying to chase them away.  
          
                                                 
 
30 ibid., 538-540.  
 
31 Generale Missiven, vol. I, 174 :Letter from Pieter de Carpentier to the  Gentlemen XVII  dated 27 October 
1625. 
 
32 ibid., 476- 477: Letter dated  5 August 1619: 
‘Die van Jambi doen groote neersticheyt om vrede met die van Malacca te maecken, waarover d’onse vry wat 
vresen van de Portugiesen aengetast te worden, omdat de coninck haer gunstiger dan ons off d’Engelsen is. 
Doch U.E mogen wel verseeckert wesen, dat de sterckste den handel van Jambi behouden sal.’ 
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Dutch assistance for the king of Jambi in 1624 against Iskandar Muda demonstrates that their  
patience with their old brother in-arms was over. The English did not want to become 
involved in the struggle, explaining that they had invested money in Aceh.33  
The cracks within the Anglo-Dutch Defence alliance already showed when in 1623 Coen set 
out to conquer the Banda islands, which he justified by claiming that the Bandanese were 
selling their produce to the Spaniards in Tidore. The English were not willing to participate in 
the expedition, declaring that they lacked enough ships.34 Incensed by their refusal Coen 
warned the Gentlemen XVII that they were nurturing a serpent in their bosom, who did not 
deserve one grain of sand in the Moluccas, Amboyna and Banda.35 He reproached  them, 
saying that if they worked for the grace of God and the welfare of the country, they should get 
rid of the English.36    
 
In 1624 the Acehnese armada raided the port of Indragiri on Sumatra’s east coast where 
Portuguese and the Dutch ships procured pepper, brought there by the Minangkabao people 
from the mountainous hinterland. In 1616 Aceh was the biggest buyer of pepper in Andragiri 
for which Iskandar Muda paid with padi, gold and slaves.   
His threat to invade Jambi impacted on the trade of the entire region which had almost come 
to a standstill. The developments were anxiously followed in Batavia. Governor-general 
Carpentier and the Council of the Indies were brooding on a plan to encircle the ‘Atchynder’ 
with ships if he obstructed Dutch efforts to trade on the west coast and refused to sign a 
‘friendly’ contract.37 They informed the Gentlemen XVII that the king of Aceh was preparing 
an invasion of the ports of Oulaccan and Indrapoura (on Sumatra’s west coast) and if he 
succeeded he would be in full control of the pepper trade from Aceh to Celebar (Silebar).38  
The Dutch acknowledged that Iskandar Muda was the kingpin of the trade. They understood 
the importance of renewing their relations with him, confident that he was anxious to be 
courted by European traders. They acted accordingly and in the course of 1632 captain 
Stadtlander arrived in Aceh with the Buyren to pledge assistance for a combined attack on 
                                                 
33 In Part Three the problems between Aceh and Jambi are explored.   
 
34 A history of Southeast Asia,  332. 
 
35 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 543-544: Letter of 11 May 1620.   
 
36 ibid., vol. I, 564. 
 
37Generale Missiven, vol. I, 144, 145: Letter dated 3 January 1624.   
 
38 ibid., 192-194: Letter dated 3 February 1626.  
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Malacca which had come out victorious from the Acehnese attack of 1629,  in return for a 
shipload of pepper or payment in tin and/or gold and toll free trade in Aceh’s ports.39  
Evidently pleased  with Dutch rapprochement Iskandar Muda promised Stadtlander a license 
to trade in Perak which was known for its tin, and four years exemption of tolls for the 
purchase of pepper in all trading ports within his domain on the condition that they assist him 
with 10 ships and artillery for an attack on Malacca.40 As a gesture of appreciation for the 
renewed friendship he  sent the governor-general one hundred picul of pepper, which was 
about 125 Dutch pounds41, two pots of minyak tanah (oil) and an elephant which was 
respectfully refused, because the big animal would not be able to stand in the boat. It is 
evident that both parties realized the importance of the re-instated alliance. The Portugese 
were still not beaten.   
The English followed with apprehension the renewed friendship between the Dutch and 
Iskandar Muda; the crew of the Exchange even spread the rumour in Tiku that the king of 
Mataram had captured Batavia the seat of Dutch authority, which caused problems for the 
Dutch to come to purchase pepper in Tiku. They succeeded in purchasing 1300 bahar of 
pepper in Tiku for which they paid with little textiles and mostly in cash.42  
The Defence alliance was deranged since Dutch extirpation strategy in Ambon in 1623.  
It is clear that the revitalized relations with Iskandar Muda bore fruit for the VOC, in 1634 it 
booked a profit of fl. 47.369 on the west coast, while the profit in Aceh for one voyage 
amounted to fl. 3.874.43  
In 1633 Iskandar Muda invaded the port of Indrapoura, south of Tiku and  Priaman and 
created mooring taxes there. Although the relations were renewed, he demanded gifts from 
the Dutch before he allowed them to procure pepper there and he set the price for 100 bahar 
at 408 real. When the local people rebelled, the Acehnese confiscated 500 bahar of pepper, 
brought it to Tiku and set fire to the pepper vines and other crops. The Acehnese actions there 
amounted to no less than extirpation. Worried by the developments Governor-General 
Brouwer wrote to the Gentlemen XVII  ‘our favourites in Indrapoura are massacred by the 
                                                 
 
39 The Acehnese attack on Malacca is discussed in Part Three.   
 
40 Dagh-Register 1631-1634, 126-130.   
 
41 The weights are described in Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. VII (pt. 2), 1875. 
 
42 Generale Missiven, vol. I,  412 : Letter to the Gentlemen XVII, dated 15 December 1633.  
 
43 ibid., 475: Letter to the Gentlemen  XVII, dated  27 December 1634. 
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Acehnese’44 Notwithstanding the fact that the relations with the Dutch were restored, 
Iskandar Muda seemed out on the monopoly of the trade.  Brouwer’s report of 4 January 163
to the Gentlemen XVII reveals his mood.  Although VOC ships were visiting Aceh where 
some lively trade took place, he remarked ‘Aceh is the enemy of our enemy and therefore
friend. The company never supported the king of Aceh against the Indian rulers because the 
company had no intention to make him big.’     
6 
 our 
                                                
   
 
 
 
2. 4. 5     Conclusion  
The three missions of Cornelis Comans to Aceh show that Iskandar Muda’s grip on the 
pepper trade steadfastly strengthened. He would not forego his position as principal trader in 
the ports on the west coast.  
The European merchants in general spoke of Iskandar Muda’s bad temper and his 
untrustworthiness; everything they felt was in conflict with their own interest, was in their 
view against the freedom of trade.  He in turn, was appalled by their greed and their 
unscrupulous ways to achieve their goals and did not hesitate to even call them ‘beggars’.  
The Anglo-Dutch Defence Alliance was not successful in bringing Iskandar Muda to his 
knees to set a lower price for the pepper. Even though he seemed eager to get rid of his 
supplies, he dragged the negotiations with French Admiral De Beaulieu and enjoyed his 
presence at the court and the discourse with him. The process shows that Iskandar Muda did 
not take advantage of the arrival of a third party to sell his supplies. Trade seemed no longer 
his big obsession. He used the visit of De Beaulieu to merely ignore the Dutch and the 
English. Whatever the merchants dislike of Iskandar Muda,  he was still the key person of the 
trade and they had to follow his whims or leave Aceh, which they hesitantly did. It had not 
been unprofitable to trade there.  
The Anglo-Dutch Defence alliance cracked over support for the king of Jambi against 
Iskandar Muda. The English refused to assist Jambi because they did not want to jeopardize 
their trade in Aceh; the Dutch were ready to defend Jambi against an Acehnese invasion 
because their business in Jambi was threatened. Iskandar Muda’s threat to invade Jambi 
 
 
44 ibid., 412.    
 160
 161
brought the area’s trade to a standstill. It shows that he was the kingpin of the trade who 
decided the course of events. He usurped the trade of the west coast ports by violent means.        
The relationship between the Dutch and Iskandar Muda was based on reciprocity; they both 
set their conditions. He asked for assistance against Malacca in exchange for trade contracts, 
they asked contracts in exchange for their assistance. Their relationship was in a constant 
impasse, but it survived the animosities. Iskandar Muda made no effort to drive the Dutch 
from Batavia. Both parties realized that their strategic alliance was of utmost importance if 
they wanted to free the Straits from the Portuguese.  
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Part Three                      
CHAPTER I 
 
 
PRELUDE TO THE WAR EXPEDITIONS 
               
 
 
3. 1. 1      Entangled interests: the real  and the ideal 
What was Iskandar Muda’s major motive to go to war? Was it gain or perhaps glory? Was 
war a means to an end or was it good for its own sake and thus to establish the sultan as a 
glorious conqueror? According to his own statements,  Iskandar Muda was out to dispel  the 
Portuguese from the Straits region. War against the Portuguese was a religious obligation. 
It is not so much royal religious ideology so to speak with which I shall concern myself  
principally in this part of the study,  for I shall consider the implications of the diverse 
documents  produced within the context of Iskandar Muda’s policies and actions, such as 
those written by the European merchants in the area. Essential to the discussion is that when 
the Portuguese settled in Malacca at the start of the sixteenth century, they imposed the cartaz 
system on shipping in their ‘sphere of influence’ which damaged the traditional trade and 
forced vessels to deviate from the followed routes. It owes it to the Muslim merchants who 
moved from Malacca to the other side of the Straits, where they based their trade with the rest 
of the archipelago and the Muslim ports of the Red Sea, that Aceh derived its strength and 
became an important transit point for the Muslim trade.  It rose from its rather inconspicuous 
position to that of a  prominent trade centre which rivalled Malacca. The Acehnese historian 
Amirul Hadi claims that this rise constituted the basic foundation for the Golden Age of the 
kingdom in the seventeenth century, especially during the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda 
(1607-1636).1  I should make it clear however, that this milestone was not a goal in itself but 
an achievement. The dispersal of the Portuguese from the Straits was the ultimate goal of the 
Acehnese rulers since the foundation of the sultanate. It lent the Acehnese campaigns against 
the ‘infidels’ the character of a ‘holy war’. At the annual gatherings in Mecca the Muslim 
leaders among other things discussed the wars against the ‘Moors’ on the Iberian Peninsula 
and Portuguese incursions in Asia and the possibilities for establishing a Pacta Islamica.2  
                                                 
1 Aceh and the Portuguese: A study of the struggle of Islam in Southeast Asia, 1500-1579, 2.  
 
2 The term Pacta Islamica  is used by Hadi , 118. 
We  have  to bear  in mind that the Portuguese not only set out to control the sea routes of the world, but to 
spread Christianity. In  many regions of Asia missionaries worked alongside soldiers and traders. 
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Aceh took on the role of leader of the Islamic opposition against the Christian invaders.  
Johor, the successor state of the overthrown Sultanate of Malacca was either too weak to fend 
off the Portuguese or unwilling to follow a consistent policy of opposing the conqueror.  
Given the constant in Acehs politics to clear the Straits region from the Portuguese, the 
seventeenth century started on a sombre note, confronting the reality that Aceh’s dream and 
relentless efforts to put an end to Portuguese presence had not come true. The Portuguese 
keenly manipulated the geo-political power equilibrium for their own survival and sustenance. 
They remained a political force of the first rank. Their invasion of Aceh in 1606, showed 
Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah that he needed to strengthen Aceh’s capabilities to protect its 
territorial integrity against the enemies of Islam. This is the fundamental basis of the Accord 
of 1607 between Ali Ri’ayat Shah and the Dutch. The support of a powerful ally was essential 
to fight the Portuguese, even if the ally demanded a rendez-vous for Dutch ships, c.q. 
jurisdiction in exchange.       
 
The exploration of the trade- and diplomatic relations between Iskandar Muda and the 
northern Europeans, has brought to light that the European efforts to secure privileges and 
obtain trade monopolies steadfastly intensified. By centralizing the trade Iskandar Muda 
showed that he did not tolerate foreign encroachment on the region’s trade. The port of Aceh 
was the centre of government and the hubbub of the trade of the Acehnese realm. The 
evocative question is, whether Iskandar Muda’s obsessive control of the trade in his extended 
domain and beyond its boundaries, came forth from a craving for wealth or from a zealous 
ideal and ardent duty to save the Islamic trade from usurpation by the ‘infidel’ in Malacca and 
from other usurpers. He vowed to pursue the Portuguese as long as he lived, which is 
unmistakingly clear from his letter of 1610 to Prince Maurice of Nassau, because they were 
the enemies of Islam. This highlights his religious motivation and obligation. He continued 
the policy of his forebears and predecessors.  
The discussion in Part Two has demonstrated that Iskandar Muda was acutely aware of the 
challenges of the times: the geo-political ambiguities and the unprecedented economic 
                                                                                                                                                        
Frederick de Houtman, a hostage in Aceh in 1600, mentions that Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah was visited by  
a Portuguese envoy and a ‘paap’ (priest) who advised him to send his hostages to the mountains.  
Joao Paulo Oliveira E Costa pays attention to Portuguese Christian zeal in his article “The Padroado and the 
Catholic Mission in Asia during the 17th Century” in: Rivalry and Conflict, European Traders and Asian 
networks 16th and 17th century, (Leiden: IGEER & CNWS), 2003.  
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opportunities. He realized that a steady income of revenues was essential for a sound 
economy and to maintain the region’s best equipped and largest armada.  
The implications of the combination of zealous defender of Islam and kingpin of the trade 
which notably played such a major role in Iskandar Muda’s reign, shall be discussed further in 
the following chapters, by exploring his war expeditions to several ports on the Malay 
peninsula and the island of Sumatra. Was he a rapacious conqueror out on the riches of the 
neighbourhood or perhaps a religious paladin? The question may seem outlandish and is 
perhaps premature, but it is essential to establish his motifs for waging wars on the ports. For 
a good understanding of the issues of war and peace and the local realities, it is important to 
establish and follow the chronology and analyse the character of the expeditions.  
 
 
 
 
3. 1. 2      Aceh’s  Forces 
The early visitors to Aceh were surprised to arrive in a city which was open, not protected by 
walls and prominent defence works, while Aceh had been almost constantly at war with 
Malacca and with Johor. It is even more surprising that when French admiral Augustin de 
Beaulieu visited the port two decades later at a most critical time when the Anglo-Dutch 
Defence alliance formed a potential threat to the safety of Aceh,  he noted that the city was 
not protected, with the exception of a fort at the mouth of the river leading to the city.3 At the 
same time he observed that it was quite difficult to reach the port because of the entwined 
waterways with their narrow entrances to the shore and the dense, almost impenetrable 
vegetation at its edges.  
Aceh’s large naval force was an effective deterrence against foreign infiltration and 
aggression. According to De Beaulieu this naval force was divided over three fleets, which 
were strategically stationed in the main port Bandar Aceh, in Pedir on the east coast and in 
Daya on the west coast.  
John Davis, the chief pilot of the De Houtman expedition which arrived in Aceh in 1598 and 
of the English expedition under admiral Lancaster in 1602, gives us the first sketch of Aceh’s 
naval force under Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (al Mukamil).   
                                                 
 
3 Mémoires, 206. 
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‘Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah hath very many Gallies, I thinke an hundred, some that will carry 
foure hundred men, made like a wherrie, very long and open, without Decke, Fore-castell, 
Chase, or any upper building. Their Oares are like Shovels of foure foote long, which they use 
only with the hand, not resting them upon the Galley. They beare no Ordnance; with these hee 
keepeth his Neighbours in obedience’ .’A woman is his admiral, for hee will trust no men. 
Their weapons are Bowes, Arrowes, Javelings, Swords, Targets; they have no defensive 
Armes, but fight naked. Hee hath great store of Brasse Ordnance, which they use without 
Carriages, shooting them as they lye upon the ground. They be the greatest that I have ever 
seene, and the metal is reported to be rich of Gold. The trust of his land force standeth upon 
his Elephants’.4 The navy’s laxamana at the time of the arrival of William Lancaster’s fleet in 
1602 was a female, a relative of the sultan, named Keumalahayati. There is no proof that she 
was in function when the preparations for the war expedition to Johor in 1599 took place in 
which De Houtman would participate. 
Ito Takeshi who made a study of Aceh’s internal structure and institutions, sees no indications 
that a standing army existed under Iskandar Muda, but he mentions the existence of a slave 
and elephant corps.5 Our witness, Augustin de Beaulieu notes that when the king plans a war 
all his subjects with no exception are obliged to march at his first command at their own 
expense, and take provisions with them for three months.6 ‘The king could assemble forty 
thousand eligible men for war from all over Aceh.  He provides them with weapons which are  
registered and these weapons have  to be returned when they come back and he provides  iron, 
gunpowder and rice if the expedition takes  more than three months.7 One may suppose that 
the village chief or the district chiefs were responsible for the recruitment of the men and the 
registering of the weapons. Whether these chiefs in return received some kind of 
                                                 
 
4 The voyages and works of John Davis the Navigator, 149;    
   De oudste reizen van de Zeeuwen, 59. 
 
5 The World of the Adat Aceh, 51. 
    
6 Mémoires, 211.     
Interesting in this context  is Bernard Lewis’assertion :‘According to Muslim teaching, jihad is one of the basic 
commandments of the faith, an obligation imposed on all Muslims by God, through revelation. In an offensive 
war, it is an obligation of the Muslim community as a whole (fard kifaya) ; in a defensive war, it becomes a 
personal obligation of every male Muslim (fard ‘ayn).  In such a situation, the Muslim ruler might issue a 
general call to arms ( nafir ‘amm).’ In: The political language of Islam, 73 . 
P. S. van Koningsveld ( 125-26), is of the opinion that in todays discussions the defensive character of the jihad 
is amplified, while classical teachings on jihad at the same time buttresses expansion.     
I mention in the chapter Geo-historical Setting that Ibn Battuta speaks of a jihad by the sultan of Pasai against 
Batak tribes.  
 
7 Mémoires, 211. 
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compensation from the sultan cannot be ascertained. It is on the other hand very conceivable 
that they would be punished if they did not follow his orders.       
Iskandar Muda placed the responsibility for the maintenance of the galleys and big ships with 
his principal orangkaya obliging them to equip and repair them, putting at their use enough 
men to help them with these tasks. The laxamana, the admiral, fitted out the largest ship, paid 
for its maintenance and its replacement in case of loss. This reputed ‘man of war’, the Cakra 
Dunya (wheel of the world), was renamed by the Europeans ‘Terror of the world’.  
Interestingly De Beaulieu observes ‘the navy consists of around one hundred galleys (galères) 
‘bigger than the ones found in Christendom. These ships are masterly built, but too heavy, for 
they are broad and high; each can carry 4 pieces of cannon which shoot balls weighing up to 
40  pounds. The largest is manned with 600 to 800 rowers ‘who are not slaves, but poor men’. 
Besides the heavy ordnance,  the ships also carry some lighter guns. A moderate sized galley 
measures about 120 feet (English?) in length. The oars are operated by two men who remain 
standing.  
Iskandar Muda boasted that he possessed 5000 canons, but De Beaulieu estimated that he 
owned no more than 2000 pieces, all made from bronze. Of these there were 1200  pieces of a 
moderate size and 800 were large.8 
While De Beaulieu was fully aware of the fact that Iskandar Muda received part of his 
ordnance as ‘gifts’ or payment from the European traders in exchange for trade contracts 9, it 
escaped him that Iskandar Muda  most probably obtained a vast amount of artillery and ships 
from his latest war expeditions to the Malay ports of Johor, Pahang and Kedah.  
The war expeditions cost Iskandar Muda hardly anything. The warriors left on their own 
expenses and were obliged to take their own provisions with them for a period of four months. 
According to De Beaulieu it was a system unknown in Europe of that time.10 As mentioned 
above the sultan provided artillery, gun-powder and weapons which were all registered. After 
                                                 
 
8 idem.  
 From the Turcs the Acehnese learned the art of canon-making ; the Ottoman emperor sent manpower, 
equipment and artillery to assist Aceh against the Portuguese.   
 
9 The Adat Aceh enumerates the gifts and dues foreign traders were obliged to present the Sultan and his 
officials; the value and the goods differed according to their nationality.   
Takeshi  describes the administration of the port, the  trade and taxation current in the seventeenth century in 
extenso: The World of the Adat Aceh, chapters V and VI. He calls the imposition of import duties ‘hybrid’ in 
nature, because of similarities with pre-Portuguese Malacca and  Pasai in the sixteenth century (p. 341). 
 
10 Mémoires, 211-212 ; 
 Also: Lombard,  Le Sultanat d Atjéh au Temps d’Iskanda Muda, 90 onwards. 
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the expedition the warriors were obliged to return the weapons they carried under the penalty 
of death. Their relatives were held responsible for any misconduct of their sons, brothers and 
husbands, for which they could be executed.11  In this way the sultan held a major part of the 
population hostage. We have to bear in mind that this was not an Acehnese device, because 
similar conditions existed elsewhere in the region.  
 
When De Beaulieu arrived in Aceh,  Iskandar Muda was busy to equip three galleys for an 
expedition to the west coast, each carrying one elephant and 400 men, to capture one of the 
chief local authorities who had fled and was hiding between Priaman and Indrapoura and 
castigate the local population for harbouring the fugitive. Dutch envoy Cornelis Comans 
referred in 1620 to the expected expedition, saying that Iskandar Muda ordered the people of 
Priaman to plant banana trees to feed his elephants, a decree that frightened these people for 
they knew that something terrible was going to happen.   
Elephants and horses were used in the land expeditions. As we note above, John Davis 
observed the importance of elephants in Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah’s army. According to 
the Hikayat Aceh elephants formed the major deterrence against foreign invasions which was 
principally the reason for the absence of defence walls around the city.12  The great reliance 
placed on elephants by the Acehnese tacticians was, from the practical point of view, not very 
realistic, as the next quotation clarifies: ‘Although fighting elephants may strike terror in an 
invading army unused to them, these animals were by no means unbeatable; we see that the 
Romans found ways to defeat the elephants of Pyrrhus and Hanibal while the Greeks, Turks 
and other invaders steadfastly lost their fear of the Indian fighting elephant. Even the best 
trained elephants, overcome by panic especially caused by fire, could throw off its riders and 
trample the troops of its own side turning the course of the battle.’  The elephants in Aceh 
were  very useful as carriers in the riverine and bushy Acehnese terrain. Iskandar Muda is 
qualified as a brilliant mahout who loved to go on elephant hunting expeditions and to train 
his elephants. Elephant fighting was a royal sport much appreciated by the successive sultans. 
The Bustan as-Salatin too refers to elephant-hunting expeditions by the sultans. Iskandar 
Muda possessed around nine hundred elephants, while his successor Iskandar Thani owned 
one thousand. It is obvious that the size and expansion of Aceh’s naval force did not make the 
use of elephants redundant. Supposedly  every one of the war ships carried at least one 
                                                 
11 idem. 
 
12 Hikayat Atjèh,  166. 
 167
 168
elephant. Royal prestige was clearly supported by a large herd of elephants. The favourite 
royal animals bore fantastic names and people in the streets greeted them with respect.     
 
                                       
  Part Three                             
 
 
 
                                                             CHAPTER II  
                                         
       
      BELLIGERENCE BETWEEN ACEH AND JOHOR 
 
 
 
 
3. 2. 1    The early conflicts   
As I set out in the chapter Geo-historical Setting, the actual belligerence between Aceh and 
Johor  started when the rulers of Aceh began expanding their territory by invading and 
incorporating several Malay speaking ports on Sumatra’s east coast like Pedir and Pasai, in 
response to Portuguese infiltration in these ports. Johor saw Aceh as a danger to its authority, 
while Aceh regarded Johor as a traitor because it often sided with the Portuguese in Malacca. 
When in 1540 the queen widow of the East Sumatran port of Aru sought help from Johor 
against Aceh’s Alau’d-din R’iayat Shah (Al-Kahar) who attempted to invade her country, 
Johor’s ruler acted  promptly by dispatching a fleet to Aru’s defence and successfully 
defeated the Acehnese at the river Panai. The sultan of Johor moreover married the widow to 
align their countries. The east Sumatran ports were Malay was the vernacular and Malay 
culture was dominant, were inclined to Johor. Aru was in an unenviable position, 
intermittently controlled by the two antagonists. The last change of authority over Aru took 
place in 1611 when Sultan Iskandar Muda’s fleet invaded the port which was under Johor’s 
umbrella. Johor and Malacca had just (1610) signed a truce. As discussed in my chapter 
‘Genesis’ in Part One,  the Portuguese supported Johor in its quest for control over Aru, 
indubitably to shatter Aceh’s ambitions for control of the east Sumatran coast. The Dutch 
admiral Joris van Spilbergen who patrolled the Straits in 1602 witnessed how little boats from 
Johor hid in the waters of Aru, to attack Acehnese vessels.1 Another example of the animosity 
between the two sultanates is when in 1564 the Acehnese invaded Johor, abducted the royal 
                                                 
1 I. Commelin, Begin ende Voortgangh van de Vereenighde Nederlantsche Geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie,  (Amsterdam: Jan Jansz., 1646), 45.  
Van Spilbergen’s account is of  September 1602.  
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family, and installed one of the sons of the defeated ruler on the throne of Johor,  making him 
a puppet ruler. This ruler was overthrown shortly afterwards by his uncle, whereupon the 
Acehnese sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (al- Kahar) sent his armada to attack Johor, ‘but 
when it arrived, the city had recovered from the rebellion and strongly defended itself against 
the Acehnese who beat a quiet retreat.’2 There were however brief moments of peace and 
even cooperation against Malacca between the contenders.3  
Again war between them erupted after the young crown prince of Aceh, Raja Buyong, also 
known as Raja Ashem, who was the son of the king of Johor and the daughter of the deceased 
Acehnese sultan was murdered around 1589  in a rebellion by the Acehnese orangkaya. We 
have to consider the fact that the crown prince, the incumbent ruler of Aceh, was a son of the 
sultan of Johor. Given the lingering antagonism between the two sultanates, it is 
understandable that the Acehnese orangkaya fiercely opposed the enthronement of a son of 
the sultan of Johor, bringing about his liquidation. It staved off the likelihood that Aceh, 
which was the political and ideological force in the region, would become a vassal state of 
Johor. Whether Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) at that time a principal courtier, 
had a hand in the murder of Raja Buyong who had been under his protection, is impossible to 
ascertain. We may declare with confidence that Aceh owes it to the rebelling orangkaya that 
it was saved the humiliation of becoming Johor’s vassal state.  
Intermarriage was certainly not the way to salve the inherent antagonism between the two 
sultanates. Johor progressively launched several attacks on Aceh to avenge the murder of Raja 
Buyong and Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) involved the Dutch in this 
internecine conflict when he requested Cornelis de Houtman’s assistance for his attack on 
Johor in 1599 as payment for a shipload of pepper. John Davis reports: ‘The first hereof (11 
september1599) the king made shew (sure?) that we should receive in ordnance for the battery 
of Ior (Johor) and take in soldiers to depart for that service. There were many gallies manned 
and brought out of the river, riding halfe a mile from our ships; the sea full of prawes and 
boats, all manned.’4 The assault on the Dutch ships, instigated by the Portuguese, prevented 
the war expedition to Johor. The Portuguese with whom the sultan maintained trade and 
                                                 
2 P. A. Tiele, De Europeërs in den Maleischen Archipel, ( BKI, 1881), vol. XXIX, 169-170. 
 
3 C. A. Gibson-Hill,“Johore Lama and other ancient cites” (JMBRAS, vol. XXVIII, Pt. 2), 144: 
‘Finally we must account for the Portuguese statement that in 1574  Raialle ‘king of Jor and Bintan’ was secretly 
supporting the Acehnese in their war against Malacca’.  
 
4 The Voyage and Works of John Davis, 147;   
  De oudste reizen, 48.  
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diplomatic relations since 1593, refused to assist him to attack Johor which was his condition 
to allow them the building of a fort within his domain. 
Aceh’s solitary attempt in 1600 to attack Johor was aborted, because of the sudden arrival in 
the waters of Aceh of a Dutch fleet under the command of Paulus Van Caerden. The 
Acehnese feared an attack to free Frederick de Houtman. 
 
 
 
 
3. 2. 2     Aceh’s invasion in 1613  
When he was in his seventh year as ruler of Aceh,  Iskandar Muda sent a war fleet to Johor 
where on the 6th of June 1613 it burnt down the city of  Batu Sawar, the new capital, and 
captured several members of the royal family. A number of twenty two Dutchmen who were 
in the city and took up their arms in defence of Johor, were also captured and carried away to 
Aceh together with a large number of the local people. A VOC delegation led by Abraham 
Theunemans had just arrived in Batu Sawar with the merchant ship De Hoop which lay at 
anchor in the river, to restock the factory. 
The Acehnese armada which consisted of several big galleys and a large number of small 
boats departed on 7 May 1613 for Johor. Sailing into the Johor river on its way to Batu Sawar,  
it encountered the Dutch  De Hoop. According to the Dutch sources, the laxamana of the 
armada sent a messenger to the crew to remain neutral with the promise that no harm would 
be done to them. But the merchants in town who were unaware of this request, fired at the 
invaders. Was this reaction because they panicked? They had just delivered cash and goods 
worth about 26.000 Dutch guilders, hastily burying 10.000 guilders, together with  44 tael 
gold, two golden swords (keris) and the contract of the factory in the soil beneath the factory. 
In the ensuing battle the Acehnese captured twenty two Dutchmen including the visiting 
Theunemans and members of his mission; two men were killed and four who were wounded 
managed to escape with a prahu to the  ship De Hoop, while eight men disappeared.5 
The captured men were taken to Aceh as prisoners of war, where they apologized to Sultan 
Iskandar Muda, saying that they were bound by their treaty of 1606 with Johor to defend the 
sultan who was a friend of Holland. There can be little doubt that Iskandar Muda was troubled  
 
                                                 
5 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 26 : Letter to the Gentlemen XVII, dated 1 January 1614;  
    VOC 1.04.02: 1056,  51 a 52 : Missive Theunemans en Boekholt   uit Atchin dated  22 July 1613.   
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by the fact that the Dutch had come to the defence of his Malay enemy, yet he allowed the 
captives to stay in their lodge on bail of the company’s goods.  
Was Iskandar Muda envious of the relationship between Johor and the VOC and therefore out 
to punish them?  He certainly felt offended when Admiral Verhoeven whom he called his 
‘confederate’ refused to visit him in 1608,  instead Verhoeven was in a hurry to depart for 
Johor to discuss an attack on Malacca with Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah of Johor.  From 
his rather lenient attitude towards the captives appears that he was not aiming at a total break 
with the Dutch, even at a time when the VOC put an embargo on its shipping to Aceh 
from1612-1614 because of  his refusal to grant the merchants a trade contract. The VOC was 
reluctantly sucked into a local conflict and at the mercy of the Sultan of Aceh. Jan Pieterszoon 
Coen, at that time president of the factory in Bantam feared that his merchants’ actions 
against the invading Acehnese in Johor had further damaged the relationship between the 
company and the king of Aceh.6      
 
To obtain an overall picture of the invasion and its ramifications, I  summarize the events 
following the invasion.  
In the course of 1614, within a period of six months after the invasion, Raja Bongsu, also 
known as Raja Seberang and Raja Ilir ( the ruler of the downstream area), youngest brother of 
Sultan Alaud’din Ri’ayat Shah, was married off to Iskandar Muda’s sister and sent back to 
Johor to take possession of the throne of his brother, known as the Yang di pertoean (Malay 
title for the ruler). The new ruler took the name of Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah and was sultan of 
Johor from1614 until his death in 1624.   
There is a striking similarity with the Acehnese invasion of Johor in 1564 when the invader 
Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (al-Kahar) replaced the captured ruler of Johor with his sibling and 
after marrying the candidate off to one of his relatives, sent him back to Johor as his vassal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
6  Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 26.  
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 3. 2. 3    The fate of Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah  
What happened to Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah when the Acehnese invaded his country, 
kept the minds of historians busy, but has not been satisfactorily resolved.7  The earliest 
accounts of the events are by the Dutch captives themselves. From the letters of Theunemans 
and Boekholt one extracts the information that they were brought together with Raja 
Seberang, the orangkaya and a large number of Johorites to Aceh.8  They do not mention the 
capture of Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah. What happened to the sultan?  If he was not 
captured by the Acehnese, it is likely that when he learned of the imminent Acehnese attack 
he escaped to a refuge. The Sejarah Melayu on the other hand mentions the death of the sultan 
while in captivity in Aceh, ‘Marhoem yang mangkat di Atjeh’.9   
From the following account of Sir Richard Winstedt, well known authority on Malay history, 
transpires that Sultan Alau’d-din had died in Aceh:  
‘Was he (Alau’d-din) present at the second attack (which happened in 1615) on Batu Sawar? 
Or was he still a prisoner in Aceh or already dead? Clearly he died between 1613 and 1615 
and in Aceh, so that it is very doubtful if the grave thought to cover his bones at Makam 
Sultan, Kota Tinggi, is really his. His bendahara, Tun Sri Lanang, composer of the Malay 
Annals was a prisoner with the Sultan at Pasai and records in the introduction to that work 
that his master died at Aceh: he also says his master was a ruler who liked music better than 
administration.’10 
One is inclined to take the information that the sultan died in Pasai on the east coast of Aceh 
for true, somebody as close to him as his bendahara, (the Malay equivalent for prime 
minister), cannot be mistaken when claiming that his patron died in captivity in Aceh. But the 
question is rather: was Alau’d-din captured during the  invasion of 1613 or when Aceh for a 
second time invaded Johor in 1615?   
                                                 
 
7 Gibson-Hill “On the alleged death of Sultan Alla-al-Din of Johore ate Aceh, in 1613”, JMBRAS, vol. XXXI 
(1), 1965;  
D. K. Bassett claims that Sultan Alla-al-Din Ri’ayat Syah II of Johore escaped when the Achinese overran Batoe 
Sawar in June 1613, but died a few years later. His half-brother Raja Bongsu or Raja Seberang, was taken to 
Aceh, married to Iskandar Muda’s sister, and sent back to Batu Sawar as Sultan Abdul’lah Ma’ayat Syah (1614-
1624), in: ‘Changes in the Pattern of Malay Politics, 1629-1655, (JSEAH, vol. X, no. 4, 1969).   
 
8 VOC 1.04.02 : 1056 , 51  a 52  ‘Missieve Theunemans en Boekholt uit Atchin’ dated  22 July 1613. 
 
9 Cited by Husain Djajadininggrat ,”Critisch overzicht van de in Maleische Werken vervatte gegevens over de 
geschiedenis van het Sultanaat van Atjeh,” (BKI, vol. 65: 1911), 180. 
 
 10 R. Winstedt, “A History of Johore” (JMBRAS, vol. X: 1932), 33.   
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General Thomas Best who witnessed the return of the armada in Aceh in 1613 from its 
expedition to Johor, speaks of the arrival of the king of Johor and his brother, thus confirming 
the bendahara’s claim that Sultan Alau’d-din was a prisoner in Aceh.  However, the bizarre 
account of Thomas Best’s assistant Ralph Croft contradicts this:   
‘The General of the Armada, for his welcome, because he did not bring the ould King of Joar, 
who was an ould decreped man, and had assigned his kingdome to his son, was by the King 
forced to eat a platter of turdes (turds) and afterwards to wash his bodie in them, to the King’s 
great infamie and dishonour, for so base a thing to be published amongst foreyners and 
strangers. Although this seeme strange, yet it is trew, as God is in heaven.’11 
Winstedt calls Croft’s rather bizarre story ‘a romantic tale of a purser’. 
It indeed looks as if Ralph Croft was more interested in the banality of Iskandar Muda’s 
punishment than in the fate of the Sultan of Johor. But one cannot deny the fact that from his 
account a tantalizing picture emerges: was the ‘old decreped king’ who had left his country to 
his son, Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah? In another account Croft mentions that Sultan 
Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah escaped to the island of Bintam before Aceh invaded Batu Sawar in 
1613: ‘In June, 1613, Batu Sawar and Kota Seberang were occupied by the Achinese. A 
number of the Malay leaders were taken prisoner, including Raja Bongsu, the Sultan’s half-
brother, but Sultan Alla-al-Din himself escaped to Bintam and the Acehnese were still 
searching for him at the end of the year.’12   
Another account is from Pieter Floris who served on board the English vessel Globe (1611-
1615) who mentions “….The king of Atchin had sente the younger brother of the King of 
Johor, Raja Boungsoe, backe agayne with great honoure, in companye of 40 prawes and 2000 
Atchinders, for to build upp agayne the forte and citie of Johor, with good store of ordinance 
and other necessaries, having married him to his sister; and was gone for Bintam some 14 
daies ago, saying that the olde King, should be disposed, and hee settle upp in his place.” 13 
This seems in accordance with the observation of Ralph Croft that the sultan had fled to 
Bintam and should be disposed. 
                                                 
 
11 ibid., 32   
   Also in Foster, The Voyage of Thomas Best, 172.  
 
12 Gibson-Hill, “Johor Lama and other ancient sites ”, ( JMBRAS: 1955, vol. XXVIII, Pt. 2), 158.  
  
13 ibid, “On the alleged death of Sultan Alla-al-Din of Johore at Aceh in 1613 ” (JMBRAS:1956, vol. XXIV    
(pt.1). 
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A last explanation comes from a legitimate source which is Sultan Iskandar Thani, the 
successor of Iskandar Muda, who told the Dutch envoy Cornelis Simonszoon van der Veer 
when the latter visited him in 1637, that the Sultan of Johor was captured in 1613 and had 
been taken to Aceh, where he was executed, because he had refused to assist Iskandar Muda 
against the Portuguese.14 One expects that as the successor of Iskandar Muda, he was justly 
informed about the fate of the sultan.  
These differing explanations have contributed to the conundrum of the disappearance of 
Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah. The Dutch could have provided the most reliable story, but they 
cared little about the fate of Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah so it seems, since they do no longer refer 
to him in their correspondence. Once he was out of sight, he was out of their minds. From the 
very start of their contacts with this ruler they had mixed feelings about him. Admiral 
Matelieff de Jonge who negotiated the successive treaties of June and September 1606 with 
him, was not at all taken to Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah, who left the government to his younger 
brother Raja Bongsu,  the one with whom he discoursed.  In Matelieff eyes Alau’d-din was a 
dud, ‘a man of little energy, who slept till noon, then ate and washed and proceeded to drink 
himself drunk so that in the afternoon it was impossible to do business with him. Provided he 
had wine and women, he cared neither for his kingdom nor his subjects.’15        
The Dutch were relieved that Alau’d-din had disappeared from the political scene, for he was 
growing out of touch with them and made advances to the Portuguese. Raja Bongsu on the 
other hand was much inclined to them.  
      
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 E. Netscher, Djohor en Siak 1602 tot 1865:  Historische Beschrijving (Batavia: 1879), 31; 
Also in: Verhandelingen van het Bataafs Genootschap, vol.  XXXV, 30, 31   
 
15 Cited from: Joost Hartgers (ed.), Amsterdam, 1648 Journael ende Historische Verhael van de treffelijcke 
Reyse gedaen naer Oost-Indien ende China met elf schepen door den Manhaften Admirael Cornelis Matelief de 
Jonge uitgevaren in den jare 1605, 12. 
“ Jan de Patuan is ook een persoon van weinigh bedrijfs/ghewoon tot bij den middagh te slapen/dan te eten en te 
wasschen/ende voorts droncken te drincken/so dat na den middag met hem niet en is te handelen/want men moet 
almede met hem drincken/ en droncke-mans dingen doen. Hij bemoeyt hem geen dingen/maar laet het al op de 
Edelen ende Raya Zabrang staen/mach van geen swarigheyt hooren/ende als men hem aenspreeckt van net te 
doen/als volck op te brenghen oft dierghelijcke/soo swijght hij al/en al vraeght men hem 2. oft 3. mael/het is al  
’t selfde/ In somma is nergens min bequaemt toe als tot koningh te wesen/denckt noch op Rijck noch op 
onderdanen/als hij slechts wijn heeft en vrouwen.”    
The treaty signed in May 1606 is included in the journal of Matelieff de Jonge (14).   
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3. 2. 4    Raja Bongsu installed as vassal ruler of Johor  
Because of his fiercely anti-Portuguese stance Raja Bongsu was obviously the most suitable 
candidate for Iskandar Muda to be his vassal ruler, even if several years earlier the same 
Bongsu asked Dutch assistance for an attack on both Malacca and Aceh.  
As the new ruler he was escorted back to Johor in great state, accompanied by several frigates 
and a large number of prahu, clearly to impress Malacca and the rulers of the neighbouring 
ports. With him a workforce of  two thousand Acehnese went to Johor to reconstruct the city 
of Batu Sawar. The victorious Iskandar Muda also sent his representative Raja Lela Wangsa, 
the admiral of the armada, to Johor. It is not clear what his actual function in Johor was; 
strangely the Dutch envoy Adryaan van der Dussen who was in Johor in 1614 to discuss 
reparation for the losses the VOC had suffered during the Acehnese invasion and to propose 
the construction of a fort,  refers to Raja Lela Wangsa as the coninck (king), at the same time 
also refering to Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah as Syne Majesteit (his Majesty)and Coninck (king), 
which blurs the actual functions and roles of these men.16 There is no evidence that he nor the 
successive Dutch envoys and merchants directly dealt with Raja Lela Wangsa in Johor.  
Iskandar Muda’s appointment of Raja Bongsu as sultan of Johor, ushered in a new era in 
Acehnese-Johor relations. Their shared wish to dislodge the Portuguese from Malacca was the 
uniting factor in their relationship, which was sealed by the marriage of Raja Bongsu with 
Iskandar Muda’s sister. It should be clear at this point that kinship relations between the two 
courts was no guarantee for lasting good relations and peace between them; the historical 
examples of the sixteenth century show, that allegiance was not secured by establishing 
kinship ties. 
  
 
                                                 
16  “Cort verhael vant wedervaeren van Adryaen vander Dussen, Opperkoopman, enz”. in: Tiele (ed.), 
Bouwstoffen, vol. I, 70-79.  
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3. 2. 5  Dutch-Johor relations  
The Dutch perceived Aceh’s invasion of Johor as another proof of Iskandar Muda’s tyranny.   
Peter Borschberg, a specialist on seventeenth century geo-politics in the Straits, is of the 
opinion that Aceh was hard to blame for feeling isolated and alone, after its allies-in arms 
Johor and the VOC had concluded different peace treaties with the Lusitian.17 Yet his 
assertion that Aceh and Johor were allies is a misconception; the historical facts show that 
they were antagonists. It should also be said that although an armistice was pending between 
the United Republic and Spain, admiral Verhoeven was still out to attack Malacca in 1608, 
this was also clear to Iskandar Muda. The rivalry between the Dutch and the Portuguese was 
certainly not over in Asia.           
 
On 25 November 1610 the Dutch resident merchant in Batu Sawar the new capital of Johor, 
Jacques Obelaer wrote to his head office in Bantam that the Portuguese had blocked the 
entrance of the Johor river with their frigates for  almost a year. This was to avenge 
Verhoeven’s actions against them after he had discussed an attack on Malacca with Sultan  
Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah, and the possibility that the Dutch obtain the sultan’s permission to 
construct a fort in the Straits area. The Portuguese blockade of the Johor river was very 
effective;  the non-arrival of Dutch ships unnerved Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah and his 
brother Raja Bongsu who felt abandoned and powerless against their Portuguese neighbour. 
When in October 1610, after one year of blockading, the Malacca administration sent its 
envoy Joao Lopes d’Amoira 18 to talk Sultan Alau’d-din into signing a peace treaty, he hardly 
needed to convince him. The envoy found support from the sultan’s half brother, who was the 
ruler of Siak on the east coast of Sumatra. He, together with the orangkaya of Johor led the 
coalition for a peaceful settlement with Malacca.19 It is obvious that the orangkaya of Johor 
saw no positive prospects by honouring the treaty of 1606 with the Dutch,  since it  had 
                                                 
17 P. Borschberg, “Luso-Johor-Dutch Relations approx. 1600-1620”  in: Rivalry and Conflict, European Traders 
and Asian Trading Networks, 16th and 17th century,  (Leiden: IGEER & CNWS, conference papers,  2003 ), 154. 
 
18 De Jonge, De Opkomst, vol. III,  304-305.  
 Letter of Jacques Obelaer. He calls him Joan Lopes de Morere Tombongon, a Portuguese by birth. 
 
19 Winstedt, “Johor, Portugal, Holland and Aceh”, (JMBRAS, vol. X,  1932), 26-34 : 31.    
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neither brought economic gains nor effective support against Malacca. They reckoned that a 
truce with Malacca was advantageous for Johor’s trade against textiles.20  
Between the Sultan and Raja Bongsu his co-regent, there existed serious differences over the 
course Johor should follow. Raja Bongsu was not at all in favour of an armistice with 
Malacca. He was the co-signatory of the treaty with the VOC and he was much inclined to the 
Dutch since the visit of the first Dutch fleet in 1603 under admiral Van Heemskerk. Bongsu 
later even implored Verhoeven to help him take Patani which he claimed in the name of his 
eldest brother, the murdered ruler of Patani. The VOC could not grant this request, because it 
maintained good relations with the ruler of Patani and quite understandably did not want  to 
jeopardize its trade with Patani where it had established a factory. Moreover, it did not want 
to become embroiled in the local feuds of the Malays.  
 
Despite the fact that the Portuguese merely forced the armistice on Johor, it was definitely a 
breach of the September Treaty of 1606 between  Johor and the Dutch, which stipulates that 
neither of the parties shall have the right to make peace with the King of Spain without  
mutual consent (art.10). The situation in far away Europe on the other hand shows that the 
Dutch had signed a truce with Spain on 2 February 1609  in The Hague, for a period of twelve 
years, even before the Johor/Malacca armistice was in place. This truce consequentially 
affected their operations in Asia. Yet,  Peter Borschberg contends,  that ‘secret amendments to 
the treaty which were made in the presence of English and French ambassadors, foresaw a 
continuation of the hostilities outside the European scenario’.21  Verhoeven was indeed 
informed of a pending truce between the United Republic and Spain, but he did not mention 
this during his visit to the sultan. He proposed to attack Malacca by land and sea and to take 
the construction of a fort in the Straits at hand to defend Johor against the Iberians. Hence 
Alau’d-din and Bongsu considered an attack by sea and land impractical. Verhoeven sensed  
that they were looking for a modus vivendi with the Portuguese and harangued them on the 
existence of the  September Treaty, warning them that an armistice between Johor and 
Malacca implied a breach of the treaty.  
 
                                                 
 
20 The provisional treaty with the VOC was concluded in May 1606, based on mutual cooperation against the  
Iberians. The capture of Malacca would entitle the Dutch a place for a rendez-vous in the Straits. Since Malacca 
was not captured by Matelieff, the treaty was replaced with a new one in September of 1606. According to this 
one the Dutch were only entitled to maintain a factory in Batu Sawar.   
De Jonge, De Opkomst, vol. I (1569-1610), 46-62. 
  
21 Rivalry and Conflict , 154.  
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Since 1607 a large Portuguese fleet  patrolled the waters of Johor, whose inhabitants 
frightened by this manifest presence, fled to the mountains. Peace negotiations between 
Malacca and Johor had come to nothing. Curiously, from a letter written by a Dutch merchant 
in Patani to Bantam transpires disillusionment that the Dutch had not delivered on the promise 
made by Matelieff to send ships to Johor and  that they were guilty for the misery in which 
Johor had arrived. First they had drawn the sultan in the war with Malacca merely to forsake 
him afterwards . The Johorites wanted peace with Malacca.22        
Clearly the years of friendship between the Dutch and Johor had not brought Johor the 
political and economic gains it had envisioned;  Matelieff did not drive out the Portuguese 
from Malacca in 1606 and Dutch ships seemed more interested to trade in Patani, one of 
Johor’s Malay rivals, than coming to Johor. Yet the Dutch heavily counted on Raja Bongsu’s 
support in opposing an armistice with Malacca. There was much at stake for the VOC if Johor 
and Malacca would agree on a truce. The chances to establish a rendez-vous in the Straits 
would go up in smoke.  
There is also the question why Malacca was pushing Johor into an armistice to fend off the 
Dutch, when  the Peace Accord of The Hague was signed. Perhaps Verhoeven’s violent 
actions against Portuguese ships in front of Malacca were proof that the Dutch were not 
dissuaded by the Accord to press forward with their plans to capture Malacca. The secret 
amendments to the Accord are prove that the rivalry for the Asian trade would persist with all 
its ramifications. 
 
 
 
 
3. 2. 6     Johor’s capitulation to Malacca in 1610 
One may infer that Sultan Alau’d-din gave in to the truce with Malacca under heavy pressure 
from his orangkaya.  Fear of a rebellion was undoubtedly the thrust to sign the armistice.  
Jacques Obelaer informed his head office at Bantam that on 23 November 1610,  a day after 
the Johorese delegates went to Malacca to officially sign the armistice, Raja Bongsu came to 
the lodge to talk in secret ‘about an issue of great importance’. Bongsu was unreservedly 
apologetic, declaring that he had to make concessions for the sake of his brother the Yang di 
                                                 
 
22  De Jonge, De Opkomst, vol. III, 79-80.  This refers  to a letter written by Victor Sprinckel, the head merchant 
in Patani to Bantam, dated 27 December 1608. 
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Pertoean  and therefore consented to an armistice with Malacca, saying that he would never 
forsake the Prince of Nassau nor the Dutch as long as he lived. He said he was forced to sign 
the armistice because of the dearth which had befallen his country, caused by Malacca’s 
blockade of the river.23  
Bongsu’s mood changed when he learned from the letter from the Prince of Nassau 24 about 
the new situation in Europe and the Accord which Holland and Spain had signed. He was  
overwhelmed by the news and felt deeply hurt. In their reply to the Prince Maurice of Nassau, 
the royal brothers uttered their deep disappointment that Holland was at peace with Spain: ‘to 
whom should we now turn to deliver us Malacca?’25  Curiously the letter to the Prince shows 
only the stamp of Raja Ilir who is Raja Bongsu. One wonders if Sultan Alau’d-din had 
distanced himself from the Dutch for the obvious reasons. Or was he not at hand when the 
letter was written? Was he in neighbouring Pahang where he went on a campaign in 1612 to 
reassert Johor’s control over the ‘rebellious’ state? Or had he left the government of the state 
to his younger brother as Matelieff experienced?  It may seem irrelevant, yet it is a fact that 
Sultan Alau’d-din was not personally involved in the correspondence with Prince Maurice of 
Nassau . I should reiterate that Alau’d-din was open to Malacca’s advances before he even 
knew of the The Hague Accord.  
There is a striking difference in the reaction of  Raja (Ilir) Bongsu and that of Iskandar Muda 
when the latter was informed by the same Prince Maurice of the The Hague Accord. Iskandar 
Muda was disappointed with the Prince’s decision, but he understood that it was difficult for 
the Prince not to give in because Spain was located in the close vicinity of the Republic and 
he could not assist the Prince. But he made it absolutely clear to the Prince that he would 
pursue the Portuguese as long as he lived no matter what the Prince decided. The point is that 
Johor and Malacca were close neighbours and Johor could not fight the Portuguese on its 
own.  
The echoes of the Spanish-Dutch Treaty reverberated in Johor, whose royals considered it a 
breach of the Treaty of  September 1606. Obelaer frantically tried to keep the dejected Raja 
Bongsu on Dutch side against the Portuguese. Bongsu retorted that the (governor)general 
                                                 
 
23 ibid., 304-305: Letter from  Jacques Obelaer dated  25  November 1610; 
    ibid., 90.  
 
24 The letter is not included in the Dutch records and the date unknown, but I assume that it was handed  to him 
by  Obelaer during their nocturnal meeting.  
 
25 De Jonge, De Opkomst, vol. III, 305-307: translation (undated) of  the  letter from  the  Sultan and Raja 
Bongsu of Ilir to Prince Maurice of Orange Nassau.   
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should send an envoy with special authority with whom a permanent agreement should be 
made, because he was tired and wary of the changing policies of the Dutch.26 His indignation 
and hurt are genuine: he had lost face. The VOC had not made good on its promises, instead 
over the years a succession of admirals (Van Heemskerk,Van Warwijck, Matelieff, Both, 
Verhoeven) had all arrived with their requests and ambitious plans.  
 
The signing of the armistice with Malacca was more than anything else an expression of 
Johor’s desperation. It underscored Dutch inability to come to its defence against the 
Portuguese who blockaded the Johor river. Even if Matelieff  injured the Portuguese naval 
force, he did not capture Malacca, the principal condition for the establishing of a Dutch 
rendez-vous within Johor’s territory. The earlier treaty which was signed in June 1606 had 
become redundant and was replaced by the a treaty signed in September 1606. According to 
this new treaty the Dutch were no longer allowed a rendez-vous within Johor’s territory, but 
had to be contend with a factory in Batu Sawar.  
 
Raja Bongsu’s eloquent stance and his prominence in the affairs of  the state, clearly hints at a 
system of dual government in Johor. This was not uncommon in the Malay region, in Perak, 
Siak and Barus one observes that political authority was divided  between the Ulu and Ilir 
(upstream and downstream) constituencies, yet in the case of  Johor this is not acknowledged. 
But the argument which strongly supports the idea of dual government is that Raja Bongsu 
was also known as Raja Ilir and Raja Seberang (the other side). Here he had his fort and his 
residence. His constituents included the orang laut, sea-nomads whose habitat was the 
seascape surrounding the Riau archipelago. He was the co-signatory of the treaties with the 
VOC and the armistice with Malacca and he was the one who signed the letter to Prince 
Maurice of (Orange) Nassau. Statecraft in Johor at that time was divided between the two 
brothers. Their different leanings painfully demonstrates the weakness in the rule of Johor and 
may have contributed to its discomfiture.     
 
 
                                                 
 
26ibid.,   304, 305.  
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3. 2. 7  Aceh’s motif to invade Johor  
An examination of the extant documents enabled us to seize up the complex political situation 
in the Straits. Johor’s significance for all parties in the field of trade and geo- political 
aspirations was its strategic location and its influence over the Malay ports such as Pahang, 
Patani, Siak, Aru, Andragiri, Kampar and Jamby, important suppliers of pepper, bezoar stone, 
camphor, silk and gold. The Dutch expected that as the assumed successor of the Malaccan 
Sultanate,  Johor could be an important ally against the Portuguese. It should be said that 
Johor’s trade was of little significance; the pepper it supplied came mainly from Jamby, while 
Pahang too was an important pepper supplier. The Dutch only briefly refer to the trading of 
bezoar stone and gold.  
 
The brisk developments in the Straits demand that we consider the Acehnese invasion in its  
perspective. It is essential to the understanding of the political realities to explore the possible 
motives of Iskandar Muda for the invasion of Johore and its protracted repercussions. 
To surrender to the hypothesis that the invasion was simply a matter of Iskandar Muda’s 
tyranny and therefore an end in itself, would render the whole discussion futile. Yet this 
seems to have been the paramount charge by the Europeans who were in the area.    
The comunis opinio among historians is that Aceh’s incessant envy of Johor was the very 
reason for its invasion. Let us ponder the possible motifs for Aceh’s aggression before we 
arrive at our own conclusion.   
1. Islam versus the ‘infidel’  
Against the background of Iskandar Muda’s religious commitment to pursue the Portuguese, 
it felt like a blow to him that Johor as the heir of the Sultanate of Malacca closed a pact with 
the ‘infidel’ and invader. The armistice between Johor and Malacca intrinsically put Johor’s 
vassal states and in fact the whole Straits area in an exposed position towards Portuguese 
unambiguous ambitions. Johor’s sphere of influence included a considerable part of the 
Sumatran east coast. The Malacca-Johor constellation effectuated by the armistice could turn 
the power scale in favour of the Portuguese and diminish Aceh’s chances to dispel them from 
Islamic soil.  
 
2.  Dutch-Johor friendship  
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The special friendship between the Dutch and Johor can be regarded the reason for Aceh’s 
invasion. However, between June 1606, when the first treaty between Johor and the Dutch 
was concluded and 1613, the year Iskandar Muda invaded Batu Sawar, seven years passed by 
without actions by Aceh against Johor. The Dutch persisted in their relations with both Johor 
and Aceh even though  the relationship between Iskandar Muda and the VOC towards 1613 
had suffered and made worse by the fact that the company put an embargo on its shipping to 
Aceh. Yet, on the basis of the fact that the laxamana of the Acehnese war fleet requested the 
crew of the De Hoop not to interfere, promising that no harm would be done to them, it is 
overwhelmingly clear that the motif for the invasion was not Johor’s indulgence of the Dutch 
and the fact that the Dutch maintained a factory in Batu Sawar. Denys Lombard’s assertion 
that Aceh was out to destroy Dutch factories is not accurate.27  The facts  presented here give 
reason to assert that Iskandar Muda’s motif for the invasion of Johor, was Johor’s capitulation 
to Malacca. Iskandar Muda considered Johor a traitor, who now de jure was on the side of the 
‘infidel’, making the balance of power skid to the Portuguese. It was a continuation of  the 
geo-politics of the Straits since the Portuguese arrived in Malacca just over a hundred years 
ago.  
 
 
 
 
3. 2. 8    Portuguese reactions to the events  
The Portuguese in Malacca were bewildered by the events. Johor was invaded by their worst 
enemy in front of their very eyes, and the Dutch were making their come-back in Johor. There 
is ample evidence that  Malacca sent an envoy to Aceh to persuade Iskandar Muda to give up 
his planned attack on Malacca. Thomas Best mentions (1613) that he intercepted a Portuguese 
barque in which came an ambassador from Malacca. Iskandar Muda strongly requested that 
he  hand him the barque and its complete cargo, which Best finally did. He was therefore 
rewarded with the title orangkaya puteh. Best did not pay further attention to the political 
implication of the visit of the Malaccan envoy. But where he left, the Dutch continued to 
report. Governor-general Both wrote to the Board of Directors or the Gentlemen XVII on 10 
November 1614  that the powerful king of Aceh and his confederated states were preparing 
                                                 
27 Le Sultanate d’Atjeh au temps d’Iskandar Muda, 92:  « Iskandar cherchait surtout à detruire la factorie 
hollandaise et n’entendait point laisser les Portugais, ou quelque autre puisance, s’installer dans les ruines de 
Batu Sawar »  
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for a siege of Malacca, ‘albeit the fact that  Malacca had sent an ambassador to persuade the 
king to desist from the use of force.’28  
The audacious Iskandar Muda could not be persuaded to abandon his plan for an attack on 
Malacca. The Portuguese grew increasingly desperate, because they were suffering heavy 
setbacks in Pegu 29. An attack on Malacca by Aceh with the help of its allies could ultimately 
mean the loss of the city.   
 
 
  
 
3. 2. 9    The come-back of the Dutch in Johor  
After their humiliation by the Acehnese, the Dutch regained their spirit when the merchants 
were released and sent back to Johor together with Raja Bongsu, who was the newly 
appointed Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah, where they started sorting out their business, even 
if the factory was destroyed by fire. They seemed comfortable with the replacement of Sultan 
Alau’d-din with Raja Bongsu as sultan of Johor.30 He was still inclined to the Dutch.         
In their letters to Bantam, written during their captivity in Aceh, Theunemans and Kistiens do 
not refer to their inhumane treatment by the Acehnese.  It seems that their intervention on 
behalf of Johor had not led to insurmountable problems between Iskandar Muda and the 
VOC.  The Dutch prisoners of war were released together with Raja Bongsu. Trailing behind 
the large fleet of frigates and prahu which convoyed Raja Bongsu to Johor, the Dutchmen 
pillaged a small Malaccan boat. The Portuguese intercepted them and in the ensuing fight five 
of them died and 15 were taken to Malacca where they were severely handled. The head-
merchant was stabbed to death and his dead body was left for two days rotting like that of a 
dog in the streets.31  Several survivors were later sent to Goa, while the rest went to the 
                                                 
 
28 Generale Missiven, vol. I (1610-1638) , 37. 
 
29 idem. 
 
30 Also: Gibson-Hill: “Johor Lama and other ancient sites on the Johor River’, (JMBRAS, 1955,  vol. XXVIII), 
158, footnote 84  ‘Bongsu was unpopular with the Portuguese for his pro-Dutch sympathies, and it was his ‘bad 
counsels’ which were responsible for Alla-al-Din’s defiance of the Portuguese threats in 1603/04, when dom 
Furtado wanted the Malays to expel the Dutch factors at Batu Sawar.’   
 
31Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 28: Letter to the Gentlemen XVII dated 1 January 1614.  
The name of the head merchant is not mentioned.  
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Philippines in 1616 with the returning fleet of the Spanish governor Juan de Silva who had 
died in Malacca during his short stay there.        
 
In Johor the persistent rumour went that the Dutch themselves set fire to their factory before 
the Acehnese invaders could lay their hands on it. They had burried cash and goods under the 
factory. This did not go unnoticed and was reported to the ‘self-proclaimed king’, an 
enigmatic figure who is not named in the merchants’ letters.  
Jan Pieterszoon Coen hinted to the Gentlemen XVII  that the Yang di Pertoewan, divided the 
money between himself and his nobles.32  Was this Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah? 
Curiously, even Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah spoke of this enigmatic person as the coninck.  
De Hoop returned to Johor in 1614 to claim the money and goods, but by then these had 
disappeared. The ‘self-proclaimed king’ had divided the loot between himself and his 
orangkaya. When the factory went up in flames, a part of the goods vanished and the 
Acehnese invaders seized the rest. The merchants had buried about 16.000 Dutch guilders, 
10.000 real, 44 tael gold,  2 golden krisses and the old contract of the factory in the night of  7 
May. 33  Sultan Abdullah Ma’yat Shah registered the names of the persons to whom the money 
was given, with the intention to return this to the Dutch in due time. 
 
 Following up on the talks between Obelaer and Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah, envoy 
Adriaen van der Dussen had arrived in Johor in August 1614 to discuss permanent 
arrangements with the sultan. It is noteworthy that he too referred to the enigmatic person as 
coninck.  
One wonders what kind of permanent arrangements the sultan had in mind: a defence 
alignment against Malacca or one with broader ramifications, for example to evict the 
Acehnese from Johor? Abdullah was in neighbouring Pahang where the ruler, a puppet of 
Johor had been murdered in a rebellion staged by the orangkaya. These orangkaya threatened 
that they would ask the Portuguese for assistance in convoying their candidate who hailed 
from the Bornean fraction, to take possession of the throne. These developments were 
threatening Johor’s political authority over Pahang.   
When Abdullah received the message that the Dutch envoy was in Johor, he immediately 
returned overland by elephant, seemingly eager to meet his important visitor.  
                                                 
32 ibid., 35: Letter dated 1 January 1614 . 
 
33 ibid., 26. 
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Van der Dussen expressed the governor-general’s ‘condolences with the loss of the city’ and 
immediately brought up the issue of reparation for the losses the VOC had suffered as a result 
of Aceh’s invasion. He tried to persuade Abdullah to compensate for these losses, since – as 
he put it – the Dutch had come to his defence, even though the Acehnese had requested them 
not to interfere and promised that no harm would be done to them. He made it clear that they 
had felt bound by the September Treaty of 1606 to defend Johor against foreign aggression. 
Abdullah, quite detached,  replied matter-of-factly that the Dutch had betrayed him and that it 
was their duty to defend him and his country. He lamented that he had lost his city, his home 
and his people and could not reasonably be held responsible for the losses of the VOC. 34 
Albeit the painful confrontation,  the two men went on to discuss the terms for renewed 
cooperation. Abdullah was still inclined to the Dutch and said that if they had only reassured 
him that they would come to Johor’s assistance, he would never have signed the armistice 
with Malacca. He asked the VOC to assist him with ships for an attack on Malacca.35  In 
exchange the company would be allowed the construction of a fort at a chosen site. High 
spirited Van der Dussen promised him assistance. Abdullah immediately had two vessels 
prepared to guide the envoy on a reconnaissance of the area from which he choose the island 
of Crymon (Carimon) as the most convenient site for the construction of a fort. 36 ‘Seeing that 
the king was inclined to us and wholeheartedly presented a site to construct a fort,  I gave his 
Majesty the assurance that the issue would undoubtedly be taken up and effectuated.’37   
From merchant Ryser, who had been in Johor before he travelled to Aceh in 1615, the Dutch 
merchants in Aceh learned that Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah requested Iskandar Muda to grant the 
VOC permission to construct a fort in the Straits. Eventually Iskandar Muda allowed this 
request.  According to Van der Dussen the ‘ambassador of Aceh’ in Johor (Raja Lela 
Wangsa?) also offered his cooperation for the construction of a fort. Could he perhaps have 
been the so-called coninck?    
Two important facts can be drawn from this: Iskandar Muda had no grudge against the VOC 
and Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah could not decide autonomously and depended on his 
                                                 
34 Adriaen van der Dussen, “Cort Verhael vant wedervaeren van Adryaen vander Dussen Opperkoopman 
etcetera” in: Tiele, Bouwstoffen, vol. I, 70-79.  
 
35 Abraham van den Broeck, who talked with Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah in his hiding place in the waters 
around Bintam in 1615, mentions in his letter of 30 September 1615 to J. P. Coen, that the Sultan spoke of  20 
ships for a period of 3 months, as promised by Van der Dussen. Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. VII, (pt.1), 41        
 
36 De Jonge, Bouwstoffen, vol. I, 76.  
 
37 ibid., 75.  
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Acehnese sovereign. Iskandar Muda’s endorsement was obviously given in by the promise 
made by Van der Dussen to assist Johor with ships for an attack on Malacca. The strategic 
partnership between the VOC and Johor, as well as the one between the VOC and Aceh 
looked finally to come into effect by this planned combined action against Malacca.  
Governor-general Both informed the Gentlemen XVII that Aceh and Johor were preparing to 
attack Malacca. He spoke of Aceh and its ‘confederated states’, but he refrained from 
mentioning the assistance promised by Van der Dussen to Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah.38 
 
 
 
 
3.2. 10    A time of flux: fusion and fission 
One may suppose that as the conqueror of Johor, Iskandar Muda set the terms under which 
Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah functioned. Abdullah was evidently obliged to join in an assault on 
Malacca. It means inter alia that Abdullah, even after Aceh’s devastating actions in Batu 
Sawar, still possessed a navy and could make available an army. An attack on Malacca was 
not against Abdullah’s own wishes for he never forgave the Portuguese that they had seized 
Malacca from his grandfather as he reiterated in the presence of  his visitors. The Portuguese 
blockade of the Johor river in 1609 had brought his country at the brink of starvation and had 
led to  Aceh’s aggression. 
The Portuguese were aware of an impending attack on their city and obviously despairing. 
They were suffering heavy setbacks in the region; in Pegu the fortress built by Don Felippo de 
Britto was taken in a popular revolt and the governor together with a number of officials was 
beheaded, while a number of Portuguese were captured and brought as prisoners to the 
hinterland. The Dutch governor-general hoped that this development would work to the 
company’s advantage.39   
Against all odds the Portuguese set out from Malacca to induce Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah, who 
was at his fort in Ilir, to consent to a new peace agreement. They must have sensed Aceh’s 
weak authority over Johor, notwithstanding the presence of Raja Lela Wangsa and a large 
garrison of Acehnese conscripts who were busy reconstructing the city and garrison and they 
                                                 
38 Generale Missiven , vol. I, 37 :Letter to the Gentlemen XVII dated 10 November. 1614. 
 
39 idem. 
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quickly seized the opportunity to intrude before the assistance promised by Van der Dussen 
arrived.40   
They hotly pursued Abdullah who fled from his fort in Ilir to the island of Bintam in the Riau 
archipelago and manoeuvred him into a defenceless position. Pushed to his limits Abdullah 
had no option but to give in and signed a second truce within two years on the island of 
Bintam in 1615. 41 The haunted Abdullah immediately started to construct a fort because it 
was painfully clear that Iskandar Muda would retaliate, notwithstanding the fact that their 
relationship was sealed with Abdullah’s marriage to Iskandar Muda’s sister.  
In the records of the English East India Company we find some rather curious information 
regarding the relationship between the two kings. Captain Arthur Spaight mentions that when 
he arrived in Aceh on 15 April 1615, the king (Iskandar Muda) was in Pedir with the king of 
Johor who has married his sister. ‘Although he be his prisoner, they do often drink together.’  
Was this Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah? The pen of John Millward sketches a similar scene, he 
found ‘the king of Aceh sitting with the king of Johor in a place built for the reception of 
strangers. He used us very kindly and drunk much (ar)rack, which we must pledge.’ 42  
 
When they arrived in Johor in September 1615 the Dutchmen Abraham van den Broeck and 
Hendrick Bruystens were told that Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah had fled to Bintam. They 
redirected their vessel to the Riau Archipelago where they found the sultan and his family 
miserable and dejected in a hiding place protected by the orang laut (the sea-nomads who 
lived in the seascape around the islands). Abdullah seemed relieved when the visitors told him 
that they came on special orders of their director in Bantam. But he became upset that ‘the 
general’ (governor-general Both)  had not delivered on the promise by Van der Dussen to 
                                                 
 
40 The VOC was at that time focussed on the developments in the Spice Islands where the English were 
strengthening their presence. The problems in Bantam were also growing and ships were not readily available.         
 
41 Rather curiously Gibson-Hill claims ‘in 1615 the fugitive Sultan Alau’d- Din signed a treaty with the 
Portuguese at Malacca, to assume government of the state’. “Johor Lama and other ancient sites”, (JMBRAS, 
1955, vol. XXVIII, Pt. 2), 158  
According to our sources  Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah who had fled to Bintam  was visited by the Portuguese 
in 1615 and forced to sign the armistice in 1615.  
 
43 Letters Received, vol. III (1615), 222, 225. 
 - Winstedt claims that Abdullah was abstemious from youth and evidently had no stomach for these potions. He 
is therefore convinced that the king of Johor in this case was Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah. 
“A  History of Johore”, (JMBRAS: 1932, vol. X) (Pt. IV), 44.   
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send him ships for a three months siege of Malacca. He said that Dutch failure to come to his 
assistance had one again forced him to make peace with Malacca.43  
Richard Winstedt has analysed the relationship between Johor and the VOC as one based on 
mutual apprehension: ‘Apparently after being placed on his throne by the Achinese, Sultan 
Abdullah remained at his fort across the river, whence he sent a secret envoy to the Dutch at 
Bantam. Thereupon on 25 August 1614 Adriaen van den Dussen came to Batu Sawar to 
reiterate the request Verhoeff (Verhoeven) had made in January 1609 for leave to build a fort 
for its protection. Again this request excited distrust and was refused: had it been granted, 
Johor would have been saved the agony of many sieges and Malaya would probably be under 
Dutch instead of English protection’.44   
The Portuguese had openly confessed to Abdullah that they feared an Acehnese attack on 
their city and proposed that Malacca and Johor combine their fleets together to withstand the 
Acehnese armada.45  They went as far as to offer him and his family sanctuary in Malacca and 
promised to protect them to their last person. But Abdullah - always distrustful of them - 
rejected this offer. By signing a truce with Malacca, Abdullah also sealed his fate, so to speak. 
He knew that Iskandar Muda would retaliate.  
 
The issues of war and peace in the Malacca Straits region went beyond Johor’s capitulations 
to Malacca and Aceh’s repercussions. It is warranted to focus on the events in Pahang to 
arrive at a critical assessment of the developing processes .   
As earlier mentioned Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah invaded Pahang in 1612 to repulse local 
agitation against his authority.46 In 1614 his vassal Abdul-Ghafur, was murdered by his own 
rebelling son who was against Johor’s authority over Pahang. Sharply divided on the issue of 
succession, Pahang was now in the middle of a deep crisis. The parricide son was eager to 
access the throne, but Johor waited in the corridors with its own candidate Raja Bujang, son 
                                                 
43 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. VII (pt. 1), 44:  Letter dated 30 September 1615. The original missive of Van der 
Broeck is registered as  VOC 1.04.02: 1060; 91a 92; 
    
44 “A History of Johor”, 44. 
 The author claims, after he examined the Malay Annals and the description given by bendahara Tun Sri Lanang 
of his patron Sultan Abdullah, that ‘king Abdullah is the most pleasing and worthy figure among the rulers of old 
Johor. While Sultan Ali Jalla Abdul-Jalil Shah stands out as a fighter, Sultan Abdullah stands out as a diplomat, 
who fell, because he could not serve three masters.’   
 
45 Coen’s  Bescheiden, vol. VII (pt. I), 42.  
Van den Broeck mentions that  Aceh’s force consisted of  twenty thousand men and one hundred galleys, which 
was expected to attack Johor, while Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah could assemble around three thousand men 
(slaves not included).  
 
46 Winstedt quoting Peter Williamsz Floris, “A history of Johor”, (JMBRAS, vol. X, 1932), 32.    
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of  Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah. The orangkaya of Pahang on the other hand preferred a 
candidate from Borneo and asked Malacca for assistance against Johor. Abdullah Ma’ayat 
Shah just back from captivity in Aceh, immediately went with a fleet of small boats (prahu), 
accompanied by three Acehnese galleys to fetch the princess of Pahang, a daughter of the 
murdered ruler, who was betrothed to his nephew Raja Bujang, the candidate for the Pahang 
throne. The Portuguese prevented Abdullah from entering Pahang, leaving the combined 
Johor-Acehnese fleet no choice but to retreat.47 It was a humiliating experience for the new 
Aceh-Johor federation. 
The crucial information given by Abraham van der Broeck is, that the Portuguese, instead of 
convoying the candidate from the Bornean fraction to Pahang as the orangkaya had requested, 
convoyed the Johor candidate Raja Bujang with two vessels to Pahang to take possession of 
the throne, after Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah signed the second armistice in 1615.48 
At this point in the developments one thing is very clear. Even after a century into its 
existence, Portuguese Malacca had to sustain itself amidst an inherently hostile environment. 
The Portuguese were able to exploit noble factions, or disaffection within the Malay ports, to 
their advantage. The orangkaya of Johor as well as those of Pahang were looking to the 
Portuguese for the same reason: trade and political power.  
 
 
 
 
3. 2. 11     Aceh’s revenge   
Johor’s second truce with Malacca was the ultimate challenge to Iskandar Muda. It was a 
setback in the power equilibrium in which Aceh gained over Malacca.  
Malacca’s ability to coerce Abdullah evidently shows Aceh’s ineffective authority over Johor. 
Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah had taken residence in Bintam when the Acehnese armada arrived in 
Johor in the course of September 1615 and for the second time destroyed Batu Sawar. The 
English vessel Solomon which had just arrived from Patani at the entrance of the Straits, was 
visited by Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah : ‘the king of Johor accompanied by five or six praws, 
came aboard our ship, who flying from the King of Achin durst not remain in his own country 
                                                 
 
47  “Cort Verhael”, in: Tiele, Bouwstoffen, I, 70 –79. 
Van der Dussen  relates his conversation with Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah.   
 
48 ibid., vol. I, 118. Admiral Steven van der Hagen (Verhaegen) who was in front of Johor with his fleet in 1615, 
mentions that the Portuguese convoyed Raja Bujang to Pahang.    
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but lived on the water like a fugitive.’49 There is no documented evidence that the English 
assisted Johor against the Portuguese or Aceh.  
 
One of the principal VOC fleets of that time, under the command of Steven van der Hagen 
(Verhagen), departed from the Moluccan islands to the Straits of Malacca at the beginning of 
1616, with the aim to seize a Macao carrack and a galleon on their way to Goa and secondly 
to defend VOC’s interest in Johor and the island of Carimon.50  The fleet of five big ships and 
two smaller yachts, left at the instruction of governor-general Reynst for what seems 
assistance for Johor, as promised by Van der Dussen in 1614. Yet the fleet was badly needed 
in the Moluccan island to fend off the advancing English.  
At the same time a Portuguese fleet was on its way from Goa to succour Malacca against an 
expected Acehnese attack and hoped to assemble with a Spanish fleet coming from the 
Philippines, to attack the Dutch in the Moluccan islands.  
It is warranted to look at the situation as it evolved to get a picture of the interests of the 
parties involved. 
To his great astonishment Admiral Van der Hagen found a situation in the Straits which was 
utterly different from what he expected. He was astonished to note that the Acehnese had 
burnt down the city of Batu Sawar ‘for which we find no other reason than the said king’s 
unmatched tyranny and ambitions’.51  Given Dutch anti-Portuguese feelings and their 
ambition to capture Malacca, it is surprising that Van der Hagen was unable to perceive 
Aceh’s invasion of Johor other than Iskandar Muda’s tyranny. It is a fine example of the 
political idiom so often used by the Europeans to describe local resistance against their own 
intrusion and unconcealed ambitions. It is proof that he came too late to secure Dutch interest 
in Johor. Van der Hagen mentions in his account that the Acehnese armada which consisted 
of  300 vessels and thirty to forty thousand men had entered the river and completely burnt 
down the already vacated city of Johor.52  His dismay over Aceh’s devastation of Johor 
                                                 
 
49 Letters Received, vol. III, 213: Letter from Lucas Antheunisz. dated 31 March 1616.   
 
50 I mention in Part Two chapter III that a fleet from the Moluccan islands was made available for the Straits. In 
1617 Jan Pieterszoon Coen instructed Cornelis Comans to bring this under Iskandar Muda’s attention to obtain a 
contract for the pepper trade on the West coast. The fleet hastily returned to protect Dutch interest in the 
Moluccan islands against the English.      
 
51 ‘Letter addressed to the ‘Bewindhebbers der O.I. Compagnie’ (Gentlemen XVII), dated 10 March 1616   
   in: Bouwstoffen), vol. I, 118-131.   
 
52 Bouwstoffen, vol. I, 118.   
 191
transpires from his letter to Bantam in which he literally says that he had not been able to 
capture the king of Aceh who was at war with the king of  Johor, and that he would do 
everything in his power to defend the king of Johor who resided in Bintam.53      
Returning homewards from Johor, the Achenese armada encountered the fleet from Goa 
which came to Malacca’s relief. In the battle that ensued one of the four Portuguese galleons 
exploded from its own fire. The Acehnese captured between fifty and sixty Portuguese, took 
them to Aceh and confiscated their artillery. Iskandar Muda some time later released these 
captives, one of which  seemed to have been the son of the governor of Malacca. This started 
the rumour that Aceh and Malacca made peace, but this is not supported by any further 
evidence.54   
 
Chancing upon the remaining three Portuguese galleons St. Bento, St. Laurenco and Nossa 
Seignora del Ramejo which were lined up together in the bay of Isla das Naos, an islet right in 
front of Malacca, Van der Hagen was able to claim victory. But he was successful only 
because after a long vehement fight, suddenly the Portuguese panicked,  jumped overboard 
and swam towards the land,  after setting fire to one of their own ships, while the second one 
also caught fire. The Dutch took the Nossa Seignora, pillaged all gunpowder and artillery and 
recovered the artillery from the two wrecks.  
It had been a hard battle and one which Van der Hagen’s men thought they were losing 
because they did not know the area well. Two of their ships almost ran aground, on account of 
the shallow waters and the head winds. The yachts Aeolus and Neptunus encountered 
Portuguese ships and in the bloody battle that followed many lives were lost. From Dutch side 
21 men died; the exact number of Portuguese victims is not given, but it transpires that over 
two hundred men perished. The Dutch were evidently relieved that the confrontation with the 
Portuguese ended with so much luck for them. Van der Hagen lost men, but not ships. The 
Macau carrack and galleon on their annual trip to Goa had not arrived which was a set back 
for the Dutch. The Spanish fleet from the Philippines was expected to leave Manilla in 
January for the Moluccan islands. The fleet had to return swiftly to the Moluccan islands to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Van den Broeck estimated a number of twenty thousand men.      
 
53 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. VII  (pt.1), 68: Letter of 25 December 1615 : ‘Wij hebben den Coninck van Atchin, 
midts de oorloghe tusschen hem ende den coninck van Johor, niet connen becomen ende zullen alle middelen 
aenwenden omme den coninck van Johor, die wij alsnoch nijet en hebben gesproken ende sich hem onder 
Bintam onthoudt, in devotie te houden’.   
 
54 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 180: letter to the Gentlemen XVII dated  31 March 1616.  
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thwart the English from there and to prepare for the Spanish fleet.55 Before he left the 
Malacca Straits, Van der Hagen presented some of the artillery he had seized from the 
Portuguese ships to Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah, to defend himself against Aceh and 
Malacca.   
Taking in Van der Hagen’s unusual remark that he was unable to capture the king of Aceh, it 
appears that the Dutch even at that time had not established a clear policy to secure their 
interest in the area. Jan Pieterszoon Coen earlier brought the disturbed relations with Aceh 
under the attention of the Gentlemen XVII and claimed that Iskandar Muda’s tyrannical 
behaviour towards the VOC and its servants was caused by the fact that it had not responded 
to his request to assist him with several ships for an attack on Malacca. He stressed the 
urgency to assist Iskandar Muda with ships.56  
Later in 1617,  Coen wittingly used Van der Hagen’s presence in the Straits and his success 
against the Portuguese galleons, as the company’s response to Iskandar Muda’s request to 
assist him with ships against Malacca. As brought forward in Part Two chapter III  he 
instructed  Cornelis Comans who went as special ambassador to Iskandar Muda to stress the 
fact that Van der Hagen had booked a triumphant success in the Straits.57   
The fleet from the Philippines under the command of vice-governor Don Juan de Silva arrived 
in the Straits in 1616 when Van der Hagen had returned to the Moluccan islands. The 
Castilleans cut down all the fruit trees in Johor Lama (old Johor) and in Batu Sawar to 
castigate Johor for befriending the Dutch after Johor had signed an armistice with Malacca 
and to demand the artillery captured by Van der Hagen.58 Their brutal action shows that Aceh 
was  absent from Johor.  
From Jambi the Dutch overseer Andries Soury informed Bantam that  Iskandar Muda was 
preparing 200 small prahu ‘to catch the king of Johor’.59 It was Iskandar Muda’s third 
castigation expedition within four years. The regularity of the expeditions lays open Aceh’s 
weakness. Although Iskandar Muda  possessed a tremendous capacity to strike, he was 
                                                 
 
55 See Coen’s instruction to Cornelis Comans who visited the sultan of Aceh during the period 1617-1619.  
Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. VII (pt. 2), 15.          
 
56 This is discussed in Part One,chapter III of this book.  
 
57 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. VII (pt 1), 157. 
 
58 ibid, 152. 
 
59 ibid., 279.  
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incapable to control Johor and spent money and time to pursue Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah. One 
wonders what had become of Johor, was it a no man’s land? The sources do not refer to trade 
in Johor itself after Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah went into refuge. In 1624 the Acehnese drove 
away a downhearted Abdullah from the island of Lingga, destroyed his residence and 
captured a vast number of his subjects. According to local history Iskandar Muda was enraged 
that Abdullah had sent his one of his wives, the sister of Iskandar Muda, back to Aceh. It may 
be a valid reason, but Iskandar Muda relentlessly pursued him. The fact that Abdullah carried 
on some trade with Malacca, because he was deprived of textiles and other necessities, was a 
major reason. The Dutch were aware of Abdullah’s connections with the Portuguese and tried 
to convince him to stop this trade with Malacca, but their advice fell on a deaf man’s ears.60  
 
M.A.P. Meilink Roelofsz’s assertion that the fierce rivalry between the two Malay states Aceh 
and Johor was an important factor in the continued existence of Portuguese Malacca should 
be put into perspective.61 Malacca’s manipulation of Johor in the period described here, drew 
Iskandar Muda’s  aggression against Johor. One should bear in mind that Johor’s capitulation 
facilitated Portuguese infiltration in Johor’s vassal states on the peninsula and in the ports on 
Sumatra’s east coast. Malacca’s divide and rule strategy - exemplified by convoying the 
prince of Johor to Pahang instead of the candidate of the Bornean faction -, deviated Iskandar 
Muda’s wrath towards Johor and towards Pahang. 
It is interesting to compare our own analysis of the historical developments with that of the 
authority on Malay history, Sir Richard Winstedt.  
“On the scene of Johor’s history there are six principal actors: the Malays, the Portuguese, the 
Acehnese, the Dutch, the Bugis and the English, overlapping but in that order of time. Trade 
brought them together and prompted their endless fighting though other lesser motives for war 
occur. The three actors first on stage sometimes advanced the Cross and the Crescent to 
excuse bloodshed; and a motive older than Christianity and Islam compelled those dynastic 
struggles that caused the sacking of Johor Lama by Aceh in 1615”. 62     
                                                 
60 In his letter to the Gentlemen XVII of 6 September 1622,  J. P. Coen suggested to blockade the shipping (from 
the Portuguese) to Lingga and Bintam, because it was disadvantageous for the VOC. 
Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 739.  
 
61 M.A.P. Meilink Roelofsz,  Asian Trade and European Influence  in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 
and about 1630  (The Hague: Martinus  Nijhoff, 1962), 298. 
 
62 “A History of Johore”, (JMBRAS, 1932), vol. X: quoted from the Introduction, 1.   
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With this tour de horizon I have attempted to put the political realities under scrutiny and to 
project the picture of the shifting loyalties and geo-political developments. I feel that  in 
general scholars shrink from contemplating the motifs of war, preferring instead to describe 
war’s impact rather than to analyse the dynamics at work.   
 
 
 
 
3. 2. 12     Conclusion 
The truism that war and conquest do not occur spontaneously but only for a valid reason, may 
offer a guideline to understanding Aceh’s motifs for the invasions of Johor in 1613 and 1615. 
Johor was an important local power factor as the successor of the Sultanate of Malacca and in 
this quality it asserted  authority over several Malay ports. Portuguese influence over Johor 
subsequently gave Malacca access to the Malay ports on the Peninsula and the island of 
Sumatra.  Iskandar Muda’s invasions of the ports of Aru and Deli which were under Johor’s 
umbrella, took place around 1611 and 1612 and must be viewed against this background. 
These were calculated attacks aimed at deterring the Portuguese who were able to sign a truce 
with Johor in 1610. The locus standi between Aceh and Johor was not their commonly 
perceived rivalry. The hostilities between them started early in the sixteenth century. In the 
eyes of Aceh it was Johor’s indulgence of the Portuguese invader in Malacca that conditioned 
the further course of events.   
Malacca’s blockade of the river Johor was in response to Dutch encroachment and their 
treaties with Johor. The VOC fleet under admiral Verhoeven had just left the Straits after 
inflicting heavy damage on Malaccan ships when the Portuguese took their chance to 
blockade the Johor river. The truce which they forced on Johor in 1610 was to draw Johor 
away from the Dutch. Although the rulers of Johor were divided over the course Johor would 
follow, in the end they signed the armistice with Malacca.   
 
Iskandar Muda invaded Johor in 1613 because of Johor’s capitulation to Malacca. On the face 
of  it, his invasion was successful in that he secured an alliance against Malacca by installing 
Raja Bongsu as his vassal. Bongsu, however, was not strong enough to withstand the 
Portuguese on his own. The Portuguese in Malacca were intimidated by Iskandar Muda’s 
striking capabilities, but recognized his weak authority over Johor. The second peace treaty  
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they forced on Johor in 1615, intrinsically shows Iskandar Muda’s ineffective control of 
Johor.  
The motif for Aceh’s invasion in 1613 was not because of Dutch presence and privileges in 
Johor but because of Malacca’s influence in Johor. Johor’s capitulation caused the balance of 
power to skid to the Portuguese. The invasion in 1615 was again in response to Malacca’s 
coercion of Johor to sign a second truce.   
From admiral Verhagen’s shocked reaction to Iskandar Muda’s devastation of Johor in 1615, 
it is quite clear that the Dutch had not yet articulated a clear policy to address the interstate 
conflicts in the Straits which affected the geo-political balance of power.                    
    
Part Three                      
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER  III 
 
                           EXPEDITIONS TO  MALAY AND SUMATRAN PORTS  
 
 
 
 
3. 3. 1    The castigation of Pahang in 1617 and 1618   
The Portuguese convoyed Raja Bujang, the prince of Johor, to Pahang in 1615. It was another 
set back to Iskandar Muda’s efforts to shatter Portuguese authority and diminish Johor’s 
influence in the Straits. In the ongoing struggle between Malacca and Aceh for hegemony in 
the Straits region, the Portuguese jealously guarded that the power scale would not turn in 
favour of Aceh. This was understandably their strategy to survive in an inherently hostile 
environment, where they were never sure of the loyalty of the local rulers on which they 
relied substantially for their basic needs like food and for their trade. While in 1614 they 
deterred the combined Johor/Acehnese fleet from infiltrating in Pahang, coming to the support 
of the orangkaya of Pahang, they now supported Johor in its bid to gain authority over 
Pahang. This turn came after Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah signed the forced armistice in 
Bintam to break Aceh’s authority over Johor in 1615.   
An interesting question is whether Iskandar Muda earlier supported  Johor in its bid to put a 
Johor prince on the throne of Pahang whence the combined Johor/ Aceh fleet went? It is 
undeniable that Iskandar Muda would have influence over Pahang through his vassal state 
Johor. 
Malacca’s intervention in the internal politics of Johor and Pahang, now even convoying the 
Johor prince to Pahang to take over the throne, invited Iskandar Muda’s response. His armada 
attacked Pahang in 1617 and took members of the royal family and thousands of the 
inhabitants as prisoners of war to Aceh. Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah grieved that Iskandar 
Muda had taken his son (or was it his nephew Raja Bujang?) to Aceh and requested Dutch 
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assistance to bring him back in return for his favours.1 Calculating as the Dutch were, they 
seriously considered Abdullah’s request, because they counted on his mediation to obtain 
permission to trade in the ports of Campar and Andragiri located on Sumatra’s east coast over 
which Johor had strong influence. It is a clear indication that Iskandar Muda did not control 
these ports, but that Abdullah assumed a degree of authority over these ports.  
The dire conditions in which the war captives found themselves in Aceh accounted for many 
deaths. They were basically left to starve in the streets of the city, many dying from hunger 
and neglect. They rebelled against the Acehnese laxamana and in this revolt the laxamana 
was injured. It was the second time that they had sought to murder him. If we are to believe 
the report of Cornelis Comans who was on his mission to Aceh, Iskandar Muda had hundreds 
of the rebels viciously murdered by hurling them to death against a wall and their bodies 
dumped in the river.2   
Nothing could be of greater contrast with this inhumane action than the interpolation in the 
Bustan as-Salatin by Nurud’din al Raniri, the religious leader and ideological force behind 
Sultan Iskandar Thani. He insisted on Pahang’s divine status for it delivered Aceh Sultan 
Iskandar Thani, who was captured during the Acehnese invasion. It is instructive to know that 
both Pahang and Johor were successor states of the Sultanate of Malacca where the sons of 
the deposed sultan set up their courts. In the quest for authority over the Malaccan territories 
they became rivals. Iskandar Muda’s second invasion of Pahang in 1618 was his punishment 
for Pahang’s friendship with the Portuguese. Remarkable is Denys Lombard’s claim that 
‘Johor and Pahang were strategic crossing points of commerce, which Iskandar Muda invaded 
to control and not to destroy.’3 The weakness of this claim is, that when the Acehnese armada 
attacked Johor for a second time in 1615 and burnt it to the ground, it eventually and 
unmistakably destroyed its prospects for commerce and trade. Iskandar Muda’s ruthless 
actions in Johor do not underscore Lombard’s claim that he wanted to establish control over 
its trade. Johor was left abandoned of its people and of its trade. The Spanish fleet which 
arrived in the Straits from the Philippines in 1616 cut down all the remaining fruit trees in 
Johor Lama and Batu Sawar, apparently without intervention or  resistance from the 
Acehnese. Iskandar Muda was evidently more interested in destroying Abdullah Ma’ayat 
                                                 
1 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 329  Letter to the Gentlemen Seventeen, dater 24 June 1618.  
  
2 ibid., vol.VII, 404. Extracted from a letter from Cornelis Comans at Priaman dated 22 February 1619. 
‘In Atchijn is orangkaya Laxamana van de Pahanders gequetst twelck nu de tweede mael is, dat se hem gesocht 
hebben om te brengen, den coninck heeft meer als hondert van de principale Pahanders doot doen smijten ende 
in de rieviere doen werpen’. 
 
3 Lombard,  Le Sultanat d’Atjéh, 93.     
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Shah and pursued him wherever he took his refuge. For the VOC it was not profitable to 
invest in a volatile situation in which the king of Johor was on the run for the king of Aceh.4 
As I earlier stated, Johor became a no-man’s land and the focus of attention of the European 
traders changed to where Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah took his refuge, which was the island of 
Bintam.  
      
 
 
3. 3. 2     The fate of a captured prince  
Sultan Iskandar Thani, a captured prince of Pahang was the son of the ex ruler Ahmad who 
was overthrown by his brother Abdul-Ghafur. The Bustan describes the scenes of his 
appointment by Iskandar Muda many years before the latter’s death as divine ordinance: 
‘Iskandar Muda conquered Pahang because it was Allah’s will and he followed this because 
he was Allah’s faithful servant. Comparing Pahang to Egypt, the composer of the Bustan 
Nuru’d-din al Raniri, expounds that Allah likewise gave Egypt to his faithful servant ‘prophet 
Joseph.’5  The story that Pahang had to be conquered, to bring Sultan Iskandar Thani on the 
throne of Aceh was a pastiche of the reality. Nuru’d-din al Raniri gave marvellous 
explanations of disturbing events and occurrences, true historical facts in the guise of 
prophecies and myths. Aceh could therefore assume leadership of  the Malaccan territories, 
rivalling with Johor. I discussed the occupational anxieties of the composers and writers of the 
chronicles and hikayat in Part One Chapter II.       
It may be in the interest of the historical accuracy, to try to establish who ruled Pahang after 
Sultan Abdul–Ghafur, the pro-Johor ruler, was murdered by his son in 1614. The orangkaya 
were in favour of a candidate who hailed from the Borneo faction and relied on the 
Portuguese to convoy their favourite to Pahang. Having obtained  the trust of the orangkaya, 
the Portuguese hoped to obtain a foothold in the South China Sea. In the end the Portuguese 
                                                 
 
4 The Gentlemen XVII thought it unwise to proceed with constructing a fort in Johor, because they saw no 
profits there and since they suffered great losses in 1613 (during Acehs invasion). They also contemplated that it 
would be better to close useless forts and factories, because they were draining the Company’s resources. 
Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. IV, letter dated 30 November 1615, 324.   
 
5 Bustanu’s-Salatin, bab II, fasal 13 
‘Sultan Iskandar Muda mena‘alokkan negeri Pahang antara lain ia-lah kerana Allah hendak melakukan iradat-
nya kapada sa-orang hamba-nya. Saparti juga Allah hendak mengurniai kerajaan Masir kapada Nabiu’l-lah 
Ysuf.  Bagitu pula hakikat Sultan Iskandar Muda mena‘alokkan negeri Pahang itu kerana hendak menyambut 
Sultan Iskandar Thani supaya menggantikan-nya sa-bagai raja Acheh. Dengan ilmu firasat di-lihat oleh Sultan 
Iskandar Muda kebahagiaan pada muka putera tersebut.’   
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convoyed Raja Bujang, son of the former Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah of Johor to Pahang 
in 1615. I.W. Linehan offers a view of the political situation based on an account from a 
Chinese source which says “the parricide prince, son of Sultan Abdul-Ghafur, who usurped 
the throne in 1614, was still ruling in 1618, but Pahang had become a piratical State in which 
revolts and disorder were rife; there were two competing princes, the scion of indigenous 
Pahang stock, son of Sultan Abdul-Ghafur, and Raja Bujang, (later Sultan Abdu’l-Jalil III of 
Johor), the nominee of Johor.”6    
The information that the parricidal son of Abdul-Ghafur ruled the country in 1618, adds much 
to the  confusion. What happened to the Johor pretender Raja Bujang, was he captured by the 
Acehnese in 1617 and brought to Aceh or was he on the run ? Did Sultan Abdullah Ma’yat 
Shah of Johor refer to him when he asked the VOC to help in bringing his son back from 
captivity? If Raja Bujang was indeed captured by the Acehnese, it means that Iskandar Muda 
released him at a certain point in time, for he succeeded Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah in 
1624 as Sultan Abdu’l -Jalil III of Johor. In 1638, two decades after a second Acehnese 
invasion which occurred in 1618, a truce was signed between Aceh and Pahang shortly after 
Sultan Iskandar Thani (the Pahang prince), was installed on Aceh’s throne. This inter alia 
means that Aceh’s control over Pahang after it invasions, had gradually ceased and a truce 
was needed to restore Aceh’s influence.  
 
 
 
 
3. 3. 3     The ravage of Kedah in 1619 
Iskandar Muda’s determination to destroy Portuguese hegemony and European influence in 
the region grew stronger year after year. The incomes from the trade gave him ample room to 
enlarge his fleets, made bigger by the confiscation of ships and ammunition from the invaded 
ports. His armada invaded Kedah, a pepper port on the west coast of the Malay peninsula in 
1619, cut down all pepper vines, killed all the cattle and destroyed everything in its way. The 
Portuguese were the principal traders in Kedah and this vengeful act was most certainly 
Iskandar Muda’s response to their lingering presence in the port. As a result of this 
extirpation, Kedah was no longer available  to procure pepper. Like the Portuguese, the Dutch 
                                                 
6 I.W. Linehan, “A History of Pahang”, (JMBRAS, vol. XIV), 35. The Chinese source quoted here is “Tung Hsi 
Yang K’an. 
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had been regular customers in Kedah which was  famous as a pepper supply station. Jan 
Pieterszoon Coen, at that time governor-general (1619-1623) wrote to the Gentlemen XVII 
that the Orangeboom could not procure pepper in Kedah any longer because the Acehnese cut 
down all the  pepper vines. It redirected its course to Aceh to procure 116 bahar of pepper 
against 44 real a bahar. 7  I should refer to merchant Casembroot’s letter in which he 
mentioned that there was plenty of pepper in Aceh, ‘more than the Orangeboom could carry.’ 
(Part Two: chapter IV). Iskandar Muda had dropped his price from 48 real to 44 real.     
The fierceness of the Acehnese attack even struck the diehard Coen with astonishment. His 
loathing for Iskandar Muda had mounted since the latter requested that the Dutch deliver him 
the king of Johor in exchange for a shipload of pepper. Dutch loyalty to Johor and especially 
to Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah was unprecedented; this loyalty was not only based on 
Dutch geo-political ambitions and the power strategy, but it came also from deep sympathy 
for Abdullah.   
Coen feared that Iskandar Muda would continue from there to Patani which had sent 2000 
men to assist Kedah. ‘It looks like the Atchijnder is out to attack all his neighbours, just like 
the ‘Mataram’(Sultan of Mataram on Java), is doing to the Javanese kings.’ A reproachful 
Coen spoke in one breath of the wickedness, cruelness and Godliness of the Atchynder and 
the Mataram who were out to establish and empire, like the King of Spain did in Europe. 8   
 
The cold blooded rape of Kedah came right at a time when it was most vulnerable. For several 
years it had endured epidemics, diseases and famine which raged havoc and caused the death 
of two thirds of its inhabitants. The king’s forty elephants and a huge number of cattle 
succumbed to diseases. At that desperate moment the Achenese attacked. They operated with 
wickedness, destroyed everything in their way; only a few people were able to escape and 
were left behind in a desolate situation. The devastation tactics had all the characteristics of a 
hongi expedition.9   
French admiral Augustin De Beaulieu is our most eloquent source with regard to the events in 
Kedah where he witnessed the aftermath of the Acehnese rampage which had taken place two 
                                                 
7 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I, 708: Letter dated 26 March 1622.  
 
8 idem 
‘Den Atchijnder is met alle zijn macht op Queda gevallen, van meninge zijnde Patani daernaer mede te 
besoecken. Die van Patani hebben naer Queda 2000 man te hulpe gesonden. ‘tSchijnt, dat het den Atchijnder op 
alle zijn gebueren gemunt heeft, even gelijck den Mattaram op de Javaense coningen doet. Sy souden hier immer 
soo groten monarchie wel stabilieren willen, als de coninck van Spangien in Europa soect te doen’ 
 
9 A ‘hongi’ expedition was similar to extirpation. The VOC carried out hongi expeditions in the Spice islands.  
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years ago. He went there on the advice of  Portuguese captives he bought free in Aceh, who 
were acquainted with Kedah and told him about the fine quality of the pepper the Portuguese 
procured in Lankawi also known as Pulau Lada (pepper island). They accompanied him and 
functioned as his mediators with the local authorities. From the penghulu in Lankawi with 
whom he hoped to negotiate the procurement of pepper, he learnt that the incumbent king of 
Kedah, who resided in Perlis on the main land, still assumed control over Lankawi.10 He was 
the son of the captured king. This remarkable information makes clear that Iskandar Muda 
had not established political authority over Kedah and Lankawi. The king was willing to sell 
De Beaulieu 30 bahar of pepper in exchange of 2 canons, but the latter thought it unwise to 
risk Iskandar Muda’s wrath for he was returning to Aceh to  pursue a license to trade in Tiku..     
The Acehnese had besieged Kedah for three months, at times standing waist-length in the 
water. Iskandar Muda had threatened his men that if they did not bring him the king of Kedah 
he would cut them in two pieces.11  The king and his family had taken refuge behind the 
fortress. He surrendered to the Acehnese after they convinced him that Iskandar Muda would 
not hurt him because he admired his great stamina and the manner in which he controlled his 
dependencies. The miserable king was left no option, because he lacked food and was badly 
injured. The crown prince who advised his father against surrendering, was able to flee and 
evade the Acehnese without his father’s approval. 
The Acehnese destroyed all the fruit trees, killed the surviving cattle, burnt down the city, and 
took 7000 people to Aceh. The devastation was so complete, that even after several years it 
was impossible to see where the city once stood. The few survivors in the ill-fated place were 
traumatized to such an extent by the past event, that every time they spotted even a small 
prahu at the horizon, they ran for cover to the hills fearing that the Acehnese or their allies 
were coming back to attack them. They were bereft of even their tools and depended for their 
food on the neighbouring countries. Patani sent some 2000 men to assist Kedah and an 
amount of rice ‘of which they were plundered ’to the bereaved people who were starving.12   
The Acehnese had confiscated their tools, to prevent them from building houses, or to do 
anything for which they needed these tools. By ravaging the land and cutting down all the 
pepper vines, the Acehnese made sure that Kedah was no longer available for foreigners to 
procure pepper.     
                                                 
 
10 Lombard,  Mémoires, 159.  
 
11  ibid., 169. 
    
12  ibid., 168.  
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 When they arrived in Aceh, the captives were chased to the outskirts of the city, where they 
were bereft of food and necessities, many starved to death. Out of a total of 7000 captives 
only 500 survived, a tragic testimony of Iskandar Muda’s growing callousness. He executed 
the king and his family and the orangkaya, justifying it as God’s punishment for their impiety. 
De Beaulieu mentions that the people of Lankawi sneered at the executed king of Kedah, 
saying that he was a cruel tyrant and impious and that he had evoked God’s wrath because of 
his bad inclinations.13  
In stark contrast to De Beaulieu’s account of the horrors which befell Kedah through the 
Acehnese rampage and to the observations of the VOC merchants, is the following statement 
in the ‘Encyclopaedy Sejarah dan Kebudayaan Melayu’: 
‘Iskandar Muda menakluki Johor, Pahang dan Perak, dan ikut persahabatan dengan Kedah.’ 
‘Iskandar Muda conquered Johor, Pahang and Perak and made friendship with Kedah.’14   
Friendship with Kedah is a distortion of the historical reality.    
When De Beaulieu was in Lankawi in July 1621 the Acehnese armada consisting of three 
large galleys and 25 to 30 smaller vessels was on its way to Perak the renowned tin supplier. 
Rumours were circulating that the armada would proceed from there to Lankawi to cut down 
all the pepper vines on the island.15 This is neither confirmed by De Beaulieu nor by the 
northern Europeans in the area.  
 
 
 
 
3. 3. 4     The subjugation of Perak in 1620 and the threat to Patani 
D.G. E. Hall is convinced that Iskandar Muda victimized Perak  because of its tin16. Thomas 
Best reported in 1613 that the king confiscated a ship from Surat because it had been in Perak, 
which he considered his enemy.17 Perak played a significant role in Aceh’s development. In 
                                                 
 
13 ibid., 169. 
 
14 (Kuala Lumpur : Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1999), 5 vols.), jilid I , 2nd ed. of the first publication , 79. 
 
15 Lombard,  Mémoires, 158.  
 
16 A History of Southeast Asia, 469.  
 
17 Thomas Best used the word ‘enemy’ thus underlining the already troubled  relationship in 1613.    
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the fifties of the sixteenth century the Acehnese built a fort in Perak to protect  the trade from 
Malabar against Portuguese attacks. Located at shoulder length of Malacca, Perak was a 
strategic port to monitor the shipping in the Straits of Malacca. The Acehnese captured the 
royal family and a Perak prince was installed as sultan of Aceh, ruling from about 1577 to 
about 1585 when he was assassinated. He was known as a pious ruler who called for the 
Friday prayer.      
Jacques Coetelij of the VOC who visited Aceh reported on 1 July 1620 to the head office at 
Bantam that almost all of Iskandar Muda’s galleys had departed from Aceh to assault Perak. 
Coetelij was sure that Aceh’s fleet would be deterred by four Portuguese men of war in front 
of Malacca.18 The manifest presence of these Portuguese force in the Straits at that time 
demonstrates Portuguese readiness to defend their interest in the Straits region against Aceh. 
Iskandar Muda asked the Dutch for assistance to attack the Portuguese ships in return for an 
extension of the contract in Tiku.19  Merchant Adriaen van der Dussen who was in Jamby 
reported on 27 December 1620 that Malacca was busy erecting walls and bulwarks as if it 
expected an attack by the Acehnese.20  Two VOC ships under the command of Cornelis 
Comans were patrolling the waters around Malacca and were within easy reach of the 
Portuguese vessels. It worried Malacca which feared that a fleet of  40 VOC ships was on its 
way to attack her. The Portuguese asked king Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah to sell them 10 pieces 
of artillery for which they would pay four bahar of gold, but Abdullah  responded indignantly 
that his artillery was not for sale, even if paid in gold.21 
Despite the fact that the Dutch had for long been trading in Perak, their presence there so far 
had not been of real concern to Iskandar Muda. But the withering relations with the Dutch and 
the English added to his anxiety concerning the region’s trade. His armada invaded Perak in 
1620 and took thousands of captives to Aceh. The sources are silent about a confrontation 
between the Acehnese and the Portuguese. Iskandar Muda now controlled the tin trade.22  
                                                 
18 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. VII, (pt.2), 610.  
 
19 ibid., 612 mentioned by Nicolaes Casembroot. 
 
20 ibid., 686. 
 
21 ibid., vol. VII, (pt.1), 686.  
    
22 In 1639 the VOC negotiated a contract with Sultan Iskandar Thani to buy tin in Perak which means that for 
many years Perak was controlled by Aceh. Interestingly after the fall of Malacca in 1641 the Dutch governor of 
Malacca approached the ruler of Perak with the request to give the VOC the sole rights of the tin trade and 
exclude all foreigners. He was categorically refused. Angered, the VOC launched a blockade of the Perak river. 
The ruler managed to hold out in the face of the blockade. Unsuccessful to wrest a contract, the VOC could not 
but approach the queen of Aceh, Taju’l-Alam Saffiatu’d-din Shah to ask her blessing. The VOC obtained a 
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Governor-general Pieter de Carpentier (1623 to1627) informed the Gentlemen XVII that 
Perak had been conquered and that Iskandar Muda was busy to project an invasion of Patani. 
He said that fear also held in its grip Jambi, Andragiri and all the Sumatran ports. As earlier 
mentioned Iskandar Muda’s vast grip on the trade of the west coast was reason for a defiant 
Carpentier to propose a blockade on Aceh and the ports of Tiku and Priaman to deter vessels 
from going there and  to encircle the Acehnese armada with a fleet of sailing yachts and flat 
bottomed boats if Iskandar Muda proceeded with his plan to assault Patani, ‘This would mean 
the end of the Atchynder’!23  One can imagine Dutch anxiety for they had been trading in 
Patany since 1601, where they set up a factory after they established the Zeeland factory in 
Aceh. Patani was well known for its pepper, silk, rice and benzoin. In 1620 all the available 
pepper in Patani was in the hands of the Dutch.24  
The female ruler of Patani expected an attack by the Acehnese because she had sent 2000 men 
to assist Kedah against the Acehnese and feared Iskandar Muda’s retribution.  
As early as 5 October 1614 the English merchant Adam Denton wrote to London that ‘the 
queen of Patani was suffering no junk nor man or person to depart, reserving all for the 
Achinders who are certainly expected with the first of the Spring to be here, being already 
arrived at Jor (Johor), with great forces, yet some think he will attempt Malacca itself.’25  
The queen allowed the Portuguese to trade in her port since they threatened her country’s 
territorial integrity by entering her waters. Interesting is her apology to the Dutch, explaining  
her difficult position, saying that she had no choice but to make peace with Malacca, begging 
for a continuation of the friendly relations with her country and requesting them not to molest 
her ships going to Malacca and the Moluccan islands as well as the Portuguese vessels in 
Patani’s waters.26 In his reply of 2 July 1619 Jan Pieterszoon Coen said that although the 
company preferred that she continued the war with Malacca, Dutch ships would not molest 
                                                                                                                                                        
contract on the condition that the company and Aceh would share equally in the tin trade, excluding other 
traders.      
 
23 Generale Missiven, vol. I, 614: letter dated 9 July 1621.  
 
24 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. VII (pt. 2), 662. 
 
25 Foster, Letters Received, vol. II, 52.  
 
26 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. I., 613: Letter  to the Gentlemen XVII, dated 8 January 1621. Strangely only in this 
letter I find a reference to the letter of the Queen of Patani of which no date is mentioned. The reply by Coen was 
on 2 July 1619.    
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her ships but would treat them friendly. He keenly requested that she send rice to Jacatra and 
left open her request to refrain from attacking Portuguese ships.27  
 
The general consternation of an imminent Acehnese attack on Patani has contributed to  
uncertainty about its materialization. The foreign sources give no evidence of this. One should 
realize that Patani’s location in the far corner of the northeast coast of the Malay peninsula 
would take the Acehnese fleet several weeks to reach. It was a dangerous undertaking with 
the Portuguese ‘men of war’ in front of Malacca and the likelihood of the Anglo-Dutch 
defence alliance coming to Patani’s help. Iskandar Muda undoubtedly realized that the rate of 
success was minimal. His many and diverse enemies were ready to attack him.  
A letter written by Iskandar Muda to the King of France on 27 June 1621 may provide the 
clue to the political reality. In the preamble of this letter Iskandar Muda calls himself ‘the 
conqueror with the help of God of many territories in the east: Deli, the kingdom of Johor and 
its dependencies, the kingdom of Pahang, the kingdom of Kedah, the kingdom of Perak and in 
the west: the kingdom of Priaman, the kingdom of Tiku and the kingdom of Passaman.’28 
Patani is missing from the list.   
 
  
 
 
3. 3. 5     The intimidation of Jambi  
In the course of 1624 Aceh’s armada chased away Johor’s Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah 
from the island of Lingga. That same year the sultan, long friend of the Dutch, died, a hunted 
wanderer, on the Tanambel islands, from what the Dutch called ‘a broken heart’. Governor-
general Carpentier feared that this was the end of the famous empire of Johor.29 But he was 
wrong, Johor remained an important factor in the regional power play.      
The rulers of Andragiri, Kampar, Jambi and Palembang, who were all connected through 
kinship ties and to the Johor royal family, feared that  Iskandar Muda would attack their lands.  
                                                 
 
27 ibid., vol. II, 574. 
 
28 Lombard,  Mémoires, 151,152. 
 
29 Generale Missiven, vol. I, 144, 145: Letter to the Gentlemen XVII dated 3 January 1624 . 
 
 206
Earlier in 1620 Andragiri asked Malacca’s help against Aceh, promising a constant delivery 
of pepper. It resulted in Aceh’s attack of Andragiri in 1624. Aceh‘s attack did not lead to its 
permanent control over Andragiri. From the VOC sources we gather that the ruler of 
Andragiri invited the Dutch to trade in his port after the Acehnese invasion of 1624 but they 
saw no advantages.    
One of the widows of Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah’s was a daughter of the king of Jambi. 
After her husband’s death she fled with her young son to her father. Iskandar Muda sent his 
envoys to Jambi to request their extradition., with the clear message that if he refused to 
comply he would destroy Jambi.30 Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah’s young son was the heir to 
the throne of Johor and destined to reign Johor as soon as he would come of age. It should be 
reiterated that the sultan was also married to Iskandar Muda’s sister in 1614 when he was a 
captive in Aceh. The king of Jamby did not comply with the request and started preparing a 
resistance force of 4000 men; he sent all women and children to the mountains. The ruler of 
neighbouring Palembang, whose daughter was married to a prince of Jamby, sent another 
4000 men to Jambi’s relief, while a force of 3000  Minancabao men was ready to defend 
Jamby.31 It was a unified effort to counter an imminent Acehnese attack. 
Although the king of Jambi had at his command some 11.000 troops, he requested from the 
English and the Dutch protection against an Acehnese attack, in exchange for trade contracts. 
The English explained that they had significant cash standing out in Aceh and a number of 
merchants residing there and could therefore not afford to assist Jambi, which the Dutch 
considered a pretext to remain on good terms with Iskandar Muda.  
Bartholomeus Kunst, the successor of Van der Dussen in Jambi, promised the king Dutch 
assistance against Aceh. He even promised assistance to the ruler of Palembang when he 
learned that Iskandar Muda also threatened his port.32 He asked Batavia to send ‘a respectable 
fleet’ to Jambi , but at the same time advised that no hostile actions be taken against the 
Acehnese, obviously hoping that the presence of the fleet would work as a deterrent.   
Even if the governor-general was a strong critic of Iskandar Muda,  he was apprehensive to 
comply with the request of his merchant to send a fleet to Jambi, seriously pondering the 
odds, fearing that the company would lose out on the west coast which Iskandar Muda 
controlled. In the end he resolved to send a small fleet under the command of Jan Willem 
                                                 
30 ibid., 194 : Letter to the Gentlemen XVII dated 4 february 1625. 
 
31 ibid., (footnote 59).  
 
32 Tiele, Bouwstoffen, vol. II, XXVI.   
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Verschoor, when it looked certain that Aceh was preparing an attack on Jambi in 1625.33  
Jambi had gradually become the chief supplier of pepper to the European traders. It became 
extremely difficult to obtain pepper on Java. One of the reasons to send a fleet to succour 
Jambi was that Dutch private traders committed piracy on vessels from Jamby, which caused 
the king’s great irritation towards the VOC. 34  
It must have been a great relief for the Dutch that the Acehnese threat of Jambi did not 
effectuate, because war with Iskandar Muda was a last resort to defend their trade in Jamby. 
As I set out in Part Two chapter IV, the fear of an Acehnese strike impacted heavily on the 
region’s trade which had almost come to a halt. Jambi’s king refused to let anyone trade with 
the Minancabao people who brought their produce from the highlands. The Dutch seriously 
considered to leave from there, fed up with his ‘unbearable’ procedures. For a while the 
merchants operated from their vessels, which was less costly and easier in case of an attack by 
either the Portuguese or the Acehnese. The English too closed their factory in Jambi.  
 
 
 
 
3. 3. 6     Conclusion  
The tangled interests of the actors in the geo-political playing field, make it  precarious to 
look at the events in isolation and base an opinion on these, without acquainting oneself with 
the issues of war and peace which intrinsically encompassed geo-politics in the Malacca 
Straits region. Underlying motifs can often prove to be the missing links to a coherent 
understanding of the logic of the developments. Fusion and fission were evidently the norms, 
but the issues behind these realities are not always clear. 
Iskandar Muda’s attacks and invasions of the ports were linked to Portuguese presence there. 
This is especially clear in the case of Pahang, Kedah and also Jambi, while the letter of the 
Queen of Patani to the Dutch speaks of the Portuguese trading in Patani.  
 
Aceh’s key role in opposing the Portuguese could not be divorced from controlling the trade 
and politics of the ports. The ports bore the brunt of the Acehnese obsession to dispel the 
                                                 
 
33 Generale Missiven, vol. I, 160: Letter to the Gentlemen XVII dated 27 January 1625.  
 
34 Tiele, Bouwstoffen,  vol.II, xxvi. 
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Portuguese from the Straits. Iskandar Muda’s actions set forth protracted struggles with the 
local rulers whose lands he invaded and devastated and whose trade he usurped.  
A cohesive stance against the Portuguese was not easy to bring about, because the ports 
traditionally sustained from trade with the outside world and were not willing to give up this 
right. The Portuguese were no longer newcomers in the Straits, having been there over a 
century and especially to the merchant orangkaya it seemed more advantageous to trade and 
cooperate with them than to antagonize them. These ports were wary of a new political order 
embodied by Aceh, which dictated the rules and norms and regarded their interest as futile, 
claiming monopoly over their trade. When possible they supported each other with troops and 
food against the brutal invasions of the domineering sultanate  
The encroachment of the northern Europeans and their efforts to obtain trade monopolies also 
contributed towards Iskandar Muda’s aggressive actions against several ports especially on 
Sumatra’s west coast. Aceh’s invasions of the ports are perceived as ‘conquests’, but scholars 
leave issues like the nature of these conquests undiscussed. Certainly in the case of Johor it is 
apparent that ‘conquest’ did not involve the absorption of the conquered state, but merely its 
reduction to a vassal state in which the vassal - in this case Johor - maintained an 
administration and a naval force. Johor is a clear example of a vassal state which was poorly 
overseen by its Acehnese subjugator, posing a persistent problem to Aceh’s efforts to break 
Portuguese authority. Traditionally members of the ruling families were often still in place as 
vassal rulers alongside an Acehnese panglima acting as governor. This system had its flaws 
and posed an unexpected problem for the victorious conqueror, because the vassal rulers were 
vulnerable to manipulation by powerful neighbours like Malacca and foreign merchants. Even 
Johor which was reduced to a vassal state of Aceh was able to assume control over Pahang 
with the help of the Portuguese. Tiku is another clear example where the king of Tiku and the 
Acehnese  representative both dealt with the foreign merchants.  
 
Iskandar Muda’s power rested principally on his great military force which enabled him to 
attack the ports, but he did not develop a system of permanent and effective control over 
them.  A consequence of this political limitation was regional instability, because the 
Portuguese were forcing agreements on the rulers of Johor, Pahang and the unconquered 
Patani which was in constant fear of an Acehnese reprisal. The Bustan as-Salatin includes a 
chronological summary of Iskandar Muda’s war expeditions. Comparing this summary with 
the accounts of the Europeans in the area, one notes some variance.  
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The Bustan does not mention the second expedition to Pahang in 1618, nor an expedition to 
Patani and the one to Andragiri in 1624, while it mentions an expedition to the island of  Nias 
in 1624.  
  
 
                                            Aceh’s  siege of Malacca (16th century)  
  
Part Three  
                                                        
                                                                 CHAPTER  IV                              
                            
                           
                    THE ATTACKS ON MALACCA IN 1629 AND IN 1641     
 
 
 
 
3. 4. 1  The besieger besieged      
The long drawn war between Aceh and the Portuguese which occupied the sixteenth century 
had seen no winners. In geo-political terms however Aceh controlled a substantial area of 
both the east and the west coast of Sumatra. The Portuguese had devised various ways to 
conquer the sultanate; in 1588 D. Joao Ribeiro Gaio, bishop of Malacca, sent the king of 
Portugal a treatise of 46 chapters in which he advocated the conquest of Aceh and of Johor.1       
The long period of conflict made place for trade relations between Malacca and Aceh, which 
lasted from1593 until about 1602. However, Portuguese meddling in Aceh’s affairs, their 
incitement of the violence against the De Houtman expedition and their ongoing support for 
Johor spelled the end of the decade of relative peace.   
At a most critical time when the sultanate was weakened from internal rebellion, resulting 
from a contest for the throne, which coincided with a long period of droughts and famine, a 
Portuguese fleet from Goa attacked Aceh in 1606, resentful that the Dutch and English gained 
a firm foothold and obtained trade contracts and privileges from Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat 
Shah who had passed away in 1604. According to the traditional history, the Portuguese 
invasion was successfully repelled by the Acehnese land army in which the young prince 
Darma Wangsa, also called Perkasa Alam, the later Sultan Iskandar Muda, was the 
commander of his uncle’s troops. His bravery ultimately destined him for the throne.  
I earlier established that it owed much to Matelieff’s siege of Malacca that the Portuguese 
beat a hasty retreat from Aceh to succour Malacca. 2  
                                                 
1 De Rotero y rrelacion que don joan ribero gaio obispo de malaca hizo de las cosas de achen para Elrrey Nuestro 
senor’, referred by Manuel Lobato in his article « Malacca «  in : de Oliveira Marques (ed.), Historia dos 
Portugueses no Extremo Oriente, (vol. I, Tomo  II), 38.  
 
2 The battle between Matelieff and the Portuguese is published  in:  
 P. A. Tiele, De Europeers in den Maleischen Archipel, vol. I , 61; 
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The Goan fleet commanded by Martin Alfonso de Castro, consisting of 14 galleons, 4 galleys 
and three thousand men started to assault the port, apparently unaware of the fact that the 
Dutch were in front of Malacca. The Dutch stopped their siege to confront the Portuguese  
and in the ensuing fierce battle both parties suffered heavy damages with the Portuguese in 
the end losing a wealth of ships.3  
Matelieff’s intervention came at a most convenient moment for Aceh. This demonstration of 
Dutch audacity and their military capability must have established Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah’s 
confidence in his European friend. It resulted in a bilateral agreement for a strategic alliance 
signed in January 1607. As already mentioned, the treaty  became redundant because his 
successor, Sultan Iskandar Muda, denied its existence. Yet the necessity to have a solid front 
against the Portuguese which was expressed through the mutually reiterated pledge to assist 
each other, acquired much strength.  
 
Iskandar Muda’s indulgence of Portuguese presence in Malacca and trade with the ports had 
reached its limit. His assaults on Portuguese ships in the Straits did not end Portuguese 
manifest presence and their meddling in the affairs of the port kingdoms as the examples of 
Johor, Pahang en Kedah clearly demonstrate. An all out attack on Malacca, which for long 
had been on his mind, did not occur, although he possessed one of Asia’s largest armadas. 
Portuguese pertinent trade with Jamby, Andragiri and Lingga during the second decade 
enticed him to act more forcefully. In 1626 he started  preparing his armada for the mother of 
all wars. Although the Dutch were aware that Iskandar Muda was preparing a huge armada, 
they spoke of one thousand boats and the Homeric number of seventy to eighty thousand men, 
they were not at all sure whether he would attack Malacca or Patani or even Jamby.4 It is only 
from Jan Oosterwijck’s dispatch of 15 March 1630 from Jamby, that one learns that the 
Acehnese armada left in 1626 with 30 ‘goraps’ and 350 smaller boats and a number of  
sixteen thousand men and had occupied the Red Island close to Malacca around  the month of 
July 1628.5  The English merchants Henley and Bix in Goa informed their office in Bantam 
on 20 august 1629 that Malacca had received 5 ships from Lisbon to spoil the Dutch and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 N. Mac Leod,  De Oost-Indische Compagnie als Zeemogendheid in Azie, vol. I, 1602-1632;   
 De Opkomst, vol. I, 46-62.  
 
3 An English account of the siege of Malacca is by William Finch published in: William Foster (ed.), Early 
Travels in India  1583-1619  (London: Oxford University Press, 1921). 
 
4 Generale Missiven, vol. I, 233: Letter from governor-general Carpentier, dated 13 December 1626.  
 
5 Tiele, Bouwstoffen, 166: Letter of Jan Oosterwijk in Jamby, dated 15 March 1630.   
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English, and 30 frigates had left Goa to succour Malacca against the Acehnese who were 
lying in siege in front of Malacca. Dutch and English documentation of the event is scant, but 
the sequel shows that their validity for the representation of the siege and the attack is not in 
doubt. This documentation supports the information derived from the Portuguese accounts.  
 
 
 
 
3. 4. 2    The momentum lost  
From three contemporary Portuguese sources published by C. R. Boxer, a lucid and intimate 
account of the siege, the attack and its aftermath appears.6 These are a) the Dispatch of Nuno 
Alvares Botelho to the Governors of India 7; b) Narrative of the Great Victory which the 
Portuguese won against the King of Achem in the Siege of Malacca of Roque Carreiro and c) 
Dispatch of the Captain-General of Malacca, Antonio Pinto Da Fonseca, to the Governors of 
India. One should bear in mind that these accounts are from the Portuguese side. 
Malacca for many years expected an Acehnese assault and started reinforcing its fortress and 
its suburbs, but it only learned about the imminent attack some two and a half months before 
the actual siege started. From the narrative of Roque Carreiro sent from Goa to Lisbon we are 
informed in detail that a son-in-law of Iskandar Muda, who was a captured Johorese prince8, 
was able to steal away with a ship from the port of Odelim (Deli?), where Iskandar Muda and 
his armada had assembled, and fled to Malacca where he informed the authorities in detail of 
the forthcoming assault. The Acehnese went after the prince, but he succeeded to evade them 
and was taken on board one of the two Malaccan galliots which patrolled the waters.9  The 
                                                 
 
6 C. R. Boxer, “The Achinese attack on Malacca in 1629, as described in contemporary Portuguese sources”, in:  
J. Bastin and R. Roolvink, (eds.), Malayan and Indonesian Studies; Essays presented to Sir Richard Winstedt 
(Oxford University Press, 1964), 105-121.   
 
7 D. Fr. Luis de Brito, Bishop of Meliapor, was succeeded on his death by a triumvirate, consisting of three 
governors, including Nuno Alvares Botelho, captain-general of the High Seas Fleet ( Armada de Alto-bordo). 
Botelho assumed command of the relief-expedition which left Goa on 22 September, leaving his two colleagues 
in charge until the arrival of the incoming viceroy, Dom Miguel de Noronha Count of Linhares who assumed 
office on 21 October 1629. ( Boxer in: Malayan and Indonesian Studies, 112, footnote 2).      
 
8 The sources do not identify this prince. Was he perhaps the son of Sultan Abdulla Ma’ayat Shah who had asked 
the Dutch in 1615 to help him bring back his son who was captured by the Acehnese and brought to Aceh?   
 
9 The prince who was in great despair, related to the Portuguese that he had to witness how Iskandar Muda  
killed his baby-son, by dashing him against a wall. The king was offended by his grandson’s incessant crying 
when he took him in his arms. He uttered that since the boy started to show his displeasure with him at this early 
age,  it could only become worse at an older age. He therefore smashed him to his death.  
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Portuguese, at peace with Johor, treated the Johor prince with due respect and furtively 
dispatched a ship to Negapatam from where three messengers went overland to Goa to inform 
the vice-king of the Acehnese intentions.10 English merchants in Goa as well as Dutch 
merchants in Surat reported the arrival in Goa of 5 ships from Lisbon ‘to spoil’ the Dutch and 
English, and that  40 frigates left Goa ‘to succour Malacca against the king of Achin who lies 
before it.’      
The Acehnese were patrolling the waters to push back ships going in and out of Malacca, a 
tactic to starve and weaken the people inside Malacca. When the armada finally arrived in 
front of the city on 4 July 1629, the sea was full of ships ‘as far as the eye could see’. The 
Portuguese estimated that the armada consisted of  246 vessels which included 48 galleys 
‘much larger than ours’ and around 19.400 men spread over the two contingents. The total 
number of warriors and  coolies is higher than the number estimated by the Dutch.  
Very curiously, Iskandar Muda appointed two commanders at the head of the Acehnese 
expedition, one was the laxamana and the second was the maharaja who was a relative. The 
maharaja whose function was that of perdana menteri (‘prime minister’) offered to conquer 
Malacca and was appointed commander of the fleet. The  laxamana was in command of the 
land troops.11 These two men disagreed from the start on crucially important strategic matters 
which is also mentioned in the Bustan as-Salatin.12 The laxamana disembarked at the mouth 
of the river and marched with 4000 to 5000 men towards a hill where they made camp. The 
maharaja sailed with the fleet into the river. On the fourth day the Acehnese warriors 
assaulted the convent of Madre de Deos located on a hill known as Sao Francisco (Bukit 
Cina). There were only 200 Portuguese to defend the fort, but they were at an advantageous 
position and even tough they were far fewer in number than their attackers, they were 
successful in killing more than  300 Acehnese. They lost a total of 128 men. The Portuguese 
admired their enemy’s great quality as builders, saying that their bulwarks were very strong, 
‘not even the Romans could have built them any quicker and stronger.’13 Nonetheless the 
Acehnese suffered fatal losses at every Portuguese counter-attack which made them flee into 
                                                                                                                                                        
This is the first account which speaks of Iskandar Muda’s presence at the departure of his armada. There is no 
evidence that he went on the successive war expeditions.  
 
10 Malayan and Indonesian Studies, 110.  
 
11 Hikayat Atjéh, 47. 
 
12 Bustanu’s Salatin, 35.  
 
13 Malayan and Indonesian Studies , 112. 
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their ships. To their great consternation they discovered that it was low tide and their ships 
could not depart. The complete fleet was stuck for seven days in the river before it could 
finally lift anchor. From the dispatch of Antonio Pinto Da Fonseca, the captain-general of 
Malacca to the governors of India transpires that five relief ships arrived on the last day of 
September, sent by the Bishop of Meliapor, with Miguel Pereira Borralho as their captain-
major. To these were added five Malaccan pinnaces, a pontoon carrying siege-guns, 6 galleys 
and 40 small prahu, carrying 450 men. On 21 October the lord governor14 arrived with his 
whole fleet accompanied by two merchant ships and a pinnace. He blockaded the river Duyon 
in which the armada had sailed and before it was able to come out of the river, the assembled 
Portuguese mercilessly attacked the Acehnese from the pontoons and from their ships, 
bombarding them by day and by night. According to the narrative of Roque Carreiro, the king 
of Johor sent 150 sail boats to assist Malacca, most of these belonging to his aunt, the Queen 
of Patany. He had earlier sent 50 vessels to supply the Portuguese with many provisions.15 
Two of Aceh’s great galleys were sunk.  Some five to six thousand Acehnese fled into the 
jungle. ‘abandoning the finest fleet that had ever been seen in Asia, full of great and small 
cannon, as well as much booty, of which our soldiers took good advantage.’16  The laxamana 
first tried to negotiate a safe conduct with the Portuguese lord governor, promising that he 
would surrender, but he fled into the jungle where he wandered around for fifteen days before 
he finally gave himself up to the king of  Johor. He implored the king not to hand him over to 
the Portuguese, but what he dreaded most, eventually happened, he was extradited.17 
The maharaja is said to have died from chagrin, ‘seeing himself vanquished and bottled up in 
a river which he had entered without forethought.’18  The numbers of Acehnese killed in the 
battle and those who fled into the jungle were large. Among the death were seventeen well 
known captains and three governors and captain-majors of provinces. Four thousand men 
were killed during the siege on land and another thousand men succumbed to diseases. The 
Acehnese man of war and flagship Cakra Dunya surrendered to the Portuguese who took their 
fantastic trophy to Goa. They were euphoric and revelled in their glory. The great Acehnese 
                                                 
14 This was most probably Nuno Alvares de Botelho.   
 
15 ibid., 116. When the King of Johor was notified of the coming of the Acehnese fleet, he immediately ordered   
   his vassals to send provisions to Malacca which they did promptly and abundantly.    
 
16 ibid., 113. 
 
17 ibid., 120.  
   Tiele, Bouwstoffen, vol II, 166-168: Letter written by Jan Oosterwijck dated 15 March 1630.      
 
18 Malayan and Indonesian Studies , 113.  
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laxamana so much held in awe, was now  in their hands. One assumes that he was the 
laxamana who commanded the fleets that invaded several of the ports in the past years. He 
and several of his officers were sent as prisoners of war to Goa on board their own ship Cakra 
Dunya, but the laxamana died on the way in Colombo, from what is said to have been an 
incurable abscess in his private parts. During the attack on the Acehnese armada, the 
Portuguese lost about 66 men .  
Encouraged by this milestone victory the Portuguese dispatched a fleet under the command of 
Dom Jeronimo da Silveira to Perak, which had been invaded by Aceh in 1620, ‘to either 
subjugate it or to forcefully restore her trade with Malacca.’19 
 
The Acehnese were defeated  because of the incredible blunders of their commanders. Both 
the Acehnese and the Portuguese sources are unanimous in their opinion that the dissent 
between these men decided the fate of the expedition. Almost a decade later the successor of 
Iskandar Muda, Sultan Iskandar Thani too came back on the wrong decision to have two 
commanders at the helm in his letter to the Dutch governor-general. This is discussed in a 
following section.  
It is certainly odd that the complete Acehnese fleet had sailed into the river. The besieger was 
besieged! It led to the Acehnese armada’s near obliteration in which ‘many Muslims lost their 
lives.’20  Aceh’s defeat was felt as a great relief in the region. The subjugator had lost almost 
his whole fleet and could not invade the ports. Yet it would be erroneous to assume that the 
Dutch and English were in a celebratory mood now that the intolerable Iskandar Muda had 
suffered a disastrous blow. That, at least, was far from their minds. The Portuguese 
confronted the Dutch in the Jamby river in 1630 and damaged two of their yachts, the 
Oostsanen and Cleijn Heusden. One of the large ships, the Walcheren, exploded from its own 
fire after it was attacked by Nuno Alvares Botelho, who was mortally wounded. The 
Portuguese seized the English yacht Coster.21 Portuguese victory over the Acehnese armada 
was a serious setback to Dutch commercial and political ambitions. Although weakened by 
the battle, Malacca was still in Portuguese hands.  
 
                                                 
 
19 ibid., 108. 
  
20 Bustanu’s Salatin , 35: ‘Kerana kedua2  panglima itu berbantah2 antara satu sama lain maka banyak-lah 
orang Islam mati shahid’.  
 
21 Tiele, Bouwstoffen, vol. II, 168. 
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The defeat at the hands of the Portuguese was the most humiliating event Iskandar Muda had 
suffered and it tarnished his glory. Not only had he lost a wealth of ships, artillery, canons and 
men, but Johor and Patani had played a significant role in his ruination. From his point of 
view this was the ultimate deception; the Malay states had again taken the side of the enemy  
of Islam. In his dispatch to the governors of India, the governor of Malacca, Antonio Pinto Da  
Fonseca mentions that the Johor fleet captured two Acehnese galleys on their way with 
dispatches to Iskandar Muda, ‘which was of great consequence for us.’22 The Portuguese 
were now in the possession of much of Iskandar Muda’s artillery and vessels.  
                                                
The few Acehnese survivors were executed on their arrival in Aceh. Others surrendered to the 
Portuguese.  It needs little imagination to envision the situation in Aceh after the news spread 
of the armada’s humiliating defeat. Iskandar Muda was beside himself with anger that his 
laxamana had surrendered to his enemy the king of Johor. The bereaved families of the 
warriors who died in the battle were now at the mercy of the sultan who without mercy 
confiscated their possessions to compensate for his heavy losses, while probably taking the 
widows and daughters of the important officers into his service. Iskandar Muda was not 
idling, he immediately started to devise how to avenge the Portuguese.     
 
 
 
 
3. 4. 3    Incitements by the Dutch 
Jan Oosterwijck, Dutch merchant in Jamby regretted that the company had not come to 
Aceh’s assistance with three to four ships to deter the Johor and Patani fleet which came to 
succour Malacca.23 The governor-general and the Council of the Indies in Batavia were in a 
ambivalent mood. Aceh’s disastrous defeat was to a certain extent a relief, for they dreaded to 
see Iskandar Muda’s power extended to the Malay ports and ultimately Malacca. Yet it must 
have been bitter to them that the Portuguese held on to Malacca, now strengthened with 
captured Acehnese vessels and artillery. Malacca’s victory was however fragile since there 
was scarcity of food made worse by the fact that the gardens and fruit trees were destroyed in 
the battle. It merits consideration to look at the view of Governor-general Specx and the 
Council of the Indies on the events and developments. They were of the opinion that with the 
 
 
22 Malayan and Indonesian Studies, 120. 
 
23 Tiele, Bouwstoffen, 166. 
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assistance of several Dutch ships a second attack could be disastrous for Malacca. But they 
pondered at the same time that even if the Dutch conquered Malacca and could draw 
Malacca’s trade with China, Japan and the Philippines, the profits and fruits would not cover 
the expenditures of an attack on Malacca. Secondly, they were not sure whether it was right to 
cooperate with the ‘Atchynder’ and advised ‘to let the Acehnese and Portuguese bodies 
wrestle with each other and debilitate’ instead of engaging the company in their struggle, 
because there were no real profits for the company.24 One cannot avoid to note a tradition of 
hesitation on Dutch side on the issue of cooperation with the sultan of Aceh on the attack on 
Malacca. Yet it would be wrong to assume  that this view was adopted in its entirety by the 
company’s directors, the Gentlemen XVII. Malacca was of great strategic importance for 
shipping in the Straits and it remained one of the ambitions of the Dutch to become the master 
of the city. After thirty years of  battling the Portuguese, the idea of abandoning this geo-
political goal was unthinkable. Therefore cooperation with Aceh  was seriously considered. 
Between the VOC and Aceh there were no agreed terms regarding the spoils of war, in this 
case the city of Malacca itself. In this respect I like to point to the treaty of June 1606 signed 
by  the VOC and Johor which laid down the conditions after Malacca was captured in a 
combined effort. This treaty became redundant when Matelieff failed to capture Malacca that 
same year and thus a new treaty was drawn in September 1606. It is not clear at this point 
how the spoils of war would be divided between the VOC and Aceh. It seems that the 
proposal which Cornelis Coman sent to Jan Pierterszoon Coen in 1619 for a combined run 
with the Acehnese on Malacca, and once inside, to overawe the Acehnese, found no favour in 
Batavia.25 Was it because of  the establishing of the Anglo-Dutch alliance that same year and 
its corollary for the defence of the Indies, that made the proposal no longer opportune? The 
Dutch clearly realized that Aceh’s single operation in 1629 was insufficient to wipe the 
Portuguese from Malacca.  
The VOC choose to revive its friendship with the king of Aceh. To this end captain Dirk 
Stadlander and Adriaen de Groot were delegated to Iskandar Muda in 1632. They were 
instructed to incite him against the Portuguese, promising him assistance to avenge Malacca. 
The governor-general hoped that the Portuguese would not prevail against a combined attack 
and that an attack on Malacca would rouse the sultan of Mataram, sworn enemy of Iskandar 
                                                 
 
24 Tiele, Bouwstoffen,  Letter of governor-general  Specx to the Gentlemen XVII, dated 7 March 1631, 
 168-173. 
 
25 The issue is discussed in Part Two, Chapter III. 
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Muda, to come to Malacca’s assistance and by being involved in the war, to distract his 
attention from the pepper areas on Java.26 It is a fine example of the scheming tactics of the 
Dutch in trying to achieve their goals. On the face of it, the capture of Malacca seemed the 
prime goal, but trade privileges were even more important.     
Iskandar Muda most graciously received the envoys who seemed almost intimidated by the 
wealth and extravagance of his court. He received them reclining on a splendid golden chair, 
fabulously attired and bejewelled. Previous visitors to Iskandar Muda do not refer to  this 
extravagant side of him. It looks as though he was out to impress his visitors, imbuing them 
that he was the powerful and wealthy sovereign even after his discomfiture in 1629.  
Notwithstanding this show of self-importance, he made it absolutely clear to the delegates that 
their request for special trade concessions depended exclusively on Dutch military assistance. 
It implies that he could not make it on his own to attack Malacca for a second time. Pleased 
with Dutch rapprochement, he lavished his guests with banquets and entertainment and 
promised them exemption from tolls for four years on the explicit condition that the VOC 
would assist him with several ships to attack Malacca. The restoration of the bilateral relations 
shows that Iskandar Muda was led by pragmatism, even when he despised the Dutch. The 
‘brothers in arms-turned-foes’ opted to mend the fences to overthrow Portuguese authority in 
Malacca. Three decades had passed in which they had acted independently against their 
common enemy.  
 
 
 
 
3. 4. 4     The end of an era and the end of a false start   
Iskandar Muda’s death on 27 December 1636 signalled the end of Aceh’s unconstrained 
power over the Straits region and brought a sigh of relief in the neighbourhood, in Malacca 
and in Goa. The year 1629 was the most critical year of his reign, when his armada was 
annihilated  in the battle with the Portuguese. It was also the year that Sheikh Shamsu’d-din 
Pasai, his trusted advisor, died.  Notwithstanding the humiliating defeat, Iskandar Muda was 
                                                 
 
26 Generale Missiven I, 448: ‘Naer Atchin is van Batavia gesonden in augusto lestleden ons schip Buyren met 
cap. Stadlander. D’Oorsaecke derselver besendinge is meest geschiet om den Achijnder tegens de Portuguysen 
aen te hitsen ende dat revensie van sijne geleden schaede soude haelen om die van Mallacca weer werck te 
geven, ten eynde den mataram bespeuren mach het cleyn vermogen, dat bij haer is om hem assistentie toe te 
seynden.’   
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still powerful enough to control much of the region’s trade. No foreign power tried to invade 
Aceh.  His assiduous efforts to dispel the Portuguese from the Straits contributed significantly 
to weakening Malacca’s strength, but he was unsuccessful in capturing the famous port.  
Pursuing their own goals, the Dutch renewed the friendship with him by offering assistance in 
exchange for trade contracts and an exemption of tolls in the ports under his control, as 
discussed with Stadlander in 1632. Until Iskandar Muda’s death in December 1636 no actual 
concerted effort was made to attack Malacca. It means inter alia that until then the VOC did 
not obtain exemption from paying  tolls.  
Yet the VOC was busy on different fronts to beleaguer the Portuguese.  It was building up its 
presence in the Straits of Malacca where captain Simonszoon van der Veer was in command 
of the patrolling fleet from 1636 until 1639. In 1637 he spearheaded the campaign to solicit 
Sultan Iskandar Thani’s assistance for a combined attack on Malacca as agreed in 1632 
between Stadtlander and Sultan Iskandar Muda. The new sultan of Aceh, a prince of Pahang, 
explained that he waited for his fleet to return from Pahang where it tried to hold back an 
invasion by Johor, before he could make ready a fleet to attack Malacca.  
Another VOC fleet under command of Philip Lucaszoon was in Ceylon to inflict damage on 
the Portuguese. It resulted in the signing of an accord between the Dutch and the king of 
Candia in 1638.27  The Portuguese anxiously watched the rising power of the Dutch which 
strongly manifested itself in the Indian Ocean. To reduce Dutch influence over the new ruler 
of Aceh, Goa sent a delegation to establish friendly relations with him. The delegation 
showered him with generous gifts, such as precious diamonds with which he was most 
delighted. The Dutch were alarmed by Portuguese overtures and their warm reception by 
Iskandar Thani. It must have been a relief to them that the rapprochement between the two 
arch enemies was a fleeting affair. The Portuguese captain, while in Aceh, misappropriated 
several royal slaves which he intended to take to Malacca. The sultan without pardon had him 
captured and thrown into prison.28 Some time later, a delegation from Malacca, which came 
to request the captain’s freedom,  again misbehaved and insulted the locals. The perpetrator
were immediately captured and thrown for the elephants who kicked some of them to death.
s 
                                                
29 
The prospect for peaceful coexistence between the antagonists seemed lost.  
 
 
27 Corpus Diplomaticum , vol. I  nr. CXXVI.  
 
28 J. A. van der Chijs, Dagh-Register int Casteel Batavia anno 1640-1641,  (‘s Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1887), 332: Letter of  Governor-general Antonio van Diemen dated  9 Devember 1637.  
 
29 Tiele, Bouwstoffen, 364-65: Letter of Governor- general  Antonio van Diemen dated 12 January 1639.  
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3. 4. 5     Dutch-Aceh negotiations for the siege of Malacca (1637-1640) 
Following up on his talks with commander Van der Veer, Sultan Iskandar Thani sent  three 
ambassadors to Batavia in the course of 1638 with a letter for governor-general Antonio van 
Diemen in which he elaborated on the problems between Aceh and the Portuguese. 
Significant is his request to Van Diemen for assistance against his enemy Johor which 
supplied the Portuguese in Malacca with necessary foodstuffs.30  The Acehnese ambassadors 
Rassia Radja, Siri Bidia Endra and Radja Endrabhana were most courteously received in 
Batavia with the shooting of muskets and canons and banquets held in their honour by the 
Council of the Indies.  In spite of the flattery of a grand reception, they were stunned when 
Van Diemen told them that Johor had offered its assistance for the attack on Malacca. They 
retorted that Johor could not be trusted for it provisioned Malacca with foodstuff and had 
many times taken the side of Malacca against Aceh. They pointed out  that Johor tried to 
assert its control over Pahang which was the country of birth of their king. Van Diemen 
explained that he considered to take Johor ‘under his wings’ to disentangle the sultanate from 
the Portuguese, and stressed that Johor was not an ally like Aceh, but a necessary underling 
needed to capture Malacca from the Portuguese.31 Reassured by the governor-general’s high 
esteem for Aceh, the ambassadors returned home in the company of Jochum Roelofsen van 
Deutecom, the ex-governor of Ambon, who Van Diemen delegated to the king of Aceh to 
make plans for the approach of the siege of Malacca.32  
When they broke the news of Johor’s participation to the sultan, Iskandar Thani was 
completely overwhelmed. He did not understand  the governor-general’s leniency towards 
Johor who sided with the Portuguese and was not to be trusted. He made it absolutely clear 
that Johor was his enemy which invaded his country Pahang. It implies that he considered 
himself the sovereign of Pahang. His frame of mind showed that it would be difficult to 
persuade him to fulfil his promise for assistance given earlier to Van der Veer.  It took Van 
                                                 
 
30 idem.  
 
31 Dagh-Register 1640-1641, 10-11. 
 
32 Generale Missiven, vol. I, 606.  One may assume  that Van Deutecom left in the last quarter of 1637, because 
Van Diemen mentions his departure in his  letter to the Gentlemen XVII of  9 December 1637.   
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Deutecom almost a year to induce the sulking king to cooperate in the attack to which he half-
heartedly consented.  Iskandar Thani invited Van Deutecom for a visit to the shrines of holy 
men and kings in Pasai. Noteworthy is the fact that the Paduka Raja of Johor who was sent to 
Aceh by the King of Johor, also accompanied the delegation of the sultan to Pasai.33 If it is 
easy to see in Van Deutecom’s presence in Pasai a sign of trust of the king in the Dutch, the 
presence of the Paduka Raja of Johor - Aceh’s enemy - makes it unsafe to make such a 
positive statement.  
 
One delegate after the other arrived from Batavia in Aceh to induce Iskandar Thani to accept 
the participation of Johor in a coalition against Malacca. One of them, Justus Schouten came 
in  the course of 1639 to officially announce to the king the alliance with Johor, ‘den 
aangegane alliantie met de Johoriet grondig berigt te doen’. It came as a blow to Iskandar 
Thani to learn that Van Diemen had ignored his serious concerns and his grievances against 
Johor and that he had invited his blood enemy to participate in the attack on Malacca. He 
declared that he would not take part in an expedition in which Johor was participating. He 
angrily spoke his mind to Schouten, declaring bluntly that he was not convinced that the 
Dutch and Johor would not turn against him afterwards.34  Earlier he voiced  his fears of a 
Dutch-Johor coalition to different Dutch delegates.  He immediately ordered the building of a 
dam in the river on the west side of the city, which was most accessible from sea, to protect 
Aceh against a Dutch-Johor invasion and had a new canal dug for the convenience of the local  
people.35 This is the very first evidence that Aceh took defensive measures against a feared 
foreign invasion.     
The Dutch enjoyed the status of most favoured foreign nation in Aceh. Van Diemen was very 
mindful not to endanger this position.36 He imbued his officials with Aceh’s importance for 
                                                 
 
33 Bustanu’s- Salatin, 25. No reason is mentioned for the prince’s visit to the sultan of Aceh.      
 
34 Dagh-Register 1640-1641 of 10 September, page 1mentions  ‘the king of Aceh looked askance at the 
avancement of the Dutch’.  
 
35 ibid., 22 October, 59. 
 
36 According to commissioner Van Deutecom the king promised the VOC far reaching privileges on the west 
coast,  at the exclusion of other nationalities.    
Iskandar Thani however firmly declared that this was based on serious misunderstanding by Van Deutecom and 
summoned the merchants to pay local tolls to the governors on the westcoast who were not inclined to exempt 
the merchants. He was not going to compel the owners of the pepper to ‘intolerable servitude’.     
He summoned the governors to send half of his own half to Aceh, needed to barter for goods brought by traders 
from Bengal, Coromandel and Dabul. He declared to the Dutch merchants that if they were interested in the rest, 
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obtaining trade contracts, at the same time stressing the need for an even-handed approach 
towards both Aceh and Johor.  In a last effort to reconcile the king with the idea of Johor’s 
participation, Van Diemen sent one of his chief diplomats Johan de Meer(e), who was 
appointed second in command of the fleet in front of Malacca, on the delicate mission to 
Iskandar Thani. De Meer was instructed ‘to urge the king to come to our assistance, to flatter 
him by saying that it is impossible for us to conquer Malacca without his help. If this be 
refused, then we are to ask him to help us with a good quantity of gun-powder against 
reasonable compensation. Otherwise we have to abandon the siege in discharge.’37 According 
to Ito Takeshi, Aceh was able to produce gunpowder since the sixteenth century, for which it 
possessed the raw material.38    
By the time the high ranked diplomat arrived in Aceh in May 1640, Iskandar Thani was wary 
of Dutch pressure on him. One is prone to ask why Van Diemen insisted on Aceh’s 
assistance, when he offers no real insight as to why Aceh was so important for a successful 
attack on Malacca. Was he afraid that Iskandar Thani and the Portuguese would overcome 
their enmity and work together to hold back the Dutch? Van Diemen was certainly at pains to 
reassure Iskandar Thani that the inclusion of Johor was not meant to anguish him, but to harm 
the enemy (the Portuguese). He declared that the relationship with Aceh was of far greater 
significance to him than that with Johor and that he liked to see it continue for another fifty 
years and hoped that their alliance against the Portuguese would sustain’39  De Meer wrote in 
his letter that when the governor-general’s letter was read out in the balai, the king showed a 
range of emotions: from almost dazed to laughing loudly and speaking harshly. De Meer 
called  it ‘een gansch glorien gemoet’ which may be translated as ‘a totally glorious mood’.  
But the governor-general’s fine words could not convince Iskandar Thani to accept Johor’s 
inclusion. He was furious about Batavia’s deception and the pressure on him to accept Johor 
and fulminated that Johor could not  be trusted since many Portuguese had married Johorese 
                                                                                                                                                        
they had to pay the local dues and taxes to his governors in reals and warned them to comply to the rules. See: 
Generale Missiven II,  p. 55-58. Letter dated 18 December 1639.  
Iskandar Thani’s firm stand may show that he was no longer willing to give privileges to the Dutch who were 
adamant to have Johor in the coalition to attack Malacca. It may also be true that the governors overruled his 
ruling to exempt the Dutch from paying tolls. Van Diemen thought that the exemptions would be valid for the 
however admitted that earlier privileges were honoured and that the company made a profit of f. 3.1276.71 on 
the west coast. 
 
 37Mac Hacobian (tr.),  P. A. Leupe ,”The Siege and Capture of Malacca from the Portuguese in 1640-1641”,   
(JMBRAS, 1936), vol. XIV, 128-429, appendix VII.   
 
38The World of the Adat Aceh, 71.  
 
39 VOC 1.04.02: 1136: Letter from Antonio van Diemen (1640), f. 948 v.   
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daughters. It would be humiliating for him to be seen together with his blood enemy. ‘What 
will all the kings say when they see me in the company of Johor? How can I explain that I am 
aligned with Johor, whose rebel king has invaded my homeland Pahang?’ He accused Batavia 
of being oblivious to Aceh’s  position in the region and declared that this stubborn attitude 
threatened their friendship. He warned that if the Dutch choose to take Johor under their 
wings, they would not be allowed to set foot in Aceh ever again.40 How did Johor react to 
Aceh’s rejection of a coalition in which it participated? The Dutch learned from the laxamana 
of Johor that Pahang belonged to his ‘master’. They fought the Acehnese over Pahang and 
were able to destroy 7 ghorabs and held back between four to five hundred Acehnese.41 Yet 
there is no hint that they had serious objections against participating in a coalition with Aceh.    
Earlier Iskandar Thani pleaded with Prince Frederick Hendrick of (Orange) Nassau – in reply 
to the Prince’s letter - to continue the friendship like it was with the late Iskandar Muda, ‘ like 
a golden chain that could not break.’42 De Meer feared that the relations between Aceh and 
the company had cracked (een grooten krack gecregen heeft) and advocated that the 
governor-general should pay attention to the king’s grievances, even though he himself 
believed that Iskandar Thani merely used  Johor’s participation as a pretext to withdraw from 
the expedition. He strongly believed that the king’s main concern was the rising power of the 
VOC. 43    
De Meer made a sincere effort to gain the king’s confidence,  promising him that the company 
would try to convince Johor to send a representative to pay his respects to him. Did this mean 
to accept  Iskandar Thani’s sovereignty (also sovereignty over Pahang? )? This concerned his 
most fundamental objection to participate in a coalition with Johor.        
Notwithstanding the fact that Iskandar Thani had firmly spoken his mind, the show of good 
intentions between the old brothers-in-arms was not yet exhausted.44 The frantic diplomacy in 
                                                 
 
40 ibid., 1133 : Bescheiden van Jan de Meere ( Aceh 1640).   
 
41 Tiele, Bouwstoffen, vol. II, 392. 
 
42 ibid., 11264: Letter from Iskandar Thani to Prince Frederick Hendrick, Translaet van den Tijtelen des Conincx 
van Atchin.    
The original letter written in Arabic characters is in the possession of the Library of the University of Leiden. 
(L.U.B., Cod. Or. 4818a 1-3, B B1): see the Annex.   
The letter from Prince Hendrick to Iskandar Thani could not be  traced.   
  
43 ibid., 1133: Bescheiden van Jan de Meere; 
Dagh-Register 1640-1641, 2; 
Tiele, Bouwstoffen vol. II, 2-4. 
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which both parties tried to convince the other to submit to its view continued. The king once 
again sent two ambassadors, Sri Nara Wangsa and Tuan Atamossafia to Batavia to convey his 
message to the governor-general.45A remarkable diplomatic instance occurred when the 
ambassadors requested the governor-general to release Dutch merchant Symon de Geus, who 
was condemned to death for his misdeeds against the VOC while he was stationed as head 
merchant in Aceh. Their request was granted ‘because of weighty considerations and the 
mediation of other people’ (‘om wichtige consideratien ende mede door ‘tvoorbidden van 
andere vergunt wiert’).46 The demonstration of empathy by the ambassadors evidently put 
across the message that their sovereign did not hesitate to mediate on behalf of a subordinate 
Dutchman, showing him a true friend of the Dutch.  It had not only symbolic, but also 
strategic value. Friendship with the Dutch was utterly important for Iskandar Thani, whose 
latest experiences with the Portuguese proved to him that Aceh was vulnerable and needed a 
strong ally against the Portuguese. Van Diemen clearly understood the significance of the 
diplomatic gesture and responded accordingly, reassuring the ambassadors that the friendship 
with Aceh would persist no matter what their king decided and bestowed them each with a 
golden chain and a diamond ring.  
It is instructive to have a closer look at Iskandar Thani’s letter to Van Diemen. His deep 
resentment against participating in a coalition with Johor is again revealed. One of his chief 
concerns was that his prestige would be tainted when he was aligned with his blood enemy 
Johor. ‘How can I appear in Johor’s company; how will the governor-general solve the 
problem to bring two nations together who are not at peace with each other; if they start to 
fight each other, what will the governor-general do ?’ His worries were genuine, coming from 
a man very conscious of his exalted position, that of ‘God’s representative on earth,  protector 
of all his subjects and sovereign of the most wealthiest state in the widespread area which had 
brought to its submission many territories on both sides of the Straits. He had recently signed 
(1638) a peace accord with Pahang, the country of his birth, after Johor tried to re-assert 
control over it. This also implies that the Acehnese invasions of Pahang in 1617 and 1618 had 
not led to Aceh’s permanent authority over Pahang.  Iskandar Thani wore the burden of two 
                                                                                                                                                        
44 A last ditch effort to urge the king to send his force to Malacca was by Adriaen Anthoniszoon who went to 
Aceh with the yachts the Reynsburg, Valkenburg and Bredamme on his way to Malacca. Generale Missiven, vol. 
II, 109: Van Diemen to the Gentlemen XVII of 30 November 1640.        
 
45 The names of the ambassadors of both missions are included  in Iskandar Thani’s letter.  
Dagh-Register 1640-1641, 6-9. 
 
46 ibid, 2, 3. Symon de Geus succeeded  merchant Jan van der Meulen in Aceh where he misappropriated the 
Company’s goods and cheated in the books. He also brought a concubine in the lodge.      
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crowns, as the king of Aceh he inherited the enemy Johor. He was the son of Sultan Ahmad of 
Pahang who was deposed by his brother, a puppet of Johor. Johor had played an essential role 
in his father’s downfall.  He insisted that the Dutch and Aceh would go together without 
Johor, but if the governor-general decided otherwise, that the Dutch and Johor would go 
together, without him. He was adamant that if they would be unsuccessful to capture Malacca, 
the governor-general should immediately cut all ties with Johor. ‘If the almighty Lord 
permits, the Dutch and Aceh Daru’s Salam will together besiege Malacca ‘as if they are of 
one blood, united in arms to dispel the enemy’ (sullen die van Atchin Darou Salam ende de 
Hollanders niet anders zijn als een bloet, dewelcke ook mede eene wapenen met malcanderen 
sullen voeren…’).47      
Van Diemen, unquestionably an intelligent man, quite naively took the refusal as an obstinate 
act of a cantankerous and arrogant man.48 He could not understand Iskandar Thani’s deep 
resentment towards Johor and saw no fundamental reason why a coalition with Johor would 
harm Aceh. He seemed oblivious of the long historical enmity between Aceh and Johor, with 
all its implications. Since his appointment as governor-general, Van Diemen made the capture 
of Malacca one of his principal objectives.49  In his eagerness to seize Malacca from the 
Portuguese he downplayed  the objections of the Acehnese ruler that it was dangerous to have 
two antagonists in a coalition. The unsuccessful mission of his chief envoy gave the whole 
undertaking a negative impulse, De Meer had been his last hope to bring Iskandar Thani to his 
senses. Van Diemen criticized De Meer’s conduct in the important affair, saying that his 
prominent position required a stronger handling in order to get the king’s promise that he 
would participate, although he admitted at the same time that it was perilous to serve two 
‘masters’(‘t is kwaad twee heeren te dienen’).50 Pursuing what seemed an impossible alliance 
was turning into a dilemma for Van Diemen, but the fact that Johor often  succumbed to 
Malacca’s coercive actions, was decisive ‘to take Johor under our wings’. He saw no other 
way of approaching the situation and would not allow the ‘Atchynder’ to destroy the 
‘Johorite’. To try to make sense of Van Diemen’s words we need to look at his letter of 9 
                                                 
 
47  NA VOC 1131:  ‘Translaet van de Missive des Conincx van Atchin aen d’Ed. Heer Gouverneur Generael 
ende de Heeren Raden van India’ in: Dagh-Register 1640-1641, 6-9: 7. 
 
48 Generale Missiven, vol. II, 57. 
 
49 Van Diemen served as governor-general from January 1639 to February 1645. He vigorously pursued policies 
to eject the Portuguese from the Moluccan islands and to conquer Malacca.      
 
50 Dagh-Register 1640 –1641, 46. 
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December 1637 to the Gentlemen XVII.  He expresses his opinion that ‘the company should 
not allow the Indian princes to become big by supplying them with Dutch artillery, but to 
keep them in balance against one another.’ He suggests to call on all of them to combine 
forces against the Portuguese which would relieve the company of expensive costs.51  
If  De Meer failed to persuade Iskandar Thani to participate in a broad coalition with Johor, he 
was successful in securing trade privileges for the VOC. The king sent his firman to his 
panglimas on the west coast to give notice that he had licensed the VOC to trade without 
paying tolls. Resident merchant Compostel informed the commander of the fleet in front of 
Malacca that De Meer had been treated well and that Iskandar Thani called him orangkaya 
Panjang (the tall orangkaya).52 
 
The intensive and extended diplomacy between the governor-general and the sultan  took 
place on two levels, through their delegates and through some very reflective correspondence. 
Iskandar Thani did not hesitate to discuss sensitive issues concerning the enmity between 
Aceh and Johor. Quite puzzling is his statement that ‘it was not Aceh’s intention to conquer 
Johor, as it had done with Pahang, which it rid of the evil-doers.’ He stressed the fact that 
Pahang was his country, the country of his birth and that of his forefathers, ‘something the 
whole world knows.’ Significant is his assertion that ‘Paduka Marhoum Mahkota Alam’ ( the 
late king Mahkota Alam known to us as Iskandar Muda) made a great mistake by appointing 
two commanders at the head of his expedition to Malacca in1629. He blamed Aceh’s defeat 
on their discord and rivalry.53 He said that because of their rivalry the combined fleets of 
Malacca and Johor came in an advantageous position and that,  if the laxamana  had not 
defected to Johor,  Malacca would certainly have been captured by the Acehnese. He used the 
example of the rivalling commanders to underline that it would be a grave mistake to have 
Aceh and Johor, two hostile parties, in a coalition, emphasising the absurdity of forcing them 
                                                 
 
51 Generale Missiven, vol. I, 605.    
 
52 One is warned not to be too appreciative of this title to foreigners. General Thomas Best and captain William 
Keeling were flattered when Iskandar Muda called them respectively orangkaya puteh and orangkaya chute atti. 
These gentlemen showered him with exceptional gifts. Thomas Best was reprimanded in London for his 
spendthrift in Aceh and the fact that he had accomplished very little. In spite of the fact that Keeling obtained a 
license for the English, the visiting ships were not allowed to trade in Tiku unconditionally but were forced to 
pay in cash or goods to Iskandar Muda.             
 
53 The Hikayat Potjut Muhammad merely warns against dual government, which is the cause for chaos and 
dichotomy in the state.  It  is seen as detrimental to the state’s unity and security. A kind of dual government was 
Johor under Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah and his younger brother Raja Bongsu.   
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together: ‘Imagine that they start attacking each other, what will the governor-general think of 
them,  how will he solve the problem?’54 The Acehnese ambassadors tried to imbue Van 
Diemen with the idea that it was ‘dishonourable’ to have two enemies in a coalition to capture 
Malacca, which the Dutch translated with ‘niet eerlijk’, (unfair). Iskandar Thani’s non-
equivocal remark that Aceh never intended to conquer Johor may have suggested that he was 
reaching out to Johor, yet on his conditions. The Johorese officials should first accept his 
daulat or sovereignty, only then would he pardon Johor. 55  
There is little doubt that Sultan Iskandar Thani was influenced by his religious advisor, 
Sheikh Nuru’d-din al Raniri whose main aim seems to have been the aggrandisement of Aceh 
and its ruler and the lifting of Pahang in the Malay setting, degrading Johor, which assumed 
the role of successor state of the Malaccan sultanate. 56 Although Johor’s participation in a 
coalition to attack Malacca was the fundamental obstacle for Iskandar Thani, yet fear that 
another European power might replace the Portuguese was definitely on his mind. From his 
letter to Prince Frederick Hendrick of Orange speaks his anxiety that the VOC would harm his 
trade with the Indian ports. He requested the prince to make sure that the Dutch would not 
molest ships coming to Aceh from Surat, Masulipatan, Bengala, Dabul and several other 
ports. It is proof of the fact that he acknowledged and feared the VOC’s  powerful position.     
Through the long years of negotiations Iskandar Thani and Van Diemen went out of their 
ways to convince each other of the importance to continue their friendship. They sent each 
other valuable presents: Iskandar Thani sent the governor-general a keris with a golden shaft 
and different other valuable presents, while Van Diemen showered him with several guns a 
golden pipe, three beautiful horses, a great number of precious diamonds, and some 
‘ingenious inventions’ such as a telescope.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Dagh-Register 1640-1641, ‘Translaet van de Missive des Conincx van Atchin’, 7.   
 
55 ibid.,  6-9.   
From Van Diemen’s letter of 18 December 1639 transpires that the laxamana of Johor declared to one of the 
Dutch captains when they assembled in front of the island of Carimon, that Pahang  inherently belonged to his 
king and not to the Acehnese. He would never accept Iskandar Thani’s sovereignty over Pahang.  
Dagh-Register, 392. 
 
56 This I brought to bear in  Part One, chapter II and in Part Three, chapter III.  
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3. 4. 6     The fall of Malacca  
On the 14th of January 1641 the glorious city of Malacca fell to the Dutch after a siege of five 
months and twelve days. The Dutch commanders Lucaszoon Van der Veer and Jan de Meer 
succumbed to diseases a short time before Dutch victory and died on their ships.  
The landing in Malacca was led by commander Minne Willemszoon Kaertekoe.  
The Portuguese put on a brave defence of the city they had held for close to a century and a 
half,  although they were starved and weakened from the long siege. Francois Valentijn 
mentions in his account on Malacca that they were deprived of necessary food because the 
Dutch and the Johorese prevented the small Malaccan crafts to enter and leave the city. 57  
It was not an easy victory for the Dutch, who lost about one thousand warriors. They 
congratulated themselves with their victory and gloried at the thought of having gained even 
more respect and honour because they took the unconquerable city without the assistance of 
the ‘Atchynder’ and downplayed the help given them by Johore.58 
 
The wretched Sultan Iskandar Thani died on 15 February 1641 from poisoning. He was 
besieged from various directions, externally - and so it seems -  internally. After his death 
Aceh once again became the scene of turmoil and bloodshed concerning the appointment of a 
successor for the throne. The throne went to Iskandar Thani’s widow, Taju’l Alam Saffiatu’d-
din Shah the eldest daughter of the late Iskandar Muda, who ruled Aceh until 1675.    
 
 
 
 
3. 4. 7     Conclusion 
The crushing Acehnese defeat by the Portuguese in 1629 can be blamed on the fact that two 
commanders were appointed at the head of the Acehnese force and their disagreement on 
strategic matters. The defeat was even more bitter because of the superiority of the Acehnese 
                                                 
 
57  D. F. A. Hervey citing from  Francois Valentijn’s account of Malacca , (JSBRAS, 1890, vol. XXI-XXII, 223-
246), 227. 
 
58 Leupe ,”The Siege and Capture of Malacca from the Portuguese in 1640-1641” (JMBRAS, 1936), vol. XIV, 
128-429, appendix VII.   
 De Reisen van Nicolaus de Graaff 1639-1687 (Linschoten Vereeniging, 1930), 10-11.  
Dagh-Register 1640-1641, 124. They received 11 ships and 600 men assistance from Johor; Patani sent presents 
to the Dutch commander.  
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armada. Johor and Patani played a significant role in Aceh’s ruination, by sending ships to 
Malacca’s relief and handing over the laxamana to the Portuguese.  
It is difficult to determine precise inclinations of loyalty between the Malays and the 
Portuguese. One observes a shifting pattern of alliances and sympathies among them and in 
their relations with Malacca. The sultan of Johor, Abdu’l Jalil III ( the former Prince Bujang) 
and successor of Sultan Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah since 1624, had his moment of glory when 
the Acehnese laxamana begged him not to hand him over to the Portuguese. The Acehnese 
prevented him to access the throne of Pahang to where he was convoyed by the Portuguese 
after Johor and Malacca signed a second truce in 1615. Iskandar Muda twice invaded his 
homeland Johor and deposed his father Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah in 1613.  
Boasting in their fragile victory, the Portuguese set off a new stage in Dutch-Aceh relations, 
which the two parties very eagerly sealed in 1632 when Stadlander visited Sultan Iskandar 
Muda.  
 
The years of frantic diplomacy between the Dutch and Sultan Iskandar Thani for cooperation 
in an attack on Malacca took up all of Iskandar Thani’s time as Aceh’s ruler. While he had to 
shake off the Portuguese, his growing fear was that the VOC and Johor would in the end turn 
against him. Out of anxiety he took unprecedented measures to defend his country from 
foreign invasions by deviating the source of the river leading to the city. This was the first real 
sign that Aceh felt vulnerable towards outside intervention.    
Van Diemen’s explanation that he would take Johor ‘under our wings’ to disentangle the 
sultanate from the Portuguese, did not bode well with Iskandar Thani. As a prince of Pahang, 
he was understandably against being allied with his blood rival Johor who  had contributed to 
his father’s downfall. At that critical time of negotiations with the Dutch, he was fighting off 
Johor which tried to reassert its control over Pahang in 1638. Although Iskandar Thani 
considered Johor’s provisioning of Malacca with food as a treacherous act, he too fleetingly 
flirted with the Portuguese. It was an episode that taught him that the Portuguese could not be 
trusted. He was ready to attack Malacca together with the Dutch but not in an alliance with 
Johor. Van Diemen took various diplomatic steps to convince Iskandar Thani of Aceh’s 
unmatched significance for an attack on Malacca. The prolonged diplomatic process shows 
that Aceh remained from the very start of their presence in Asia, a factor of unprecedented 
importance for Dutch geo-political ambitions. Iskandar Thani in his turn stressed the brotherly 
bond with the Prince of Orange. He desperately tried to keep the Dutch on his side against his 
Malay enemy Johor. The relationship between Aceh and the Dutch through the decades 
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received heavy blows, but the pleas from both sides to keep the ‘brotherly’ bond shows, that 
their common aim and ideal, which was the overthrow of Portuguese authority in Malacca, 
was the raison d'être of their relationship.  
  
 
 
Part Three                                                                         
               
         
CHAPTER V 
 
                                      
SUBJUGATION AND SLAVERY 
 
  
 
 
3. 5. 1    Introduction 
The influx of vast numbers of people in Aceh who came either voluntarily, as merchants and 
adventurers, or involuntarily, as slaves and war captives, was intrinsically connected to 
Aceh’s development into a vibrant  trade centre and its  rise into a sovereign power of the first 
rank. The host of foreigners contributed to the cosmopolitan society, which was a salient 
characteristic of the great trading ports. The upshot of Sultan Iskandar Muda’s many war 
expeditions was the movement of thousands of war captives into the Acehnese orbit. In this 
chapter I like to focus on the plight of the people who came involuntarily, either as war 
captives or as slaves and debt-bondsmen. Because the European merchants in Aceh almost 
without exception point to the subjected people as slaves, the haunting question is, whether 
the war captives who hailed from Islamic ports on the Malay peninsula were regarded as 
slaves by their Acehnese captor. The extant sources are neither explicit nor exhaustive in 
explaining the position of the war captives in Acehnese society. Augusustin de Beaulieu is 
our most eloquent source in this respect, whereas several scholars examined and described the 
social conditions which prevailed in Aceh during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; 
their observations and conclusions are to a certain extent helpful in gleaning the conditions of 
the seventeenth century.   
 
 
 
 
3. 5. 2      Demographic need for the invasions  
Denys Lombard and in his footsteps Anthony Reid and other historians, adopts the view that 
Iskandar Muda’s war expeditions to the Malay ports were necessary to (re)populate the 
Acehnese realm. There is no clarity on what observations and sources these historians base 
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this opinion, except for the comment by Augustin de Beaulieu that Iskandar Muda populated 
his realm by way of conquests.1 This unavoidably establishes the thesis of a mono-causal 
objective for the invasions, making the acquiring of humans Iskandar Muda’s sole 
consideration. This is falsified by the surfacing facts in the discussion which show that the 
motifs for his invasions of the ports were Portugese trade interests and their meddling in the 
political affairs of the ports.     
We may however consider the fact that the increasing trade with foreigners and the 
developments in Aceh demanded a growing labour force. Taking also for true that several 
rulers had huge numbers of orangkaya and other persons murdered when they seized the 
throne, it is understandable that they needed fresh human resources to provide them with new 
cadres. Most importantly, the assumed role of protector of Islam could only be upheld by the 
availability of manpower for the war against the ‘infidel’ in Malacca. Religious mobilization 
requires a readiness to go to war from all classes of society. Although Iskandar Muda was 
often victorious in his wars, he too suffered human losses which had to be made good. But 
were the war expeditions directed to acquire human resources?   
I established earlier that the invasions were fundamentally inspired by idealistic 
considerations, yet the acquiring of humans was a most welcome spin off but not a goal in 
itself. One should understand that in the nexus between de-population and re-population, 
taking away the enemy’s subjects, artillery and ships, were means not only to strengthen one’s 
own power, but the defeated opponent was seriously weakened and his efforts to launch a 
counter attack were completely diminished. The conqueror was feared in the neighbourhood 
and this instilled in him a sense of supreme authority. Iskandar Muda let it be known to the 
ports in the region that they could not accept Portuguese friendship or intervention without 
impunity.      
 
Pondering the postulation that the invasions were geared to (re)populate Aceh, it is interesting 
to know that in 1599 John Davis observed that the port of Aceh was a spacious city with a 
large population: ‘the town spreadeth over the whole land with a great concourse of people 
living in the city which had three markets.’2  He wrote this ten years after the just installed 
                                                 
1 Lombard, Mémoires, 224.  
De Beaulieu says here literaly that Iskandar Muda populated his town by way of conquests, or more properly, by 
ravaging Johor, Deli, Pahang, Kedah and Perak.  
 
2 The Voyages and Works of John Davis the Navigator, 147 .  
 233
Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) had thousands of his subjects massacred 
and before the multiple war expeditions under Iskandar Muda had taken effect.  
The assumption that the war expeditions were inspired by Iskandar Muda’s need to populate 
his domain, also founders in the face of De Beaulieu’s own account that the people from the 
invaded Malay ports were treated inhumanely and left to starve and die in the streets of the 
city. Is this the way to treat people who are badly needed to populate Aceh? About twenty 
thousand captives from Pahang, Kedah and Perak had been brought to Aceh between 1617 to 
1620. Whether the five thousand captives from Perak mentioned by the Dutch is included in 
this number is not confirmed.3 Out of the total of seven thousand captives from Kedah in the 
end only five hundred survived because of the appalling conditions under which they lived at 
the outskirts of the city where they were deprived of basic necessities.4  Rebellion of the 
Pahang people against the Acehnese laxamana led to the execution of hundreds of them. The 
people from Johor who were captured by the Acehnese armada in 1613, were left on the 
streets where they starved and many died.   
The waste of so many lives is a tragic testimony of Iskandar Muda’s callousness. It does not 
underscore the thesis that the conquests were geared  to populate the Acehnese realm.  
 
 
 
 
3. 5. 3   Dominant relations in Islam 
In a sense the Sultanate Aceh Daru’s-Salam was a paradox, where the egalitarian society 
advocated by Islam was imaginary; society was socially stratified with the rise of classes as a 
result of the developing trade based economic system. The Adat Aceh gives evidence of the 
stratification of a society, in which nobles, merchants and slaves formed important 
constituents. 
One of the efforts of this discussion is to find an answer to the question of the status of the 
war captives who hailed from Islamic territories, such as the invaded Malay ports. This is 
important because the foreign visitors almost unanimously refer to the hostages and war 
captives as slaves. Such an effort may prove to be difficult, because by abandoning Western 
associations of slavery, one may find oneself strapped in a web of local dependency threads  
                                                 
 
3 Generale Missiven, vol. I. 103: Letter of Pieter de Carpentier to the Gentlemen XVII, dated 8 March 1621.  
 
4 Lombard, Mémoires, 169. 
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which are difficult to disentangle and define. A genuine endeavour to perceive a connection 
between subjugation and slavery in Aceh,  requires a frame of reference which pays heed to 
the special character and the anomalies of the Acehnese state.  
Islam presents a key reference for the rules of conduct in a moslim society and is therefore a 
legitimate manner to do away with the time-honoured method of dealing with the imprecision 
of Western association and perception, which obscure rather than shed light on the Acehnese 
social scene. Opponents of the idea to look at the rules of Islam to examine subjection in 
Aceh,  may question whether the Acehnese state was based on a clearly articulated religious 
system and cast their doubts about its rulers’adherence to the teachings of Islam, declaring the 
whole exercise futile.5  This may seem a valid objection, because the Acehnese rulers are 
generally depicted in the foreign documents as potentates who disregarded the interests of 
their subjects and those of other people. I have set out in chapter II of Part One that a 
fundamental requirement for Islamic rulers is that they are adil (righteous).6   
In fact the Acehnese rulers’style of living challenged the teachings of the creed they claimed 
to profess: their pleasure in animal fights, their love of the alcoholic beverage arak, the 
display of incredible wealth and the opulence of their court seem proof  that they strayed from 
the ‘true path’. Interestingly, John Davis observed in 1602 that Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat 
Shah surrounded himself with female advisors. A woman called Keumalahayati was the 
laxamana of the Acehnese fleet when Davis came to Aceh in 1602 as the chief pilot of 
Admiral Lancaster’s fleet. From 1641 until 1699 four females in succession ruled Aceh.7 
Following the orthodox view in Islam, women in powerful positions is an aberration. 
While the arguments against looking at the rules of Islam as a reference are not without 
persuasive power, they are, in my opinion, premature. Against all the odds, the identification 
of these rulers with Islam was public and categorical. According to the Hikayat Aceh Iskandar 
Muda built several mosques. Foreigners witnessed religious processions which departed from 
the royal palace to the great mosque in the city of Bandar Aceh where the sultan led the 
                                                 
 
5 I may refer to C. Snouck Hurgronje’s critical stance on  the nature of Islam in Aceh during the rule of its 
greatest rulers: The Acehnese, vol. I, chapter I.  
Snouck Hurgronje visited Mecca and evidently used the knowledge he obtained of  Islam as a yardstick  to 
evaluate Islam’s influence on Acehnese society.   
 
6 This is also advocated in the Taj as-Salatin by Bukhari al Johari.   
 
7 Snouck Hurgronje made the following comment on female rule in Aceh: “The fact that four female souvereigns 
in succession have occupied the throne of Aceh must create an unfavourable impression in the mind of every 
Mohammedan who reviews the past history of the country. Yet in that very instance of female rule we have a 
remarkable example of how quickly a favourable experience may induce devout champions of Islam to lay aside 
their aversion even to such an anomaly as this. The Acehnese, vol. II, 335.    
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Friday prayer, one of the Islamic injunctions, as well as processions and celebrations on 
Islam’s sacred days like Idu’ l-Fitri after the end of the fasting month of Ramadan and on the 
day of sacrifice in the month of Dhu’l-Hijja. The Adat Aceh tells us that ‘the sultan first puts a 
knife into the neck of one of the sacrificial animals: as soon as some blood appears Sheikh 
Shamsu’d-din takes over the knife and dispatches the victim’.8 One should realize that the 
Adat Aceh which is a compilation of - indeed - royal ordinances, stipulates the rules for 
religious conduct and Islamic festivals. It is obvious that the sultan was the ‘law-giver’. He 
was aided by Islamic scholars at his court and by the highest Islamic judge, the Kadi 
Maliku’l-Adil (judge of the righteous king), who presided over the religious court. Adil or 
righteousness and just judgement is a fundamental principle which the Qur’an imparts on 
government and society in all aspects of life. It is an essential aspect in governing human 
relations.9  
Noteworthy is the fact that the Acehnese ulama A. Hasjmy defends women’s role in public 
positions, by bringing forward the example of Prophet Muhammad’s wife Ayshah, who 
became a resistant soldier,  translated the scriptures and set a precedent for Islamic women in 
political life.10 
It is obvious that any study of Aceh should reckon that Islam played a crucial role in Aceh. 
This makes it opportune to look at the rules it set out with regard to subjugation and slavery 
and  take this as a frame of thought and even as a methodological tool to examine the 
condition of the Islamic war captives in Aceh.  
 
Islam in principle rejects privileges; caste and aristocracy do not exist, but it recognizes 
inequalities. Islam does not forbid slavery, but it does not allow a follower to enslave 
someone of his own faith.  A freeborn Muslim can never become a slave. This religious 
constraint to enslave co-religionists thus compelled the purchase or the capture of people 
outside Muslim enclaves when there rose the need for slaves. Yet to manumit a slave was 
regarded highly meritorious. The early jurists of Islam reasoned that it would be illogical and 
detrimental to developments to ban slavery overnight in a society in which it had rooted. To 
                                                 
 
8 Adat Atjèh , 21. 
 
9  Mahmoud Ayoub “The Muslim Ummah and the Islamic State” in: Syed Othman Alhabeshi  and Syed Omar 
Syed Agil (eds.), The Role and Influence of Religion in Society (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Islamic 
Understanding Malaysia (IKIM), 1994), 49-57: 51. 
 
10 Hasjmy found examples in the Qu’ran to justify women’s position in society. He alludes to several verses 
which show that women and men both had the same status:  59 Tahun Aceh Merdeka Di Bawah Pemerintahan 
Ratu, (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1977), 22.   
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avoid serious social dislocations they took a gradual approach to the issue of abolition of the 
widespread system, by developing and promoting two steps for abolition:  
1. Moral-religious: slave-owners were encouragd to free their slaves; this was seen as virtuous 
and commendable ( Sura 2: 177, 90:13). To manumit slaves was one of the ways to atone for 
sins.   
2. Legal: through a freedom contract. 
The glitch in Islamic societies was, that there existed some form of domestic slavery, but it 
was generally permeated with a patriarchal character. Every Islamized society added its own  
traditional views to the new religion and evidently the egalitarian society was difficult to 
attain then as well as now. The acceptation through the centuries of these inequalities in 
Muslim societies have resulted in classification and regulation. The classification of ‘unfree’ 
people in orthodox Islam as summed up by Bernard Lewis is: slave, woman, unbeliever. 
These groups lack the freedom to participate in the exercise of power.11 Over the centuries 
Islamic rulers increasingly came to rely on their slave soldiers, examples are found in the 
Ottoman Empire, in Egypt of the Mamluks and in Moghul India. This dependency of the 
rulers on their slaves gradually led to instances in which these slaves became dominant in the 
military and government apparatus in which they started to occupy central positions.12   
The Arabic word for slave abd is principally used as a metaphor for man in relationship to 
God or Allah to Whom he owes total submission. The Malay word used in the same context is 
hamba (Allah). The composer of the Bustan as-Salatin, Sheikh Nuru’d-din al Raniri, tells us 
that ‘Sultan Iskandar Muda subdued Pahang, because God wished to carry out his plans 
through his slave’.13  
Of special relevance for this discussion is the stipulation in the Islamic law books for the 
capture of people from other Muslim states. As regards the conflicts between Muslims, Islam 
accepts invasions of Muslim lands and their subjugation and the capture of co-religionists 
under set conditions. According to Bernard Lewis there is a special stipulation in the law 
books which is concerned with the capture of co-religionists from Muslim states ‘who are in 
                                                 
11 The political language of Islam, 65: ‘Until the eighteenth century the Islamic terms for ‘free’had a primary 
legal, and occasionally social significance and meant one who, according to the law, was a free man and not a 
slave. Neither term ‘free’ or ‘slave’ was used in a political context. Western use of the terms ‘freedom’ and 
‘slavery’ as metaphors for citizen’s rights and oppressive rule is unknown in Islamic discourse. The central issue 
is justice and not freedom’.   
 
12 idem. 
 
13 Bustanu’s Salatin, 12      ‘ …bahawa sultan Iskandar Muda mena‘alokkan negeri Pahang antara lain ia-lah 
kerana Allah hendak melakukan iradat-nya kapada sa-seorang hamba-nya.’  
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conflict with the state that declares war’. They are usually regarded as baghi, rebels, and may 
not, unlike the ‘unbeliever’ or ‘infidel’ be enslaved or held to ransom in captivity. The general 
purport is clear. Lewis mentions two categories of Muslim enemies against whom it is lawful 
to wage war: rebels and bandits. It was legal to make arrangements with rebels and these 
arrangements had to be honoured.14  The Malay ports which Iskandar Muda invaded can be 
considered rebel states who permitted the enemy of Islam (the Portuguese) to trade in their 
ports,  or made peace pacts with the Portuguese.  
 
 
 
 
3. 5. 4    The institution of slavery in Aceh  
Tomé Pires, assistant to the Portuguese governor of Malacca from about 1511 to 1515 gives 
one of the earliest accounts of slavery in the Straits region and talks about the presence of 
slave-markets in Palembang, Deli and Aru.15  H. J. Nieboer an authority on slavery in the 
Southeast Asian context, asserts that the institution of slavery existed in Sumatra, but, it was 
not widespread. Among the Battak tribes the existence of slavery was sufficiently proved.16 In 
the Lingga-Riau archipelago there were debtor-slaves. But in large areas of Sumatra there was 
no evidence of slavery ‘in the true sense’.17   
Debt-bondage was a system long known in Southeast Asia. Several scholars have studied this 
system of dependency in the Asian setting.18 The historian Edward Loeb observes: ‘In Aceh 
as among the Bataks and elswhere, debtors who were without means bound themselves to 
their creditors to work out their debts as pawns. Pawns were able to purchase their freedom, 
while slaves could not do so unless their masters consented’.19 Debt-bondage is generally  
                                                 
14 The political language of Islam, 82. 
See also : Robert Wuthnow (ed.), Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion,  2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1998), 425-426: ‘In addition to the expansionist jihad, medieval scholars also 
dealt with internal conflicts against rebels within Islam. In this form of jihad, stricter rules of engagement and 
greater protection for the lives and property of the enemy applied than in the case of non-Muslims. The aim of 
this type of jihad was to rehabilitate the rebels as quickly as possible into the Muslim body politic.’ 
 
15 Armando Cortesao (ed.), Tome Pires The Suma Oriental (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944).    
 
16 Aru and Deli were ports within the non-Islamic Batak territories. 
 
17 H. J. Nieboer, Slavery as an Industrial System , (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1910), 32. 
 
18 A. Reid (ed.), Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia, (St. Lucia. London. New York: University 
of Queensland Press, 1983).   
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regarded a moderate form of slavery, combining feudal principles, customs and traditions 
with exploitative labour.20 Anthony Reid points to linguistic patterns as paradigms to show 
that vertical bonding was the core of many social systems in this part of the world. He asserts 
that when Southeast Asians speak, they place themselves in a vertical relationship, 
demonstrating that they accept a system of unequal relations.21 Whether this practice can be 
regarded as a cultural matrix to explain unequal relationships is for the social scientists to 
decide, but it is nonetheless an interesting inference. Reid notes that the theoretical concept of 
human equality was latent in the three major religions in Southeast Asia, but that it was not 
present in the great texts of the Southeast Asian high cultures.22  If we consider the Adat Aceh 
a great local text, we surprisingly note an entry which gives evidence of the fact that slavery 
in Aceh was institutionalised.23  No mention is made of a system of debt-bondage, but one 
assumes that this system existed. While the Adat Aceh interpolates rules for religious conduct, 
it defies the Islamic notions of equality and thus bears witness to a gap between the adat 
(local law) provisions and those of Islamic Law.  
It is also worthy to note from the Encyclopaedia of Islam that the dominant relationship 
between master and slave in Persia was influenced by Sufism. There existed a domestic form 
of slavery of which the characteristics were: 1. usually good treatment; 2. integration in the 
family; 3. ease of enfranchisment.24 We may consider the fact that the system of dominant 
relationships in Aceh was influenced by Sufism, the spiritual form of Islam which was highly 
regarded. 
 
It may be instructive to look at the systems of slavery and debt-bondage in the Malay port of 
Perak and with little variation in the rest of the Malay world as they applied at the end of the 
nineteentyh century and described by W. E. Maxwell (1882).25    
                                                                                                                                                        
19 E. Loeb,  Sumatra Its History and People (Oxford University Press, 1989), 230 .  
20 Quotation by V. Matheson and M.B. Hooker in: Reid, Slavery, Bondage and Dependency, 191: ‘Maxwell 
states that the institution of debt-bondage is “a native Malay custom” and conflicts with Muslim law which is 
more lenient to debtors. (Maxwell 1890, p. 248).   
 
21 Slavery,  Bondage and Dependency, 6-7.  
 
22 ibid., 7.   
 
23 Adat Atjèh, 25.   
 
24 edited by H.A.R.Gibb, J.H. Kramer, E. Lévi-Provencal  (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960, vol. 1), 36.  
 
25 W. E. Maxwell, “The law relating to slavery among the Malays”, (JSBRAS :1890), vol.  XXI-XXII : 248-
297), 248.   
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‘Mohammedan law has however largely influenced Malay custom respecting slavery, and 
Arabic terminology is noticeable in many of the details incidental to the system. So far from 
being identical with the slavery lawful among Muslims in Egypt, Arabia, etc., the Malay 
institution is, in some respect, completely at variance with it, and in this particular, as in many 
others there is a never ending struggle between the hukum adat (customary law) of the 
Malays, and the hukum shari’a (religious law) of the Koran. Muhammadan priests, who 
would sometimes seek, if they could, to enforce the latter, are met by the plea that the practice 
denounced is lawful by Malay custom and it is thus that debt-bondage,  like opium smoking, 
gambling, etc., is always defended.’ There are two classes of slaves: hamba and kawan.   
‘The debt-bondsman (orang berhutang), is more correctly termed kawan (companion).’ The 
slave (abdi) (Ar.) is termed hamba.  
A slave is either a captive taken in war; an infidel captured by force (i.e. Batak, etc.); a man-
slayer (yang bawa darah mati);  
The debt-bondsman is a free man, (mardahika) as opposed to a slave ‘though from his being 
obliged to serve his creditor in all kinds of menial employment, the two conditions are not 
always readily distinguishable’. It was custom among the Rawa Malays who originated from 
Sumatra, but had settled in Perak, to detain a debt bondsman ‘for two years only’. If the debt 
was not paid back at the expiration time, it was remitted as alms. The national customs in 
Perak on the contrary, when favourable to the debtor, have been openly disregarded and every 
kind of oppression has been practiced.’26  
 
 
 
 
 3. 5. 5     European perceptions of slavery in Aceh 
The European visitors perceived dependency relations,  mis-treatment and castigation as 
slavery, whether this was locally regarded as such. A person’s freedom or rather the lack of it 
was the parameter for equating his condition with slavery. Let us look at some examples of 
what should be considered unqualified terms used by the European merchants in Aceh for the 
dependency relations. John Davis who was in Aceh in 1599 and 1602,  perceived that Aceh 
was fundamentally a society of unfree people: ‘For it seemeth there is no free-man in the land, 
                                                 
 
26 ibid., 250. 
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for the life and goods of all is at the Kings pleasure.’27  Interestingly, Nieboer advanced the 
proposition that despotic societies are not by nature slave societies: ‘The slave lives in a 
society that regards him as a slave; slavery cannot exist where there is not a society of 
freemen. Therefore the despot,  however great his power,  is not as much a master of 
slaves.’28  Nieboer defines a slave as follows: ‘A slave is the property of another, politically 
and socially (a slave is) at a lower level than the mass of people and performs compulsory 
labour.’    
An unqualified statement is by the English admiral Thomas Best who was in Aceh in 1613: 
‘for this day he (the King) confiscated a junk from Suratt which was worth 100.000 crowns, 
and made all the people slaves, for that they had bene att a place called Pera(k), which people 
are enemies to this King of Achen.’ Worthy to note is the fact that their names suggest that 
theye were muslims and as we know Islam forbids the enslavement of co-religionists.29 The 
Dutch official Hans de Haze who was in Aceh in 1616 wrote to his headoffice in Bantam that 
the sultan was holding the captain of the Dutch factory as a slave and was going to take him 
to Malacca’.30  He referred to merchant Ryser who was thrown to the elephants because he 
trespassed the local law to wait for the royal cap. The unfortunate man was suffering from 
broken limbs and it is unlikely that he was enslaved. After he recovered he left Aceh.       
Francois Martin observed a curious system in 1602 which allowed strangers to buy women 
for as long as they stayed there, ‘without the women being shocked by this’. ‘Men buy for 
money all their household – women, servants and slaves – and get rid of them when it suits 
them.31  Martin in fact states that not only slaves but ‘free’ women too were bought and sold. 
Apparently slaves and women as well as servants could be owned.  Against this background I 
like to point to a rather similar custom which was practiced in Aceh in 1989, although the 
conditions were clearly in favour of the woman. Known as a contract-marriage, this is the 
only accepted way for a temporary intimate relationship between a foreigner and an Acehnese 
woman and legitimate as long as the foreigner resides in Aceh. The main condition is that he 
submits himself to Islamic rites, for example by undergoing circumcision. Whether the 
                                                 
 
27 The Yoyages and Works of John Davis the Navigator, 148.  
 
28 Slavery as an Industrial System , 31. 
 
29 The Voyage of Thomas Best, 271 ‘ Our general hath much endeavoured to redeem Abdela Cadir, father-in-law 
to Hoja Shan Allye, also Malyn Allye, Mea Hassan, Hassan Gemattee, Allye Croudia and Daud Bapon…’ 
  
30 Quoted. Arun Das Gupta,  Aceh in Indonesian trade and politics 1600-1641, 160.  
   
31 “Aceh in 1602 ”  in : A Reid (ed.), Witnesses to Sumatra A travellers’Anthology, 58. 
 241
foreigner is married in his country of origin, is not relevant. The contract covers the rights of 
the woman to a house and her husband’s belongings when he departs from Aceh and she is 
entitled to keep their offspring. It is profoundly a way to protect her against sexual 
exploitation.32   
Although he was in Aceh in 1688, decades later than the period which I set out to explore, the 
English traveller William Dampier sketched a picture of slavery as a kind of constituted 
order.33  According to this picture the shahbandar owned no less than thousand slaves,  some 
among them were chief merchants : ‘they were all in some way each others slaves and all in 
general to the Queen and orangkaya. Even the less wealthy people, who did not own slaves 
themselves, hired slaves to carry rice for them. Slaves were also hired to check the money 
from the money-changers. Yet there is no rigour used by the Master to his slave, except it be 
the very meanest, such as do all sorts of servile work: but those who can turn their hands to 
any thing besides drudgery, live well enough by their industry. Yet though all these are slaves, 
they have habitations or houses to themselves in several parts of the city, far from their 
masters houses, as if they were free People.’34  Slaves were encouraged by their masters to 
start their own business for which they lent them money ‘whereby the servant lives easy, and 
with great content follows what his inclination or capacity fits him for; and the master also, 
who has a share in the gains, reaps the more profit, yet without trouble. When one of these 
slaves dies,  his master is heir to what he leaves; and his children, if he has any, become his 
slaves also: unless the father out of his own clear gains has in his life time had werewithal to 
purchase their freedom there, I spoke of before’.35   
One would almost propose by looking at the European perceptions about dominant or 
dependency relationships, that the Europeans who maintained relations with the Acehnese 
port,  in fact defined themselves.  
In general writers are apprehensive and perhaps unable to define the boundaries of the unfree 
situation in which other people lived and laboured, and the structure of this situation. The 
numerous writings concerning this subject show that it is difficult to find a universally 
accepted definition for slave. J.L. Watson remarks that the writers’ linguistic usage is limited 
and subsequentially the word ‘slavery’ (between inverted commas) becomes the denominator 
                                                 
32 The author was acquainted with two couples who had closed a contract-marriage.  
 
33 Lombard calls Dampier a victim of his own categories and of his European vocabulary and the term ‘slaves’ as 
used for the situation inaccurate. See:  Le Sultanat d’Aceh au temps d’Iskandar Muda 1607-1636, 75.   
 
34 N. M. Penzer (ed.), William Dampier, Voyages and Discoveries (London: Argonaut Press, 1931) , 98-99. 
 
35 ibid., 90-101.  
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for all forms of subjection.36 ‘Thus the open-ended notion of ‘slavery’ not only makes it 
difficult to isolate it as a specific social system, but it demonstrates that in the nexus between 
slave and victim, the West has created its own types of slaves.’37 One should bear in mind 
that historical developments and events are often remembered by the linguistic usage shapin
a situation,  thus a wrongly used word can bring with it different perceptions, which blurrs the
socio-historical reality. In the dependency relationships it has profound significance to 
identify a person as a slave. It is evident that the tentative language used when describing and 
discussing phenomena of subjection, underscores the problem and indicates that we are 
dealing with complex social institutions.  
g 
 
                                                
There is also a marked scruple of local (Indonesian) scholars to discuss subjection and slavery 
as it prevailed in their homeland. This has resulted in the lack of a local perspective of the 
socio-historical reality and thus to a mainly western oriented view of the human conditions. A 
persistent,  yet unjustified sense of embarrassment or shame is generally the reason for this 
neglect. The history of Aceh has no secrets, just missing information. 
Whatever view one may hold on either side of the divide between Western and local ideas on  
human subjection, it is important to describe and understand the historical realities of 
dominant and dependency relations as they conditioned life in Aceh.  
 
 
 
 
3. 5. 6   Treatment of royal captives and foreign orangkaya in Aceh          
Since they were brutally captured in war and forced to work for the enemy, it is difficult to 
conceive that these people were loyal subjects, happily living their lives in the new 
environment. Be they persons who hailed from the highest social strata like the members of 
royal families, orangkaya, as well as the ordinary men and women, they all went through 
traumatic experiences. The majority of them were living in secluded areas at the boundaries of 
the city of Bandar Aceh,  deprived of basic food and necessities. Rebellion resulted in their 
execution, as the case of the Pahang captives demonstrated.     
 
 
36 J. L. Watson:  ‘…anthropologists are uncharacteristically diffident when they write about the institution of 
slavery. Only a few of the contributors even attempt a definition; most are content to get on with the task at hand 
and assume that they are writing  for an audience of sensible people who know full well what slavery entails’.  
‘Slavery as an institution’ in: Asian and African Systems of Slavery, Asian and African systems of slavery 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), 2. 
 
37 idem. 
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Little is known of the vicissitudes of the captured members of the different royal families in 
Aceh.  One of the historical most prominent was Raja Bongsu of Johor younger brother of 
Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah, whom Iskandar Muda appointed in 1614 as his vassal on the 
throne of Johor. Iskandar Muda gave him his sister in marriage, in a move to strengthen the 
ties between the two courts. There are more examples of kinship ties with different Malay 
courts.  A captured prince of Pahang was given in marriage to Iskandar Muda’s eldest 
daughter,  he later succeeded Iskandar Muda on the throne as Sultan Iskandar Thani. Iskandar 
Muda’s first wife was also from Pahang and many princesses from subjugated ports were 
among his wives and concubines.38 A captured prince of Johor was married to another one of 
Iskandar Muda’s daughters; this prince fled to the Portuguese in 1626 when the preparations 
for a siege of Malacca were underway, and informed them of an imminent Acehnese attack.  
From the onset of their captivity many of the captured royal princes lived in the royal palace 
which provided for their education. Dutch merchant Pieter van den Broecke on a visit to Aceh 
in 1618, witnessed a royal procession in which the just captured king of Pahang had to walk 
in front of the Sultan, carrying some of the royal regalia. He perceived this as a form of 
slavery: ‘Iskandar Muda ‘used him as a slave’.39   
According to the Adat Aceh which stipulates the ceremonial procedures and the groups that 
function in the royal procession, to wait on and accompany the ruler was a significant part of 
the duties in the category outer court functionaries.40 Accordingly, these functionaries were 
not slaves, yet they symbolised and made manifest the elevated position of the Acehnese 
sovereign. The king of Pahang was deliberately humiliated and treated as a minor official.41   
The fate of the captured ruler of Kedah presents a different example. After his belongings 
were confiscated he was executed together with his whole family and many of his orangkaya. 
                                                 
 
38  De Beaulieu mentions that Iskandar Muda had twenty legal princesses from the enemies he conquered  among 
his  wives. Lombard,  Mémoires, 205. 
 
39 W. Ph. Coolhaas (ed.),  Pieter van den Broecke in Azie, 2 vols. (Nijhoff, 1962-1963), vol. I, 177. 
 
40 Adat Atjèh, 21. This describes the procession and the groups that accompany the sultan to the mosque. These 
were heralds, pages, bearers of the state insignia and standards,  royal guards and members of the royal 
orchestra. 
 
41 According to Lewis there was a special law in Islam concerning ‘rebels’: ‘In fact, the unity of the Islamic 
society and polity, however firmly maintained in theory,  had been lost in practice from the mid-eight century 
onward. Many different Muslim states came into existence, often in conflict with one another, sometimes at war. 
The paramount need to accommodate this fact in the legal framework was met through the law relating to rebels. 
The rebel, ‘baghi’, as discussed in the law books, is obviously rather more than a mere insurgent or mutineer. 
Muslim rebels have virtually full belligerent rights. According to some law books, they may be killed only on the 
battlefield and not otherwise. Unlike apostates,  they may be given quarter; unlike unbelievers, they may not, if 
captured, be enslaved or held to ransom.’ The Political Language of Islam, 80, 81. 
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We have no answer to the question why he was executed and not spared like the other 
captured rulers. The people of Lankahui told De Beaulieu that the king of Kedah deserved to 
be executed because he was a cruel and impious tyrant.42   
It is interesting to see what conditions were set by Iskandar Muda for the functioning of his 
vassal Abdullah Ma’ayat Shah of Johor, the captured Raja Bongsu. Although Radja Lela 
Wangsa was the Acehnese sultan’s representative who accompanied the vassal to Johor, 
Abdullah was evidently in charge of governing. The Dutch and English kept communicating 
and dealing with him even when he went into exile in Bintam and Lingga. The Dutch always 
remained his friend, until his death in his refuge in 1624. The Portuguese forced him to sign a 
peace agreement in 1615 which indicates that he was indeed in command of the government 
and army of Johor and not the Acehnese Radja Lela Wangsa.  
Several orangkaya who hailed from the invaded Malay ports were appointed in government 
functions.  It is obvious that Iskandar Muda wanted to avoid conspiracies against him by 
drawing their loyalty and avoid their rebellion. The historian Dato F. W. Douglas sheds some 
light on the fate of some of the important Malay war captives in Aceh: 
‘The earliest records of the Malay Annals by another pen appears in the Bustan a’s Selatin 
whose author was a Gujerati writing in Malay at Acheh in 1638 (Nuru’d-din al Raniri). He 
says that he met there Tun Muhamad, nicknamed Sri Lanang, the Bendahara (equivalent of 
Prime Minister) of Johor and the editor of these annals who had been taken captive when 
Mahokota Alam (Iskandar Muda) conquered Johor in May 1613. His sultan and thousands of 
Malays were removed to Aceh and left to starve in the streets. Amongst the loot was the large 
brass cannon now on the Penang esplanade, named Si Rambai, and bearing a silver plate let in 
by Mahkota Alam’s orders recording its capture. Sri Lanang (his nickname means man, 
manly) would seem to have thrown in his lot with his captors since his son Tun Rembau 
became Sri Paduka Tuan at Aceh and married a daughter of Tun Mai Bendahara  of Perak and 
a fellow captive there. Their eldest son became Bendahara of Aceh. So Sri Lanang must have 
enjoyed a serene old age, but would probably be surprised to find that 300 years later Malay 
schoolboys were reading his history as an example of good Malay and a record of life in 
Malaka during its greatest glory.’43  These foreign orangkaya had thrown in their lot with 
their Acehnese captor, instead of rebelling against him, with the result that some sort of 
                                                 
   
42 Lombard,  Mémoires, 169.   
 
43 Dato  F. W. Douglas, “Notes On the Historical Geography of Malaya: Sidelights on the Malay Annals”, in: 
Dato Sir Ronald Braddell, The Study of Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula and Straits of Malacca, and Notes 
On Ancient Times in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: M.B.R.A.S, 1980, Reprints, no. 7), 515.  
 245
symbiotic relationship came into existance between them. The ties between the Malay nobles 
were reinforced while they were in captivity in Aceh; intermarriages posed no threat to 
Iskandar Muda.  
Sri Lanang who was the chronicler of the Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals), which appeared 
around 1613, told Sheikh Nuru’d-din al Raniri in Aceh that he wrote what he had heard from 
his forbears of the Rulers of Melaka, Johor and Pahang and their descent from Sultan Iskandar 
D’zul-Karnain ( Alexander the Great).  It is evident that  Nuru’d-din al Raniri put this 
firsthand information to good use when he started to work on his major opus the Bustan as-
Salatin.  
We draw the surprising information from the quotation by Douglas that three centuries later 
Malaysian schoolboys were ignorant of the fact that their revered hero Sri Lanang had been 
living a comfortable life in Aceh, the country of his captor and the enemy of the Malays.  
 
 
 
 
3. 5. 7    The plight of European captives 
In the years of relations with the northern Europeans during the rule of Iskandar Muda and 
Iskandar Thani, the differences and animosities between the actors did not lead to murdering 
northern Europeans on Aceh’s soil. The Acehnese invasion of Johor in 1613 which prompted 
the Dutch merchants to take up arms in defense of Johor, resulted in their capture and 
temporary confinement in Aceh, but not in their execution. To my knowledge this was a 
unique case of capturing Europeans other than Portuguese. The murder of merchant Rassiere 
in Tiku in 1617 by a mob of discontented locals can be regarded as an incident. The killing of 
Cornelis de Houtman and many members of the Zeeland expedition in 1599 was incited by 
the Portuguese. John Davis who described the attack on the ships said ‘the Infidels murdered 
all our men ashore, only eight excepted, ‘whom the king fettered for slaves’ 44  As discussed 
in an earlier chapter, the condition of Frederick de Houtman and his mates went from 
reasonably tolerable to almost unbearable: from relatively free to move, to chained prisoners 
in Pedir, where they received only small rations of unboiled rice twice a day on which they 
barely survived while they laboured hard to restore the pinnace which the Acehnese had 
                                                 
 
44 The voyages and Works of John Davis the Navigator, 144. 
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seized from them.  He pleaded with Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah to let them go unchained, 
a request which was granted on the condition that this applied until such time when Dutch 
ships appeared in Aceh’s harbour. The treatment of the hostages was utterly appalling, but can 
we establish that they were slaves?  
It may be interesting to know that Islam sets out how the relations between the Muslim state 
and ‘infidels’ who wanted to establish trade relations could be reconciled and brought into 
practice. Interaction with non-Muslims was only possible if they accepted Muslim rule, 
Muslim protection and paid the poll tax to the Muslim state. The relationship between the 
Muslim ruler and a foreign state was in fact contractually based. Members of the non-Muslim 
community were allowed as temporary visitors, who enjoyed safe conduct and were granted a 
certain status, with certain duties and privileges.45  The legal scholars of Islam declared that 
the natural and permanent relationship between the world of Islam and the world of the 
unbelievers was one of open or latent war, and there could, therefore, be no peace and no 
treaty.46  Bernard Lewis asserts that truces and temporary agreements were,  however, 
possible,  and for these,  the scholars found precedent even in the Qur’an.’47  It may make 
clear why from the outset the Portuguese conquerors of Malacca were seen as enemies against 
whom it was a religious commitment to wage war and why the northern Europeans who came 
to trade,  accepted the sovereignty of the sultan and respected Aceh’s territorial integrity, were 
accepted as visiting residents and even allies and friends. The provisions as laid down in the 
Privilege of 1602 and the Accord of 1607 even granted them  jurisdiction on Islamic soil with 
far reaching consequences for the sovereignty of the Islamic host.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
45 Van Koningsveld asserts that it is a religious obligation of the believers to protect these foreigners:  De Islam, 
126.   
 
46 idem.  
The author  postulates that the right to protection was of a relative character and could be abrogated by Islamic 
scribes especially in cases of treason or in times of war.      
 
47 The Political Language of Islam, 78. 
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3. 5. 8     The human commodity 
Aceh’s rich merchant community and its trade based economic system worked as a magnet on 
destitute prople from outside its borders who were desperately searching for a livelihood. The 
Coromandel and Malabar coasts of India catered,  so to speak,  in people who sold themselves 
into debt-bondage due to droughts,  political instability and other calamities which resulted in 
famine and eventually death. For many years the unfavourable weather conditions in 
Paliacatte and the surrounding areas compelled destitute people to enter into dependency 
relations. They preferred debt-bondage and slaving in a foreign place, to the freedom to starve 
at home. We note that in 1622 Jan Pieterszoon Coen, governor-general in Jacatra (Batavia), 
instructed head merchant Andries Soury and governor Van Uffelen in Masulipatam to obtain 
as many slaves as possible to populate Jacatra, Amboyna and Banda. He explicitly referred  to 
the large numbers of slaves that went from there to Aceh.48 Coen received the information 
from Nicolaas Casembroot the resident merchant in Aceh, who may have provided an 
inaccurate report, saying that a number of threehundred slaves had arrived in one transport 
from Paliacatte.  Andries Soury in Masulipatam on the other hand received confirmation from 
the nachuda of the ship that the cargo consisted of only forty to fifty slaves.49   
It was true that substantial numbers of people had left Paliacatte in previous years when the 
critical conditions had pushed them into debt-bondage. Soury’s remark that the downwards 
trend would remain, ‘unless it would please God to unleash the same plague on Paliacate’, 
unmistakably illustrates that forms of social thought were shaped by the primacy of a market 
economy. 50 On the basis of the information by Soury that the slaves who went to Aceh in the 
above mentioned shipment were mainly ‘Moors’ (Muslims) one may establish that there was 
no obstacle for Muslims to sell themselves as debt-bondsmen to people of the same creed. Ito 
Takeshi has taken the analogy a bit further and discerns a cleavage in Acehnese society 
between the ideas of Islam in theory and practice.51  It is not proven that the VOC traded in 
debt bonds-men to Aceh; the correspondence between Soury and Coen centres around the  
numbers of destitutes that went to Aceh from Masulipatam. 
                                                 
 
48 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. III, 177: Letter from Jan Pieterszoon Coen dated 8 May 1622;  
 ibid., vol. VII (pt.2),  983-94: letter from Abraham van Uffelen dated 7 July, 622;   
 ibid., 989-94: letter from Andries Soury dated 7 July 1622. 
 
49 I was not able to trace Casembroot’s letter in which he refers to slaves from Paliacatte. 
 
50 quoted from the letter of Andries Soury, 990-991.  
 
51 The World of the Adat Aceh, 410.    
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Cornelis Comans who frequented Aceh between 1617 and 1619 mentions in his letter of 28 
January 1619, that the ‘Atchynder’ (the sultan) had laid an embargo on a Portuguese ship 
from Negapatam which arrived in the harbour of Aceh, and captured all people (Kalinga 
slaves) and goods, notwithstanding the fact that the king had licensed the Portuguese captain 
of the ship to trade in Aceh. Iskandar Muda also confiscated two Gujerati ships.52     
Ito Takeshi detects a steady arrival of slaves (he does not call them debt-bondsmen) from 
Coromandel and Bengal after 1630.  A Kalinga ship arrived in 1642 from from Porto Novo 
carrying ninety eight slaves and various kinds of textiles. Several weeks later a Danish ship 
from Pipli in Bengal arrived with twohundred slaves belonging to Muslim merchants on 
board the ship. Istructive is the information that the Danes earned 4 real per head of slave for 
freight charges, which is a concrete reference to their role as transporters. Rice cultivation in 
Aceh necessitated experienced labourers from rice-growing areas.53  
There is no solid evidence that Aceh was a (transit)market for slaves. There are only brief 
references to the sale of slaves. In 1613 Thomas Best bought several slaves : ‘Eleventh July 
(1613) Our General, hastinge business, sent abord 4 or 5 slaves, bought here at 4 or 5 taill.’54  
Augustin de Beaulieu describes how he was approached in 1621 by the ‘Moorish’ captain of a 
ship from Negapatam who requested him to help in buying back four Christian Portuguese 
captives in Aceh who the king used as slaves. For many years the unfortunate men were used 
for carrying stones for the construction of buildings which Iskandar Muda had ordered. They 
were in a miserable state. The Portuguese in Negapatam commissioned the captain to pay four 
hundred real to release them. After Iskandar Muda refused De Beaulieu once, he sent him the 
second time to the laxamana to make an arrangement. This man asked De Beaulieu one 
thousand real for the release of five men who had trained themselves to practice surgery. 
Iskandar Muda wanted to keep one of them for his private use. The deal was closed when De 
Beaulieu payed the king and the orangkaya laxamana six hundred real, and an extra sixty 
real to different other persons. The admiral drew from his own money to pay the extra for the 
release of these people. He was again approached by ten Portuguese sailors who had been 
forced by the Acehnese to convert to Islam, but even after that, they were bereft of anything to 
                                                 
 
52 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. VII (1), 398. 
 
53  The World of the Adat Aceh, 398.  
Also: VOC : 1.04.02: 1143.   
 
54 The Voyage of Thomas Best, 174-75. 
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sustain and this caused the death of four of them. De Beaulieu responded that he had not 
enough money, because he needed to load his ship with pepper which was expensive.   
For the money he had earlier paid to release the five men, De Beaulieu kept one of these men 
as his personal assistant and promised his release either later in Aceh or at their arrival in 
France.55  Here we note that although the Portuguese prisoners were forced to convert to 
Islam, they were not redeemed and still badly treated.      
Iskandar Muda paid with padi (rice), slaves and gold for the pepper he bought in Andragiri.56 
Thus slaves were also used to barter pepper. 
Slaves were regarded a commodity. The Adat Aceh speaks in one breath of the import tax on 
rice and slaves.57  The tax for slaves who were bought in Deli (Batak land), at that time a 
principal slave market was ‘one slave for every sixteen is payable to the Panglima of Deli’.58  
The import tax was sixteen to the hundred; which meant that out of hundred slaves sixteen 
were destined for the sultan, in addition two slaves were allotted to the Panglima Bandar, the 
principal harbour official. The provision in the Adat Aceh is known as the Adat pada tebusan. 
Literally tebusan means ransom or compensation. ItoTakeshi is of the opinion that the high 
tariff of 18% gives ample reason to establish that ‘considerable value was attached to slaves 
and their importance in Acehnese social and economic life’.59  It is doubtful that Iskandar 
Muda paid for the acquisition of slaves. The tax on the import shows that the sultan acquired a 
substantial number of slaves from the slave trade and so did the Panglima Bandar.   
 
The locals perceived that the more slaves one possessed, the more the slave-owner was 
respected. The distinguished Persian diplomat and poet Ibn Muhammad Ibrahim who visited 
Aceh on his way to Siam in 1685 noted that the natives reckoned high rank and wealth by the 
quantity of slaves a person owned. He mentions the existence of a system of hiring slaves, in 
which the hired slave was paid a certain amount of money which he gave to his master and 
performed whatever work was required of him.60   
                                                 
 
55 Lombard,  Mémoires, 129-31. 
 
56 Coen’s Bescheiden, vol. VII (I), 224: letter from Andries Soury dated 27 November 1616. 
 
57 Adat Atjèh,  25.  
 
58 ibid, 46. 
 
59 The World of the Adat Aceh, 365. 
 
60 John O’Kane (tr.), Ibn Muhammad Ibrahim,  The Ship of Sulaiman, (Persian Heritag Series, no. 11, London:  
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), 177. 
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De Beaulieu who was able to closely observe life at the court of Iskandar Muda when he was 
in Aceh in 1621, gives a detailed account of the position of the slave at the court. He says that 
Iskandar Muda owned about fifteen hundred slaves.61 Slaves could conclude an agreement 
with the sultan concerning their working conditions and as a result of this they wore no chains 
and worked under the care of three or four superintendents. Out of every eight days they 
worked four days in the sultan’s service; during the remaining days they worked for their own 
livelihood. Those who knew something about trade and were able to make a moderate living, 
could obtain exemption from his compulsory labour by paying Iskandar Muda five ‘sols’. 
This to me seems a form of debt-bondage where the person is able to buy himself certain 
freedoms. De Beaulieu reckoned that slavery in Aceh was more tolerable than in other 
places.62 
One of the duties of the royal slaves, known as hamba raja 63 was to keep watch on the 
orangkaya and the eunuchs who patrolled the inner courts of the royal palace during the night. 
As I set out in a previous chapter in Part Two, Iskandar Muda designed a scheme of watch by 
the orangkaya with the aim to divide them and keep them from complotting against him. The 
royal slaves featured prominently in the system of intelligence designed by the sultan; the 
sultan’s reliance on his slaves is thus apparent. 
One of Iskandar Muda’s sources of servitude was by entering widows,  daughters and slaves 
of deceased (and executed) orangkaya and other subjects into his court while confiscating the 
dead men’s possessions. According to De Beaulieu he became the heir to all his subjects if 
they had no male children.64 The women of the court were confined to a life within its walls 
and not allowed to go beyond its boundaries. For their personal needs a special bazaar was 
held within the inner walls of the court. It is not surprising that the northern Europeans at that 
time perceived this situation in which the sultan  decided upon the fate of his subjects as 
slavery. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘These slaves are drawn from every nation and race. Every day a certain number of them is delivered to the 
king’s administration and when the king has finished grinding each individual like so much grain in the dust of 
the year’s turning mill tax have been extracted in the form of the slave’s services, the remainder is given back to 
the master and this whole procedure is not considered in any way base or unfair.’  
      
61 Lombard, Mémoires, 215. 
 
62 ibid., 214 : ‘Et à mon avis, l’esclavage est plus tolérable en ce lieu, qu’en aucun autre de ma connaissance….’    
 
63 The Malay word for slave and bondsman is budak. Hamba is used specifically in relations to God and ruler, 
for example hamba Allah which means God’s servant.       
 
64 Lombard, Mémoires, 215. 
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3. 5. 9     The impact of subjugation and slavery on Acehnese society   
“Yet that the slavery of some part of the human species, in a very abject degree, as existed in 
all ages of the world, among the most civilized, as well as the barbarous nations, no man who 
has consulted the records of history disputes. Perhaps, like pain, poverty, sickness, and sorrow 
and all the various other calamities of our condition, it may have been originally interwoven 
into the constitution of the world for purposes inscrutable to man.” (Edmund Burke)65 
 
 
Acehnese society was unique in the sense that the influx of people was unprecedented 
compared to the rest of the region. Whether these people hailed from subjugated countries, 
from pillaged vessels or from the slave trade,  Muslims and non-Muslims alike added an 
important dimension to the development of Acehnese society which implied a unique process 
of nation-building. When Iskandar Muda’s war campaigns came to a halt, the influx of war-
captives also stopped.    
The gradual enforcement of orthodox Islamic rules when Sultan Iskandar Thani came to the 
throne,  started to transform society into one in which heterodoxy was no longer an accepted 
reality.66  Whether this transformation implied a reduction of slavery in Aceh cannot be 
conclusively answered. In the world of Islam the perfect society never existed; the egalitarian 
society was difficult to attain.   
  
For some understanding of Acehnese society in the seventeenth century we rely on foreign 
historians and scholars writing in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. A rather curios 
observation is by Charles Lockyer, which - although observed many decades after the period 
of this exploration – may still be significant for our discussion.67 
                                                 
 
65 Quoted  by Gordon Lewis, Main Currents in Caribbean Thought; the Historical Evolution of Caribbean 
Society in Its Ideological Aspects, 1492-1900. ( Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1983), 114.    
 
66 As mentioned in ‘The Geo-historical setting’, Francois Martin witnessed in 1602 Hindu ceremonies regarding  
the self-combustion of widows.   
 
67 C. Lockyer,  An Account of the Trade in India  (London: 1711).  
I consulted the Dutch translation by Arnout Schuyt,  Beschrijvinge van den koophandel in Oost-Indiën  (1753), 
33.  
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‘The natives are Malay, who speak the language fluently…..but they are plumper and stronger 
built than the Indians from Coromandel, of which there are many here, slaves of the 
principallest merchants, and difficult to distinguish from the freeborn because they were 
considered friends and mates instead of servants. They deserve this because of their 
faithfulness and their numbers.68 Aceh owes much of its wellbeing to these people, who take 
care of the rice fields,  unknown to Aceh. They were driven by famine from the coast of 
Coromandel. They are more agile and smarter than the natives and more inclined to 
commerce and trade and are stimulated by their masters with cash and loans. I am not certain 
that they need to convert to Islam which is the religion of their masters….’69   
It is remarkable that Lockyer only seems to distinguish Indian slaves and ‘freeborn’ people. 
He does not speak of Malay, Batak, Niasese or Acehnese slaves nor does he make mention of 
a system of debt-bondage.  Had these different ethnic groups assimilated into Acehnese 
society to the extent that it was difficult to distinguish them other than (Malay) natives? 
Lokyer’s description also makes clear that the number of Indian slaves in Aceh was quite 
substantial, but while he seems uncertain of the religious affiliation of these Indian slaves, a 
Dutch scholar on Islam, Th.W. Juynboll has established that ‘almost all slaves in Muslim 
countries converted to Islam’.70  Here we bump into one of the elusive conditions in Islam: 
co-religionists could not be enslaved but slaves who converted to Islam did not automatically 
lose their status of slave. In other words it looks as if conversion in Aceh was not the path to 
redemption. One should realize however,  that if all converted slaves automatically obtained 
their freedom as a result of conversion, slavery would have been quickly eradicated.  
Ito Takeshi speaks of a ‘hierarchy in dependence’ in Acehnese society :  ‘…there exists for 
Aceh no sign that the door was open for slaves to play roles of great political importance as is 
known to have been the case in the Ottoman Empire. The so-called ‘slave-family’ system, on 
which the Ottoman Empire based its political institutions, did not develop in Aceh, and this 
absence of an elaborate slave system tightly connected with the political administration may 
have resulted in a relatively low political status for slaves there.’71   
                                                 
 
68 The Malays call them hamba kawan.  
 
69 Arnout Schuyt,  Beschrijvinge van den koophandel in Oost-Indiën’, 33.  
 
70 Th. W. Juynboll, Handleiding tot de kennis van de Mohammedaansche Wet, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1925),  233. 
 
71 The World of the Adat Aceh, 409-410. 
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On the other hand the slaves or debt-bondsmen in Aceh owned extraordinary privileges which 
contributed to the general view that the system of slavery was mild or ‘tolerable’. To quote 
Anthony Reid: ‘Southeast Asia demonstrates very well the fundamental contradictions always 
inherent in slavery. The slave is a commodity and yet a human being; exploited and yet 
trusted to be loyal, inferior yet intimate. These contradictions have ensured that no system of 
slavery can be ‘pure’ or free from anomalies.’72  
The Dutch ethnologist C. Snouck Hurgronje found many slaves on Aceh’s west coast at the 
closing decades of the nineteenth century; it concerned slaves raided from the island of Nias, 
an island in the Indian Ocean before the Batak territories. ‘These people were an important 
factor in the development of the Acehnese race. They were raided in hundreds up to the end 
of the nineteenth century and were still clandestinely purchased in smaller numbers. 
Compared to the number of slaves from Nias, the number of slaves from other nations and 
races was inconsiderable. The Acehnese set a high value on these (Nias) people as slaves. 
They described them as tractable, obedient, zealous and trustworthy. The women were more 
highly prized for their beauty than those of the dominant race, and many boys were trained as 
sadati  (dancers) or otherwise were used as lust objects by the Acehnese.’73  The author does 
not speak of Indian debt-bondsmen or slaves in that period, as if they did not exixst.  
We depend largely on the view of Snouck Hurgronje and his fellow ethnologist J. Jacobs to 
gain some insight in the ways a slave was manumitted.  Jacobs mentions that a slave could not 
marry into the house of his master, according to the laws of Islam a person could not at the 
same time be the owner and the husband of a slave. He could on the other hand marry the 
slave of somebody else which happened frequently. One way of manumitting a female slave 
with the aim to marry her, was to prepare a meal and invite guests to the occasion. The 
marriage partners would sit at the meal together with the guests. To eat together in the 
company of eyewitnesses was proof that the master had set her free. From now on the 
community should accept her as a free person.74 Yet slave-owners could own their female 
slaves as concubines (goendih). This makes clear that manumission was a simple formality.  
An important cultural trait which is brought forward by Snouck Hurgronje is, that the 
Acehnese lay great stress on descent from mother’s side. ‘Thus no Acehnese willingly 
                                                 
 
72  Introduction to Slavery and Bondage in Southeast Asian History (University of Queensland Press, 1983), 43-
44. 
 
73 The Acehnese, vol. I, 20.       
     
74 Het Familie- en Kampongleven op Groot-Atjeh, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1894), vol. I, 12.  
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becomes the father of children by his female slaves, alshough such a practice is freely 
admitted by Moslim law. It is for this reason that the intercourse of masters with their female 
slaves is very limited in comparison with other Mohamedan countries, and where it does take 
place, recourse is had to various methods to avert or nullify its natural consequences. All the 
same there is a certain proportion of children born of such concubinage.75   
The  information put together from the diverse sources has brought to light that it is 
impossible to ascertain whether the Muslim war victims were regarded slaves by their 
Acehnese captor. Even if they were freeborn, they may have been driven by starvation into 
debt-bondage and also  because of the inhumane conditions they met at their arrival in Aceh. 
The early scholars do not speak of Malay slaves, only of slaves from non-Muslim enclaves 
such as the island of Nias and the Batak territories, and of Indian slaves. They do not 
explicitly distinguish between slaves and debt-bondsmen.   
We may conclude that Acehnese society constituted different components; it grew into an 
amalgamation of diverse races, cultures, ranks and classes. The incipient stratification of 
society,  that logically emerges from a situation of different types of social relationships and 
categories of social entities, expanded when slaves and war captives came in large numbers to 
Aceh. The influx of  people impacted significantly on society, both in the vertical and the 
horizontal sphere. 
 
Vertical sphere: the economy 
The growth of the trade necessitated labour and eventually generated slavery and debt-
bondage. Rich people surrounded themselves with slaves and debt-bondsmen.  
The sultan received slaves as import tax for slaves.  
Slavery and debt-bondage formed a major motor of the sultanate’s development..  
 
Horizontal sphere: the social lay-out 
The arrival and assimilation of people from different racial and cultural backgrounds 
contributed to the rise of the plural society.  
Debt-bondsmen were often given responsibility over the business of their masters and were 
regarded as hamba kawan or friends.  It follows that social mobility was a fact.  
 
 
                                                 
 
75  ibid., 21. 
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3. 5. 10     Conclusion 
Slavery and debt-bondage were a reality in Aceh and the high number of war victims added to 
society’s social and cultural make-up. Evidence of the existence of an institutionalised system 
of slavery is found in the Adat Aceh, while the tenets which uphold the Islamic ideal of human 
equality are missing. Stratification of society and the privileges that derive from this are 
embedded in the Adat Aceh. Slaves were an import commodity,  mentioned in one breath with 
rice, no more, no less, and tax levied on the human commodity illustrates the existence of a 
degrading system. Yet the main obstacle for drawing an assessment of the incidence of 
slavery and debt-bondage is the absence of data and facts. There is no evidence that Aceh was 
actively engaged in importing debt-bondsmen from India. It was up to the decision of the 
people to leave Paliacatte and Negapatam in times of peril and calamities. The numbers of 
people who left to labour abroad, dropped significantly when the situation improved.  
According to the stipulations in the Adat Aceh,  slaves were usually imported from the slave 
market in Deli. Aceh was not an export market for slaves.     
The rise of slavery and debt-bondage can be associated with Aceh’s development and it 
became a vital element in the accumulation of wealth. The moral standards seemed to have 
lost out and slavery, a status contra naturam, was an accepted reality.  
Thus the indicators for the incidence of slavery and debt-bondage in Aceh are wealth, 
development and royal power. The paradox is that Aceh gradually entered the pre-modern era 
with the emergence of contractual trade relations with a number of foreign states and 
companies, the codification of regulations, a prolific literary upsurge and the development of 
crafts and skills, but slavery was not erased.  
 
The status of the war captives from Islamic ports has pulled us to the question of Aceh’s 
adherence to the rules of Islam. By  trying to establish their status in the country of their 
captivity I posit two hypotheses:  
1. Their brutal capture, their loss of freedom and their inhumane treatment as a result of which 
many starved and died,  gives room to propose that these Muslims were not given equal rights 
which Islam concedes to ‘rebels’ and that they were slaves.  
2.  A rebel’s action was detrimental to the very existence of Islam. Islam commands the 
punishment of rebels. The moral paradox is that although Muslims were captured and often  
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inhumanely treated and bereft of their freedom, there was the religious constraint to regard 
them as slaves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
     17th Century royal architecture in the Taman Ghairah or Pleasure Garden.  
     (photo: own collection) 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 Pinto Khob, the gate at the back of the dalam or royal palace which was exclusively used by 
the royals. (photo: own  collection) 
 
 
 
                                                CONCLUSION      
 
A revised or reconstructed past is never the same as the past as it was. This is the reality we 
have to accept. The character of our analysis is chiefly determined by the nature of the 
surviving evidence, from the problematic information provided by the Acehnese annals, to the 
other kinds of documentary evidence emanating from the court of the sultans and from 
foreign material. We have tried to determine the motives, aims,  goals and intentions of the 
actors in the playing field of international and interstate relations from our fragmentary 
knowledge about their behaviour.    
           
Two primary moments in Aceh’s history are readily identifiable :  
The conquest of Malacca by the Portuguese in 1511,  bringing about the sultanate’s genesis. 
War was the cataclysm for change: Aceh’s subjugation of  Pasai,  Pedir and  Daya resulted 
from Portuguese intrusion in these ports located on the east and the west coast of Sumatra. 
Portuguese manifest presence, their frantic efforts to usurp the Islamic trade and their 
incursions in Sumatra was the impetus for Aceh’s expansion and the formative elements of 
kingship.  
The second defining moment was the arrival of the northern Europeans at the turn of the 
sixteenth into the seventeenth century,  bringing unimagined prospects for trade revenues, 
royal incomes and alliance forming.  From being a powerful regional state and an important 
trade centre,  Aceh steadfastly acquired international recognition, engaging in trade and 
diplomacy with countries outside the traditional boundaries of trade, religion and rivalry.  
Islam and the Islamic trade seemed no longer Aceh’s raison d’etre.  
We establish that the Age of Aceh started when Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah was 
approached in 1593 by merchants from Malacca, followed at the turn of the sixteenth into the 
seventeenth century by traders from the United Republic, England and France, who came to 
trade with his country and to establish diplomatic relations. The Malaccan traders were in 
favour of a rapprochement with Aceh to advance their trade,  instead of being engaged in  
endless wars which were disruptive to their trade and existence. Realpolitik won from power 
politics. 
The northern Europeans saw in Aceh an important supplier of pepper and other commodities. 
At the same time they recognized Aceh’s political prominence in the Straits and especially the 
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Dutch saw in Aceh an ally against the Portuguese. The Dutch were keen on breaking 
Portuguese hegemony on the Asian seas.  
The encounters with the northern Europeans were of critical importance for the direction  
Aceh would eventually follow. It can be supposed that from his contacts with Cornelis De 
Houtman, Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah became aware of written contracts. The exchange 
of goods and services started an age of equal partnership between Aceh and the Dutch. The 
sultan used the opportunity of the presence of the Zeeland expedition to barter pepper for 
Dutch assistance in an attack on Johor. This request to the Dutch - staunch enemies of the 
Spaniards and Portuguese - was an open invitation to the Portuguese to come to Johor’s 
assistance against the insufferable alliance, diminishing Aceh’s chances to become the 
overlord of Johor and controller of the Malacca Straits. The unprecedented period of peace 
and stability with a level playing field in geo-politics which started in 1593, was upset.  
The relentless efforts of the Dutch to re-gain the sultan’s trust and favour, demonstrates that 
Aceh’s attributes were essential to their ambitions to monopolise the region’s trade. The 
Zeeland factory, established in 1601  in Aceh, was the first official factory of the Dutch in 
Asia. The visit of the Acehnese ambassadors to the United Republic of the Netherlands in 
1602 was the first Southeast Asian mission to Europe;  a sovereign sultanate conducted 
diplomatic relations with an independent European state.  It ushered in the start of a strategic 
partnership between the two states.  
 
Dutch admiral Matelieff’s thoroughness in intervening on Aceh’s behalf by confronting the 
Portuguese fleet that tried to invade Aceh in 1606, was honoured by Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah 
who granted the VOC the right in 1607 to establish a rendez-vous in exchange for military 
assistance against the Portuguese and the Spanish. Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah’s successor, his 
nephew Iskandar Muda,  following his own course,  made an implicit statement in 1608 when 
he denied the existence of a formal accord with the Dutch and the Privilege of 1602 to the 
English.  He did not allow the VOC to have jurisdiction on Aceh’s soil in exchange for 
military assistance.  It is difficult to determine the precise consequences for the sultanate if 
these treaties with the northern Europeans were honoured,  but the young sultan can be 
supposed to have recognized the dangers posed to Aceh’s sovereignty if the Europeans 
obtained special rights. The Privilege of 1602 did not constitute English military assistance 
and in the bi-lateral relations assistance was not bartered for trade contracts.  In the 
negotiations between the Dutch and the sultan a trade contract was the conditio sine qua non 
for Dutch military assistance. Sultan Iskandar Muda equally set the condition that they assist 
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him with ships to attack Malacca before he was willing to gave them trade licenses. Yet the 
notion of being ‘brothers in-arms’ versus the Portuguese remained the backbone of their 
relationship.  It was a kind of gentlemen’s agreement which replaced the military component 
of the redundant Accord of 1607. The ‘brotherly’ bond was inspired by Prince Maurice of 
Nassau and highly esteemed by the Acehnese sultans. The special bond weathered the heavy 
storms in their contacts:  Malacca remained a potential and an actual threat,  politically and 
economically. But it was fundamentally the idea of being strategic partners that sustained the 
tempestuous relationship. They continually failed to meet their obligation.  Although they 
both heatedly and repeatedly appealed for assistance, the evidence is that they operated 
independently against the Iberians.  Often they acted like bantams,  but eagerly ended their 
quarrels,  the process showing a shifting pattern of sympathies and loyalties between them. 
This presumed equal partnership relation in which military assistance was bartered for trade 
contracts, lasted until the Dutch besieged and captured  Malacca in 1641without Aceh’s actual 
participation. The extraordinary relationship between Aceh and the Dutch during this period is 
completely neglected in the historical literature, moreover, it is a non-est. We observe 
however that within the continuity of the special relationship there were contingencies. 
 
In 1610 the balance of power in the Straits skidded to the Portuguese after Malacca and Johor 
signed an armistice. The failed attempt by his Dutch ‘confederate’ Verhoeven to capture 
Malacca in 1608 and the subsequent Portuguese coercion of Johor to sign the armistice in 
1610, urged  Iskandar Muda to come into action against the Malacca/Johor pact.  In the light 
of these developments,  Iskandar Muda’s  invasions of the Sumatran ports Aru and Deli 
around 1611and 1612 acquire the character of a political coup d’état far more than that of 
aggressive conquest,  since these ports were under Johor’s umbrella and thus easily accessible 
to the Portuguese. The invasions of these ports cleared the way for Aceh’s armada to reach 
Johor in 1613 undisturbed,  to castigate it for signing the armistice with Malacca. Even though 
Iskandar Muda  subjugated  Johor, Aceh did not automatically become the overlord of Johor’s 
vassal states such as Pahang,  Siak,  Andragiri and Jambi.  
 
Even though he was pragmatic,  Iskandar Muda did not consciously develop an expansion 
policy;  he was not a great visionary who set himself the task to effect the systematic 
subjugation of the region. Conquest was not his chief ambition;  he invaded those ports who 
either succumbed to the Portuguese by engaging in trade with them or by closing peace pacts. 
These were deliberate reprisals, legitimated from his point of view by his obligation to Islam 
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and to his forefathers.  Accordingly, the acquisition of humans, vessels and artillery from the 
subjugated ports was an achievement, but not a goal in itself. Although the demographic 
scene changed in favour of Aceh, the invasions were not designations for acquiring human 
potential  to (re)populate the Acehnese realm;  it was an effective way to weaken an opponent. 
The death of thousands of war captives because of his neglect and his maltreatment 
underscores this proposition. There is no substantiated evidence that the Malay war victims 
were enslaved. But in the nexus between slave and victim the borderline was very thin. 
 
The Acehnese sultans not only relied on their military strength to settle disputes, they also 
engaged in diplomacy with the Europeans and with neighbouring courts. Diplomatic relations 
were not thoroughly organized for there is no evidence that there existed a system of 
permanent ambassadors. These relations were maintained by envoys who were sent to 
conduct the special business at hand. One of the features of disrupted relations was hostage-
taking. Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah reciprocated Prince Maurice’s wish for friendship by 
releasing Frederick de Houtman and by sending his ambassadors to the United Republic of 
the Netherlands in 1602.  In 1617 Iskandar Muda sent an envoy to the court of one of his 
rivals, the ruler of Bantam.  In 1624 he sent envoys to the king of Jambi to request the 
extradition of the widow and young son of the deceased Sultan Abdulah-Ma’ayat Shah of 
Johor, who had died in exile. It was implicitly an order.  After the king of Jambi refused to 
comply with this,  Iskandar Muda threatened to destroy Jambi.  It was intrinsically  a 
declaration of war. There is no evidence that he officially declared war on the ports he 
subjugated. The attack on Jambi did not materialize. It is very unusual behaviour in a callous 
subjugator to know when to hold back. In this case it was, first of all, the strength of the 
resistance against him; the fact that the neighbouring rulers too had their own position to 
safeguard. This, together with the help Jambi received from the Portuguese and in particular 
from the Dutch, decided the course of events,  showing that the most effective antidote to 
aggressive power is counter-power.  Faced with a formidable opposition,  Iskandar Muda 
balked at starting a confrontation.  He viewed Dutch support with a small fleet for Jambi in 
1624 as a deception.  Be that as it may, the mere fact that Iskandar Muda threatened to stretch 
his military muscles to the neighbouring ports,  halted their trade for several years. Thus he 
ultimately became the kingpin of the area’s trade.  
The critical year of Iskandar Muda’s rule was 1629,  the year of his humiliation at the hands 
of the Portuguese, when his armada was ruined. He made a strategic blunder to appoint two 
commanders at the head of the war expedition who were not in agreement with each other 
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about the strategy to follow. Given the superiority of the Acehnese armada,  made the defeat 
more  bitter. The Malay kingdoms Johor and Patani who came to Malacca’s assistance, 
contributed to his ruination. The loss of his splendid fleet and thousands of warriors did not 
break Iskandar Muda’s determination to fight the Portuguese,  he remained a force to reckon 
with.  During his reign Aceh did not suffer any Portuguese or foreign attack and even after his 
defeat he still controlled much of the region’s trade.  Aceh remained the most powerful state 
and fiercest opponent of the Portuguese. Out of economic and geo-political interests, the 
Dutch renewed the friendship with Iskandar Muda in 1632.  Dutch rapprochement boosted his 
self-importance.  By offering him their assistance in exchange for trade privileges in the ports 
under his control,  the Dutch acknowledged that he was the key-figure in the region’s trade. 
He was delighted with the renewed relationship. The equality of military power between 
them,  discouraged conflict between them.      
 
The Acehnese sultans were communicators. They communicated orally and in writing, relying 
on the capabilities of scribes, copyists, translators, envoys, chiefs and religious scholars. The 
sultan’s authority would give the oral pronouncement made at an assembly or in a audience its 
power, similarly the royal letters, the sarakatas or edicts and the royal cap indicate that the 
written record of whatever had been decided, or what the sultan required,  created an essential 
obligation on the part of whoever it was to do a certain obligation or whoever made a request. 
The royal edicts and the harbour regulations are proof of the fact that the clerks of the Public 
Hall and the harbour office acted on oral or written instructions from the court. Those officials 
who wrote their own letters,  reiterated the sultan’s wishes in these letters, and thus mediated 
the sultan’s voice.  Proof  of this can be found in the letter of the Laxamana to the Dutch 
governor-general written in 1617 and given to ambassador Comans,  in which he complains 
about the furtive departure from Aceh of the resident merchants, repeating the sultan’s words. 
The records reflect more about the sultans’ concerns in ruling the realm than any other source. 
The written word itself increasingly became an essential element of royal administration,  
local law, literature and religious expression. The royal support for the creation of literary 
works had a profound effect on the development of Acehnese cultural identity, and a lasting 
impact into the present.   
 
The cooperation with the Islamic scholars was not only borne upon the sultans by the need for 
political legitimacy, these men were trusted to council them on a range of matters. The sultans 
could not rule by coercion alone; their legitimacy very much depended on the effective and 
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impartial administration of  justice. The sultan’s power was kept in check by his fear of a 
revolt against his rule. This established a modus vivendi between him and the powerful 
orangkaya. However,  Iskandar Muda’s  authority over the orangkaya of the realm was 
unprecedented. This is especially clear when he announced the appointment of the foreign 
prince from Pahang as his successor. Accession was not followed by the customary rebellion 
and took place without bloodshed. No orangkaya seized the throne although the sultan 
himself and the influential Sheikh Shamsu’d-din Pasai, had already died.  
Under Sultan Iskandar Thani, the socio-religious atmosphere changed. The ideological force 
behind him was Sheikh Nuru’d-din al Raniri, a Gujerati, who took Aceh on a more orthodox 
course. A period of religious intolerance entered. It brought Iskandar Thani in conflict with 
the orangkaya who had enjoyed a fair degree of religious freedom under the previous sultans. 
Iskandar Thani’s orthodoxy did not make him a modest man; in the preamble of his letter 
written in 1637 to the Dutch governor-general he exalts his divine status khalifat Allah, at the 
same time boasting about his worldly riches. His short rule from 1637-1641 was an upsetting 
time for Aceh. The Portuguese courted him, but abused his kindness which ignited the old 
hostile feelings between them. The Dutch anxiously watched the courtship and they put heavy 
pressure on Iskandar Thani to cooperate in an attack on Malacca in which his enemy Johor 
participated. The talks on Johor’s inclusion in a coalition to attack Malacca took up all his 
time as sultan of Aceh. He felt deceived by the Dutch. Despite the fact that Aceh did not 
participate in the final attack on Malacca in 1641, it steadfastly contributed to weaken 
Portuguese authority in Malacca. 
Nuru’d- din al Raniri advocated a firm stance against the Wugudyah mystics and their 
teaching which led to their persecution. The sultan did not control and patronise,  but 
antagonised both the spiritual and secular spheres in society. His premature death by 
poisoning represents his fall from grace. After his death in 1641, succession once again 
became a matter of rivalry and bloodshed, bringing schism in society. The Islamic leaders 
favoured a male and orthodox candidate on the throne, but the orangkaya showed an 
inclination for the royal dynasty to continue and nominated  Iskandar Thani’s widow, the 
eldest daughter of Iskandar Muda. The controversy between the religious and secular spheres 
demonstrates among other things that the orangkaya were not willing to suffer the orthodox 
tendency introduced at the court by Nuru’d-din al Raniri. It not only robbed them of their 
social and religious freedom, but it also impacted on society as a whole. They established a 
precedent by appointing a female ruler in Aceh. In the narrow historical view the appointment 
of a ‘weak’ female is seen as a strategy to assert their power over her. She reigned for thirty 
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four years (1641-1675) and her rule is marked by political stability in society and a fair degree 
of welfare.  
 
Of the sultans discussed in this study, Iskandar Muda is generally seen as a composite super-
king, not just because of his mythical descend and his role as unifier of Aceh because he was 
the heir of two dynasties,  but because he provides a very powerful model. Bred in the court 
of his grandfather where he was tutored in politics and war,  his reign was one of an almost 
continued state of military preparations or actual warfare.  However, Iskandar Muda and his 
aims cannot be taken for granted,  nor should these aims be assumed the equivalent of his 
achievements. To dispel the Portuguese from the Straits, entailed control of the trading ports; 
trade and religion could not be divorced,  not when the overarching  goal was to free the 
Straits from the Portuguese ‘infidel’ and from other trade usurpers. Whatever were Iskandar 
Muda’s religious vagaries,  the increasing possibilities of earning a constant flow of revenues 
and valuable gifts from trade with the northern Europeans,  seemed a goal in itself. Trade with 
them implied a heavy focus on economics. Within these perimeters he operated. It was a 
major challenge of his rule. Whatever be the view taken of Iskandar Muda’s personal 
character or of the effectiveness of his policies, it can hardly be disputed that he contributed to 
the steadfast disintegration of Portuguese hegemony and to establishing Aceh as the 
commanding and wealthiest player in the geo-political field in the Straits. Blatantly pursuing 
the Portuguese and aggressively protecting the area’s trade from foreign usurpers,  sadly 
involved the destructive invasions of the trading ports who were not willing or able to comply 
with his aims. Yet not only Aceh, but Malacca and Johor too formed a threat to their 
independence.  It needed conviction on their part to conceive Iskandar Muda’s aggressive 
actions against them as inspired by religious ideals and therefore legitimate. Such an 
assumption carried little weight against the background of the tragedies they suffered. The 
port rulers found themselves crushed between these two contending powers and an ambitious 
newcomer, the VOC.  
 
A brief comparison between the developments in Europe and Asia is justified because of the 
East-West interactions which we have explored and described. Merchants from the United 
Republic of the Netherlands,  from the Kingdom of England and from the Kingdom of France 
were frequenting Aceh and negotiated with the sultan and his officials. Their perceptions of 
the local political scene were generally based on their own cultural and political backgrounds.    
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In Europe the rise of the bourgeoisie and of bureaucracy was closely linked to the age of 
mercantilism.  It is common knowledge, that after the Reformation, the principle that the 
authority of the king could not be questioned because he was God’s chosen one, gradually  
died. We see that in both parts of the world the absolute authority of the ruler was often 
questioned and challenged. The two Asian treatises for statecraft to which I referred, the Taj 
as-Salatin and the Arthasastra warn against obeying a wicked monarch. The Jesuits and 
Calvinists of seventeenth century Europe did the same. The relationship between king and 
nobility in both parts was very ambivalent. Although the monarchs allowed their nobility to 
maintain their wealth and live opulent lives, they tried at the same time to prevent these 
nobles from passing on their lineage and wealth to their offspring. While seventeenth century 
Europe can be described chiefly in terms of war,  Aceh’s history since its foundation, was a 
history of war. Typical features of state formation processes in the European societies were 
the collection of taxes and acquiring of the monopoly over physical force. Internal stability 
made the development of capitalism possible: that of social differentiation (the rise of the 
entrepreneurial class, a working class and a class of farmers producing for the market). A 
similar trend is visible in Aceh, which is confirmed by the provisions in the Adat Aceh.  
 
The Acehnese cast of dramatis personae included many foreigners, the most important one 
was Sultan Iskandar Thani, who originated from Pahang. Also included were orangkaya of 
foreign descend, of whom several functioned in high offices and religious scholars such as 
Nuru’d-din al Raniri from Gujerat in India. The ethnic plural society also constituted Malay 
war-victims,  brought to Aceh by the victorious armada of Sultan Iskandar Muda and slaves 
from the Indian sub-continent,  Batakland in Sumatra and the island of Nias.  
The Dutch ethnologist J. Jacobs’ interesting observation in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century is, that people from Malacca, Padang, ‘pagen’ Batak, Niasese, Kelings and different 
other tribes and even Javanese assimilated with the original people of Aceh and with the 
resident Hindus, and from this assimilation the generation of Acehnese evolved. They had 
taken some of their customs to the new land, making it difficult to distinguish the original 
customs.1 Apparently Jacobs found a society which had absorbed the different cultural inputs.  
But can we propose that Aceh of our period was a tabula rasa on which every newcomer 
could leave his imprints as he wished? It is true that the newcomers, according to their ethnic 
                                                 
 
1 J. Jacobs, Het familie- en kampongleven op Groot-Atjeh: eene bijdrage tot de ethnographie van Noord-
Sumatra, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1894), vol. I, 4. 
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background, lived in specially assigned living quarters in the city. Within defined limits, these 
people thus followed their own traditions in the new environment. I cannot pass over a 
curious etymological metaphor the Acehnese of today like to use when they point to the name 
Aceh. They maintain that A stands for Arab, C stands for Chinese, E stands for European and  
H for Hindu. While they distinguish different racial constituents, it also looks as if any native 
as well as any Malay element (Malay war captives formed a significant part of Acehnese 
society) is erased from the collective memory.   
 
By following a practical level in the discussion has enabled us to look at Acehnese kingship in 
its mundane expression. We establish that the royal cap was the basic symbol of the sultan in 
his relations with foreign traders, while the sarakata or edict expressed his power over the 
realm. These two elements of kingship contributed to regulation and to institutionalisation 
during the reign of Iskandar Muda.  Increased international trade necessitated regulations and 
laws. The Adat Aceh was the code of law of the Acehnese sultanate.  
The discussion at the more theoretical level has provided us with a perspective of how 
kingship and society were conceived and more or less conceptualised.  
The different hikayat and even the Bustan as-Salatin come with wonderful and distorted 
explanations of historical events and incidents disguised as prophesies and miracles. The 
accession of the throne  by Iskandar Muda and of the prince of Pahang, Iskandar Thani, serve 
as clear examples; the writers’ main concern was to make these prophesies fit their idea of the 
sultanate as the leading and divinely guided state.  In this respect Shamsu’d-din Pasai and 
Nuru’d-din al Raniri were aiming for the same. 
By approaching the phenomenon and evolution of Acehnese kingship from both angles, has 
provided more clarity over its essence. There is no single source of inspiration in the forming 
of Acehnese kingship and political identity.  Kingship as a mythological phenomenon 
furnished it with a legitimating antiquity, and kingship as a contractual institution meant that 
the sultan could be removed from office. The sultan maintained his position chiefly through 
his ability to control and through patronage.  
The Acehnese orangkaya were the kingmakers and the kingbreakers, yet they preferred 
dynastic kingship to a primus inter pares government. Unfortunately the term orangkaya 
which is primarily used in the foreign sources, does not distinguish between rich merchants, 
nobles, high officials and chiefs (hulubalang). This blurs the picture of the social and political 
realities in which they all fulfilled their specific roles.     
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Summa Summarum  
The key to understanding Aceh is the role it played against the Portuguese and against foreign 
encroachment in general. The constant in kingship from the onset of its foundation, was the 
overthrow of the Portuguese ‘infidel’ in Malacca. Religious mobilization against the enemies 
of Islam was one of the evocative themes during the period of manifest Portuguese presence 
in Malacca which lasted for one hundred and thirty years.  In this respect Iskandar Muda as 
well as his two predecessors followed the line set out by the early rulers of the sixteenth 
century. We may conclude that the war between Aceh and the Portuguese is one of history’s 
longest wars. The Acehnese aim to form an Islamic pact against the Portuguese did not prove 
successful; evidently Islam was not the critical criterion for cohesion and loyalty, fusion and 
fission were inherent factors in establishing political entities in the Malay region.  
The third primary moment in Aceh’s history, is the conquest of Portuguese Malacca by the 
Dutch in 1641.  Non-Muslim authority over Malacca was once again a fact.  
It can perhaps be said that Aceh was created by external pressure and finally weakened by 
external pressure, yet it had an inner strength,  a recognition of its own destiny that has 
assured its survival. 
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     GLOSSARY 
 
Foreign, non Malay words  are in italics: A =Arabic, D= Dutch, J = Japanese P = Portuguese,  
S = Sanskrit, Sp.= Spanish   
 
 
alam : world  
 
adat :  local custom, local law   
 
adil (A) : just, right  
 
alfandique (P) : harbour office  
 
arak : distilled beverage made of palm sap, rice or sugar cane.  
 
baghi (A) : rebel 
 
bahar : unit of weight widely used in Southeast Asia, varying slightly from place to place,  
sometimes amounting to 3 picul which is about 375 Dutch pounds and 385 English.  
balai besar :  public hall  
 
bandar : port 
 
bendahara :  highest government official in the Malay ports (litterary ‘grand vizier’) 
 
bongsu : younger brother 
 
cartaz (P) : written permit 
 
catty : small unit of weight of about 1-2  English pounds  
 
cap:  royal seal, written permit  
 
caracque (P) : Portuguese freight carrier  
 
coninck (D) : king 
 
dalam : royal palace 
 
daulat : sovereignty 
 
g(h)orab :  Acehnese vessel 
 
goendih : concubine 
 
hamba : slave   
 
hikayat : epic story 
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hukum (A) :  law, custom 
 
hulubalang : Acehnese chief 
 
ilir : downstream area 
 
jihad (A) : religious war 
 
kadi (A) : Islamic judge 
 
kawan : friend 
  
keris : ceremonial, often decorated dagger 
 
laksamana : admiral 
 
mahkota, meukuta : crown 
 
mandala (S) : circle   
 
mas (Sp) : coin   
There were two kinds in Aceh: a golden coin amounting to 1/16 tael; a silver coin amounting 
to 1/8 Spanish real 
 
nachuda (J): captain of a ship 
 
nobat : music ensemble in the Malay world  
 
orangkaya :  rich man; in the Malay speaking world the term is commonly used to denote  
nobles, rich merchants and chiefs  
 
padi : unhusked rice 
 
panglima : field commander; title of the Acehnese governors of the port territories  
 
payung : umbrella  
 
permaisuri : princess, royal consort 
 
picul : measure of weight amounting to 125 Dutch pounds   
 
pinnacle : small sloop or galley   
 
prahu : small local sail craft 
 
penghulu kawal : chief guard, overseer    
 
raja (S) : prince 
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real (Sp) : silver coin of Spanish origin current in the ports; several variations existed for 
example the real ‘of eight’   
 
sadati : Acehnese dancer 
 
sarakata : royal decree, edict 
 
sayyid (A) : title for descendant of the Prophet Mohamad 
 
shah : Persian equivalent for ruler    
 
shahbandar : harbour master 
 
stadthouder (D):  executive head in cooperation with the States General of one or several 
provinces of the United Republic; title of the prince of  Nassau 
 
sultan : ruler, monarch  
 
tael : Chinese currency with varying value.  
1 tael varied between fl. 3,50 and  fl.4,= 
 
taj (A) : crown   
 
tambaga : a kind of brass metal 
 
tuan(ku) : (my)lord  
 
ulama ( A) : Islamic religious leader 
 
ulu: downstream area 
 
wugudyah (A) : mystical movement within Islam 
 
SAMENVATTING 
 
 
 
In deze studie die betrekking heeft op de periode 1599-1641 is getracht de evolutie van het 
koningschap weer te geven tegen de achtergrond van Aceh’s betrekkingen met de 
buitenwereld. Het was een tijdperk van dynamische ontwikkelingen die mede veroorzaakt 
werden door de relaties met Noord-Europese handelaren die vanaf 1599 Aceh aandeden op 
zoek naar contracten voor de peperhandel.  Het Sultanaat Aceh Dar as-Salam werd de 
belangrijkste  tegenspeler van de buitenlandse handelaren in het gebied rondom de Straat van 
Malakka en op de westkust van Sumatra. Op geo-politiek gebied was Aceh de meest 
dominante staat van deze regio. De zestiende eeuw was er een van constante oorlogvoering 
tegen de Portugezen (‘de ongelovigen’) die zich in 1511 van het belangrijke Islamitische 
handelsbolwerk  Malakka hadden meester gemaakt met de bedoeling de handel te usurperen.  
In 1565 zond Aceh een gezantschap naar de Sultan van Turkije, hoofd van het Ottomaanse 
Rijk, met het verzoek om assistentie tegen de Portugezen. Sultan Selim II was blij met een 
bondgenoot in het Oosten tegen de Portugezen en zond Aceh schepen, manschappen en 
artillerie. De Portugezen zagen de acties van Aceh eerst als razzia’s, maar kwamen  al gauw 
tot het besef dat het ging om een jihad of religieuze strijd tegen hen. 
De machtsverhouding wisselde regelmatig vanwege het vormen of het uiteenvallen van 
allianties en door conflicten tussen Aceh en het Sultanaat Johor dat de opvolger was van het 
Sultanaat van Malakka.  Johor was ofwel te zwak om de Portugezen te weerstaan of  koos 
bewust de zijde van de Portugezen tegen Aceh, wiens opkomende macht een bedreiging 
vormde  voor haar positie als hoofd van de Maleische confederatie dat zich uitstrekte tot op de 
oostkust van Sumatra.      
De constante in Aceh’s politiek was om de Portugese overheersers uit Malakka  te verdrijven.   
 
Handelaren uit Malakka namen in 1593 het initiatief om handelsbetrekkingen met Aceh aan te 
knopen.  Het was een kwestie van realpolitiek want de voortdurende oorlogen hadden 
desastreuze gevolgen voor de handel van Malakka en daar was het afhankelijk van. Het 
inwilligen van dit verzoek door Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’yat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) was 
gunstig voor Aceh omdat de band tussen  Malacca en Johor daardoor aan sterkte verloor en de 
Portugezen zijn troonsbestijging (usurpatie) daardoor  erkenden . Door het nieuwe 
machtsevenwicht  kwam er een periode van ongekende rust in de Straat van Malakka. 
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Door de komst van de eerste Nederlandse expeditie in Aceh in 1599,  uitgevoerd door de 
Zeeland Compagnie, begon het machtsevenwicht te wankelen. De Nederlanders werden door 
de sultan betrokken in zijn vijandigheid tegenover Johor. Hij bood hen een scheepslading 
peper aan in ruil voor assistentie in een oorlogsexpeditie naar Johor. De kiem werd gelegd 
voor een relatie van gelijke partners die deze periode kenmerkt.  
De Portugezen die niet gediend waren van Nederlandse inmenging in de politiek en handel 
van het gebied, schilderden de Nederlanders af als onbetrouwbare, vechtlustige lieden die in 
1596  in gevecht raakten met de sultan van Bantam op het eiland Java. Hierdoor wisten ze de 
expeditie naar Johor te verhinderen en te voorkomen dat Aceh de machtigste staat werd. De 
moord op admiraal Cornelis de Houtman en een flink aantal expeditieleden net voor de 
expeditie naar Johor zou plaatsvinden, was het gevolg van deze interventie. Kapitein 
Frederick de Houtman, de jongere broer van de admiraal en een aantal van zijn 
bemanningsleden werden gevangen genomen.  
De verhouding tussen Aceh en de Portugezen kwam vooral door dit incident weer op scherp 
te staan en kort daarna was de situatie tussen hen weer vijandig. Het inter bellum tussen Aceh 
en Malakka duurde minder dan tien jaar.   
De verhouding met de Nederlanders werd in 1601 na enkele vruchteloze pogingen van 
Nederlandse zijde, weer hersteld en werd zelfs vriendschappelijk. In 1602 bezochten Acehse 
ambassadeurs de Republiek der Nederlanden, waar zij Prins Maurits van Nassau ontmoetten 
en bezoeken aflegden aan de Staten Generaal en verschillende steden, wat impliceert dat Aceh 
als eerste Aziatische staat de onafhankelijkheid van de Republiek der Nederlanden van Spanje  
erkende. De sultan gaf impliciet te kennen dat hij de Spanjaarden en Portugezen als vijanden 
beschouwde. Het was ook het jaar dat de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) waarin 
de oude handels compagnieën werden samengevoegd, werd opgericht. Vanaf toen werd de 
VOC de Nederlandse handelspartner van Aceh.    
Door de komst van de Nederlanders in 1599, gevolgd door de Engelsen en Fransen in 1602, 
werd Aceh van regionale grootmacht, een belangrijke internationale exporthaven voor peper 
en een bondgenoot van de Nederlanders tegen Malakka. De zogenoemde ‘broederband’ tegen 
de Portugezen en Spanjaarden tussen de Nederlanders en de opeenvolgende sultans, hoewel 
nooit werkelijk nageleefd, was een bijzonder kenmerk van de periode 1599-1641.  
 
De relaties met de Europese handelaren was winstgevend voor de sultans. Maar deze liepen 
niet altijd vlot. Het akkoord dat in 1607 door Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah, de zoon en opvolger 
van Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’yat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) met de VOC werd gesloten waarin  
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Nederlandse assistentie tegen de Portugezen en Spanjaarden werd geruild voor het recht om 
een  rendez-vous te stichten voor Nederlandse schepen wat samenging met een beperkte  
jurisdictie op het grondgebied van Aceh en het Privilege dat de Engelsen in 1602 van Sultan 
Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah kregen, waarbij zij tol-vrij in de havens konden handelen, werden 
door Iskandar Muda, die na het overlijden van zijn oom, Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah, de troon 
usurpeerde en tot 1636 aan de macht was, ontkend c.q. geannuleerd. Iskandar Muda begon 
zijn regeerperiode met het centraliseren van de handel. Er moest worden betaald voor 
vergunningen en langdurige contracten, hetzij in geld of door het schenken van artillerie en 
andere goederen, of door het verlenen van assistentie tegen de Portugezen.  
Hij probeerde de handelshavens in de regio onder zijn controle te brengen om de Portugezen 
vandaar te weren en om andere buitenlanders te verhinderen handelsmonopolies te verwerven. 
Hij ondernam felle acties tegen de overtreders van zijn decreten en voerde strafexpedities  uit 
naar verscheidene handelshavens.   
Iskandar Muda werd de meest geduchte vijand van de Portugezen omdat zij de vijand waren 
van de Islam en vanwege hun pogingen de handel van het gebied te usurperen. Hij ging 
daarbij nietsontziend te werk en legde zijn wil op aan de handelshavens. 
 
Iskandar Muda profiteerde van de rivaliteit tussen de Nederlanders en de Engelsen door deze 
nog meer aan te wakkeren; hierdoor verkreeg hij artillerie, geld en waardevolle geschenken in 
ruil voor handelscontracten. Zelfs de in 1619 tot stand gekomen Defence Alliance tussen de 
Nederlanders en de Engelsen, die druk op hem uitoefende om de prijs van de peper te 
verlagen, kreeg hem niet op de knieën. Dit was niet zozeer zijn sterkte, want zij vertrokken uit 
Aceh en gingen zich meer richten op Jambi,  Aceh’s lokale rivaal, de peperhaven op de 
oostkust van Sumatra.  
De expedities naar de handelshavens waren niet ingegeven door een bewuste 
expansiepolitiek, hoewel ze Iskandar Muda veel profijt leverden, zoals geconfisceerde 
schepen en artillerie, of de inkomsten uit de peper- en tinhandel en textiel. Ook nam hij 
duizenden krijgsgevangenen uit de veroverde gebieden mee naar Aceh. Het waren 
strafexpedities naar die havens die contacten onderhielden met de Portugezen. Toch was er 
geen sprake van een permanent Aceh’s  gezag over deze veroverde gebieden.     
De Portugezen wisten de machtige Acehse armada die in 1629 voor Malakka verscheen een 
grote klap toe te brengen en veroverden bijna alle schepen en artillerie. De door hen zo 
gevreesde Acehse laxamana  (admiraal) viel in hun handen. Hoewel het een grote vernedering 
voor Iskandar Muda was en zijn armada was gedecimeerd, bleef hij de handel domineren tot 
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in Indrapoura en Silebar op de zuidwestkust van Sumatra. Op de oostkust kwam hij tot 
Andragiri. Noch de Portugezen, noch de Nederlanders of Engelsen en lokale vijanden voerden 
aanvallen uit op Aceh gedurende zijn regeerperiode. De vriendschap met de Nederlanders 
werd in 1632 hersteld. 
Iskandar Muda’s opvolger Sultan Iskandar Thani, een gevangen genomen prins uit het 
Sultanaat  Pahang, de erfvijand van het sultanaat Johor, die beide voortkwamen uit het 
Sultanaat van Malakka, was niet bereid om met de Nederlanders op te trekken in een aanval 
op  Malakka, omdat Johor door Governeur-Generaal Antonio van Diemen was gevraagd te 
participeren in de aanval op Malakka. De vijandschap tussen Aceh en Johor liep als een rode 
draad door de geo-politiek van het gebied.   
Sultan Iskandar Thani erfde van twee kanten een last: Johor was de vijand van Aceh en zijn 
vader, Sultan Ahmad van Pahang, was afgezet door tussenkomst van Johor. Gedurende zijn 
gehele regeerperiode van 1637 tot 1641 werden intensieve onderhandelingen tussen de  
Nederlanders (VOC) en hem gevoerd, waarbij beide hevig probeerden elkaar van hun 
standpunt te overtuigen. Het kwam niet tot een samenwerking; de verovering van Malakka in 
1641 door de Nederlanders geschiedde in samenwerking met Johor en zonder de participatie 
van Aceh. Er kwam een einde aan het tijdperk waarin Aceh het voor het zeggen had. 
                                                           RINGKASAN 
 
Studi ini menyangkut masa 1599-1641 dalam sejarah Kerajaan Aceh Daru’s-Salam dan 
mengulas evolusi yang terkait dengan kesultanan di dalam kontéks hubungan Aceh dan 
dunia luar. Gejolak yang terus timbul dalam politik Aceh sejak Portugis merebut benteng 
perdagangan Islam di Malaka pada tahun 1511 adalah mengusir para penguasa Portugis 
dari Selat Malaka dan pelabuhan-pelabuhan di Sumatra dan menghalau mereka ke arah 
Samudra Hindia. Bagi bangsa Aceh, abad keenambelas merupakan masa peperangan 
berkelanjutan melawan bangsa Portugis (‘kaum kafir’), yang bermaksud mengambil 
paksa kuasa atas jalur perdagangan Islam dari mereka. Pada tahun 1565 Aceh mengirim 
utusan ke sultan Turki, kepala Kekaisaran Ottoman, untuk meminta bantuan guna 
melawan Portugis. Sultan Selim II senang menjadi sekutu dunia Timur untuk melawan 
Portugis dan mengirimkan kapal-kapal, manusia dan artileri ke Aceh. Orang-orang 
Portugis awalnya memandang tindakan Aceh sebagai razzia, namun kemudian menyadari 
bahwa tindakan Aceh tersebut merupakan jihad atau perang yang dilandasi semangat 
keagamaan melawan mereka. 
Hubungan kekuasaan berganti secara teratur karena terbentuk maupun runtuhnya 
persekutuan lokal serta akibat perselisihan antara Aceh dengan Kesultanan Johor sebagai 
penerus Kesultanan Malaka. Johor entah terlalu lemah untuk melawan Portugis atau 
dengan sadar memilih untuk berpihak pada Portugis guna melawan Aceh, yang 
kekuatannya mulai tumbuh dan mengancam posisi Johor sebagai kepala konfederasi 
Melayu. 
 
Ketika pada tahun 1593, atas inisiatip para pedagang di Malaka, hubungan dagang antara 
Malaka dan Aceh berkembang maju, datanglah masa damai di Selat Malaka. Hal itu 
mencerminkan fakta politik, bahwa peperangan terus-menerus antara Malaka dan Aceh 
telah mengakibatkan kehancuran perdagangan Malaka dan memungkinkannya. Sultan 
Alau’d-din Ri’yat Shah (Sayyid al Mukamil) dari Aceh memperoleh kehormatan besar 
dengan menerima dan menghendaki kunjungan musuh. 
Kedatangan ekspedisi Belanda yang pertama di Aceh tahun 1599, yang dilakukan oleh 
Zeeland Compagnie, menciptakan keseimbangan kekuasaan di wilayah tersebut. Orang-
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orang Belanda dilibatkan oleh sultan dalam perangnya melawan Kesultanan Johor. Sultan 
Aceh menawarkan satu kapal-penuh lada kepada orang-orang Belanda atas bantuan 
mereka dalam ekspedisi perang ke Johor. Dengan demikian benih hubungan rekanan 
yang setara telah ditanamkan. 
Orang-orang Portugis bermaksud menghalangi ekspedisi orang-orang Belanda dengan 
menggambarkan mereka sebagai perompak, yang pada tahun 1596 terlibat perselisihan 
dengan Sultan Bantam. Terbunuhnya Laksamana Cornelis de Houtman dan banyak 
anggota tim ekspedisi merupakan dampak dari fitnah pencitraan yang buruk ini. Kapten 
Frederick de Houtman, adik laksamana dan sejumlah awaknya dipenjarakan. Hubungan 
antara Aceh dan bangsa Portugis akhirnya memanas dan tidak lama kemudian putus. 
Hubungan dengan bangsa Belanda diperbarui pada tahun 1601 dan berkembang hangat. 
Pada tahun 1602 duta-duta Aceh mengunjungi Republik Belanda dan bertemu Pangeran 
Maurits van Nassau. Mereka juga menyambangi Staten Generaal dan sejumlah kota. 
Semua ini menyiratkan bahwa Aceh merupakan negeri Asia pertama yang mengakui 
kemerdekaan Republik Belanda. Sultan Aceh secara mutlak menyatakan bahwa dia 
menganggap orang-orang Portugis dan Spanyol sebagai musuh. 
Dengan kedatangan bangsa Belanda pada tahun 1599, disusul bangsa Inggris dan 
Perancis dalam tahun 1602, Aceh menjadi pusat penting persidiaan ladah di daerah Selat 
Malaka. Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’ayat Shah memperoleh kesan bahwa para pedagang luar 
negeri, khususnya Eropa, bersaing dengan sehat.  
Tumbuh dan berkembangnya persaudaraan antara bangsa Belanda dan para sultan 
selanjutnya dalam menghadapi bangsa Portugis dan Spanyol, meskipun bukan tanpa 
cacat, merupakan ciri istimewa dari masa 1599-1641. Namun hubungan itu tidak berjalan 
mulus. Perjanjian yang dicapai pada tahun 1607 antara Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah, putra dan 
penerus Sultan Alau’d-din Ri’yat Shah, dengan Belanda serta hak istimewa yang 
diperoleh Inggris pada tahun 1602 dari Sultan Alau’d-din  Ri’ayat Shah, tidak diakui oleh 
Iskandar Muda, yang setelah mangkatnya sang paman, Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah, merebut 
tahta mahkota dalam tahun 1607 dan berkuasa hingga 1636. Iskandar Muda memulai 
pemerintahannya dengan politik-baru sentralisasi dan pengaturan perdagangan di 
wilayahnya. Mulai saat itu, para pedagang luar negeri harus membayar kontrak maupun 
perizinan. Dia mencoba menguasai semua pelabuhan dagang di sekitar Aceh demi 
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menghalau bangsa Portugis dan bangsa-bangsa asing lainnya dari kemungkinan kontrak-
dagang dan monopoli barang-barang komoditas. Iskandar Muda mengambil berbagai 
tindakan terhadap para pelanggar kebijakan di wilayahnya. Ia menjadi musuh yang paling 
ditakuti oleh bangsa Portugis, yang mengalami banyak kesulitan selama Aceh berada di 
bawah kekuasaan sultan tersebut. Melalui surat, Iskandar Muda mengatakan kepada 
Pangeran Maurits bahwa dia akan terus berperang mengusir bangsa Portugis karena 
mereka merupakan musuh Islam dan bahwa memerangi musuh Islam merupakan perintah 
wajib para leluhurnya. Memang, sekutu tidak bekerja sama dalam hal ini.   
Persaingan antara bangsa Belanda dengan Inggris mengakhiri kekuasaan Sultan Iskandar 
Muda; dia memanipulasi hubungan demi kepentingan sendiri dan memperoleh artileri, 
uang dan hadiah-hadiah yang tak ternilai harganya dengan imbalan kontrak dagang. Pada 
tahun 1619 Belanda dan Inggris mencapai kesepakatan, yang mendesak Iskandar Muda 
untuk menurunkan harga lada, namun sang sultan tidak mau memenuhi tuntutan itu. Hal 
itu mendorong Belanda dan Inggris berpaling ke Jamby, pesaing Aceh dalam 
perdagangan lada. 
Iskandar Muda mengobarkan peperangan terhadap pelabuhan-pelabuhan Malaya dan 
Sumatra, yang mengijinkan bangsa Portugis membuka usaha dagang dengan mereka atau 
siapapun yang melakukan perdamaian dengannya, dan dengan demikian Iskandar tidak 
mengenal kompromi. Hal ini bukan ekspansi-politik yang disadari, namun besarnya 
kekuatan prajurit yang dikirimkannya telah memberi Iskandar Muda banyak keuntungan, 
seperti mendapatkan kapal dan artileri, serta aneka pemasukan dari perdagangan lada, 
timah, dan tekstil. Dia menjadi ‘gembong’ (kingpin) perdagangan. Kendati demikian, 
adalah suratan sejarah bahwa kekuasaan Aceh atas pelabuhan-pelabuhan itu tidaklah 
abadi. 
Malaka sungguh-sungguh melemah akibat berbagai tindakan Iskandar Muda, namun 
masih sanggup menyingkirkan armada Aceh yang kuat, yang pada tahun 1629 muncul di 
Malaka, memberikan sebuah pukulan besar dan menghancurkan kapal-kapal dan artileri 
Aceh. Laksamana Aceh yang mereka takuti jatuh ke tangan mereka. Namun Malaka tidak 
serta merta telah menaklukkan Aceh. Betapapun peristiwa tersebut merupakan kehinaan 
besar bagi Iskandar Muda dan armadanya berkurang banyak, Iskandar Muda tetap 
mendominasi perdagangan sampai dengan Indrapoura dan Silebar di pantai barat Sumatra. 
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Di pantai timur dia tidak lebih jauh daripada Andragiri. Baik Malaka maupun musuh-
musuh lain menyerang Aceh sepanjang periode pemerintahannya. Penerus Iskandar 
Muda, Sultan Iskandar Thani, seorang pangeran dari Kesultanan Pahang, saingan utama 
Kesultanan Johor, yang dua-duanya merupakan keturunan Malaka, tidak bersedia 
bergabung dengan orang-orang Belanda untuk berperang melawan Malaka, sebab Johor 
telah diminta oleh VOC untuk berpartisipasi menjatuhkan Malaka. Permusuhan antara 
Aceh dan Johor menjadi semacam benang merah geopolitik di Selat Malaka. 
Sultan Iskandar Thani mewarisi persoalan dari dua sisi: Johor merupakan musuh Aceh 
dan ayahandanya, Sultan Ahmad dari Pahang, dikalahkan oleh campur tangan Johor. 
Sepanjang seluruh masa pemerintahannya dari 1637 sampai dengan 1641, perundingan-
perundingan intensif berlangsung antara Gubernur Jenderal Antonio van Diemen dengan 
Iskandar Thani, di mana keduanya mencoba saling memaksakan pandangannya masing-
masing. Perundingan-perundingan itu tidak pernah menjadi kesepakatan kerjasama; 
penaklukkan Malaka pada tahun 1641 oleh Belanda membuka jalan kerjasama Belanda 
dengan Johor tanpa keterlibatan Aceh. Maka berakhirlah masa kejayaan Aceh 
sebagaimana telah diuraikan. 
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             (Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asian Society, 1898: 108-110) 
 
Translation letter of Sultan Iskandar Muda  to Prince Maurice (1610)  Source: NA: VOC 1.0402, 11243 
                
            Original letter of Sultan Iskandar Thani to Prince Frederik Hendrik.                                  
 (Source L.U.L. Cod. Or. 4818 a-I-3 special collections) 
                                                         SUCCESSIVE RULERS OF ACEH  
                                             (based on the enumeration in the  Bustan as-Salatin which uses the Hijrah dates)   
 
 
 
Sultan Salahu’d-Din 
abdicated in 946 H 
Sultan Iskandar Muda son of Rajah Mansur Shah, 
died in 1046 H 
Sultan Alau’d-Din Ri’ayat Shah  (Marhum al Kahar) 
died in 975 H  
Sultana Taju’l -Alam Safiatu’d-din Shah, daughter of 
Sultan Iskandar Muda, died in 1086 H 
Sultan Iskandar Thani Alau’d-Din Mughayat 
Shah died in 1050 H 
Sultan Hussain (Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah) 
died in 983 H 
Sultan  Ali Ri’ayat Shah 
died in 1015 H 
Raja Seri Alam 
murdered in 984 H 
Sultan Muda  ibn Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah 
died  in 984 H 
Sultan Alau’d-Din Ri’ayat (Sayyid al-Mukamil) son 
of Firman Shah, abdicated in 1013 H 
Makota Buyong (Sultan Ali Ri’ayat Shah)  
murdered in 996 H 
Sultan Zainu’l-Abidin 
murdered in 985 H  
Sultan Alau’d-Din ibn Sultan Ahmad  Perak 
murdered in 993 H 
War captive 
from Perak   
grandson  
(son of the 
Princess of 
Aceh and the 
Sultan  of 
Johor ) 
Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah ruled from 913- 928 H 
conqueror of Daya, Pidie (Pedir) and Pasai  
War captive 
from Pahang  
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